G. H. VON WRIGHT: Six Essays in Philosophical Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 60, Helsinki, 1996, 91 pp., ISBN 951-9264-28-0
Reviewed by
M. J. FRÁPOLLI, Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Psicología,
18071 Granada, Spain, e-mail: frapolli@ugr.es
As the title shows, this is a collection of six essays on
philosophical logic. Three of them are devoted to analyse the possibility of
building a logic of norms and the features any such logic should posses, and
the other three deal with pervasive philosophical questions as the problem of
colour incompatibility raised by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the analysis
of several kinds of conditionality and nomic connections, and the rules governing
the truth operator.
The paper which opens the book is called “On Colour. A logico-philosophical
Fantasy” and it has not been published before. Here von Wright goes back
to the problem, raised by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, of colour incompatibility
and imagines situations, cultures and languages in which it would be possible
to have a system of basic attributions of colour in which they were, at the
same time, primitive and independent of other attributions, making it possible
the Tractarian thesis that elementary propositions are not dependent one on
the others, a basic idea of logical atomism.
Dealing with the logic of norms, or deontic logic, there are three essays in
which the author discusses the very possibility of such a logic and establishes
some basic distinctions on this field. The paper are: “Is there a Logic
of Norms?” (the English version of a paper previously published in German
in 1993 and reprinted in his book Normen, Werte und Handlungen, Suhrkamp, 1994),
and “On Conditional Obligation” and “Ought to be – Ought
to do”, which can be considered as developments of the previous one.
The paper entitled “Conditionality” offers an analysis of conditional
sentences and their relationships to the classical material conditional. The
author distinguishes here between conditionality, entailment and implication,
and argues for the thesis that necessarily “pÆq” (the material
conditional of classical logic) and “if p, then q” (its proposed
counterpart in natural languages) have identical truth conditions. Other topics
touched upon in this paper are how to interpret intensional conditionals, how
to accommodate causality and other nomic connections between propositions, and
how to deal with counterfactuals.
The last essay on the book is called “Truth-Logics”. In it, von
Wright continues the development of questions examined by him in two earlier
published papers: “Truth and Logic” (Philosophical Papers, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1984) and “Truth, Negation and Contradiction”
(Synthese, 66, 1986). Preliminary versions of “Truth-Logics” have
also been published in Hungarian and Russian. The aim of this last work is to
present several systems of propositional logic enriched with a truth operator
(truth-logics) and to discuss their interest concerning some well-entrenched
complexities in philosophy of logic, as the acknowledgement of two kinds of
negation, the question of truth-value gaps, paracompleteness, paraconsistency
and others, taking profit of this operator.
The author argues that the study of logic is a descriptive task, that of systematize
the principles of correct reasoning. And, although sentences used in our everyday
arguments do not necessarily begin by phrases like “it is true that”,
implicitly all reasoning is concerned with truth. In fact, soundness in logic
is truth-preservation. All the same, von Wright does not defend the existence
of the true logic, but allows that different kind of reasoning and diverse contexts
might need different laws of logic. In this sense, the behaviour of the truth
operator helps to determine logical relations between propositions in a variety
of situations. This explains the philosophical interest of the extension of
classical logic provided by truth-logic.
Six Essays in Philosophical Logic is a useful collection for any one interested
in the philosophy of logic, in deontic logic and, in general, in extensions
of classical logic which allow to apply it to real philosophical debates. Given
the philosophical character of the author, the book is a worthy contribution
also from a historical point of view.