Migration Flows, Societal Security and EU’s Integration Process. The Spanish Case

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[ 1 ] Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War international migration has risen rapidly in the political agenda of the Western Europe. Europe has witnessed, in a special way, some events that have created a high degree of anxiety (justified or not) over the issue of migration, an anxiety that affects not only political circles, but also most other sectors of society. The opening-up of the former Eastern bloc together with a growing economic instability in the Central and Eastern Europe seemed to announce a massive movement of people from East to West in search of a better life. The events in the former Yugoslavia –wars, persecutions and ethnic cleansing– have increased worries about a dislocation of thousands of persons in central and southern Europe. An increase in illegal immigration from outside Europe, particularly from the lesser developed countries of the Mediterranean rim and sub-Saharan Africa, has intensified the feeling of a ‘threat from the South’. Suddenly, it seems that Western Europe is under siege from its poorer and less stable neighbors.

At the same time, academics, media and, in second hand, governments have increasingly begun to speak about the need for immigration. Europe, at the beginning of the 21st century, is facing a problem in terms of demography. According to the first demographic estimates for 2000 by Eurostat [2001], the population of the EU on 1 January 2001 was expected to total 377.6 million. While the pace of population growth in the EU has slowed considerably in the last 30 years, the increase of 0.3% in 2000 was slightly higher than the figure in recent years. The natural population growth (live births minus deaths) in the EU was expected to be 343,000 in the 2000, compared with a figure of 277,000 in 1999.

The initial estimates confirm the important role of international migration flows, which accounted for about 70% of the EU population increase in 2000. Over the last 50 years, net migration peaked in 1992 (+1,350,000). It then steadily declined until 1997 (+530,000) before starting to climb again. Net migration figures were rising in 2000, moving from +720,000 in 1999 to +816,000. The overall increase in the population in 2000 was thus expected to be about 1,150,000, compared with 1 million in 1999. About a two-third of the migration flows went to Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. However, it was Luxembourg that recorded the highest net migration per 1,000 inhabitants in the EU, with a figure of 11.4, followed by
Ireland (6.6). The lowest figures were recorded in Finland (0.6), France (0.8) and Spain (1.0). Without positive figures for net migration, Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden were expected to show a decline in their populations in 2000 (table 1).

Among the major findings, in a UN Population Division Report [2000] titled ‘Replacement migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing population?’, it was found that in the absence of migration, the declines in population size will be even greater than those projected and population ageing will be more rapid. For France, United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union, the number of migrants needed to offset population decline are less than or comparable to recent past experience. But, for Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Europe\(^{[i]}\), a level of immigration much higher than experience in recent past would be needed to offset population decline (table 2). The UN projections about the need for immigrants may appear a bit catastrophic and can alarm governments and public opinion. Governments because of the difficulties to manage such human flows and public opinion because of the changes that it can produce in the society. However, at the same time, migration appears useful to Europe from the economic and demographic points of view. So migration (and in a special way immigration with its illegal dimension) is, nowadays, a source of debate, worries and hopes both in the European societies that receive immigration as well as for the immigrants that arrive.

We have chosen a regional space –the European Union– that is experiencing the migration phenomenon at large scale and, in particular we will look at one member state –Spain– as a new immigration country. The geographic position of Spain entail that the immigration flows that we will focus are those from the Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. This is an immigration movement that increases steadily and that in the last three years constantly occupies the main newspapers’ front page (table 3). These migrants, arriving in small boats crossing the Strait of Gibraltar to the southern Spanish region of Andalusia or the Atlantic Ocean to Canary Islands, are almost always news due to shipwrecking or due to the detention of illegal immigrants on the shore. This study will ponder the attitude of Spain facing the migratory flows and examine how Spain and migration issues fit inside a larger framework as the EU one. With respect to the Union, we know that its integration process is on-going and, among other difficulties, migration could be an obstacle or paradoxically a benefit for the process.

Our aim is to analyze the migration-state relation through the lens of the Spanish case trying to study its impact on the EU’s integration process. In analyzing the migration-state relation, we will introduce the concept of societal security as an analytical framework to allow us focus on a special aspect of immigration linked to the threat to national identity.

There is a circular relation between migration and the state because both influence each other in a mutual way. Migration impinges on the state introducing the need to regulate and control human movements at large scale (above all the irregular immigration) and to face with internal issues as social integration and the supply of social services (health, housing, education). So, migration can affect the composition of population of a country and can oblige state to implement a new or a renewed migration policy. In fact, in a short term, the composition of the population can only be affected by a consistent human flow but in this sense perceptions can be
decisive to define a potential situation of worry/insecurity/danger. For example, it is interesting to see that in a society as the Spanish one with only one million (documented) immigrants (approximately, 2.5% of population) there is a strong perception of insecurity [see section 3] stemming from the novelty of migration as worrying issue and from the ‘threat of invasion’ caused by the arriving from the sea with a regular frequency as the media daily remember. On the other hand, the state can directly influence on migration flows through its legal instruments such as the control of frontiers or a restrictive immigration law. We can say that sovereignty of the state and border controls stay at the heart of the regulatory efforts of the state.

Starting from these premises, in continuation this work will analyze two concepts: security—especially societal security—and migration as parts of a conceptual framework that we will apply to a case study. Firstly, we introduce the security concept because, through its societal dimension, it helps us to explain what could be the impact of migration on a society. In fact, this impact is difficult to measure but some indicators about worries and insecurity provide us with a general idea could be significant. Secondly, we will examine the concept of migration to define this phenomenon in its global context and to allow us to better understand the specific dimension of the African migration toward Europe.

Our case study is centered on Spain as a recent immigration country. We develop the analysis on three levels: individual, domestic and European to study in a more detailed way how society deals with that new phenomenon, how Spanish government manages migration and how the EU is contributing to the definition of a common migration policy. Furthermore, three elements that characterize each level will be introduced: the perceptions, the instruments and the recognition to observe how societal security and migration interact among them. Each level perceives migration in a different way and with different intensity therefore we suppose that individual level is more affected by migration for the day-to-day contact with foreigners that can create a negative perception about it (unsafe towns, suspicious, disdain). The instruments refer to the possibilities that each level has to act toward a phenomenon such as migration. It seems that at the domestic and at European levels there are a major possibility to produce legislation or to take effective measures to regulate migration while at individual level, people can only to protest with a quite limited success. The last characteristic is the recognition (legitimization) that indicate if the perceptions and the instruments produce effects on a superior or a similar level. The three levels seek for recognition or, more in general, seek for involve the higher or the similar level to find support. In this case, too, the domestic and the European levels seem to have more chance to find support while the individual level appears weaker or can act with efficiency only in some precise situations.

Our conclusions are not definitive and they are presented as a research agenda. In fact, there are many point to deepen and many directions that work can take and we only explore some possibilities for a future and more elaborated research.

The European Union is undergoing a ‘socio-political revolution’ caused by migrations and by the creation of new social identities that have challenging implications for the EU’s integration process at the individual, domestic and European level. It is a new situation that the EU has been experiencing in a special way during the last two decades.

Current migrations are caused by the terrible socio-political and economic situations in the origin countries that act as the incentive to undertake a journey of hope in search of richer countries. Lack of democracy and of respect for human rights, corruption, persecutions and ethnic cleansing deriving from ethnic and religious conflicts are only some of the socio-political issues that justify fleeing a country. In the economic sector there are a great number of problems as low income level, lack of jobs, low expectation of mobility, economic imbalances or a general crisis that affect a person every day life directly such as inflation and lack of staples.

The previously rather homogeneous European societies are faced with a new phenomenon of considerable dimension as they are receiving people searching for a job and sometimes coming from a very different culture and style of life compare to Europe. This is not easy because it requires the receiver society to have a good capacity to integrate[2] the newcomers (health care, education, social services, housing,...). It is a challenge that Europe is facing and in a short period it has to try to solve all the new problems that rise.

In this section we will explain the main conceptual tools that we will use throughout the text. We analyze security and its new broadening agenda and migration as general concept that helps us to understand the more specific African migration. Then, we illustrate our pattern of work, the level-of-analysis model [Singer, 1969] that allows us to explore the migration phenomenon at individual, domestic and European level.

**Security: a framework of analysis or a treacherous tool to work?**

Security, and in general, security studies have become sources of debate in the last decades. The changes in the world system (end of bipolar world, emerging of new actors and of new strategic environment) have forced scholars to redefine or to modify the concept of security to fit the new world order and accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of it. However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the classical conflict and military matters (i.e., the East-West confrontation), most scholars continue to argue in terms of what they regard as an appropriate broadening of the concept ‘security’.

Really, the new issue still being debated a decade after the end of the Cold War is concerning the necessity and/or the rightness to widen the security agenda. In light of a new world order, is right that the security agenda encompasses only military aspect? A wider agenda does extend the understanding necessary to pursue current security studies but that, in turn, has some consequences. First, a wider agenda tends to expand state mobilization to a broad range of issues and in some cases this is not the best solution for the problem. For example, the securitization of environment does not necessary provide an effective solution to, for
example, the disruption of an ecosystem. Although it could mean an increased sensitivity on the part of governments and the public toward environmental issues. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Second, a wider agenda tends to elevate ‘security’ into a kind of universal good thing –the desired condition toward which all relations should move [Buzan et al., 1998: 4].

When we consider a wider agenda, what do the terms, ‘existential threats’ and ‘emergency measures’ mean? A central premise in an expanding notion of security is whose security one is talking about, i.e. the referent object of security. Existential threats can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question.

When we introduce a widening security agenda and establish a relation between security sector and referent object, we are securitizing an issue. As Buzan says, security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the games and frames the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics [Buzan et al., 1998: 23]. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (the state does not deal with it) through politicized (the issue is part of public policy) to securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat). For some issues (e.g., the environment) we have the problem of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized. That does not imply that securitization always go through the state; politicization as well as securitization can be enacted in other fora, too (an environmental NGO or an international conference can ‘securitize’ the protection of biosphere to preserve human and animal life; public opinion can ‘securitize’ migration issue to defend national identity).

The securitization of an issue or rather, the excessive securitization, may entail risks. A danger could be the militarization, as the armed forces tend to assume that ‘security is their business’. In times of budget cuts in military expenditures, the militaries tend to be quite eager to embrace expanded notions of security in the hope that this will protect them against further reductions. Other danger could be the desecuritization of an issue that may lead to a neglect of them (i.e., the desecuritization of the ‘Somalia issue’ by US administration).

In the case of security, Wæver [1995, 1996] suggests that an issue is designated as an international security matter because it can be argued that this issue is more important than others and should take absolute priority. By putting the label ‘security issue’, the actor has claimed the right to deal with it by extraordinary means. ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue –not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. Security can thus be seen as a speech act. The word ‘security’ is not interesting in itself, it is only when we fill it with a meaning, referring to something more real. It is the utterance itself that is the act. By stating it we give the word meaning. By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular issue development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to remedy it. To attempt taking an issue out of the normal weighing of issues against others demands both that it is generally accepted that the threatened has to survive, and that there is a possible point of no
return, that it can suddenly be too late, and it is therefore necessary to act in time [Wæver, 1996: 107].

The speech-act approach to security requires a distinction among three types of units involved in security analysis:

1. Referent objects: as we have seen, objects that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.
2. Securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues by declaring something—–a referent object—–existentially threatened.
3. Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector.

We summarize the five dimensions of security (military, political, economic, environmental and societal) [Buzan et al., 1998, 1991] in the table 4, but we explain in a more detailed way the societal dimension that is central in our work.

The societal sector

National security has been the key concept for the entire area of security affairs, but there has been little reflection on the nation as a security unit. The focus has been on the politico-institutional unit—the state—and accordingly on the political and military sectors. If we focus our attention on the nation, another sector enters the picture—the societal one. In international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community [Buzan et al., 1998: 119]. In the contemporary international system, societal security concerns

‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’ [Wæver et al., 1993: 23]

Ole Wæver suggests working with the more classical concept of state security together with the new concept of societal security. Since the five sectors of security have the state as referent object, if we only use the former, societal security would be about the way states could be undermined or destabilized by ‘their’ societies becoming threatened or weakened in terms of social cohesion and identity. On the contrary, if we use the state security concept together with the societal security concept, we will have sovereignty as the ultimate criterion of the former and identity as the ultimate criterion of the latter. In other words both concepts concern survival. Sovereignty is the essence of survival for a state; to survive for a society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about existential threats [Wæver et al., 1993: 24-26].

The organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development of a real or imagined security threat as a risk to their survival as a community. Societal security has to be understood first of all as the security of a social agent which has an independent reality and which is more than and different from
the sum of its part. Societal security is not the security of the individual
parts, nor it is the sum of the security of the parts.

The societal security agenda has been set by different actors in different
regions. Buzan has identified three of the most common issues perceived as
threats to societal security:

1. Migration: X people are being overrun or diluted by influences
   of Y people; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition
   of the population (e.g., Chinese migration into Tibet, Russian migration
   into Estonia during the Soviet era).

2. Horizontal competition: although it is still X people living here,
   they will change their ways because the overriding cultural and
   linguistic influence from an external culture Y (e.g., Canadian or
   French fears of Americanization).

3. Vertical competition: people will stop seeing themselves as X,
   because there is either an integrating project (e.g., the EU) or a
   secessionist-regionalist project (e.g., Quebec, Kurdistan, Scotland)
   that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities. They are
   both instances of vertical competition in the sense that the struggle is
   over how wide the circles should be drawn or rather to which to give
   the main emphasis.

Society can react to such threats in two ways: through activities carried
out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political
(and potentially the military) sector. At the state level the threat of
immigration can be addressed through legislation and border controls. At the
community/individual level the identity threats can be managed through
non-state means (protest campaigns, sit-ins, demonstrations).

In the societal sector, the referent object is large-scale collective identities
that can function independently of the state, such as tribes, clans, nation
(and nationlike ethnic units, also called minorities) civilization, religions and
race. Given the peculiar nature of this type of referent object, it is
extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential
from non-existential threats. Collective identities naturally evolve and
change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes
may be seen as invasive and their sources pointed to as existential threats,
or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of the identity. Given the
conservative nature of identity, it is always possible to paint challenges and
changes as threat to identity, because 'we will no longer be us'. The ability
to maintain and reproduce a language, a set of behavioral customs or a
conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in terms of survival.

It is difficult to determine the securitizing actors of the societal dimension
of security. In general, people in power use references to state and
sovereignty because the defense of state and sovereignty tend to
strengthen those in power (it is complicated to argue that those in power
imperil the security of the state). On the contrary, oppositional political
forces use the concepts of nation and identity because if they want to reach
power it is easier to argue that the nation is in danger rather than the state
(they can argue that the present leader do not pay attention to that
matter). There may also be some social movements –nationalist, anti-UE,
anti-immigrants– that may appear threats to national identity. If we take
into account religious identification, we can find official or semiofficial
leaders who claim to be able to speak on behalf of religious communities
and consequently they are securitizing actors (contested or not).
Functional actors in the societal sector may be the media that sometimes contributes significantly (or not) to the definition of situations. The media will often tell the news in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and when we use some categories (‘us’ and ‘them’; ‘Serbian’ and ‘Kosovars’; ‘Spanish’ and ‘immigrants’) as interpretative instruments for understanding a situation or a conflict that the media have often contribute to create.

**Migration: the true challenge of the next decades?**

Over the last decades, immigration has emerged as a major force throughout the world. After 1945, many countries in Western Europe began to attract significant numbers of workers from abroad. While the migrants were initially drawn mainly from Southern Europe, by the late 1960s they mostly came from developing countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. As a result, many European countries, as most of the world’s developed countries have become diverse, multiethnic societies, and those that have not reached this status are moving decisively in that direction.

Migration is a result of the integration of local communities and national economies into global relationships. At the same time, it is a cause of further social transformation in both sending and receiving countries. Today, migration is becoming increasingly common as people move in search of security and a better life: from villages to towns, from one region to another in their home country, or between countries and continents.

Migration is often a result of economic and social development. Migration may contribute to further development and improved economic and social conditions, or may help to perpetuate stagnation and inequality. Migration helps to erode traditional boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states. It therefore challenges cultural traditions, national identity and political institutions, and contributes to a decline in the autonomy of the nation-state [Castles, 2000]. International migration arises in a world divided into nation-states, in which remaining in the country of birth is still see as a norm and moving to another country as a deviation. This is why migration tends to be regarded as problematic: something to be controlled and even curbed because it may bring about unpredictable changes [Castles, 2000].

The theoretical base that explain the forces that produce migration remains weak. Despite the great movements of people in the last decades and the need to study the reason of these flows to find a solution, there is no single, coherent theory of international migration. At the moment, we have a fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another. Moreover, current patterns and trends in immigration suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis. Rather, the complex, multifaceted nature of migration requires a pluridimensional theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions.

A variety of theoretical models has been proposed to explain why international migration begins, and although each seeks to explain the same thing, they employ radically different concepts, assumptions, and frame of
reference. We summarize them in the table 5. All these theories contribute
to a better understanding of the causes of migration but there are still
problems and doubts in migration theorizing. The usefulness of theories that
try to explain why people move are doomed by their inability to explain why
so few people move. It should be important to study mobility but also
immobility. The explanation may be found in social and cultural factors
(family, kinship systems, social systems, and social structures in general)
but also in the realm of politics, more precisely in the crucial role played by
the states. Nothing shapes the scale and composition of migratory flows
more than admission policies. Any theory built on economic basis is limited
because political considerations and states are increasingly more prominent
into that issue.

Migration and international relations

The movements of population across international borders have a significant
impact on international relations. These movements can be classified as
voluntary migration, forced migration or refugee movements and the
differences among the three are so tiny that we can infer that international
movements—in all their facets—show no sign of decreasing. It is clear
that we are dealing with a growing phenomenon, one that scholars hardly
are incorporating into their understanding of either international migration
or international relations. Theories of international migration pay
remarkably little attention to state interventions, while the literature on
international relations says relatively little about population movements
(except perhaps in terms of refugee).

In general, states affect international migration by the rules they create
regarding exit from a country and entry into a country. These rules are
affected by relations between states. Understanding access rules is
important because the congruence or incongruence of rules between states
will influence the patterns of international conflict and cooperation. For
example, when one state promotes entry and another state promotes exit
the two countries have compatible objectives that enable them to negotiate
such matters as wages, condition of employment and so on. Where one
state permits, promotes, or compels emigration to a state that prohibits
entry, the situation carries a high potential for conflict (i.e., migration from
Bangladesh to north eastern India). Where one country restricts emigration
that another country seeks to promote, migration policies may began a
‘bargaining chip’ in a large negotiation package (i.e., the Russian Jews’
emigration to Israel). Countries with strained relations may effectively seal
their borders to population movements in order to avoid further conflicts
(i.e., China and Soviet Union). Expulsions need not be a source of
international conflict if another country is concerned with the promotion of
immigration (i.e., the exit of Jews from North Africa in the 1950s was not a
source of international conflict).

International migrants are becoming important political actors influencing
both the political process of the country in which they reside and the
relationship between their country of residence and their country of origin.
Migrants, or their descendants, have at occasion sought to influence
migration policies in their country of residence, sometime promoting
promoted policies intended to benefit the economic or foreign policy interests of their country of origin. At other time, they have been critics of their country of origin and pressured their host government to influence the domestic politics of their country of origin. Some examples are Turkish fundamentalist in Germany, Cuban refugees in the U.S., Kurds all around the world and so on.

The media are focusing their attention on South/North migration and East/West migration but this focus is narrow and misleading. The movement of migrant workers from North Africa to Western Europe, migration from Asia and Latin America to the United States and Canada, and the increase in the number of people from the less developed countries and Eastern Europe claiming refugee status in the West represents simply one dimension of the global flows. Economists have paid attention to the ways in which economic differentials between countries influence migration, and some political scientists have paid attention to the ways in which conflicts within countries lead to refugee flows. But little attention has been given to the ways in which international population movements create conflicts within and between states, that is, consider population flows as an independent rather then as a dependent variable.

Weiner [1992/93] identifies five categories of situations in which refugees or migrants may be perceived as a threat to the country that send emigrants, to the countries that receive them, or to relations between both. The first is when refugees and migrants are regarded as opponent of the home regime. Conflict create refugees, but refugees can also create conflicts. The mere granting of asylum can create an antagonistic relationship (i.e. in 1990, the debate over whether Chinese students should be allowed to remain in the US, the former-President Bush only agree to extend their visas, while many members of the Congress wanted to grant formal asylum status as a means to condemn China). The second category is when refugees and immigrants become considered as a political risk to the host country. Governments are often concerned that refugees, to whom they give protection, may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist refugees in their opposition to the government of their country of origin. For example, the decision by Arab countries to provide political support and arms to Palestinian refugees from Israel created within the Arab states a population capable of influencing their own foreign policies and internal politics. The third category is the main one of this work –migrants perceived as a threat to cultural identity– will be elaborated on later, so we only note it at this point and pass to the fourth: migrants perceived as a social or economic burden. Societies may react to immigrants because of the economic costs they impose or because of their social behavior such as criminality, welfare dependency, delinquency, etc. Societies may be concerned because the people entering are so numerous or so poor that they create a substantial economic burden by straining housing, education, and health facilities (e.g., the US made a distinction between those Cubans who fled the Communist regime in the 1960s, whom it welcomed, and Cuban convicts removed from prisons in the 1970s, whom it did not). Finally, the last situation concerns migrants used as hostages. Migrants can be used as an instrument of statecraft in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home government. Following the invasion of Kuwait on August 1990, the government of Iraq announced a series of measures using migrants as an instrument for achieving political objectives.
How do states react when they are confronted with an unwanted population influx, either by economic migrants or by refugees? What strategies are available to states confronted with a rising demand for entrance? One possible response is to increase immigration, but even countries that are relatively open to economic migrants and to refugees will not be able to admit all who want to enter. There are problems in the borders controls, in the regulation of employers, in the opposition parties and in the public opinion. Other solution can be aid, investments, improvement in trade and other measures to improve income and unemployment in low-income countries to reduce the rate of emigration. Also diplomatic pressures may be exerted and a coercive diplomacy to induce a country to halt actions that are forcing people to flee may be more effective when there are collective internationals sanctions. Finally, there is the extreme sanction of armed intervention to change the political conditions within the sending country (i.e., the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict).

It is, of course, an old story that states are becoming interdependent, that there are more and more international constraints on domestic policies, that global trends in transportation, in technologies, in weapons and in general in the structure of the world economy allow a deeper and effective interaction involving human beings. However, international migration changes the composition of one’s population and therefore potentially one’s domestic policies.

The level-of-analysis as a pattern of work

A three-level analysis –individual, domestic and European⁵[v]– will be the core of our research methodology. As the observer is always confronted with a system, its sub-systems, and their respective environments [Singer, 1969: 21] we will move through those three levels of analysis that will allow us to divide into sections our main issue. Our first referent as individuals is the ‘individual level’ that is our immediate space where we take contact with others. It could be a space relatively big or small, depending on our participation in it. That individual level coexists and is at odds with our second level, the domestic one. It is the level that refers to the state as a political structure (government), as an administrative apparatus and as a group of organisms that carries out the domestic politics. The last level we have in mind is the European one. Perhaps, it is the newest one but its importance has been growing quickly in the last decades. The European Union and its structures overlap partly with the domestic level and therefore also the individual one, creating new relationships between the three levels and of course, new conflicts, too.

We will use this level-of-analysis method throughout this study as a guide to develop in parallel the three blocks (individual, domestic, European: horizontal point of view) and to move from one in another (vertical point of view) confronting and trying to explain what happens in the three levels.

It is interesting to study the issue of migration in relation to different levels because the possible implications vary depending on the level in which we are. The attitudes, the reactions and the following decisions will be greatly influenced depending on the level we are at because the
perceptions, the instruments and the recognition of our acts (that is, indirectly, a legitimization) will be affected by the level *per se*. The perception of phenomena is the basic element that allow us to understand the implications of an issue at an individual level. It could simply depend on the extent of the issue, for example, a problem raising from a military confrontation that produces thousands of refugees could be perceived as serious and urgent to resolve (e.g., the Kosovars refugees in Italy during the 1999 NATO bombing). It could depend alternatively on the intrinsic nature of the issue, e.g. as in the case of perceptions related to culture and identity (e.g., the influence of the Arab culture on French culture or of Indo-Pakistani cultures on the English culture). The instruments are also important in defining a level because they are the main key to express perceptions. They are the means to convoy simple perceptions to a higher status, to transform the ideas into actions. The definition of instruments is quite broad, it goes from the pressure that the individual could exert at its own level as well as on the upper levels through public opinion, the media and public actions or civic events (demonstrations, sit-ins, participation in TV debates, occupation of a public building) until arriving at legislation (laws, codes, regulations,...) and coercive instruments (army, police) that a state or a suprastatal organization could use. Finally, the last element is the recognition that we could define as the possibility to spread our final position (after adding up the perceptions and the instruments) about an issue looking for a recognition from a superior level or inside our level.

Putting together the three level of analysis and the three element that characterize each level we will obtain the following figure.

![Figure 1. Levels of analysis and their characteristics](image)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Recognition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>not too numerous</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic level</strong></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>numerous</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European level</strong></td>
<td>low</td>
<td>numerous</td>
<td>high</td>
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At the individual level, there are persons that could have a stronger perception of phenomena but sometimes few instruments and narrow capacity to act. In our case, the three-sides issue of migration-security-European identity could have (and has!) a great impact on the individual that living its day to day implications. But he/she finds difficult to express him/herself because, in general, there are no legitimated representatives of society, no uncontested speakers that can account for the perceptions, the insecurities, and the fears of society. What we have are partial representatives of society. In the last decades, the individual has been seeing an increment of its instruments to act through the creation of associations, local organizations, and much more different forms of expression, e.g., local and national mass media (TVs, radios, newspapers). There are no doubts that the individual as member of a group can impinge on certain social issues at local as well as at national level (the town/state
administration, the rejection of a law or the call for a new legislation). In some cases, the group can arrive to produce results, it can be good to join forces but its durability is limited (of course, with some exceptions). Accordingly, the possibility of recognition of the individual could be limited because of his short visibility as individual and as group. This final stage, recognition, is the most difficult to reach for the individual level because a qualitative step is necessary and sometime the associations or the civic platforms do not have the capacity to coordinate a huge effort in this sense. The circumstances form the group and it may have cohesion for a long time but not enough to acquire recognition that imply a great capacity to impose and defend our point of view\textsuperscript{6[vii]}. Moreover, as we have noted previously, those are partial voices of societies and that means that is more difficult to reach a common position about an issue to move it to a higher level. At the same time, this chaotic expression of society is its strength because is the example of its pluralism and freedom.

The questions that rise in this purview are about the extent of the impact of the Mediterranean migrations on the European societies, and especially on the individual and about the consequences on societal identity. Migration could impinge on societal security - as we explain later - threatening the hard core of societies that is its identity and provoking the lost of part of its culture.

At the domestic level, we can note a similar strong perception of phenomena: the state sees its security threatened by migration flows that put to the test its social, economical, political and administrative institutions facing the integration of a great number of migrants. Migration supposes for the state, and in particular for the government, a big effort after the arrival of newcomers. If we think about illegal migration problems as beginning on the shore or at the port with the arrival of ships or of small boats loaded with desperate people, the rescue operations, the acceptance and the possible repatriation are only some of the actions that institutions, in general, carry out. In the case of legal immigration there are problems linked to the social integration as to guarantee a certain level of services as education, health care and worship\textsuperscript{7[vii]}. However, instruments at the state level are more effective than at the individual level. A state has an apparatus to produce decisions and actions and to codify them. Its acts can be criticized by political opposition or by public opinion and the state can decide to negotiate talking with the parts or can impose its point of view, but in both perspectives it has the capacity to translate its position into something effective (law, initiative, strategic plan) that can impinge on the issue. With those instrument to act, the decision making about migration and security could produce targeted solutions. Obviously, the possibility of its recognition by a superior level or at its own level (among states with the same problem) is great. The state as an international actor with a known legitimacy has a great possibility of movement in the international scenery.

If we move at the European level, the purview of perception decreases its intensity because we can consider that the European Union as an entity is not too homogeneous and this can prevent the creation of a common position about a issue. The intergovernmentalism seems to be the main mechanism of decision making and that make it difficult to reach a common policy. The EU’s members could be more or less affected by the migration but their claims will take a long time until transformed into an effective communitarian action. It could depend on the activity of pressure that a
single country carry out in regards to the issue but in general migration has not been a top priority of the EU. The coexistence of restriction and expansion tendencies is the central feature of current European immigration politics and the main problems at European level are decision and implementation. In fact, even though many see the EU as an appropriate forum for decision on immigration, the EU relies on member state for implementation. Even if the EU formulated a common immigration policy it would face significant constraints on its ability to implement it, because it would not necessarily depend on successful implementation of agreed objectives by implementing agencies. Geddes [2000: 24-26] suggests some general prerequisites for a successful policy implementation. Many of these problems have particular resonance for immigration policy in southern European countries. For example, there are countries for which immigration is a relatively new priority (Spain, Italy, Greece) and in which administrative and bureaucratic resources are underdeveloped or the length of the chain between policy decision being made and being implemented is fundamental.

From those constraints rise the relatively weakness of the EU to convey the perception of the member states about migration into a tangible policy. Of course, there is interdependence and interplay between national and supranational levels but we can say that in the key questions the member states remain in control (e.g., France vetoed the UK entry in the 1960s and, recently, Spain threatened to block the enlargement process toward the East), in other situations to cede competences to supranational level has given the Commission, European Court of Justice, and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament a sufficient margin of autonomy to become significant actors with the power to shape policy outcomes (e.g., in the day-to-day administration).

So, at this level, the basic problem of imperfect communication with the domestic level, or in other words the difficulty to translate national perceptions into a common policy, damages in a certain sense the possibility to take advantages of the instruments that EU manages. Through directives and regulations, the EU has the capability to create a policy or to give to the member states some guidelines to act. At the European level it is difficult to activate the instruments and to present solutions in a short time and the defense of 15 different policy positions can deteriorate the common doing in a such delicate issue. Also the EU’s possibility of recognition is great. Although, legally, the EU is a new figure that is not a federal state and neither an international organization in the classical sense (as the UN), her recognition derives from the members that make her up.


After analyzing the two main elements of our work –security and migration–, this section will apply the conceptual framework to the case of Spain.

Spain is interesting to study in terms of migration. Migration is a new social phenomenon in Spain that was a marginal issue only 10 years ago and that now is becoming a fundamental challenge for the Spanish society. In 1981, the foreign residents in Spain were 198,042, in 1999, 801,329 and the first data for 2000 indicate a total of almost 1 million foreign residents (938,783) [El País, 22 December 2000]. At the end of the last regularization process –begun early 2000[viii]– a 2.5 per cent of Spanish population will be
of immigrant origin and of those, 600,000 non-communitarians. Among the non-communitarians, almost 200,000 are Moroccans, and approximately 30,000 Ecuadorians, 30,000 Chinese and 10,700 Romanians.

The immigrants that enter in the country without a regular or valid permit deserve a special attention because they constitute the predominant concern of the Spanish society, of the government and also for other EU member states in general, since immigrants enter via Spain also tend to spread into the remaining EU territory. It is quite impossible to know what is the number of immigrants without legal documents, although estimations forecast between 150,000 and 200,000 in Spain. The main flows come from Sub-Saharan Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria) and Maghreb (Morocco and Algeria) toward the Canary Islands and the southern most region of Spain (Andalusia). A part of this African movement only passes across Spain because the final destination is France but a great number of people remains in Spain to work or to reunite with the family.

The arrival to Spain from Africa is sometime very difficult because of the sea conditions in the Strait of Gibraltar and the dangerous and small boats that immigrants and their smugglers use. The immigrants pay a big sum of money to the smugglers or arrive in small groups after a dangerous journey often hungry, wounded and dehydrated (tables 6 and 7).

These are only some data to show the situation in Spain, but they reveal the significant increase in migration in the last few years. The data exemplify how migration is, at the moment, a relevant issue in the Spanish society and in the Spanish political debate.

There is an important linkage between Spain as new country of immigration and the EU as structure that need to develop a common migration policy. Spain clearly inserts its measures to manage immigration into the European framework and it is aware of its role as a guardian of the European southern frontiers. If from the individual level there is the attempt to involve government into the problems that can derive from immigration, government, for its part, is favorable to a stronger European involvement.

In the following sections we will analyze how the phenomenon of migration is affecting the Spanish society, the Spanish government and at the upper level the EU. What about the societal security of Spanish people? Is there a real threat for Spanish identity? And, how does the government face this new issue? Is there a coherent domestic migration policy? Finally, what is the EU’s position toward migration? Does a common migration policy exist?

Our point of departure is the figure 1 where we resumed our idea of a three-levels analysis. Our analysis is only a first approximation to a complex issue that can only be understood over time. We will observe some events that happened only few months ago or that are developing at the time of writing. For this reason, it is difficult to develop a complete analysis. We can only relate the events as examples and attempt to analyze them with all the difficulties that may arise. We will try to explain each of the elements that make up the levels through examples, declarations, official positions and literature about the issue. Each section contains an explication of our aim, a panorama of situation and a short analysis.
The individual level

As we wrote, the individual level is perhaps the most difficult to describe because it is the less ‘institutionalized’, in the sense that when we speak about or study society we refer to an abstract entity that can take different forms. These forms can be associations, pressure groups, civic demonstration and others, more or less structured and more or less powerful and with different purposes that can imply a local and limited action or a higher level and widespread action.

In this section we will try to explain how migration impinge on the Spanish society and, above all, what are the feelings of the Spanish people in terms of immigrants. We will analyze these attitudes through some statistical data produced by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) that studies the Spanish society and producing monthly surveys. These data are useful to demonstrate that there is currently a momentum in which immigration will transform itself into a relevant issue inside the Spanish society. It means that there are some events that produce the change or that, in general, people are beginning to perceive immigration in a different way (i.e., influenced by the media). We will take as example an event that had a great impact and that perhaps was the first to make the Spanish people aware about immigration.

Our aim is to demonstrate that Spanish people feel that immigration is a problem because it is producing changes that in some areas are difficult to manage (i.e., illegal immigration). With reason or not, people feel worried, unsafe and powerless. People address their protests to the government to ask for a more decisive action that also could solve the immigrants problems. Finally, we will analyze the own characteristics of this level (perceptions, instruments and recognition) according to our three-levels diagram.

It is important to point out that the Spanish perception of people in terms of migration has changed in only few years. We can see that through the Barómetro CIS, the survey about Spanish public opinion (tables 8 and 9). The two tables show that immigration is a recent issue in the perceptions of the public opinion. Immigration has become an issue of a great relevance in the media above all due to the murder of a young girl in the South of Spain by a north African immigrant, but also due to the implementation of the new migration law. Thanks to these two facts and the daily media information about the precarious little boats crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, the attention of the Spanish society was captured by the issue and currently public opinion express the growing concern with a personal and direct impact on the problem.

The news about the murder by a North African immigrant in a little town called El Ejido (Almería) –an agricultural zone of the southern Spain with an important presence of Maghreb and Sub-Saharan immigrants the majority without the regular documentation⁹[ix]– caused the protests and social controversy to break out¹⁰[x]. Racist violent manifestations such as hostilities against immigrants, claimed injuries and there were destructive actions against the property of foreigners (a mosque, some telephone booths, butcher's shops and restaurants).

The Spanish society was deeply affected by these events, perhaps because it was the first serious large scale violent reaction involving immigrants that made Spanish people aware about immigration as new
element of society. If we return to the *Barómetro CIS* (table 8) two elements can be observed as a result. The first one is that immigration appears as problem for the Spanish society only few months ago. It emerges in connection with the El Ejido events and related to the growing concern in regards to the massive arrival of illegal immigration on the southern shores during the summer. The second element is that the critical point in the perception of migration as problem (in the first three months of 2001, migration was considered as the third most problematic issue in Spain) coincides with the implementation of a new immigration law\textsuperscript{11[xi]}. That phenomenon exploded as a new one and causing serious reverberation in the Spanish society touching its most sensitive perceptions.

It is interesting to analyze how that violent reaction in Southern Spain could affect the public opinion in terms of the more general migration issue. We can compare *Barómetro CIS* surveys of February 2000 (during the El Ejido incident) and of February 2001 (one year later) (table 10).

These are only some references to the social perceptions held about the migration issue but they are interesting and illustrate well the situation. Ununknown issue until that moment, immigration jumped to the social and political scenery after the serious events of El Ejido, increasing immigration flows that have been present in Spain since the end of the 80s, but for the first time there was a strong clash between nationals and immigrants. The violent clash which came as a shock contributing to the development of a new social awareness of the migration phenomenon in Spain. The data that we have used are quite general but they reveal Spanish people’s general attitude toward migration when faced with immigrants that they consider ‘different’.

The media, too, have a great responsibility in the creation of perceptions about immigration. First, attention is concentrated on illegal immigration that is more interesting in terms of news than migration in general. Second, this type of immigration is mainly from Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. The drama surrounding the number of small boats detected on the southern Spanish coasts attract headline and draw in a poignant way the public’s attention to that people want to enter illegally into the country. That contribute to the creation of a biased image of immigration made only by ‘bad immigrants’ that want to exploit Spanish opportunities. The idea that there are hundreds of people every day threatening Spanish borders could easily transform itself in an idea of ‘invasion’ as a new form of colonization wave from south. At the moment, Spain needs immigrants but there is no coherent policy towards to the incoming flows. The lack of a positive vision of immigration and the trouble to set up a good migration policy create a sense of inconvenience that societies experiences as something difficult to control and it expresses its dissatisfaction through public demonstration.

So, we can conclude that the negative perception of the migratory phenomenon is and will be strong in Spanish society. Perhaps, it is only a legitimate reaction caused by the biased information about immigration and by the common fear of ‘the other’. However, the Spanish society is experiencing immigration as a threatening phenomenon because there is need of manpower but no one can explain the detentions on the shore, the lines to ask for work permits or the sensation that the towns are more unsafe than before. The attitude in the society is of suspicion toward an immigrant that is compelled to leave his/her country to seek a better life but, at the same time, arrives to Spain in an illegal way.
There are attempts to carry out activities meant to react to the migration issue through no-governmental organizations, resident associations and in general, with demonstration to manifest dissent about the Spanish government’s conduct. The Spaniards are demanding more control in the sensitive areas to avoid violent events. But, at the same time, people sympathize with the difficult situation of hundreds of immigrants and demand speedier procedures to regularize the status of those that are yet in Spain. People also demand a tougher approach towards the smuggling networks that exploit immigrants promising documents and work. However, it is quite impossible to know the real thinking of people about immigration because it is a very debated issue and not all people demonstrate in the street. Public opinion tries to move the issue from the individual level to a superior national level, i.e., to the level of government and other state agencies (local governmental delegations, government delegation for migration law and immigration) but the result is still not clear.

We yet wrote as these instruments to act can have a great impact on society attitude but it is difficult to say how they impinge on the third element of our analysis, the recognition. The search for an upper recognition that legitimizes society’s efforts to transmit its wishes is the priority for society. But the action of the society should be constant and convincing, to demonstrate that migration is beginning to impinge on individuals and that it is an urgent issue which must be dealt with. The El Ejido incidents produced a rushed governmental intervention (legalize the immigrants situation, provide accommodations) to stop the violence and to try to restore the pacific coexistence in the area but it is a short term measure that after a year has lost its efficacy. So, the effort of society to concretize and to see its perceptions recognized is useful in relation with a single fact that shock public opinion and produce mobilization but it is difficult to maintain attention at a high level to maintain the superior level’s involvement and actions.

The domestic level

At the domestic level, the main actor is the government as the responsible for managing migration issues. We will analyze now if there is an effective attempt to securitize immigration in the sense of putting it among the priorities of Spanish agenda. In effect, the last two years have been decisive in developing a Spanish migration policy that before was inexistent. Clearly, this development has been due to the increase of (illegal) immigration flows above all from the Maghreb and the Sub-Saharan Africa. We have analyzed the government attitude through the minutes of the Chamber of Deputies meeting in its plenary sessions and in its working commissions. The minutes allow us to know what the positions of the government and of the opposition parties in terms of immigration are.

Our aim is to demonstrate that the government perceives migration as potentially dangerous or, in a more simple way, as a issue difficult to manage that needs a rigorous plan of action. Although it is not a clear and direct securitizing discourse about migration, the attitude is quite harsh and it is influenced by the public opinion pressure and by the responsibility that Spain believe itself to be the guardian of EU’s and Europe’s southern frontier. The result is stricter migration law trying to control migration flows
and more controls in the Strait of Gibraltar to fulfill its European obligation. At the end of the section, we analyze how the domestic level fit in with the level-of-analysis framework.

In June 2000, the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, Jaime Mayor-Oreja presented the policy of his department for the new term of office[12][xii], arguing that the phenomenon of immigration has to be dealt with and that it is necessary build a global immigration policy. He emphasized the importance of the legal immigration to manage the flows in a global, systematic and organized way [Congreso de los Diputados, Comisión Justicia e Interior, June 2000: 520]. The Government decided to appoint a government delegate for migration law and immigration, Enrique Fernández-Miranda, to coordinate the departments that deal with immigration (Internal Affairs, Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Employment).

Immigration is qualified as the most important issue that will affect the coexistence between social group in Spanish society in the coming years. It is clear that this is a new stage for Spain and the acceptance of immigration as a positive differential factor have to be the key. There is also a project to intensify the external security at the frontiers[13][xiii]. Above all, it insists on the concept of a ‘Spanish blue frontier’ that demands more technology to control the networks of human smuggling and of illegal immigration, consistent with the Spanish perception of being the guardian of the EU’s southern borders.

The main opposition party, the Socialist Party, argues that the migratory phenomenon does not have to transform itself into a problem. The alarmist discourse about the migration law, the dramatic image of the problems related to the border, the public order perspective of the issue and the politicization of an issue with socio-economic and human components, without explaining the positive aspects of immigration in Spain and without remembering that more than two millions of Spaniards were immigrants, is considered by the Socialist party as a wrong attitude. The Socialist Party holds that there is a lack of governmental policy in this area [Congreso de los Diputados, Comisión Justicia e Interior, June 2000: 529].

It is interesting to note the reference to the politicization of the issue of immigration. It is not an explicit assertion of the government, it is a complaint by the opposition parties that see in the control of the immigration service by the Ministry of Internal Affairs a securitization of the issue[14][xiv]. It is only a small reference to securitization but it means that the Spanish government considers immigration as a security problem and there is an attempt to ensue a strict control of the phenomenon to avoid any further serious events.

The main novelty in the government approach has been the creation in March 2001 of an ad-hoc Program for Regulation and Coordination of Migration law and Immigration-GRECO (Programa global de regulación y coordinación de la extranjería y la inmigración) to formulate a global approach for the migration issue [http://www.mir.es/dgei/index.html]. The program has a budget of 6,285,397.536 millions of euros and a duration of four years. There are four basic points in the GRECO program: a design of a global and coordinated approach to migration as a wishing phenomenon for Spain in the framework of the EU; the integration of the foreign residents and their families that contribute actively to the growth of Spain; the regulation of the migratory flows to guarantee the peaceful coexistence in
the Spanish society and the maintenance of the system for protection for refugees and displaced.

The program also foresees the creation of a Superior Council of Migratory Policy (Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración) as a means of dialogue and participation for the whole public administration and of a Forum for social integration of immigrants (Foro para la integración social de los inmigrantes), which was created in 1994 and continues as organism of consultation, information and advice.

The Spanish government’s migration policy and especially its GRECO program have been the subject of a lot of criticism. A lack of precision about time is one of these criticisms. The 72 measures linked to the program should have to frame in a temporal framework to circumscribe its validity and to control implementation. Another criticism is about the lack of budget precision with the worry that there is not enough money for the ambitious plan. The third criticism is about securitization of migration. For the opposition parties, the government’s is aiming to control immigration and especially through police control without taking into account the migrants as persons with rights and freedoms. The opposition parties believe that a large amount of the measures proposed approaches the phenomenon as a confrontation and give a quasi exclusive prominence to the use of power and legal authority of the Spanish state. Moreover, there is also critique that the government’s approach focuses too much on foreigner as useful for the economic interests of the job market [Congreso de los Diputados, Comisión Justicia e Interior, 28 December 2000: 3958]. Furthermore, according to the opposition parties, the GRECO program is not in line with the changes in EU migration policy. The last Commission communication on migration [COM(2000) 757 final] has bet on a more global vision trying to go beyond its previous focus on police measures in immigration politics. It has introduced a connection among immigration and development policies as well as in addition employment policies, social welfare policies and demographic policies. For the opposition parties, the GRECO program has not reflected this new approach and thus it is not in line with the EU’s guideline [Congreso de los Diputados, Comisión Justicia e Interior, 28 December 2000: 3960-3961].

After this quick panorama of the actuation of the Spanish government, we can say that debate in the country is notable. The perceptions of the Spanish government in terms of immigration issue derives from strong public opinion pressure, as well as from some concrete incidents in the Spanish society and, more in general, from the widespread worries about immigration throughout Europe. An important point in the attitude of the Spanish government is the high degree of politicization of migration and a not-manifested, but detected by the opposition parties, securitization of the issue. The management of migration through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the mention of immigration as problem and the reform of the migration law in a more restrictive sense are considered as elements of a harsh stance by the Government. This attitude puts sovereignty of state and border control at the heart of the regulatory efforts [Sassen, 1996] and contribute to a negative interpretation of the state as a securitizing actor. In effect, migration flows show the difficulties in continuing to adopt a vision of the society as closed in itself and linked to the traditional image of the nation-state. Although it is impossible to ensure the inviolability of borders and the need for state intervention in this sector, they appear deeply
conditioned in their efficacy by this new situation of demographic mobility. The Spanish government considers immigration as a priority on its agenda and believes that it is necessary to act with decisiveness when trying to control human flows. Of course, in this case, Government can use effective instruments such as a law to reinforce and apply its point of view. Can the criticism expressed impinge on the Spanish government actions? At the moment there has only been a strident political debate where the opposition party have made an effort to have the recent migration law declared unconstitutional although the government is not relenting.

The capacity of the Spanish government to act is much more forceful than that of the society and although its decisions can change or adapt to the complaints of the opposition parties or of the public opinion, it has some binding instruments that allows it to carry on a certain policy. The rigidity of law depends on the characteristics of the migration phenomenon in Spain and on the inexperience of the country in managing this phenomenon. One might infer, the government interprets the negative perceptions by the Spanish public opinion in terms of migration as worrying and acts consequently to instate a stronger law to please voters. The objective of the government is to adopt a migration policy that could contribute to the dissuasion of the migration flows. The new migration law hardens the sanctions against businesspersons that employ immigrants in an illegal situation, but at the same time the situation of the immigrant becomes more difficult because the law reduces the immigrant rights, as well as possibility to obtain job and residence and increases the risk of expulsion. The problem, at the moment, is to try to regularize the immigrants that already staying in the country and then begin with a serious control on the flows because a great number of undocumented immigrants is a source of problems: any policy of integration or management are unviable if these persons are nor regulated by law.

In the Spanish case, the government, as we mentioned, think of itself and Spain as the guardian of EU’s as southern border. For that reason, Spanish migration law are strict as a reflection of the government’s desire to seek and find recognition from the EU. This could be an effort to continue to act in a issue as migration that affect directly state as a whole but that, at the same time, is a subject of communitarian decision.

The European level

In this last section, we will analyze the European level, trying to observe how the EU faces the migration issue. Europe has a long history related to immigration which, at the beginning, was basically an interstate movement from its periphery into the core countries. The challenge, at the moment, is how to manage from this upper level a phenomenon that is affecting member states in different ways (France and Germany have a long tradition as host countries and have consolidated migration law; Italy and Spain have serious difficulties to manage the massive disembarking onto their shores and ports). The answer to this problem is the attempt to elaborate a common migration policy that embraces all the aspects related to the issue (asylum seeking, refugees, rules on visa, illegal entry).
The EU is securitizing the migration issue considering it as a security threat. It is closely related to one of the main objectives of the EU: the construction of a space of freedom, security and justice that is based on citizenship of European Union (i.e., excluding non-citizens).

We can divide the European migration policy into a number of stages. It can be argued that in the 1950s and 1960s immigrants were primarily an extra workforce in most Western European countries [Collinson, 1993]. The economic situation and the labor market required a cheap and flexible workforce that did not exist in the domestic market in that moment. Countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium facilitated and promoted migration from lesser developed countries with a surplus of manpower such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. The legal status of the immediate post-war immigrants did not become a politically sensitive issue. In France, for example, specialized agencies (as the Office Nationale d'Immigration created in 1945) recruited immigrants directly in the country of origin without necessarily always regularizing them in the host country.

In the late 1960s and the 1970s, immigration increasingly became a subject of public concern. There was a shift from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive policy [Fielding, 1993]. The restrictive policy was motivated by changes in the labor market and by a desire to protect the social and economic rights of the domestic workforce. Despite the decision to halt labor immigration, the immigrant population continued to grow because of the permission granted to family members to immigrate for family reunion. As a result, public awareness of immigration increased and the temporary guest workers became permanent settlers.

Since the mid-1980s, the focus has changed. Immigration has increasingly become politicized as a result of the contentious issues surrounding the question of asylum, or more precisely the '(con)fusion of immigration and asylum' [Huysmans, 2000: 755]. A significant Europeanization of migration policy took off in the 1980s. Policy coordination and development were institutionalized in the European interstate cooperation in the framework of the EC as well as other transnational cooperation in Europe between functional organizations such as the police. Migration would eventually become an important issue in intergovernmental fora in Europe such as Trevi, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration and the Schengen Group [Collinson, 1993: 109-138]. The main mechanisms of consultation and cooperation in terms of migration policy have been intergovernmental consultations and formal harmonizations through conventions and processes of the European Union.

The Treaty of the European Union signed at Maastricht in February 1992 goes a step further. Migration policy is present in each of the three pillars of the Treaty. Within the first pillar, a new article was inserted (art. 100c) stating that the Council of the European Community ‘shall determine the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the member states’. The first article of the third pillar (intergovernmental cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs) is more wide-ranging listing areas which member states ‘shall regard...as matter of common interest’ which include rules governing the crossing of external borders and also immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries (entry and movement, residence, family reunion and access to employment, illegal immigration). The second pillar which is dedicated to foreign and security policy does not contain any explicit
references to the migration issue but the movement of persons has become increasingly intertwined with wider political and security issues (e.g., population movements caused by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia). Soon, dissatisfaction with the intergovernmental approach of the third pillar emerged and, in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the sections relating to immigration, asylum and refugees were communaritized. Kostakopolou [2000] suggests that the transfer of migration-related areas from the third to the first pillar is a welcome development if only it promises to introduce a single constitutional basis and more democratic control in areas where civil liberties are at stake. However, this structural change was not accompanied with a debate about inclusion and exclusion among EU nationals/Union citizens and non-EU migrants. So, if this change allows to the Union to expand its modest legislation in migration-related issues, it also opens the way for the installation of the logic of inclusion and exclusion and the security paradigm which characterized the third pillar.

During the ratification process and after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty some important steps forward were taken in the EU’s migration policy. At the European Council of Wien in 1998 an Action Plan on how to best implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam to achieve an area of freedom, security and justice was adopted [OJ C 19, 23.01.1999]. The next important step was the European Council of Tampere in October 1999 where the central issue was the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union. A shared area of peace and prosperity already exists for the citizens of the EU and the Treaty of Amsterdam added to this the possibility to guarantee such freedoms as the right to move freely throughout the Union in conditions of security and justice accessible to all. However, this freedom should not be considered an exclusive right of the EU’s citizens and for that the EU has to develop common policies on asylum and immigration with a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration as well as to combat those who organize it and commit related international crimes.

The more recent Commission document on immigration is about a common migration policy [COM(2000) 757 final] and it is important because is a global approach to all the aspects of the phenomenon. This (re)newed migration policy should be based on the recognition that the migratory pressure will continue and that orderly immigration can benefit EU, the immigrants and their origin countries. Migration has shown a changing nature in the last decade, thus, to regulate the migratory flows and to reduce illegal immigration, the EU has to adopt a coordinated approach that take into account the different interlinked aspects of the migratory phenomenon in collaboration with the origin and transit countries. The Commission has proposed that the better way to reach a controlled migration policy is to establish an overall framework at the EU level, with common standards and procedures and a mechanism to determine objectives and directions. Within this framework the member states will develop and implement their national policies.

With these brief references to the more recent attitude of the EU toward migration we have showed the ambitious effort on the part of the Union to face a complex phenomenon such as immigration. The EU has picked up on the public and elite perceptions in member states that manifest an interest in a supranational and European management of migration, but at the same time member state governments defend their capacity to decide about a
such delicate issue, lest they would be seen as incompetent by their voters. The demand of the member states suffering from the ‘new’ immigration wave is for a deeper implication of the EU in defining and managing a common migration policy. The objective has to be to remove the negative aspects of migration as human smuggling, exploitation and illegal entry, etc. to allow a positive integration of migrants into European societies that need them. Some authors [Huysmans, 1995, 2000; Kostakopolou, 2000] underline the notable use of the word/concept ‘security’ in EU documents to suggest that the Community has adopted the member states’ own discourse on the ‘securitization’ of migration and the following identification of possible sources of insecurity. Kostakopolou [2000] holds that the notion of freedom, security and justice is based on the assumption that migration is a security threat which must effectively be controlled and reduced. In effect, in the documents there are references to the linkages between freedom and security: the full benefits of an area of freedom will not be enjoyed in an area where people cannot feel safe.\(^{16}\)

The instruments of the EU are numerous and effective. There is an enough consolidated willingness from the member states to Europeanize the migration issue, so the next step of EU is to prepare and implement of rules and standards that can create a common framework to operate. Europeanization implies the establishment of a supranational authority that EU member states have helped to create but that affect policy management in member states. So, domestic and European levels become strictly interconnected. For that, the willingness to Europeanize the migration issue could be influenced by member states that cannot be agree with the development of that common framework (or common standards) or that it could expect a quick reaction by the EU that it is difficult to ensure (the bureaucratic delay could be an obstacle). The scoreboard of the second half of 2000 [COM(2000) 782 final] presents a great number of proposals and communications in the fields covered not only by the Commission but also by the Council and the European Parliament.

The last aspect, after the perceptions and the instruments, is the recognition (legitimization). EU has, potentially, a great capacity of recognition as supranational structure created by states that decide to share first, their economics and later, political actions. The building of a common policy about migration will be a sign of maturity and responsibility because it is a difficult issue to manage and it will mean a real willingness to operate together. But, this positive attitude toward cooperation could be interpreted from the outside as the creation of a ‘fortress Europe’ attempting to exclude new migrants and settled migrants from the European construction. A ‘fortress Europe’ about migration should mean restriction and exclusion also at domestic level as a reflection of the Europeanization of migration policy. Geddes [2000, 29-31] has explored the inclusion/exclusion debate at the European level. Suggesting that chances for inclusion/exclusion will be structured by ‘the migration policies competencies of the EU that determine its capacity to act; the EU’s commitment to ‘social inclusion’ and the ways in which the EU institutional context can structure debates about inclusion; and the motivations, calculations and alliance-building strategies of institutional actors and NGOs in the migration policy area at the EU level’.\(^{24}\)
To summarize this section we can observe that migration is a phenomenon that causes worries at individual, domestic and European level and thus there is a significant attempt to securitize the issue. At individual level, there is securitization because migration produces notable changes into society and people do not know exactly how to face it, so a sense of insecurity and the claims for government intervention prevails. At the same time, at domestic level securitization derives from the need to control (illegal) immigration flows. This control is most often coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that operate through the army and the policy corps contributing to create a sense of danger stemming directly from the phenomenon of migration. In effect, we can not say if there is a clear willingness from the Spanish Government to securitize migration considering it as a threat, but surely there is a series of hasty measures to try to channel the issue in a more controlled terrain. One of these measures is the new immigration law that is stricter than the previous and that has the aim to impede the illegal entries into the country. Finally, also at the European level there is a discourse about securitization of migration. It derives from the project of an area of freedom, security and justice that is at the moment restricted to European citizens while the ‘others’ are considered difficult to integrate.

[ 4 ] A research agenda

In this first approach to the matter of EU’s integration process through the analysis of security and migration many questions have arisen. So, we call this section a ‘research agenda’ to set out questions, debates and possible developments. The work is still open and the main interest in this first approach has been to clarify the concepts and to show in a simple way a possible application to a case study.

Migration is a phenomenon inside the EU that for its intensity and its characteristics is facing states to some troubles such as frontier controls, social integration or illegal immigration and, in general, a sense of insecurity for the ancient fear of the ‘unknown’. States can only try to respond to migration flows controlling entry in the majority of the cases with a more restrictive migration laws but with the consequent increase of illegal immigration. The problem is that Europe, due to its future demographic trends, needs manpower above all in some productive sectors (agriculture or unskilled jobs) in which nationals just do not want to work. So, the dilemma is about how to admit migrants and how to integrate them into the job market and, at the same time, how to avoid an uncontrolled entry that can have effects on the social integration of the newcomers. Undeniably, this relation between state and the phenomenon of migration is difficult to manage also because it involves other actors as society/public opinion, governments, NGOs that consider the issue from a different point of view (suspicion, insecurity, solidarity and much more) and demand different solutions to the problems may arise related to immigration. As we also noted, we have tried to study the relation state-migration using the concept of societal security with the aim to observe if migration issues are suffering from a process of securitization and what are the effects of this.

This relation state-migration that, currently, with more or less intensity, quite all the EU member states are experiencing can impinge positively or
negatively on the EU integration process. The positive influence could be to
discover the necessity to deepen right now the integration process because
there are issues such as the migratory ones that cannot be manage without
the participation and collaboration of all member states. Migration
introduces issues as free movement of persons, human rights and declining
population that cannot be ignored and that above all have to be solved in a
common effort. So, the direct consequence could be the discussion and
implementation of a common migration policy in order to create a
framework to homogenize the member states’ actions. The negative
influence of relation migration-state on EU’s migration process could derive
from the attempt of member states to continue to manage migration flows
at their own. The risk for the member state could be to give way in a
migration policy that does not share with a possible strong opposition to
include in the common policy each member states’ requests.

We have introduced a three-level analysis to provide a basis for a more
detailed study. The first level is the individual one and it refers to the
society as important actor with strong perceptions on some issues such as
migration but with limited (or not effective) instruments. Also the
recognition, in the sense of legitimization of its claims, could be difficult to
achieve because it is not easy to give a uniform direction to the multiple
society expressions. The second level is the domestic one and it deals with
how a state and its government are facing the migration issue. If their
perceptions are not totally direct but in part mediated by society claims, the
instruments are undoubtedly more effective and binding. As consequence,
also the recognition will be fuller than at the individual level because the
projection of a state is larger. The last level is the European one. Its
characteristics are similar to those of the state. Its perceptions derive from
member states and much more indirectly from societies but its instruments
and capacity of recognition are quite large. We applied the three-level
analysis to the Spanish case. Spain is interesting for its recent history as a
country of recent immigration and at the same time as a young EU’s
member state. Thus, it is a good example of a country that needs to
regulate migration flows that are changing its domestic (both social and
politic) panorama trying to adapt its exigencies to the European framework.

This work was only a first approach to the matter of the on-going EU’s
integration process in terms of immigration, so there are many questions to
answer and, at the same time, many directions that the following work can
take. At this first stage, we are interested in defining the two main concepts
–security and migration– as conceptual bases for further deepening.

In terms of security, the great point of debate is about securitization.
What are the real consequences of the act to declare an issue a priority on
our agenda? Is securitization only a negative action? We wrote that,
referring to migration issues, securitization means the creation of a dynamic
of inclusion/exclusion because it applies the security logic to a matter such
as migration that concerns society and identity. It would be interesting try
to consider security and securitization as something positive. Huysmans
[1999] suggests that securitization can also be carried out with an
emancipatory interest. Given the capacity of the language of security
(security as speech act) to prioritize issues and to mobilize people,
securitization could be a tactical source to give to a issue a greater visibility.
This change of point of view will lead to ‘a positive concept of security which
defines liberation from oppression as a good that should be secured’ [Huysmans, 1999: 27]. So, in the case of securitization of migration, it should not mean a conservative interest in keeping the status quo or in establishing law and order, but an effort to maintain high interest on an important issue that deserve attention. Migration as phenomenon that impinges on society for its own characteristics (illegal immigration, social integration, etc.) needs to stay on the top of the list because it is a issue that in the next years will continue to be present in the European panorama. How can we reach this positive point of view to assess security?

In terms of migration we can say that the main point is that immigration is necessary for the next development of Europe. Demographic trends show clearly that European population is bounded to decline, so countries need people to replace its population. There is a lot of literature about the importance of immigrants to occupy the job places that natives do not want because unskilled or less paid. We also observed that it is difficult to explain in a univocal way why people migrate, but in the case of migration towards the EU’s countries the economic motivation is strong and pushes people to leave their own country to seek for an economically better life. So, the challenge is to learn how to coexist with immigration and all its consequences, above all the cultural one. European societies are quite homogeneous and, despite internal migrations, they were for a long time emigration countries. One of the main problem at the moment is that some European countries receiving recent immigration have problems and to manage the issue and at the same time to create and maintain pluralistic societies. While countries as France, UK or Germany, that have a longer immigration tradition, there are also intolerant reactions toward immigrants that show the existence of a fragile social equilibrium, the situation is perhaps more uncertain in the new countries of immigration such as Italy and Spain. In these countries immigration is experienced as an ‘invasion’ from the sea or from too permeable frontiers.

It should be interesting to connect these reflections with the role of the society/public opinion in immigration issues and its related problems in the latter countries. Is there a ‘clash of civilization’ –to use a dramatic expression– between natives and immigrants? Why do Spanish people prefer Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans to North Africans? Is cultural proximity important for social integration? Are there real differences between these three-types of immigration?

In the next coming years, member states will be the main actors in the migration issues. If the common European framework could introduce some general norms to regulate entry into the EU territory, member states will be responsible to directly manage immigration flows in their own territories, above all, through the application of quotas. It could be interesting to study if the member states agree about a further transfer of sovereignty and regulatory power to the European level in such a sensitive issue as immigration. Historically, the power to control who enter in a country is a strong attribute of sovereignty and so the definition of sovereignty can be seen as the discretion of states to admit or to expel aliens. With the implementation of the free movement of persons throughout the EU territory, the border controls refer only to the external frontier of the Union obliterating the possibility to control internal movements of people (the member states are no longer free to admit or reject foreigners from other member states). On the contrary, this transfer of power could turn out to be
easy due to that immigration is a difficult phenomenon to manage and thus member states could assess in a positive way a policy from above that would eliminate the domestic conflict (i.e., the public opinion pressure or the opposition parties pressure). In other words the problem-solving capacity would increase if the member states accepted a further transfer of sovereignty to the Union.


Table 1. Population change in the EU in 2000 (first estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population 01.01.2001 (1000)</th>
<th>Live births (per 1000 inhabitants)</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
<th>Total increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,267</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,349</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82,264</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,570</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39,509</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59,520</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3,827</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,876</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15,982</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8,116</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10,016</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5,181</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,880</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>59,817</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>377,614</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and social conditions, 16/2000
Table 2. Average annual number of immigrants (*1000) needed in the EU to meet three demographic criteria and resulting population size (2000-2050)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>a. Constant population size</th>
<th>b. Constant size age group 15-64</th>
<th>c. Constant ratio 15-64/65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual number of immigrants needed (°)</td>
<td>Index population size (°°)</td>
<td>Annual number of immigrants needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1 596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2 424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>1 216</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>1 416</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1 063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(°) average number per annum during the next 5 years (in thousand)
(°°) index=100 corresponds to 372 million in the EU.

Table 3. Immigration into Spain (1990-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>25,854</td>
<td>62,925</td>
<td>71,298</td>
<td>79,422</td>
<td>82,607</td>
<td>95,725</td>
<td>98,820</td>
<td>142,816</td>
<td>179,718</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>80,558</td>
<td>83,257</td>
<td>89,314</td>
<td>96,844</td>
<td>103,324</td>
<td>108,931</td>
<td>121,268</td>
<td>126,959</td>
<td>147,412</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>28,863</td>
<td>31,996</td>
<td>33,299</td>
<td>34,612</td>
<td>35,743</td>
<td>38,221</td>
<td>43,471</td>
<td>49,110</td>
<td>60,726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europa</td>
<td>270,275</td>
<td>180,735</td>
<td>198,087</td>
<td>218,397</td>
<td>238,507</td>
<td>255,702</td>
<td>274,081</td>
<td>289,495</td>
<td>330,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística
(http://www.ine.es/htdocs/daco/daco42/migracion/exrexp.htm)

Table 4. The five dimensions of security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security sectors</th>
<th>Threatened object</th>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Securitizing actor</th>
<th>Functional actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Firms/State</td>
<td>Firm/State</td>
<td>Individuals, trade unions, local and state governments</td>
<td>Banks, financial operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental</strong></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>State, activist, ONGs</td>
<td>Transnational corporations; state firms; agricultural, chemical and nuclear industries; fishing; mining; IGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State representative, pressing group, intelligence services</td>
<td>Governments, armed services, firms of arms industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Sovereignty/Ideology</td>
<td>State, quasi-superstate, tribes, minorities, clans, transnational movements</td>
<td>States’ leaders, governments, official representatives</td>
<td>Political parties, lobbies of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal</strong></td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Large-scale collective identities</td>
<td>State power representatives, oppositional political forces, some social movements, official or unofficial religious leaders</td>
<td>The media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Main migration theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neoclassical Theory</th>
<th>The New Economics of Migration</th>
<th>Dual Labor Market Theory</th>
<th>World System Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors that</td>
<td>Searching for</td>
<td>Searching for</td>
<td>Migration due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>determine the decision-making</strong></td>
<td>individual welfare</td>
<td>family or household welfare</td>
<td>to the permanent work supply (no rational choice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic context of the decision-making</strong></td>
<td>Complete and well functioning markets</td>
<td>Missing or imperfect markets</td>
<td>Economic structure of developed nations demands permanently for immigrant labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government's intervention to control immigration flows</strong></td>
<td>Macro: regulate or influence labor markets in sending and/or receiving countries Micro: policies that affect expected earnings in sending and/or receiving countries</td>
<td>Policies that affect labor markets, but also capital, insurance and future markets</td>
<td>No intervention (or only little changes) because the demand of labor is structural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cádiz</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Málaga</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almería</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceuta</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melilla</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canarias</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>475</strong></td>
<td><strong>780</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *El País*, May 2001
Table 7. Immigrants arrested on small boats and accidents (1999 and 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,569</td>
<td>14,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>2,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipwrecks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappeared people</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpses rescued</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipwrecked people rescues</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *El País*, May 2001

Table 8. Can you tell me what are, in your opinion, the two/three most important problems that exist at the moment in Spain? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs/alcoholism</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/unsafe towns</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in those first surveys immigration as problem does not appear

Source: Barómetro CIS

Table 9. What are the three problems that, personally, affect you?
Table 10. Surveys about migration in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>February 2000</th>
<th>February 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What do you think about the number of people coming from other countries that live in Spain?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enough, but not too much 44.7%</td>
<td>Too much 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Too much 31.3%</td>
<td>Enough, but not too much 40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you think that in the next years the number of foreigners in Spain...?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grow much more 46%</td>
<td>Grow much more 54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grow a little 38.2%</td>
<td>Grow a little 30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When we speak about foreigner immigrants that live in Spain, do you think immediately about who?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans, North Africans 76.6%</td>
<td>Latin Americans 59.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans in general 27.9%</td>
<td>Eastern Europeans 18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans 20.5%</td>
<td>Moroccans, Algerians, ... 4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Of the following immigrants groups, to which one do you do the preference to facilitate its staying in Spain?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans 59.6%</td>
<td>Eastern Europeans 18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europeans 18%</td>
<td>Moroccans, Algerians, ... 4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in those first surveys immigration as problem does not appear

Source: Barómetro CIS
| In your opinion, do you believe that the law that regulate foreigners entry and staying in Spain is...? | Tolerant 24.3%  
Hard 18.6%  
Correct 16.1%  
Too much tolerant 11.5% |
| --- | --- |
| How do you define, in general, the Spanish attitude toward immigrants? | Suspicion 46.8%  
Indifference 14.4%  
Disdain 11.4% |
|  | Suspicion 44.5%  
Disdain 14.8%  
As Spanish 13.9% |
| Have you got some relationship or contact with immigrants in Spain? | Yes 52.6%  
No 47.2% |
|  | Yes 55.9%  
No 44% |

Source: Barómetro CIS

[ 6 ] Selected bibliography


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1[iv] In the UN Report, Europe consists of 47 countries and areas (see p. viii of the report).
2[iii] We use that term as a neutral one without any negative or reductive connotation.
3[iii] Here we will refer to ‘nation’ as a concept using Anthony D. Smith’s definition. Smith defines ‘nation’ as ‘a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and a common legal rights and duties for all members’ [Smith, 1991: 14]. Smith’s definition draws our attention to the elements of historical continuity such as myths and memory that he considers as the *sine qua non* for a concept of nation.
4[iv] In the literature the concept of migration quite always includes the notions of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The aim of this work is analyze only immigration but in this more general section we put some references to the other two categories to offer a more global vision of phenomenon.
5[vi] We call this level ‘regional’, but as we have chosen European Union as our research field, we directly define this third level as ‘European’.
6[vi] Of course, we are not speaking about NGOs spreading world wide (Greenpeace, Medecins sans frontieres, Amnesty International and more) that can be born as simple associations of
individuals but now have reached a more important status with their own resources and with a strong international recognition.

7[vii] In the case of education or worship, the effort of state could be the creation of new schools with native teachers or the creation/adaptation of rooms for religions different from its.

8[viii] This regularization process ended in January of 2001 with 137,454 immigrants regularized. The total files received were 226,570 of which 82,845 were rejected. In the following months more than 80,000 people have regularized their position thanks to other ways (especially thanks to family reunion). At the moment, there is in course a revision in course of 55,898 files that were rejected at the beginning of the process, of these 23,464 have already been accepted (El País, 17 February 2001).

9[ix] The municipality of Almería has 45,000 inhabitants and more than 17,000 farms. Its active population is of 18,291 personas and the occupied population is of 16,633. The day’s wage is of 5,000 pesetas for a Spanish people but only of 2,500 for an immigrant (ABC, 7 February 2000).

10[x] On 5th February 2000, a 26 years old girl died after stabbing by a man that the witnesses identified as a young Maghreb immigrant of about 20 years. That accident caused public indignation above all because it happened fifteen days after the death of two farmers in the same zone and by an Arab immigrant.

11[xi] The last Spanish immigration law came into force 23rd of January 2001. It was a reform of the organic law 4/2000 about rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration that was implemented on 11th of January 2000. Before these two laws there was an organic law (7/1985) of 1985.

12[xii] On 12 March 2000 there were general elections in Spain and the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies (183 seats on 350) and in the Senate (127 on 208) went to the Popular Party (Partido Popular) of the already premier José María Aznar.

13[xiii] It refers to an Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance (Sistema de Vigilancia Integrado Exterior). The main aim will be to control the arrival of undocumented immigrants in the Strait of Gibraltar. The station detects by radar and by cameras the presence of a human body or of an engine, after the analysis of the still-image, it calculates the geographic position of the target and outlined it on a map. The target is identified and followed, it alerts the operative units nearest to the target and an interception takes place as quickly as possible [El País, March 2001].

14[xiv] The governmental answer is that in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Holland, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom there is an immigration service and except in Ireland and Sweden, it depends on the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

15[xv] In the EU official documents, the words asylum and migration are always used together.

16[xvi] In the action plan of 1998 there is an example about that: ‘Freedom loses much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with a full backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can have confidence. […] It should be noted in this context that the treaty instituting the European Community (article 61 ex article 73I a), makes a direct link between measures establishing freedom of movement of persons and the specific measures seeking to combat and prevent crime (article 31 e TUE), thus creating a conditional link between the two areas’ [OJ C 19, 23.01.1999: 1-2].