1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to provide the distinctive identification and interpretation criteria of novel metonymy, on the one hand, and novel metaphor, on the other. Marginal as they might be considered by many theoreticians nowadays, we defend that these novel uses of language deserve attention on their own to be distinguished from literal, conventional or textual ones. In this regard, we will show that they share some characteristics, to wit, both have the contextual abnormality as one of their identification criteria, and both are best characterised as utterances requiring a primary pragmatic process for their interpretation, a subpropositional process that intervenes in the production of what is said by means of utterances; thus, a view of novel metaphor and metonymy as implicature, as utterances requiring a secondary pragmatic process, is discarded. However, there are very important differences between them.

In metonymy, the identification is completed by the realization that there is a veiled restricted nominal element functioning as the notional head of a textually incomplete noun phrase, and, consequently, the primary pragmatic process required for its interpretation is that of recovery of the content of empty elements in order to complete the description which allows reference assignment. There is a reconstruction so that the content of the empty syntactic element becomes “visible” in the interpretation of the metonymic utterance. In this sense, the result of applying the pragmatic process involved in metonymy has a direct effect in the grammatical structure of this type of utterance, and this serves to show once again that there is a compelling interaction between grammar and discourse.

Conversely, for the identification of metaphor, a conceptual contrast has to be perceived and a primary pragmatic process of transfer is required and depends on a mapping between cognitive domains in order to determine the metaphoric provisional meanings or transferred meanings.

Thus, the distinctive criteria for the identification of novel metaphor and metonymy trigger different primary pragmatic processes of interpretation. This position contrasts with the proposals by authors who consider that these two uses are interpreted by the same cognitive process (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Gibbs 1994).

2. IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA

2.1 CONTEXTUAL ABNORMALITY IN BOTH METONYMY AND METAPHOR

In order to identify a certain use of language as metonymical and as metaphorical, we have to resort to both the linguistic competence of the interlocutors and the context in

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1 Financial support for this research, which has been carried out within the framework of the Project El significado y los procesos pragmáticos primarios y secundarios, has been provided by the DGICYT, code number BFF2003-07141. This paper has benefited from the suggestions of the editors of this volume after a careful reading of an earlier version.

2 For the distinction between primary and secondary pragmatic processes see Recanati (2004: 23-36).
which the language is used, in the same way as to identify the literal use of language. In
the linguistic competence of individuals, possible contexts of use, linguistic or extra-
linguistic, are predicted for lexical items. From our perspective, what novel metonymic
and metaphoric uses of language have in common is that both require a contextual
abnormality for their identification. In general, the contextual oddity or abnormality we
refer to here must be understood as the use of an expression in an unusual linguistic or
extra-linguistic context and, in this sense, it differs from the notions of anomaly
normally found in the literature (Loewenberg 1975, Kittay 1987).

Verbal utterances in which contextual abnormality is found contrast with those
in which expressions appear in normal linguistic or extra-linguistic contexts. For
example in (1),

(1) [Sarah asks Mary where her pet is and Mary answers:] The cat is on the mat

Sarah perceives that both the linguistic and the extra-linguistic contexts for every word
uttered coincide with one of the potential contexts fixed for them in the linguistic
competence of the speaker. If a speaker does not transgress any of the norms in which the
combinatorial and situational potential of lexical items takes shape when used, a textual and
literal use of language is identified. By contrast, sometimes linguistic expressions occur in
abnormal linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts.

If we understand the contextual abnormality as the use of an expression in an
unusual linguistic or extra-linguistic context, we can distinguish between two modes of
appearance of this abnormality in metonymy and metaphor:

Mode (a) an oddity between the terms uttered.
Mode (b) an oddity between the occurrence of an expression in the actual unusual context
and the implicit context associated to a normal use of this expression.

Mode (a) can be illustrated by examples (2) and (3):

(2) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress says to another:] The ham sandwich
is waiting for his check
(3) [A and B are talking about A’s new jeep and its advantages, and A says:] My jeep is a
frog

In the metonymic utterance (2), the normal interpretation of the predicate, “is waiting for
his check,” is incompatible with the normal interpretation of the noun phrase “the ham
sandwich” functioning as its subject. Something similar happens in the metaphoric
utterance (3), where the normal interpretation of “a frog” as the subject complement of
“my jeep” is not allowed. In both cases, there is an oddity between the terms uttered.

Mode (b) can be exemplified by (4) and (5):

(4) [In a restaurant, a waitress asks another to give the check to several customers that have
finished eating and handing her the check of a customer, she utters:] The ham sandwich
is at table four
(5) [Sarah asks Marian where her one-year-old son is and she answers:] The cat is on the mat

3 Our use of the term “linguistic competence” differs from the Chomskian. We add “of individuals” to
underline the fact that although there is some normativity, it must refer to the conceptual system of the
speakers. Thus, it includes their linguistic and non-linguistic past experiences. As Toolan (1996: 9) says:
“it is apparent that most individuals become habituated to a code-like predictability of usage, forms, and
meanings.”
In the metonymic utterance (4), the abnormality is presented by the confrontation between the semantic value of “the ham sandwich” in a possible usual context and the actual and unusual use of the expression in this specific situation in which interlocutors know that we do not give the bill to a ham sandwich and it is clear that when the waitress uses the expression “the ham sandwich,” she cannot be speaking merely about the ham sandwich in this context. Similarly, in the metaphoric utterance (5) the occurrence of “the cat” is abnormal, since it is used to talk about an infant. Then, as in cases of metonymy, the contextual abnormality characteristic of metaphor can be produced by the confrontation between the actual and unusual context and a possible normal context of the expression.

Taking into account what has been said so far, nothing allows us to distinguish between the identification of novel metaphor and metonymy. Thus, although the contextual abnormality is a necessary condition of novel metonymic and metaphoric identification, it is not a sufficient one as it does not allow the metonymic-metaphoric distinction but also because there are examples that show abnormality and, nevertheless, are not detected as metonymic or metaphoric phenomena. Examples like (6) and (7) below are paradigmatic cases:

(6) [A child tells his father in the zoo:] Peanuts eat elephants
(7) [In the film The Aristocats, a cat says about her offspring:] Berlioz plays the piano

(6) is an utterance that makes no sense. There is an abnormality of type (a) as in (2) and (3).

In (7) the abnormality is of type (b) as in (4) and (5). The sentence “Berlioz plays the piano” is not abnormal unless we knew, from the context, that we are talking about a cat.

The fact that the abnormality is not a sufficient condition in these two senses makes us search for some additional identification criteria.

2.2. OTHER CONDITIONS OF IDENTIFICATION FOR NOVEL METONYMY AND NOVEL METAPHOR

2.2.1. VEILED RESTRICTED NOMINAL IN METONYMY

(2) and (4) can be considered examples of a homogeneous group, cases of referential metonymy. In novel metonymy, there is an abnormal use of a noun phrase which leads to recognize that the noun phrase used abnormally is part of the restrictive modifier of an implicit nominal element. This recognition leads to the automatic recovery of the non-textual nominal element it is restricting and with which it has an obvious connection. In other words, novel metonymy is identified when the hearer appreciates that there is a noun phrase used abnormally and a veiled restricted nominal element.

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Nonsense cannot be of type (b) because nonsense does not have meaning at any layer of speaker’s meaning. An utterance of a sentence that yields an abnormality of type (b) is characterized because the sentence included has linguistic meaning and some utterance of it fixes truth conditions.

Utterances such as “It won’t happen while I still breathe”, “She turned pale”, etc. are sometimes considered cases of metonymy. We won’t take into account this type of examples because, as Warren (1999: 121-122) reveals, not all of them are equivalent from a conceptual or linguistic point of view. Even if we admit that both the examples excluded and those included have a common cognitive basis, it can still be defended that within this group there are different types of metonymy that respond to different restrictions and that, linguistically speaking, they behave differently.
Both examples (2) and (4) share the fact that, when the speaker utters them, the hearer appreciates that there is a textual paraphrase of them, shown in (2a) and (4a) respectively.

(2a) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress says to another:] The customer of the ham sandwich is waiting for his check
(4a) [In a restaurant, a waitress asks another to give the check to several customers that have finished eating and handing her the check of a customer, she utters:] The customer of the ham sandwich is at table four

In most of the proposals on metonymy it is argued that there is a mechanism of transfer in which there is a substitution, but if we pay attention to examples such as (2) and (4) we see that the substituting element is always an abbreviated part of the substituted one which is wider and we have presented in (2a) and (4a). A metonymy is produced in (2) when the substituted element “the customer of the ham sandwich” is reduced forming a shorten substituting element: “the ham sandwich.” Thus it can be argued that referential metonymy involves a mechanism of language reduction (Le Guern 1973). Reduction is “a grammatical principle by which the structure of a sentence is abbreviated” (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik 1985: 858) and there are two types: ellipsis and substitution by means of pro-forms. The motivation for the use of this principle is that, other things being equal, the users of a language will follow the maxim “reduce as much as you can.” This preference for reduction is not justified only by a preference for economy but also because reduction contributes to clarity. By reducing given information, attention is focalised over new information. The type of reduction characteristic of metonymy is that of ellipsis. Furthermore, referential metonymy is an ellipsis at a phrasal level.

Ellipsis is the omission of one or more necessary elements in a grammatical structure (Quirk et al. 1985: 884, Burton-Roberts 1986: 101-102), specific elements that can be explicitly recovered from the (linguistic and extralinguistic) context by the interlocutor.

(8) [John asks Mary:] Have you written the letters?
[She answers:] (I have) Not (written them) yet.
(9) [In a bakery, Mary points to the loaves of bread and utters:] (Give me) Two (loaves of bread), please

For example, in (8) the missing elements, signalled in brackets, can be recovered from the linguistic context while in (9) the missing elements can be recovered from the extralinguistic one. In both cases, the actual words are recoverable and necessary.

In addition, one or more elements in a sentence or phrase can be elided. The obligatory character of the empty element is given by the structure that includes the element. For a case of ellipsis to occur, at least one of these elements must be omitted. In (8) all the obligatory elements in the clause structure (the subject, the predicator and the direct object) have been omitted. The only piece of new information in this case (given the previous linguistic information) is the negation operator and the adverbial; thus, they are explicitly expressed. In (9) the predicator, the indirect object and part of the noun phrase functioning as direct object are empty elements.

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6 The term “ellipsis” is used here as a cover term for any of the anaphoric processes that exist which involve omission of a syntactic constituent under identity with an antecedent in the adjoining discourse, and not in the more specific sense in which it is used restrictively to account for just one of them. For a detailed description of some of the subtypes, see Lobeck (1995: 21-46).
Ellipsis can happen at sentential or phrasal level: sentential if a sentence constituent is missing as a whole and phrasal if the element missing is just part of a phrase. Examples (10) and (11) are cases of ellipsis at a phrasal level. The head of the noun phrase, which is the obligatory element in a phrase structure, is missing:

(10) This is one of the oldest buildings in town, if not the oldest (building)
(11) [In a hairdresser’s, a hairdresser tells another:] The blonde (lady) is waiting for her check

Let us consider examples (12), (2b) and (4b), referential metonymies, and let us highlight the elided elements.

(12) [In a hairdresser’s, a hairdresser tells another:] (The lady of) The blonde wig is waiting for her check
(2b) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress says to another:] (The customer of) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check
(4b) [In a restaurant, a waitress asks another to give the check to several customers that have finished eating and handing her the check of a customer, she utters:] (The customer of) The ham sandwich is at table four

In these cases there is an ellipsis at a phrasal level. In particular, the elided elements are the head of a complex noun phrase and its determiner together with one or several elements of the modifier that go with it (prepositions, relative pronouns, …), pointing only to part of the modifier. Thus, in (2b) and (4b) the elided elements are the head “customer”, the determiner “the” and the linker “of”, which introduces the post-modifying constituent and in (12), the elided elements are the head “lady”, the determiner “the” and the linker “of”.

What examples (12), (2b) and (4b), examples of metonymy, have in common with the previous examples (8)-(11) is that they all need to recover the content of an empty element to be interpreted (Romero and Soria 2002). In all cases there is ungrammaticality. But, how do they differ? Cases of ellipsis such as (8)-(11) are syntactically incomplete; there is an obligatory element with a missing obligatory grammatical category either in the clause structure or in the phrase structure. In (12), (2b) and (4b) there is also ungrammaticality but this time it is revealed just semantically. When the ellipsis occurs at a phrasal level it might be the case that apparently there is a complete sentence structure as in (12), (2b) and (4b). In metonymy, although the obligatory element is also missing, the syntactic function is apparently filled by an element which does not really correspond to that function. The head of the modifier takes over the head of the phrase. The part of the modifier that remains does not acquire, nevertheless, a different improper meaning; it refers to what it usually refers. But when is this type of language reduction possible? When is it possible to leave just part of the restrictive modifier?

The language reduction that takes place in metonymy is possible because a restrictive modifier forms a part of the description that serves to pick out the referent (Huddleston 1984: 265) and the notional head is given information.\(^7\) In (2) and (4), the

\[^7\] In this way, if the semantic value of the restrictive modifier is the essential new information of the whole noun phrase and the head is given information, it is not just possible but also more efficient, from a communicative point of view, to omit the given information and keep just the central element of the restrictive modifier. Often a noun phrase is the relevant element used to restrict the head of the noun phrase and, if, through a process of reduction, only the restricting noun phrase remains, it can be taken as the syntactic head of the whole noun phrase whereas it is just part of the restrictive modifier of a complex noun phrase. Thus an abnormality is
context, waiters speaking about their customers in a restaurant, is essential to reveal that there is a type of entity which constitutes a piece of given information (Halliday 1985: 275) and forms a part of the non-textual semantic value of the head of a noun phrase. In a restaurant, it is well known that waiters’ work consists in serving customers; thus, “customers” will be given information for the waiters when talking about the goods and services that they have to offer them. When waiters are communicating at work, it is essential for them to pick out the specific customer in order to get him served. In this case, a restrictive modification may be required as in “the customer of the ham sandwich is waiting for his check” or “the customer who ordered the ham sandwich is waiting for his check.” Both (2) and (4) include the expression “the ham sandwich,” which is a semantically incomplete definite description. No matter whether this description is used attributively or referentially, it requires contextual information for it to actually denote or refer to an object, to a particular ham sandwich. When we take into account contextual and not just linguistic information, we realize that the object referred to or denoted by this singular term, the specific ham sandwich, is not the type of object that the utterance of the explicit designator term must refer to or denote. Given the utterance (2), there is no doubt that we are talking about a customer and the same occurs in (4). In (2) and (4), “customer” doesn’t appear explicitly, it is but a veiled restricted nominal element. The “ham sandwich” is part of the restrictive modifier “of the ham sandwich” whose task is to restrict the identification of one entity of this type which constitutes given information. “The ham sandwich” is just part of the description that serves to pick out the referent. The head of the noun phrase must be “customer.” We detect that, in spite of being the notional head of the noun phrase that functions as subject of the sentence, the topic talked about, a customer, does not realize the syntactic function of the explicit noun phrase. This syntactic function is apparently realized by the expression “the ham sandwich.” The slot left empty by the elided head of the noun phrase is filled by this piece of new information, “the ham sandwich.” However, this expression does not bring about the description of the customer but its identification (if it described the customer through features of the ham sandwich, it would be a case of metaphor). “The ham sandwich” is recognized as part of the modifier restricting “customer.”

The use of a restrictive modifier is appropriate in a context of discourse when there is more than one entity which can be included in the semantic value of the head of the noun phrase and a modifier is required to distinguish the entity being referred to from other entities of this type. The task of the modifier “of the ham sandwich” is to identify one entity of this set. The key to restrictive modification is that the significant part of what the speaker has to say with a noun phrase that forms part of an utterance is the piece of relevant or new information included in the semantic value of the restrictive modification. The central element that serves to pick out the referent of the expression “the customer of the ham sandwich” is, in this context, “the ham sandwich”, as “the customer of” is given information and, therefore, can be omitted without any problem of recovery. However, the part of the modifier that remains after the process of reduction, “the ham sandwich”, does not acquire a semantic value different from the one it usually has. The reason why the noun phrase used metonymically refers to an object different from the object it refers to in a textual use is not—as argued in the most extended theories of metonymy—that in the metonymic use of designators, they change their meanings but that the description perceived which leads the hearer to recognize that the head must be a veiled non-textual nominal element which is restricted by the textual noun phrase.

8 However, we are not before a referential use of an object whose property does not describe it although the speaker and interpreter believes she does, as it is the case of some of the referential uses of definite descriptions in Donnellan (1966).
used metonymically is just part of the modifier of the designator that really refers or denotes. Metonymy does not exploit a transferred meaning. Metonymy is a non-textual use of language in which there is at least one empty sub-phrasal constituent, a veiled restricted nominal element. The expression “the ham sandwich” keeps its ordinary meaning and denotes or refers to a sandwich.

In short, we identify a case of referential metonymy when we perceive that the noun phrase included in a restrictive modifier is used abnormally as the apparent syntactic (though not semantic) head of the whole noun phrase and the rest is omitted.

2.2.2. CONCEPTUAL CONTRAST IN METAPHOR

In metaphor, abnormality is accompanied by a conceptual contrast (Romero and Soria 1997-98). Abnormality, though being a necessary condition for the metaphoric identification of an utterance, is not sufficient; it does not even serve to delimit the nonliteral use of language from other uses; the abnormality, as we have seen, may be found in nonsensical utterances, fictional utterances and in certain cases of ellipsis. Thus, to delimit them we have to find an additional criterion, which in metaphor is the conceptual contrast. The conceptual contrast is but the recognition that the speaker is talking about a topic (represented by the target domain) using terms which normally describe another (represented by the source domain). A conceptual contrast is brought about when we identify a concept as source domain and another concept as target domain. In (5) there is a conceptual contrast because we identify that we are talking about an infant using a term that normally describes a feline. The abnormality in (5) leads us to recognize that two concepts are involved and that one of them acts as the target concept, the concept we are talking about or the concept INFANT, and the other one as the source concept, the concept attributed to the one we are talking about or the concept CAT, taking into account that among the senses of ‘cat’, the one that serves to classify the infant nonliterally is the sense of ‘cat’ in which it is conceived as “a small domesticated feline mammal”. We recognize INFANT as the concept that acts as the target domain, and CAT as the concept represented by the source domain. We realize that certain features typical of cats are used to describe metaphorically an infant. The two domains represent the conventional conceptions of the two concepts that we detect in the conceptual contrast and specify the conventional meanings of the terms included in their vocabulary, which is shown by their relations with other terms in the description of a concept. The target domain represents the concept we are talking about, and the source domain represents the concept attributed to the one we are talking about. The domains represent the conventional conceptions of the concepts that we detect in the conceptual contrast, and consist of a set of terms which make up its vocabulary and a set of sentences which specify how these terms are related to the information associated with the concept.

As in (5), in (3) we detect a conceptual contrast, now between the target concept, JEEP, and the source concept, FROG. We can say, then, that we are facing a metaphoric utterance. When a metaphoric use of language is identified, a mapping from source domain to target domain is triggered.

This is very different from what happens in (4), where we talk about a customer but we do not use terms belonging to another domain to describe it: there is no source domain. Although the metonymic and metaphoric uses of language require a contextual abnormality for their identification they do not have in common the rest of their identification criteria. Thus, (2) and (4), on the one hand, and (3) and (5), on the other, are respectively utterances that exploit different uses of language. Indeed, their respective
criteria of identification trigger, as we are going to see, different primary pragmatic processes of interpretation.

3. NOVEL METONYMY AND NOVEL METAPHOR AS PRIMARY PRAGMATIC PROCESSES OF INTERPRETATION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE

3.1. A PRIMARY PRAGMATIC PROCESS OF RECOVERY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF NOVEL METONYMY

The identification of a novel metonymic use of language leads to the automatic recovery of the non-textual nominal element that the textual one is restricting and with which it has an obvious connection. When the noun phrase used abnormally is identified as part of the restrictive modifier of a non-explicit nominal element, the noun phrase must be completed and it becomes a more complex noun phrase that includes the given information “customer” as the head in (2) and (4). When the speaker uses the expression “ham sandwich” in (2) and (4), the hearer realizes that a process of recovery of the non-textual element is triggered. Now we can reconstruct the complex noun phrase, “The customer of the ham sandwich,” and what is literally said with utterances (2) and (4), although what is said is not textually said.9 What is literally said in (2) is that the customer of the ham sandwich is waiting for his check and in (4) that the customer of the ham sandwich is at table four.

The ellipsis that characterizes metonymy can be understood in theory of meaning as a mandatory primary pragmatic process that operates at a subpropositional level. The hearer picks out the referent when he unveils the missing elements and the restriction of the head. “The ham sandwich” is recognized as part of the description that denotes or refers to a specific customer in (2) and (4). It points to the specific customer not because this expression acquires a new and transferred meaning but because the missing elements that this expression restricts are recovered. The expression “the ham sandwich” keeps its ordinary meaning and denotes or refers to a sandwich. The metonymic use makes the hearer recover some non-explicit but required sub-propositional and sub-phrasal element in order to have an accessible proposition, but once we recover what is unarticulated (“the customer of”) both terms (“the customer” and “the ham sandwich”) are used with their respective normal meanings.

3.2. A PRIMARY PRAGMATIC PROCESS OF MAPPING IN THE INTERPRETATION OF NOVEL METAPHOR

By contrast, the identification of metaphor triggers a primary pragmatic process of transfer that depends on a mapping from the source domain to the target domain (Indurkhya 1992) to generate a metaphoric target conceptual domain that will work as the metaphoric context from which to interpret the metaphoric utterance (Romero and Soria forthcoming), from which to determine the transferred meaning of the terms used in the metaphoric utterances.

To interpret (5), we may coherently transform a set of sentences from the source domain, cat, to sentences with terms only of the target domain, infant, and this set of transformed sentences will re-describe the concept INFANT through the concept CAT. The mapping generates a metaphorically restructured target domain, a conception of infants

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9 In general, what is said is related with the truth-conditions of an utterance. For a description of the technical notion of what is said, see Grice (1989). A more up-to-date discussion on the topic can be found in Carston (2002), Recanati (2004), and Romero and Soria (forthcoming).
provisionally modified by those aspects of the concept CAT that influence its restructuring. From this context of interpretation, the meaning of “cat” in (5) is the meaning that this term has in the metaphorically restructured target domain, it is the information that can describe INFANTS coherently when they are seen as bearing the features typical of cats; it is a question of seeing an infant as a being that needs feeding and care, goes on all fours, plays with anything available, scrutinizes things carefully and are unfriendly with the unknown. “Cat” acquires a transferred metaphoric provisional meaning. Now, “my cat” in (5) denotes Marian’s son and Marian is the progenitor of the infant that the speaker is denoting when she uses “cat” metaphorically. Once all these changes have been made, what is said with (5) is composed in the same way as what is said with (1), what varies is a process of contextual interpretation that intervened at the level of constituents, the process of interpretation characteristic of the metaphorical. What is obvious here is that the speaker does not have the literal interpretation of the sentence included in (5) at any moment of the interpretation. There are not two stages in metaphoric interpretation.

In (3), a mapping is needed to describe the target conceptual domain, jeep, by means of the source conceptual domain, frog. This mapping generates a metaphoric context from which to determine the metaphoric provisional meaning of the terms used in (3). As the context of interpretation from which the terms that are involved in a metaphoric utterance changes, the meanings associated with these terms change too. Some terms acquire a metaphoric provisional meaning. The relation between the terms and the originated metaphoric meanings is not established or conventionalized.

Metaphor is a mechanism used to produce metaphoric provisional meanings which are not available in the system of the language. In metaphor, old words are used for new jobs.

3.3. PRIMARY PRAGMATIC PROCESSES OF RECOVERY AND MAPPING IN THE SAME UTTERANCE

Up to now we have described the different types of processes involved in utterances that are either metaphorical or metonymical. In this section, we would like to make it clear, with an example, that both phenomena can appear together in the same utterance and thus we can have an utterance which is both metaphorical and metonymical. Let us take (13) as an example:

(13) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress says to another:] The ham sandwich is very appetizing

In this case there is a double abnormality: the one generated by the metonymy is eliminated when we recognize that the speaker is talking about the customer that is, when the process of recovery has been applied. The fact that this abnormality does not entail a lack of another contextual abnormality. Indeed, when we recover the content of the empty element, we obtain (13a):

(13a) [Looking at the ham sandwich customer, a waitress says to another:] The customer of the ham sandwich is very appetizing.

This utterance makes it manifest that there is another abnormality as customers are not the type of objects that are very appetizing, “appetizing” is applied to culinary objects and people are not of such a kind, cannibalism is not an actual practice in our culture and thus it is not part of our context of culture. This abnormality, however, appears together
with a conceptual contrast, that is, we recognize human being as the target domain and culinary object as source domain and this conceptual contrast encourages us to consider the first concept through the second, thus generating the appropriate context of metaphoric interpretation of (13a) or of (13). This does not mean that (13) and (13a) are identical with respect to the presentation of information. As we have already said, elided elements constitute given information and ellipsis helps focalizing new or significant information. Accordingly, if metonymy is a case of ellipsis, it will share its motivation with this phenomenon. On the one hand, it obeys a principle of economy and, on the other, it acts upon an essential principle, the focalizing of information. For waiters who are working in a restaurant and are talking about the customers they have to serve, customers are given information. Thus, when a waiter wants to refer to the particular customers, he can make the restriction by foregrounding the differentiating aspects that are related to each customer. This is one of the typical functions of modifiers in a noun phrase: the restriction of the referent of the head. If, for example the customer we want to refer to, is the only one that has eaten a ham sandwich or has complained about the ham sandwich, or something like that, a concise and clear way of identifying him or her is by saying “the ham sandwich”. The most relevant information in the context specified in (13) is not that there is a customer that is very appetizing, what interests here is to identify without any doubt what customer is very appetizing. Metonymy is used to achieve semantic prominence of the restrictive modifier “the ham sandwich”. As the head of the noun phrase has been left empty, the referent included in the modifier achieves foregrounding but not for this reason the description “the ham sandwich” undergoes a process of transfer of meaning.

Very different is what happens with the use of “appetizing” in (13). In this expression, there is indeed a transfer of meaning if we want to know what the speaker says with the utterance. In the interpretation of (13) the speaker has to recognize that appetizing is said of a customer. The process of recovery is applied first and then we appreciate the second abnormality which will lead the hearer to the conceptual contrast between the source domain, culinary object, and the target domain, human being, to get a metaphoric provisional meaning of the term “appetizing”. This term that belonged to the source domain, culinary object, has to change so that it becomes applicable to talk about the target domain. In this way, a new target domain modified provisionally for the occasion serves as the context from which to interpret the utterance metaphorically. Both (13) and (13a) are interpreted metaphorically but just (13) is interpreted both metaphorically and metonymically.

4. CONCLUSION

In novel metonymy and metaphor we always detect a contextual abnormality. In both, the abnormality can be produced by detecting an oddity between the terms uttered or between the occurrence of an expression in the actual unusual context and the implicit context associated to a normal use of this expression. The difference in identifying a use of language as metonymical or metaphorical will depend on other factors. In referential metonymy, the context shows that the noun phrase should not be interpreted textually as the notional head of the noun phrase (identification of a veiled restricted nominal element). The oddity is overcome taking into account the relation between two references; we pick out the referent functioning as head of the noun phrase because of its relation with the restricting modifier, part of this restricting modifier is the noun used metonymically. We detect that in its interpretation we must resort to given information which is easily
recoverable. The noun phrase can be interpreted as an abbreviated formulation so that, when the missing element is recovered, the abnormality is eliminated. Metonymy is not a case of transfer, it does not depend on a mapping between two domains. By contrast, in metaphor the contextual abnormality is not overcome, as in metonymy, by recovering the given contextual information. Abnormality is linked up with a conceptual contrast, by which we identify a domain as a source to describe the target, to generate a metaphoric concept that will work as the metaphoric context from which to interpret the metaphoric utterance; metaphor requires the cognitive process of mapping from which to establish the transferred meanings that intervene in the interpretation of metaphors. Both metaphor and metonymy are different phenomena not only because they trigger different criteria of identification but because they are phenomena whose interpretations depend on different processes.

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