

The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam

From Jihad to Dhimmitude



Bat Ye'or

Foreword by Jacques Ellul

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of Eastern Christianity
under Islam

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By the Same Author

Les Juifs en Egypte. Geneva: Éditions de l'Avenir, 1971. Revised and enlarged Hebrew edition: *Yehudai Mizrayim*. Foreword by Hayyim Ze'ev Hirschberg. Translated from the French by Aharon Amir. Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1974.

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The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam

From Jihad to Dhimmitude

Seventh–Twentieth Century

Bat Ye'or

With a Foreword by
Jacques Ellul

Translated from the French by
Miriam Kochan and David Littman



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Renée Reine Orebi
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Contents

List of Abbreviations	15
Foreword	
JACQUES ELLUL	17
Author's Note	23
Acknowledgments	25
Introduction	27
1 THE PRE-ISLAMIC ORIENT	33
The Origin of <i>Jihad</i>	37
The <i>Jihad</i> : Dogma and Strategies	39
2 THE ERA OF CONQUESTS	43
The First Wave of Islamization (632–750)	43
Expansion Overland	43
<i>Jihad</i> on the Seas	50
The Second Wave of Islamization	52
The Emergence and Consolidation of the Muslim State	56
Administration of the Conquered Territories	60
3 DHIMMITUDE: LEGALISTIC FOUNDATION AND HISTORIC CONDITIONING	69
The Characters of the Conquered Lands	70
Religious Character	70
Fiscal Character	71
<i>Jizya</i>	77
Other Taxes (<i>Awarid</i> : Irregular Taxes)	79
Public Office	80
Inequality before the Law	81
Worship	83
Places of Worship	83
Ritual	87
Forced Conversions	88
Segregation and Humiliation	91

4	THE CONQUERED LANDS: PROCESSES OF ISLAMIZATION	100
	The Nomads: Factors of Islamization	100
	Slavery: Demographic, Religious, and Cultural Aspects	108
	<i>Devshirme</i>	113
	Political Instability	115
	The <i>Dhimmi</i> : Economic Function	121
	The Tribute: Factor of Recuperation and of Collusion	123
	The Caliphate: Protecting Power of the <i>Dhimmi</i> s	124
	Oppression and Collaboration	128
	Other Processes of Islamization	131
	Conclusion	136
5	RELATIONS BETWEEN <i>DHIMMI</i> COMMUNITIES	141
	Intrinsic Factors of Interaction	141
	Extraneous Factors of Interaction	147
	Domination and Interference of the Islamic State	147
	Interference by the Christian States	152
	<i>Religious Protection</i>	153
	<i>Commercial Protection</i>	158
	<i>Political Protection</i>	162
6	FROM EMANCIPATION TO NATIONALISM (1820–1876)	165
	The European Humanist Movement	165
	The Policy of the Western Powers	166
	The Islamic Reaction	171
	Opposition to Europe	171
	Opposition to Ottomanism	172
	Opposition to Emancipation	173
	Emancipation	174
7	NATIONALISMS (1820–1918)	181
	Anatolia and European Turkey: Common Characters	182
	The Cultural Renaissance	182
	Reorganization of the <i>Millet</i> s	184
	Uprisings	186
	Different Characters	187
	Armenia	192
	The Massacres	195
	Ottoman Arab Provinces	198
	Christian Emancipation: Arabism	200
	Jewish <i>Dhimmi</i> Nationalism: Zionism	204

8	SOME ASPECTS OF THE PAST'S REVIVAL IN MODERN TIMES	211
	The Legacy of the Colonial Era	211
	The Roots of Modern Islamism	215
	Dhimmitude of the West?	217
9	CHARACTERS OF DHIMMITUDE	221
	Factors in the Ruling Group Imposing Dhimmitude	221
	The Realm of Dhimmitude	222
	Structures within the Targeted Groups Conducive to Dhimmitude	223
	The Communities: Organization within Dhimmitude	224
	The Role of the Notables	226
	Patronage and "Golden Age"	227
	The Islamic-Judeo-Christian Cultural Current	231
	The <i>Dhimmi</i> Syndrome	235
	Dissymmetrical Relationships: Oppression-Gratitude	236
	Manageability of the <i>Dhimmi</i>	236
	The Exclusion and Concealment of History	239
10	CONCLUSION	242
	Conquered Peoples or Tolerated Religious Minorities?	243
	Political Character of Dhimmitude	244
	The Problem of Tolerance	244
	Tolerance in the Political Context	246
	Relative Tolerance or Absolute Tolerance?	246
	The Globalizing Historical Trend	248
	The Practice of Evasion or Amalgamation	250
	Practice and Theory: Laws and Customs	251
	The Alibi of the <i>deus ex machina</i>	254
	The Method of Comparative History	255
	The Choice of Sources and Their Credibility	257
	Epilogue	261

DOCUMENTS

PART I: *JIHAD*

1	THE ERA OF CONQUESTS (SEVENTH TO ELEVENTH CENTURY)	271
	Egypt, Palestine, Tripolitania (640–646)	271
	John of Nikiou	271
	<i>The Capture of the Fayyum</i>	271
	<i>After the Flight of the Greek Army near Nikiou</i>	271

Iraq	272
al-Baladhuri	272
<i>Letter from Umar Ibn al-Khattab (633–643)</i>	272
Iraq, Syria, and Palestine	273
Abu Yusuf	273
<i>Umar Replies to the Muslim Soldiers from Iraq and Syria</i>	273
Armenia (642)	274
Sepeos	274
Cyprus, the Greek Islands, and Anatolia (649–654)	275
Michael the Syrian	275
Cilicia and Cesarea of Cappadocia (650)	276
Michael the Syrian	276
Armenia (ca. 705)	277
Elegy of Saint Vahan of Gogh'ten	277
<i>The Extermination of the Armenian Nobles</i>	277
al-Baladhuri	280
<i>These Same Events Described by a Muslim Chronicler</i>	280
Cappadocia	281
[Pseudo] Dionysius of Tell-Mahre	281
<i>Under the Caliphs Sulayman and Umar II (715–720)</i>	281
Spain and France (793–860)	281
Ibn al-Athir	281
Anatolia	282
Michael the Syrian	282
<i>The Taking of Amorium (838)</i>	282
Bar Hebraeus	284
<i>Exchange of Prisoners (September 845)</i>	284
Armenia	286
Thomas Ardzruni	286
<i>Under the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–861)</i>	286
Sicily and Italy (835–851 and 884)	289
Ibn al-Athir	289
Mesopotamia	290
Michael the Syrian	290
<i>Causes of the Invasions by the Turks (Eleventh Century)</i>	290
<i>Pillage of Melitene (Malatia) (1057)</i>	290
Armenia	292
Matthew of Edessa	292
Samuel of Ani	292
<i>The Taking of Ani by Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan (1064)</i>	292
Syria and Palestine	292
Michael the Syrian	292

2	THE THEORY OF <i>JIHAD</i>	295
	Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani	296
	Ibn Khaldun	296
	Ibn Taymiya	296
	<i>Booty</i>	296
	<i>The Fay</i>	297
	Abu Yusuf	301
	<i>Battle Procedures</i>	301

PART II. THE PEASANTRY'S CONDITION

1	ACTUAL LIFE	305
	Mesopotamia-Iraq (ca. 767–773)	305
	[Pseudo] Dionysius of Tell-Mahre	305
	<i>Depopulation</i>	305
	<i>On Exile</i>	305
	<i>On Poll Tax (Jizya)</i>	308
	<i>On Torture</i>	308
	<i>Exodus of the Peasants</i>	312
	Egypt	314
	Michael the Syrian	314
	<i>Journey of the Jacobite Patriarch Dionysius of Tell-Mahre to Egypt (826 or 827)</i>	314
	<i>Second Journey to Egypt by Dionysius of Tell-Mahre (832)</i>	317
	<i>Under the Caliph Harun al-Wathiq (842–847)</i>	320
2	JURISTS' OPINIONS	322
	Abu Yusuf	322
	<i>Concerning the Costume and Appearance of the Tributaries</i>	322
	al-Mawardi	324
	<i>Poll Tax and Land Tax</i>	324
	Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya	327
	Ibn an-Naqqash	328

PART III. SEDITION, NOMADISM, AND DHIMMITUDE

	Iraq-Mesopotamia (Early Ninth Century)	333
	Michael the Syrian	334
	<i>The Troubles Continue</i>	334
	Abbasid and Fatimid Empires	337
	Bar Hebraeus	337
	Baghdad (1100)	339
	Obadyah	339

North Africa and Andalusia	340
al-Maliki	340
Ibn al-Athir	340
Ibn Abdun	341
al-Marrakushi	342
<i>Under the Almohades (1130–1269)</i>	342
Mesopotamia-Iraq (Twelfth to Thirteenth Century)	342
Michael the Syrian	342
Bar Hebraeus	346
Ibn al-Fuwati	348
<i>Obligations of the Dhimmi, According to Ibn Fadlan</i>	348
Ghazi b. al-Wasiti	349
Bar Hebraeus	349
<i>Religious Celebrations</i>	349
<i>Anarchy and Banditry</i>	350
<i>Destitution of the Jewish Vizier, Sa'd al-Dawla (1292)</i>	354
<i>After the Conversion of the Mongols to Islam (1295)</i>	356
Egypt	359
Ibn Taghribirdi	359
Morocco	360
Ibn Askar	360
<i>Collection of the Poll Tax (Jizya)</i>	361
al-Maghili	361
al-Adawi	361
Persia (Seventeenth to Eighteenth Century)	362
Arakel of Tauriz	362
<i>Deportation of the Population of Armenia by Shah Abbas I (1604)</i>	362
<i>The Hunt for Fugitives</i>	366
<i>Conversion of the Jews of Persia (1656–1661) under Shah Abbas II</i>	369
Abraham of Crete	375
<i>Deportation of Armenians from Ararat (1735)</i>	375
Palestine	377
Gedaliah of Siemiatyc	377
<i>Jews and Christians in Jerusalem (1700)</i>	377
Egypt	380
al-Djabarti	380
<i>Coptic Pilgrimage from Egypt to Jerusalem in 1756</i>	380
al-Damanhuri	381
Opinion of an Eighteenth-Century Egyptian Jurist	381
Turkey	384
<i>Letters from British Ambassadors to Constantinople (1662–1785)</i>	384

Morocco (Nineteenth Century)	389
Eugène Fumey	389
<i>Letter from the Sultan of Morocco Mulay Abd ar-Rahman</i> <i>(1822–1859) to the French Consulate at Tangiers (1841)</i>	389
Abbé Léon Godard	390
Afghanistan	390
Mattatya Garji	390
<i>Expulsion of the Jews from Mashhad (1839) and from Herat</i> <i>(1857–1859)</i>	390

PART IV. THE ERA OF EMANCIPATION

Ottoman Empire	395
<i>Reports by British Diplomats (1850–1876)</i>	395
Beirut, October 1850	395
Jerusalem, November 1858	397
Jerusalem, November 1858	399
Aleppo, March 1859	399
<i>Report on the Massacres of the Christians at Hasbeya and</i> <i>Rasheya, Lebanon, June 1860</i>	401
Damascus, July 1860	404
Damascus, July 1860	407
Damascus, August 1860	407
Papers Relating to the Condition of Christians in Turkey (1860)	409
Salonica, July 1860	409
Belgrade, July 1860	412
Rustchuk, July 1860	415
Jerusalem, July 1860	416
Pristina, July 1860	417
Aleppo, August 1860	420
Bosna-Serai (Sarajevo), July 1860	421
Correspondence Respecting Disturbances in Herzegovina and Montenegro in 1861–1862	427
Correspondence Concerning Cases of Alleged Religious Persecution in Turkey (1873–1875)	427
Part I. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in The Herzegovina (July to December 1875)	429
Part II. Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in The Herzegovina (January to March 1876)	430
<i>Jihad</i> and Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Sudan	433
The Armenian Question	437
<i>The Massacres of 1894–1896</i>	437

<i>Two Eye-Witness Accounts of the Armenians during World War I</i>	439
Palestine, 1915	439
Iraq, 1915–1917	441
Appendix A: Muslim Historians and Theologians	447
Appendix B: Non-Muslim Historians and Authors	450
Appendix C: British Ministers, Ambassadors, and Diplomats	452
Notes	454
Glossary	472
Bibliography	475
Index of Persons, Peoples, Tribes, and Institutions	498
Index of Places	513

Abbreviations

AS	<i>Arabian Studies</i> (Cambridge)
ARABICA	<i>Revue d'Études Arabes</i> (Paris)
BAIU	<i>Bulletin of the Alliance Israélite Universelle</i> (Paris)
BIJS	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Jewish Studies</i> (London)
BJRL	<i>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library</i> (Manchester)
BSOAS	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i> (London)
DOP	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</i> (Washington)
EI ¹	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , first edition
EI ²	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , second edition
EJ	<i>Encyclopaedia Judaica</i> (Jerusalem, 1971)
HESPERIS	<i>Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines</i> (Paris)
HGS	<i>Holocaust and Genocide Studies</i> (Oxford)
IOS	<i>Israel Oriental Studies</i> (Jerusalem)
JA	<i>Journal Asiatique</i> (Paris)
JAOS	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i> (New York)
JESHO	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i> (Leyden)
JHSE	<i>Jewish Historical Society of England</i> (London)
JIMMA	<i>Journal, Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs</i> (Jeddah)
JIS	<i>Journal of Israel Studies</i> (Baltimore)
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies</i> (Oxford)
JOS	<i>Journal of Ottoman Studies</i> (Istanbul)
JQ	<i>Jerusalem Quarterly</i> (Jerusalem)
JRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i> (London)
MES	<i>Middle Eastern Studies</i> (London)
NC	<i>Nouveaux Cahiers</i> (Paris)
PAAJR	<i>Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research</i> (New York)
PARDES	<i>Pardès</i> (Paris)
RAS	<i>Royal Asiatic Society</i> (London)
REI	<i>Revue des Études Islamiques</i> (Paris)
REJ	<i>Revue des Études Juives</i> (Paris)
RFSE	<i>Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Economiques</i> (Istanbul)
ROC	<i>Revue de l'Orient Chrétien</i> (Paris)
RSJB	<i>Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin</i> (Brussels)
RSTP	<i>Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques</i> (Paris)
SPS	<i>Studies in Plural Societies</i> (The Hague)

<i>SI</i>	<i>Studia Islamica</i> (Paris)
<i>TM</i>	<i>Les Temps Modernes</i> (Paris)
<i>VJHfz</i>	<i>Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte</i> (Stuttgart)
<i>WLB</i>	<i>Wiener Library Bulletin</i> (London)
<i>YOD</i>	<i>Revue des Études Hébraïques et Juives Modernes et Contemporaines</i> (Paris)
<i>ZfA</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie</i> (Strasbourg)
<i>Zion</i>	<i>A Quarterly for Research in Jewish History</i> (Jerusalem)

Archives, Libraries, etc.

AIU	Alliance Israélite Universelle (Paris)
BL	British Library (London)
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris)
DD	Documents Diplomatiques (Paris)
FO	Foreign Office, PRO Archives (London)
MAE	Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris)
PP	Parliamentary Papers (London)
PRO	Public Record Office (London)
SP	State Papers (London)
TSL	Topkapi Saray Library (Istanbul)

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Foreword

Jacques Ellul

Contrary to the oft-held peaceable or romanticized picture, history is not an inoffensive discipline (not to say a “science,” which would be challenged immediately). Any sound historical work, that is to say which, as far as possible, avoids prejudices and preconceptions—using the maximum available sources, without selectivity, other than on a scale of values according to their finality—hence, any work undertaken with conscientiousness and rigor always causes uneasiness. Actually, such a study generally challenges preconceived images of this past, as well as the traditions and judgments concerning this or that period, opinions, and, at times, ideologies, thereby giving rise to disquiet, polemics, and disputes. This has been the case with all great historical works, and the present book will be no exception.

I venture to say that it is a great historical work on account of its scrupulous examination of the sources, the search for those sources¹ (though it is impossible to speak of exhaustiveness!), and the boldness in tackling a historical factor of prime importance too often neglected. In the general current of favorable predispositions to Islam, about which I have already spoken in the preface to the author’s previous book,² there has been a reluctance to allude to the *jihad*. In Western eyes, it would be a sort of dark stain on the greatness and purity of Islam. Yet this book, a sequel to the previous one, broadens considerably the perspective since it adds to the previous study of dhimmitude its alternative: the *jihad*. *Jihad* and dhimmitude are posited as an “uncircumventable” alternative: two complementary institutions, and when faced with Islam, a choice between the two has to be made! This *jihad* still needs to be defined: there are many interpretations. At times, the main emphasis is placed on the *spiritual* nature of this “struggle.” Indeed, it would merely indicate a “figure of speech” to illustrate the struggle that the believer has to wage against his own evil inclinations and his tendency to disbelief, and so on. Each man is engaged in a struggle within himself (which we Christians know well and thus find ourselves again on com-

Every effort has been made to retain the essence and style of Jacques Ellul’s French text.

mon ground!); and I am well aware that this interpretation was in fact maintained in some Islamic schools of thought. But, even if this interpretation is correct, it in no way covers the whole scope of *jihad*. At other times, one prefers to veil the facts and put them in parentheses. In a major encyclopedia, one reads phrases such as: "Islam expanded in the eighth or ninth centuries . . ."; "This or that country passed into Muslim hands. . . ." But care is taken not to say *how* Islam expanded, *how* countries "passed into [Muslim] hands". . . . Indeed, it would seem as if events happened by themselves, through a miraculous or amicable operation . . . Regarding this expansion, little is said about *jihad*. And yet it all happened through war!

This book neatly highlights what one is concealing—I would say, *carefully* concealing—so widespread is the agreement on this silence that it can only be the result of a tacit agreement based on implicit presuppositions. In the face of such an agreement, this book will appear blasphemous and will be described as polemical, simply because it reveals facts, *series* of facts, consistencies in practice—I would say a permanence, which shows that there is no question of accidental events. But despite this clarification, this book is not polemical, for the author willingly recognizes all the great achievements of the Islamic civilization and in no way negates the values of this civilization. The author emphasizes that Islam's victories were due to the military quality of its army and the high statesmanship of its leaders. Likewise—and this is another virtue that we found in *The Dhimmis*—the author takes the greatest account of diversities and subtleties and does not globalize or generalize from a few facts. Relying on the sources to the utmost, she notes the diversities between periods and situations.

But a major, twofold fact transforms the *jihad* into something quite different from traditional wars, waged for ambition and self-interest, with limited objectives, where the "normal" situation is peace between peoples; war, in itself, constitutes a dramatic event which must end in a return to peace. This twofold factor is first the religious nature, then the fact that war has become an institution (and no longer an "event"). *Jihad* is generally translated as "holy war" (this term is not satisfactory): this suggests both that this war is provoked by strong religious feeling, and then that its first object is not so much to conquer land as to Islamize the populations. This war is a religious duty. It will probably be said that every religion in its expanding phase carries the risks of war, that history records hundreds of religious wars and it is now a commonplace to make this connection.³ Hence, religious passion is sometimes expressed in this manner. But it is, in fact, "passion"—it concerns mainly a fact which it would be easy to demonstrate does not correspond to the fundamental message of the religion. This disjuncture is obvious for Christianity. In

Islam, however, *jihad* is a religious obligation. It forms part of the duties that the believer must fulfill; it is Islam's *normal* path to expansion. And this is found repeatedly dozens of times in the Koran. Therefore, the believer is not denying the religious message. Quite the reverse, *jihad* is the way he best obeys it. And the facts which are recorded meticulously and analyzed clearly show that the *jihad* is not a "spiritual war" but a real military war of conquest. It expresses the agreement between the "fundamental book" and the believers' practical strivings. But Bat Ye'or shows that things are not so simple. Since the *jihad* is not solely an external war, it can break out within the Muslim world itself—and wars among Muslims have been numerous but always with the same features.

Hence, the second important specific characteristic is that the *jihad* is an *institution* and not an event, that is to say it is part of the normal functioning of the Muslim world. This is so on two counts. First, this war *creates* the institutions which are its consequence. Of course, all wars bring institutional changes merely by the fact that there are victors and vanquished, but here we are faced with a very different situation. The conquered populations change status (they became *dhimmis*), and the *shari'a* tends to be put into effect integrally, overthrowing the former law of the country. The conquered territories do not simply change "owners." Rather they are brought into a binding collective (religious) ideology—with the exception of the *dhimmi* condition—and are controlled by a highly perfected administrative machinery.⁴

Lastly, in this perspective the *jihad* is an institution in the sense that it participates extensively in the economic life of the Islamic world—like *dhimmitude* does, which involves a specific conception of this economic life, as the author clearly shows. But it is most important to grasp that the *jihad* is an institution in itself; that is to say, an organic piece of Muslim society. As a religious duty, it fits into the religious organization, like pilgrimages, and so on. However, this is not the essential factor, which derives from the division of the world in the (religious) thought of Islam. The world, as Bat Ye'or brilliantly shows, is divided into two regions: the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*; in other words, the "domain of Islam" and "the domain of war." The world is no longer divided into nations, peoples, and tribes. Rather, they are all located en bloc in the world of war, where war is the only possible relationship with the outside world. The earth belongs to Allah and all its inhabitants must acknowledge this reality; to achieve this goal there is but one method: war. War, then, is clearly an institution, not just an incidental or fortuitous institution, but a constituent part of the thought, organization, and structures of this world. Peace with this world of war is impossible. Of course, it is sometimes necessary to call a halt; there are circumstances where it is better not to make war. The Koran makes provision for this. But this

changes nothing: war remains an institution, which means that it must resume as soon as circumstances permit.

I have greatly stressed the characteristics of this war, because there is so much talk nowadays of the tolerance and fundamental pacifism of Islam that it is necessary to recall its nature, which is fundamentally warlike! Moreover, the author provides an enlightening explanation of "Islamization," a complex process whereby Islamized populations supplanted peoples, civilizations, and religions in the conquered countries. This comprised two phases: amalgamative processes (absorption of local cultures, conversions) and conflictive processes (massacres, slavery, and so on). The conflictive and amalgamative situations could in fact co-exist. Nevertheless, there are actually two phases: the first is war; the second is the imposition of the *dhimmi* status.

These are the foundations on which were developed both the expansion of Islam and then the evolution that resulted from the relationship of this empire with the West—an evolution that nothing could prevent and that seemed to reverse the current, since, on the one hand, the West would conquer several Islamic countries and, on the other, Western "values" would influence this world of Islam. But if some of these values (tolerance, for example) are a sort of challenge intending to prove that Islam practices them, others act in another manner to strengthen the dominant trend: nationalism, for example. But whatever the evolution, it must never be forgotten that it can only be superficial because doctrine and conduct are based on a religious foundation: even if this may seem to be weakened or modified, nevertheless what I have elsewhere called the "persistence of religiousness" remains unchanged. In other words, even if the rites, structures, and customs are all that continue to exist of a once-strong religion—today, seemingly neglected—these visible survivals only need a spark for everything immediately to revive, sometimes violently. And this process is described in a masterly fashion in this book: The situation that was thought to be dislocated and lapsed suddenly revives, and we are again faced with the fundamental choice: the world is still divided between the world of Islam and the world of war. And inside the *umma*, the only possible existence for the infidel is *dhimmitude*.

This leads the author to pose the question which has become so alarming today: "Dhimmitude of the West"? After having thus covered thirteen centuries of history, read in the light of this question, we then reach our present situation, acutely feeling its ambiguity and instability. We misunderstand this situation, for lack of a clear vision of the alternative which, whether explicit or not, existed throughout these centuries and which the present book has the immense merit to analyze rigorously. The author has the courage to examine (summarily, because this is not

the purpose of the book) whether a certain number of events, structures, and situations that we know in the West do not already derive from a sort of “dhimmitude” of the West vis-à-vis an Islamic world that has resumed its war and its expansion. Hostage-taking, terrorism, the destruction of Lebanese Christianity, the weakening of the Eastern Churches (not to mention the wish to destroy Israel), and, conversely, Europe’s defensive reaction (antiterrorist infrastructure, the psychological impact of intellectual “terrorism”, political and legal restraints regarding terrorist blackmail): all this recalls precisely the resurgence of the traditional policy of Islam. Indeed, many Muslim governments try to combat the Islamist trend, but to succeed would require a total recasting of mentalities, a desacralization of *jihād*, a self-critical awareness of Islamic imperialism, an acceptance of the secular nature of political power and the rejection of certain Koranic dogmas. Of course, after all the changes that we have seen taking place in the Soviet Union it is not unthinkable, but what a global change that would imply: a change in a whole historical trend and the reform of a remarkably structured religion! This book thus allows us to take our bearings, so as to understand more easily our present situation, as every genuine historical study should do—without, of course, making artificial comparisons and by remembering that history does not repeat itself.

Bordeaux, July 1991

Author's Note

As a general rule the spelling has been simplified by omitting diacritical points, with the exception of an apostrophe (') used indiscriminately for the *hamza* or the (') *ayin* occurring in the middle of a word only. Ordinary transliterations (e.g., Koran instead of Qur'an, Qairuan rather than Kairouan) have been adopted in order to provide the English-speaking reader with the easiest possible phonetic reconstruction. Despite inconsistencies, the different transliterations of individual names (e.g., ibn Khaldun, Ibn Khaldoun) and foreign terms (e.g., *djizya*, *jizya*) have been retained in the quotations and references. Some italicized Arabic and Turkish words have an "s" to indicate a plural, e.g. *dhimmis*, *rayas*, *qadis*.

Texts and quotations in English have been reproduced as originally printed, with the punctuation, syntax, and spelling left intact. Eastern Armenian spelling of names has been used in Armenian texts.

In the documentary section, page numbers in square brackets [] refer to the reference of the work quoted, which are listed in the bibliography under the name of the author provided at the end of each document. Oblique brackets < > indicate additions provided by the translators of the Syriac, Armenian, and Arabic texts. Square brackets [containing clarifications] are by the author, as are the subtitles in italics.

Texts from Christian sources emanating from the higher clergy comprise long commentaries, inspired by the Bible, on the events recounted. Although these digressions often lack neither beauty nor interest since they shed a human light on the perceptions and experience of history, I have preferred to indicate these passages by square brackets [. . .] thereby facilitating reading and maintaining the thread of the narrative after an omission of a few pages. Estimations of the numbers of people killed, mentioned in the chronicles, are generally exaggerated and indicate a scale of magnitude rather than a precise assessment.

The word "antisemitism" is spelled throughout, following the usage initiated by Dr. James Parkes in his pioneer work, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism* (London, 1934).

For convenience, the King James Authorized Version of the Bible and Arthur J. Arberry's *The Koran Interpreted* (London, 1964) have been used.

* * *

Notes for the foreword, introduction, and chapters 1–10 appear at the back of the book. Notes for the documents appear within the documents themselves.

Italic page numbers and part captions in the two indexes refer to the three maps and sixty-seven illustrations.

A planned thematic index will be integrated into a more comprehensive index on this subject, to be published in the English edition of my last book (French edition, 1994).

MAPS

The First Wave of Islamization (632–750)	42
Arabs in the Mediterranean (Ninth century)	51
The Ottoman Empire (Fifteenth–Seventeenth centuries)	54

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I am indebted to René Wadlow, an experienced editor, who kindly read through the entire translated manuscript at short notice.

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The author is grateful to the Public Record Office (London), for permission to reproduce numerous documents dating from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries; and to Mr. David Littman for three letters (1919) from the archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (Paris). She also expresses her thanks and appreciation to the following institutions and publishers for permission to reproduce or reprint material from their books. The page and name provided after each document and illustration are completed by the full source reference in the bibliography:

Columbia University Press (New York), for *The Origins of the Islamic State* by al-Baladhuri, translated from the Arabic by Philip Khuri Hitti. Copyright © 1916; the American Oriental Society (New Haven, Conn.), for “An Answer to the Dhimmis,” by Ghazi b. al-Wasiti, translated by Richard James Horatio Gottheil, in *JAOS* 41 (1921); APA-Philo Press, Postbus

122, NL-3600 AC Maarssen, Netherlands, for *The Chronography of Gregory Abul-Faraj. 1225–1286. The Son of Aaron the Hebrew Physician commonly known as Bar Hebraeus . . .*, translated from the Syriac, with a historical introduction by Ernest Alfred Thompson Wallis Budge (Amsterdam, 1976); the Oriental Institute (Oxford), for “The Origins of Obadya the Norman Proselyte,” translated by Alexander Scheiber, in *JJS* 5, no. 1 (1954); Princeton University Press, for *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, by Ibn Khaldun, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, Bollingen Series 43 (1958); the University of California Press (Berkeley), for *Shaykh Damanhuri on the Churches of Cairo (1739)*, being a translation from the Arabic by Moshe Perlmann (1975).

Illustrations: the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, as well as the Armenian Museum in Jerusalem, for numerous engravings and photographs already reproduced in the French edition of this book, published by Les Editions du Cerf in 1991; the British Library, for the miniature in the Later Herat *Nizami* manuscript, Add. 25900, fol. 121v, “The Battle of the Rival Clans”; the Art Institute of Chicago, for a painting by Eugène Delacroix, “The Combat of the Giaour and Hassan,” 1826 (oil on canvas, 59.6 × 73.4 cm), gift of Mrs. Bertha Palmer Thorne, Mrs. Rose Movius Palmer, and Mr. and Mrs. Arthur M. Wood, 1962.966, photograph © 1995; the Topkapi Saray Library (Istanbul), for the miniature from Nakkas Osman (1588), in Sayyid Lockman, *Hüner-nama*, Ms. fol. 256v; the Palestine Exploration Fund, for a photograph of the Western (Wailing) Wall, Jerusalem (1870); the Israel Museum (Jerusalem), for a Coptic fabric, cat. no. 139; Simon & Schuster Macmillan (New York), for map 22: “The Umayyad Caliphate,” p. 27, and map 24: “Arabs in the Mediterranean in the Ninth Century,” p. 29, from *Historical Atlas of the Middle East* by G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville. Cartography by Lorraine Kessel. Copyright © 1993 by Carta, The Israel Map and Publishing Company Ltd; HarperCollins Publisher, Inc. (New York), for map: “Ottoman Empire, 15th–17th Centuries” (p. 163), from *The Harper Atlas of World History*, Revised Edition by Librairies Hachette. Copyright © 1992.

More than half of the illustrations are reproduced from several publications of the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and from the author’s private collection.

Introduction

This is not a book about Islam; it examines neither its expansion nor its civilization. Its objective is the study of that multitude of peoples subjugated by Islam, and to determine, as far as possible, the complex processes—both endogenous and exogenous—that brought about their gradual extinction. A phenomenon of dissolution, which after all is hardly exceptional, and part and parcel of the evolutionary cycles of human societies.

These *dhimmi* peoples—that is to say, “protected peoples”—represent those populations, custodians of scriptural revelations, who were conquered by Islam. In Iran and the Mediterranean basin, these populations englobed Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews.

For guidance, I used a wide range of sources, which emanate from these peoples and often had the additional advantage of being contemporary with the events described. As these testimonials are confined to certain regions and periods, the dearth of material has, of necessity, determined the areas both of clarity and of silence in this study.

This work was originally conceived as a new French edition of *Le Dhimmi*,¹ based on the revised and considerably expanded English edition. It is therefore hardly surprising that a resemblance still remains, particularly in chapter 3 (chapter 2 of *The Dhimmi*). However, the abundance of new material gave rise to further analyses. Determined to keep the book to a manageable size, I was prompted to reduce considerably the section concerning the Jews of Islam, which had been widely covered in my earlier publications. Essential documents appear in both books.

Whereas there are innumerable studies and specialized works on the history of Islamic civilization, publications on the vanquished peoples remain fragmentary and limited. This makes all the more valuable those books which examine the organization and history of ethnoreligious groups according to geographic boundaries and religious affiliation. The present work is not a chronological recapitulation of the history of the various peoples who were subjugated by the Arabs, Turks, and Persians. That task should be undertaken by a group of historians who would not only be able to master Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, but also Spanish, Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, the Slavonic languages, and the dialects spoken by all those populations who, over the

centuries, constituted the subjected *dhimmis*. These peoples have left plentiful evidence of their past: chronicles, narratives, poems, and other documents. In other words, it would be impossible for any one person to encompass, in its effervescence and its contradictions, the entirety of a history which spans three continents.

My research follows a thematic structure dictated by the broad extent of the subject and its extreme difficulty. In spite of its disadvantages, this method does permit a synthesis of the themes within a long-term perspective. The idea of a general treatment of the history of the *dhimmis* was inspired by the research of the Serbian geographer and ethnologist Jovan Cvijic.² In his essay on "human geography," the author defines the area of Islamic influence in the Balkans with the help of numerous maps and examines its variations in relation to demography, the nature of the soil, climates, and urban or rural environment. My own study attempts to uncover the legal, sociological, and historical framework which determined the evolution of the *dhimmi* peoples, yet far from exhausting the material, it barely sketches a rough outline.

I am indebted to Bashir Gemayel for the term "dhimmitude,"³ which he mentioned on two occasions. This word could not better express the actual subject of my research, begun in 1971, on the manifold and contradictory aspects of a human experience which millions of individuals endured over the centuries, sometimes for more than a millennium.

The specific world of dhimmitude emerged from the documents, and the book itself—with its thematic reflections, landmarks, and stages—was constructed in relation to, and with the aid of, the sources. If they differ somewhat on the chronology of dates—often dubious—they nevertheless agree on essential points. If witnesses, in different contexts and at different periods, describe certain facts based on the special provisions of jurist-theologians, such as the regulations concerning dress, these data can be regarded as a constant element in the status of the *dhimmi*.

I have approached this theme as an object of historical research and have not considered it necessary to resort to apologetic formulas or historical embellishments which, under cover of objectivity, have unfortunately become the norm in this field. Evidently, such a study can only project a negative picture of the history of the Muslim peoples, since it is integrated—sometimes by chance circumstances, sometimes by political design—within the actual process of the disintegration experienced by the conquered peoples. Despite this important disadvantage, I did not feel it expedient to abandon my research, thinking that the prestige of a civilization, which has made such eminent contributions at both the cultural and scientific level, would hardly suffer if, alongside its splendid and triumphant epic, a very small place in history was set aside for these

forgotten peoples. I hope that I shall not be unduly criticized for offering them a tribute of well-deserved sympathy and respect.

The *dhimmi* status examined in this study only concerns Christians and Jews in the Mediterranean basin, Anatolia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Iran. The Zoroastrians, whose influence was preponderant on Islamic civilization, are only mentioned incidentally.

Having already published a considerable number of documents on the Middle Ages and the first half of the nineteenth century, I have limited myself here to little-known pre-medieval sources, particularly on the status of the peasantry, and to certain unpublished nineteenth-century documents. The reader interested in the intervening period may consult the documentary section in the 1985 English edition of *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam* (4th printing, 1996).

For this English edition of *Les Chrétientés d'Orient entre Jihad et Dhimmitude*, several nineteenth-century documents from the British Public Record Office have been enlarged, and also from *The Chronography* of Bar Hebraeus. A document on Sudan from the late nineteenth-century was added, as were several illustrations, others having been omitted.

An analysis of dhimmitude during the twentieth century until recent times is provided in my last book.⁴

The Decline
of Eastern Christianity
under Islam

From Jihad to Dhimmitude

1

The Pre-Islamic Orient

When delving into the history of the peoples of the pre-Islamic Orient, it is necessary to outline, albeit very briefly, the general situation that prevailed there on the eve of the Arab conquest in the seventh century.

On the fringes of Arabia, Sassanid Persia stretched from the Persian Gulf in the south to Armenia in the north and the Indus in the east. Throughout the fertile regions of this vast territory, a dense network of villages supplied food to towns and cities inhabited by merchants and skilled craftsmen. Innumerable churches, monasteries, and synagogues flourished in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates.

Indeed, despite periods of intolerance, the Sassanid dynasty (224–651) had accepted religious pluralism. The aristocracy, the army, and the common people followed Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism, the national religion, whereas in Babylonia and as far as upper Mesopotamia, Christians and Jews were a quasi majority among the peasantry and urban population.¹ Prohibited in Byzantium and therefore encouraged in Persia, Nestorian Christianity was widespread in Babylonia, Susiana, Fars, Khuzistan, on the eastern coast of Arabia, in Bahrain, and in Oman; it had infiltrated as far as Sistan (Afghanistan) and had reached China.²


The Jews formed the largest community in Babylonia after the Nestorians.³ They constituted a majority in the southern province between the Euphrates and the Tigris (Sawad), a region where a technically advanced network of irrigation canals supported intensive exploitation of the soil. Thus, this province was renowned for its fertility, gardens, and orchards. The Jews lived mainly along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, but also formed scattered communities in the regions of present-day Iraq, in Syria, and as far as the foot of the Zagros mountains.

Monophysite Christians (or Jacobites) were fewer in number than the Nestorians or Jews, yet they made up sizable communities, especially in Mesopotamia, the Jazira between Armenia and Syria, and around Tagrit on the Tigris (Assyria), seat of the Eastern Monophysite Primate.

Cradle of a rural and urban economy-based civilization, these densely populated regions contained prosperous towns bustling with merchants

and artisans whose skill was expressed at its finest in utilitarian or decorative objects, whether woven, wrought, chiseled, or modeled. Spiritual life prospered in churches, monasteries, and synagogues, while jurists codified the bases of a civil organization which allowed the Christians and Jews of Persia to rule themselves according to their own jurisdiction. In effect, each group had several schools and academies where scholars, learned men, and theologians developed their knowledge and transmitted their science.

Facing the powerful Persian Empire, the Byzantine Empire extended from its eastern limits along the desert borders of Syria and Palestine toward North Africa in the west. In these provinces, doctrinal conflicts undermined Christianity, the state religion since Constantine's conversion (337). Whereas Nestorianism found refuge in Persia, the Monophysite dogma spread to Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia. Although the Byzantine territories were completely Christianized, nonetheless substantial Jewish communities inhabited the Mediterranean regions, principally in Palestine (Galilee, Samaria, Judea), Syria, Egypt, and along the North African coast.



House of Airamis. Refadi, north Syrian desert

The names of the owner, Simeon, and the architect, Airamis, appear on the Greek inscription to the left: *Simeon, may the Lord bless our going in and our coming out. Amen. This portico was completed the 13 lous, the third indiction of the year 558 [13 August 510], Airamis.*

de Vogüé, vol. 2 (1877), pl. 110

These primarily rural populations farmed intensively in the Nile, Jordan, and Litani valleys; the mountains and hillsides of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria; the oases of Egypt; and the Negev and Transjordan. Densely populated, many of these regions were then among the most fertile, despite the aridity of certain soils. The abundant produce of the

fields, orchards, and pastures supplied the many towns and cities, centers of a brilliant culture and civilization. Jerusalem, Alexandria, Caesarea, Antioch, and many other cities glittered throughout the Latino-Byzantine world.

The magnificence of the urban architecture, the ingenuity and skill of the craftsmen, the genius of the artists, and the erudite debates of the learned satisfied the requirements of a large urban population: scholars, philosophers, jurists, theologians, or merchants, whose activities covered the whole Mediterranean and spread as far as the Indies.

On the eve of the Islamic conquest, a certain degree of homogeneity emerged from the civilization of the Near East and North Africa, despite the bloody religious conflicts. Heir to Hellenistic culture, it had assimilated the spiritual values of Judaism via Christianity. Although Greek and Pahlavi were the official languages of the Byzantine and Persian empires, respectively, the native inhabitants of Babylonia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine spoke and wrote Aramaic. Being a vernacular, liturgical, and literary language, Aramaic was used by the Jews to compile juridical works such as the Talmud and by the Christians to write the historical and theological works of the Nestorian and Monophysite Churches in its Syriac version. In Egypt, the native inhabitants used Coptic, their spoken and written national language.

As in Sassanid Mesopotamia, the intensity of religious and cultural life on Byzantine soil was evidenced by the innumerable places of worship and by the violence of the diatribes and religious conflicts which stimulated literary and artistic production. From the Nile valley to Ctesiphon (Babylonia), the Sassanid capital, the native inhabitants of the territories which the Arab armies would soon invade constituted the most civilized peoples of their time.

Arabia itself, despite the isolation imposed by deserts, was penetrated by the spiritual currents stirring its powerful neighbors, Persia and Byzantium. At a very ancient period Judaism, and later Nestorian and Monophysite Christianity, had been widespread in the peninsula, along the nearby coasts of Egypt and Persia. Several Jewish tribes, immigrant or of Arab origin, cultivated the oases of the Hijaz: Ta'if, Yathrib, Fadak, Khaybar, Tayma, Tabuk, and others. These tribes, mainly composed of peasants and craftsmen, lived among the pagan Arabs, semisedentary shepherds or townsmen who carried on the caravan trade from Arabia to Palestine, Syria, Persia, and the Indian Ocean. Outside the oases, the desert vegetation of Arabia could only feed the flocks of nomads, dependent on seasonal transhumance. Linked by tribal ties or joined in powerful warlike confederations as in north and central Arabia, these tribes carried out razzias on the oases and the caravans. In the absence of a state or juridical organization governing social ties, relations be-

tween the warlike nomads who lived in the deserts and the sedentary populations of the oases or towns were controlled by a system of ransom or payment of protection money.⁴

The renewed incursions by nomads into the cultivated land of lower Mesopotamia and Syria on the Arabian fringes had necessitated their permanent surveillance from ancient times. Thus the Byzantines had assigned to a Christianized Arabian tribe, the Ghassanids, the task of restricting the nomadic advance within the desert by means of regular subsidies, military support in the form of weapons and horses, and honorific titles. The Lakhmids, another Christianized Arabian tribe, fulfilled the same functions on the southern frontier of Persia.

However, the constant south-north thrust had led several partially Christianized Arab tribes to settle on the edges of the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts in the course of their seasonal migrations. Gradually, by continuous slow infiltration, these nomadic shepherds had acquired permanent or seasonal roots on the west bank of the Euphrates and on the borders of Syria and Palestine. Engaged in stock-rearing, the semisedentary or nomadic Arabs attended the markets and nearby towns, thereby keeping close contacts with sister or allied tribes roaming the Hijaz and Najd. Intermediaries between the nomado-Arab world and the settled civilizations, they remained alien components, extraneous to the civilizations of the Near East. The religious controversies which stirred the populations and the great cultural movements expressed through the creativity of these civilizations remained alien to them.⁵

Indeed, the seventh century inaugurated an eruption of bloody fanaticism against a background of the Perso-Byzantine wars. In Persia itself, Manicheism had been drowned in a bloodbath; in the Christian world, the condemnation of Nestorianism by the Council of Ephesus (431), followed by the prohibition of Monophysitism at the Council of Chalcedon (451), rekindled the war between the Eastern Churches and the Greek Church (Chalcedonian or Melchite). These doctrinal dissensions were envenomed by quarrels among the patriarchs over the hierarchical primacy of their sees, the control of nominations and finances in the dioceses, and their respective boundaries. In addition to these conflicts, the national antagonisms of the various Christian ethnic groups, fuelled by huge politicoeconomic interests, set Nestorian Persians against the Monophysite (Jacobites) populations: Armenians, Egyptians (Copts), and Aramaeans in Syria and Mesopotamia.

Determined to subject the Eastern Churches to its obedience, the Greek episcopate had prohibited the Oriental rite by persecutions and the confiscation of churches, monasteries, and dioceses. These conflicts worsened when the emperor Heraclius (610–41), at the instigation of

the bishop of Jerusalem, decreed the conversion of the Jews (632). This measure unleashed a wave of cruelty and killing throughout his empire, thereby increasing hostility to Byzantine rule.

Before the Arab offensive, the power struggle in Constantinople between the emperor Phocas (602–10) and his general Heraclius had provoked mutiny in the administration and among the Greek troops stationed in Egypt. In addition, the debilitating Greco-Persian wars (611–30) had left the Arab frontiers of these empires unguarded. When the Islamized Bedouins planned their raids on the towns of Babylonia and Syria, they recruited allies not only from among local Christians—Nestorians, Jacobites, and even Melchites—but primarily from among those Arabs who, having settled in these regions, now joined the invaders in order to participate in the sacking of the towns and populations among whom they had lived. Persians and Greeks at that time saw these destructions as no more than the usual predatory activities of nomads, extorting their booty by *razzias*. They were mistaken—this was *jihad*.

THE ORIGIN OF *JIHAD*

Islam—a religion revealed in Arabic by an Arabian prophet—was born in seventh-century Arabia and developed in the midst of a population whose traditions and customs were conditioned by a specific geographic environment. Consequently, while borrowing the essentials of its ethical teaching from the two biblical religions, Islam integrated specific local cultural elements from the customs of the nomadic or semisedentary tribes which populated the Hijaz. These tribes formed the militant nucleus of the Islamic community and, by war, ensured that its resources and its followers constantly expanded. In the space of a century the Islamized Arabs, originating from the world's most arid regions, had conquered the most powerful empires and had subjugated peoples who had created prestigious civilizations.

The *jihad* (the holy war against non-Muslims) linked the mores of great warlike nomadism with the conditions of existence of Muhammad in Yathrib (Medina) where he emigrated in 622, fleeing the persecutions of the pagan Meccans. Lacking means of subsistence, the small emigrant Muslim community lived at the expense of the new converts in Medina, the *Ansar*. As this situation could not last, the Prophet organized armed incursions to intercept the caravans which traded with Mecca. Interpreter of the will of Allah, Muhammad combined the political power of a military leader, the religious power and the functions of a judge: "Whosoever obeys the Messenger, thereby obeys God" (Koran 4: 82).

Divine revelations relating to these raids justified the Muslims' right

to the property and lives of their pagan enemies. Verses in the Koran sacralized the psychological conditioning of the fighters, the logistics and procedures of battle, the division of the booty, and the fate of the vanquished. Gradually, relationships with non-Muslims were determined in the course of the ambushes, battles, stratagems, and truces, which formed the holy war's body of tactics, required to secure the expansion of Islam.

As the life of Muhammad has already been the subject of a large number of studies, it is unnecessary to go over it again. Suffice it to note that the policy the Arab prophet adopted toward the Jews of Medina and the Jews and Christians of the oasis of the Hijaz determined his successors' policy towards the native Jewish and Christian inhabitants of territories conquered subsequently. The Jews of Medina were either plundered and expelled from the town (Banu Qaynuqa, Banu Nadhir, 624–25) or massacred, except for converts to Islam and women and children who were reduced to slavery (Banu Qurayza, 627). As all these decisions were justified by Allah's revelations inscribed in the Koran, they became normative and obligatory in the strategy of the *jihad*. The possessions of the Jews of Medina constituted a booty to be shared between the Muslim fighters, a fifth of every seizure being reserved for the Prophet himself. In the case of the Banu Nadhir, Muhammad kept all the booty, which, having been taken without a fight, reverted in its entirety to the Prophet. According to verses in the Koran (59:6–8), he was entrusted with managing it for the benefit of the Muslim community, the *umma*. This was the origin of the *fay*, that is to say, the religious principle, laden with consequences for the future, whereby the collective property of the *umma* was constituted by the former property confiscated from the vanquished non-Muslims.

Muslim jurisconsults subsequently derived the status of the tributaries from the treaty concluded between Muhammad and the Jews who farmed the Khaybar oasis. Within the framework of the present study, the tributaries are the Jews and Christians—referred to as “Peoples of the Book,” the Bible—and the Persian Zoroastrians.

In this treaty, Muhammad had confirmed the Jews of Khaybar in the *possession* of their land, the *ownership* of which passed to the Muslims as booty (*fay*). The Jews retained their religion and possessions on condition that they handed over half their harvests to the Muslims. However, this status was not permanent as Muhammad reserved the right to abrogate it at random.⁶

The *umma* continued to grow and increased its wealth by raids on caravans and oases populated by Jews, Christians, or pagans in Arabia, and to the furthestmost Syro-Palestinian deserts (629–32). These agglomerations, situated to the north of Ayla (Eilat), in the Wadi Rumm

and around Mu'ta, were surrounded by nomadic Arab tribes. When these tribes rallied to Muhammad, the settled populations, frightened by the razzias, preferred to deal with the Prophet on the basis of an agreed tribute.⁷ Utilizing contemporary sources, Michael the Syrian later described these events:

[Muhammad] began to assemble a band of his own and to organize ambushes in parts of Palestine, so that by bringing something back for them [the Arabs], he persuaded them to believe in him and to join him. As he had gone down [from Medina] and gone up several times without being harmed, had pillaged and had returned laden <with booty>, the thing [Muhammad's preaching] was confirmed for them by the love of possessions which led them to make a regular feature of going out to pillage . . . Soon his troops set about invading and pillaging several lands. [. . .]

We showed earlier how, from the beginning of the empire of the Arabs, they went out to take prisoners, to pillage, steal, ambush, invade and destroy whole regions during all of Muhammad's life.⁸

By the time the Prophet died (632) nearly all the tribes of the Hijaz had rallied to Islam, idolatry had been vanquished in Arabia, and the Peoples of the Book, Jews and Christians, were paying tribute to the Muslims. The Prophet's successor, Abu Bakr, suppressed the revolt (*ridda*) of the Bedouins and forced them to adopt Islam and pay the legal tax (*zakat*). After unifying the peninsula, he carried the war (*jihad*) beyond Arabia. The *jihad* provided non-Muslims with an alternative: conversion or tribute; refusal forced the Muslims to fight them till victory. Arab idolaters had to choose between death or conversion; as for Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, if they paid tribute and accepted the conditions of conquest, they could buy back their right to life, freedom of worship, and security of property.

In 640 the second caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, drove the Jewish and Christian tributaries out of Hijaz by invoking the *dhimma* (contract) of Khaybar: the land belonged to Allah and his Envoy and the contract could be broken at the discretion of the *imam*, the religious and political leader of the *umma* and the interpreter of Allah's will. Umar also invoked the desire expressed by the Prophet on his deathbed: "Two religions should not co-exist within the Arabian peninsula."⁹

THE *JIHAD*: DOGMA AND STRATEGIES

The doctrine of *jihad* borrowed the practices of the razzias perpetrated by the nomads but softened them with Koranic injunctions.¹⁰ Muslim jurisconsults established a Koranic dogma that regulated the procedures and tactics of military operations during the conquests, as well as the

treatment of conquered peoples and the fiscal system applicable to the conquered lands (tithe, *kharaj*, *fay*). A brief outline follows.

The aim of *jihad* is to subjugate the peoples of the world to the law of Allah, decreed by his prophet Muhammad. Mankind is divided into two groups, Muslims and non-Muslims. The former compose the Islamic community, the *umma*, who own the territories of the *dar al-Islam* governed by Islamic law. Non-Muslims are *harbis*, inhabitants of the *dar al-harb*, the lands of war, so called because they are destined to come under Islamic jurisdiction, either by war (*harb*), or by the conversion of their inhabitants. According to the jurisconsult Ibn Taimiya (fourteenth century), the property of non-Muslims must revert legitimately to the sole followers of the true religion (Islam). Consequently, the *jihad* is the means whereby possessions considered illegally usurped by non-Muslims are restored to Muslims.¹¹ That is why every act of war in the *dar al-harb* is legal and immune from censure.¹²

As the *jihad* is a permanent war, it excludes the idea of peace but authorizes temporary truces related to the political situation (*muhadana*). These truces must not last for more than ten years at most and can be unilaterally denounced by the imam, after notifying the adversary. In the context of temporary truces, the *jihad* governs the conditions of treaties with the *dar al-harb* and provides for an intermediate state of non-war or of vassality. The holy war, regarded by Islamic theologians as one of the pillars of the faith, is incumbent on all Muslims; they have to contribute to it according to their capacities, by their persons, their property, or their writings.


Jihad can be waged by military means, as occurred during the period of the great Arab expansion (seventh to eighth century), and later by the Islamized Turks in Europe. The strategy of war provides for the destabilization at the frontiers of the *dar al-harb* by irregular forces—burn villages, take hostages, or pillage and massacre in order to drive out the inhabitants and facilitate the army's advance by gradual territorial encroachment. The methods of dividing the booty are governed by Koranic revelations, one fifth reverting to the custodian of spiritual political authority (the imam or caliph).

Jihad can also be waged by peaceful means: proselytism, propaganda, and corruption which consists of gratuities "to win over hearts" (*ta'lif al-qulub*). The *harbi*, inhabitant of the lands of war, is an enemy who cannot venture without risk into the lands of Islam where, according to the dogma, any Muslim may shed his blood and seize his goods. However, his safety can be ensured by the *aman*, a temporary protection which any Muslim of either sex can grant.

When a victory transforms some of the *dar al-harb* into *dar al-Islam*, its former inhabitants (*harbis*) become prisoners of war. The imam can,

according to the circumstances of the conflict, condemn them to massacre, slavery, exile, or negotiate with their representatives and grant them a treaty of protection (*dhimma*), which confers on them the status of tributaries (*dhimmis*). The *dhimmi* status resulting directly from the *jihad* is linked to this contract which suspends the initial right of the victor over the vanquished, providing the latter agree to pay tribute and submit to Islam, following the example of the agreements that the Prophet made with the Jews and Christians whom he subjugated.

If the *jihad*—the procedures of war—is viewed in the context of the period, it could be argued that Islam not only moderated Bedouin barbarism but also had an immensely beneficial influence on Bedouin society. The *dhimma*, independent of its later applications and interpretations, henceforth prohibited pillage, massacre, and enslavement inherent in the *razzias*. Even if the total extermination of the vanquished had never been perpetrated by the victors, it is nonetheless true that the offer of the *dhimma*, erected as a theological principle, curbed the barbarity of war.



The First Wave of Islamization (632-750)

2

The Era of Conquests

THE FIRST WAVE OF ISLAMIZATION (632–750)

Under the first four caliphs—Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali—and under their Umayyad successors, the Arab conquest spread over land and sea. Led by brilliant and fearless leaders, the Muslims overcame the Persian armies and seized Babylonia, Susiana, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Persia, pushing on as far as the Sind (713) and beyond the Syr-Daria (751). In the West, they conquered all the Christian provinces of the eastern Mediterranean, from Syria and Palestine to Egypt, North Africa and through Spain, before suffering defeats at Narbonne (720) and at Poitiers (732).

After the Abbasid revolt (750), the caliphs—harassed by religious and dynastic schisms and by the Byzantine armies—contented themselves with sending their troops to pillage, sack, and carry off booty from across their frontiers with Anatolia and Armenia. But in the West, Islamic expansion continued by maritime warfare. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Berbers and Arabs from Spain and the Maghreb raided the coasts of France, Italy, Sicily, and the Greek islands. These confrontations between Muslims and Byzantines in the central Mediterranean aimed at ensuring Islamic naval supremacy, while still offering to adventurers opportunities for gaining vast booty.

Expansion Overland

About 633, Arab armies composed of nomadic tribes from Yemen, the Hijaz, and other regions of Arabia invaded Babylonia and Syria. The conquest extended over a decade and comprised some decisive armed confrontations, but mainly razzias and the pillage of both villages and rural areas. This conquest was facilitated by support from Arab tribes who had infiltrated the Mesopotamian and Syro-Palestinian borders of Arabia during the previous two centuries, occasionally settling

there. Some of these tribes had become Christianized, opting for either Nestorianism or Monophysitism, depending on whether they had settled in Persian or Byzantine territory. As vassals of these states, they assumed responsibility for defending their frontiers and protecting towns and villages against the raids of the nomadic Bedouins who roamed throughout the adjacent deserts.


In the light of this Arab tribal migration and their settlement on Persian and Byzantine territory, some recent historians discarded the theory of a lightning Islamic conquest. Rather, they have suggested a gradual process spread out over two centuries of continuous penetration by the nomadic Arab world into those regions of sedentary civilization.¹ The disintegration of the Persian and Byzantine empires and the collapse of their defenses made it possible for the nomadic tribes, united by Islam, to invade the countryside, enlisting valuable assistance for their razzias from among those Arabs settled on the margins of Mesopotamia and Syria, who were familiar with the topography of these regions.

After the death of the Prophet, the caliph Abu Bakr organized the invasion of Syria which Muhammad had already envisaged. He gathered tribes from the Hijaz, Najd, and Yemen and advised Abu Ubayda, in charge of operations in the Golan (Palestine), to plunder the countryside but, due to a lack of adequate weaponry, to refrain from attacking towns.²

Consequently, the whole Gaza region up to Cesarea was sacked and devastated in the campaign of 634. Four thousand Jewish, Christian, and Samaritan peasants who defended their land were massacred. The villages of the Negev were pillaged by Amr b. al-As, while the Arabs overran the countryside, cut communications, and made roads perilous. Towns such as Jerusalem, Gaza, Jaffa, Cesarea, Nablus, and Beth Shean were isolated and closed their gates. In his sermon on Christmas Day 634, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, lamented over the impossibility of going on pilgrimage to Bethlehem as was the custom, because the Christians were being forcibly kept in Jerusalem: "not detained by tangible bonds, but chained and nailed by fear of the Saracens," whose "savage, barbarous and bloody sword" kept them locked up in the town.³

In Syria, the Ghassanides and Monophysite Arabs sided with the Muslims. Sophronius, in his sermon on the Day of Epiphany 636, bewailed the destruction of churches and monasteries, the sacked towns, the fields laid waste, the villages burned down by the nomads who were overrunning the country. In a letter the same year to Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, he mentions the ravages wrought by the Arabs.⁴ Thousands of people perished in 639, victims of the famine and plague that resulted from these destructions.

A distinction, however, should be made at this point between the fate



Mosaic from the Synagogue at Beth Shean (5th-7th century). Israel
Abandoned in the 7th century

Israel Museum

suffered by the peasantry and that of the townspeople. In effect, these campaigns combined the usual razzias carried out by nomads on the sedentary peoples with new regulations that related to the terms on which the towns surrendered. Country areas, particularly the plains and valleys populated with hamlets and villages, were ravaged by Bedouins who set fire to crops, massacred and carried off the peasantry and their cattle, and left nothing but ruins. Townspeople were in a different position. Protected by their walls, they could defend themselves or negotiate the conditions of their surrender on payment of tribute to the Bedouin chiefs.

This distinction between rural regions and towns, mentioned in contemporary Christian accounts, is confirmed by later Muslim historians. In fact, the record of the precise progress of the Arab conquests constituted a basic principle in the earliest stages of Muslim law, since it fixed not only the nature and taxation of the land, but also the legislation applicable to its indigenous inhabitants. Although some disparities appeared in respect of the towns, the majority of the villages fell into the category of conquest without treaty. According to the strategy of *jihad*, the absence of a treaty allowed the massacre or enslavement of the conquered population and the division of their property.

Whatever the land, country, or people vanquished, this pattern invariably recurred in the two cycles of Islamization: the Arab and the Turkish. It reconciled the predatory habits of the Bedouins vis-à-vis the settled populations with the rules of *jihad* and, naturally, with the customary practices of the time.

The attack on Babylonia took place on two fronts which corresponded precisely to the densest Arab settlements: in the south, around Ubullā; and slightly higher up the Euphrates, in the Hira region. Large numbers of Christian Arab tribes fought on the Persian side,⁵ but others, long settled in these regions and attracted by booty, went over to the Muslims.⁶ The chief of one of these tribes, the Banu Ijil, had even informed the caliph Umar, then in Medina, of deficiencies in the Persian defenses and had invited him to send an army there. Tribes from northern Arabia who pillaged villages along the Euphrates and took advantage of the Persian weakness were enrolled in the Islamic forces.

Helped by local Arab support—particularly active in the central region and the lower Euphrates—and by troop reinforcements sent from Arabia, the Muslims extended their raids on the countryside and villages to the south and center of Iraq around Mada'in (Ctesiphon). After their victory at al-Qadisiyya (636), they invaded the Sawad (Babylonia), the villages along the Tigris and Euphrates, advancing to Tagrit on the Tigris and Karkisiya on the Euphrates.⁷ These raids were supported by Umar who sent reinforcements from Medina. The monasteries were pillaged, the monks killed, and Monophysite Arabs massacred, enslaved, or Islamized by force;⁸ in Elam the population was also decimated, and in Susa the notables were put to the sword. The conquest of Mesopotamia took place between 635 and 642. Like the conquest of Syria, it seems to have been a joint operation between the Muslim armies and Arabs already settled in the region.

More information is available on the political situation in Egypt, thanks to the chronicle written between 693 and 700 by John, bishop of Nikiou, a place on the Nile near present-day Damanhur. The author represented the Jacobite episcopate of Upper Egypt and held the position of director of monasteries. Witness to the events, he was an important enough figure to be able to understand their complexity.⁹

A ten-year religious war was still rife in Egypt when the Arab bands entered it in December 639. With a force of four thousand men, Amr b. al-As passed through al-Arish, seized Pelusium in the Delta region after a month-long siege, then Bilbays before marching on Babylon (Old Cairo), while simultaneously sending a force against the Fayyum oasis. Behnesa, a town further south, was seized by the Muslims, who exterminated its inhabitants,¹⁰ while the Fayyum and Aboit suffered the same fate. The whole population of Nikiou was put to the sword. Amr contin-

ued the conquest of Egypt, pillaging and massacring. The terrorized inhabitants fled to the towns, abandoning their property, possessions, and livestock. Bishop John of Nikiou mentions two Egyptians who helped the Bedouins, one of whom disclosed to Amr the positions of the Egypto-Greek army, which was wiped out near Aboit; the other, a Melchite, supported the Arabs out of spite, having previously been slapped and humiliated by John, the prefect of Damietta.

Terrified by the horrors perpetrated by the Arabs, the Egyptian population carried out Amr's orders to equip and supply the army. Some Egyptians renounced Christianity and joined the Arabs in pillaging. It seems that the devastation caused by the Muslim invasion and the departure of the Byzantine troops took place amidst the confusion of an Egyptian civil war, with old scores being settled by Christian renegades and among Monophysite Copts and Orthodox Greeks.

The Arabs continued to launch successive raids on Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Armenia. The countryside suffered constant razzias, while those who escaped the sword swelled the contingents of enslaved women and children, shared out among the soldiers after the deduction of the fifth reserved for the caliph. According to Michael the Syrian, the land taken from the Greeks was systematically pillaged. "The Taiyaye [Arabs] grew rich, increased and overran (the lands) which they took from the Romans [Byzantines] and which were given over to pillage."¹¹

After the surrender of Damascus:

Umar [Ibn al-Khattab] sent Khalid [b. Walid] with an army to the Aleppo and Antioch region. There, they murdered a large number of people. No-one escaped them. Whatever may be said of the evils that Syria suffered, they cannot be recounted because of their great number; for the Taiyaye [the Arabs] were the great rod of God's wrath.¹²

Palestine was laid waste and plundered.¹³ The Arabs moved into Cilicia, taking inhabitants with them into captivity. Mu'awiya sent Habib b. Maslama to Armenia, then torn by internecine conflicts. On his orders, the population of Euchaita (on the river Halys) was put to the sword; those who escaped were all taken into slavery.¹⁴ According to the Armenian chroniclers, the Arabs, after they decimated the populations in Assyria and forced large numbers of people to embrace Islam, "entered the district of Daron [south-west of lake Van] which they sacked, shedding rivers of blood. They exacted tribute and forced the women and children to be handed over to them."¹⁵ In 642 they took the town of Dvin and annihilated the population by the sword. Then "the Ishmaelites returned by the route whence they had come, carrying off in their wake a multitude of captives to the number of thirty-five thousand."¹⁶

The following year, according to the same chronicler, the Arabs again invaded Armenia, "wreaking havoc, ruin and slavery."¹⁷

Mu'awiya while in Cappadocia, ravaged the entire region, seized men, and collected considerable booty. Then he led his troops on to devastate the whole region of Amorium. Cyprus was sacked and pillaged (649), after which Mu'awiya turned toward Constantia (Salamis), its capital, where he established his rule by a "great massacre."¹⁸ The island was pillaged again.

In North Africa, the Arabs took thousands of captives and accumulated a large stock of booty. Whereas the strongholds were defended, "the Muslims set to work overrunning and laying waste the open country."¹⁹ Tripoli was ransacked in 643; Carthage was entirely razed to the ground and most of its inhabitants killed. The Arabs put the Maghreb to fire and sword, and it took them more than a century to restore peace there by crushing the Berber resistance.

The wars continued on land and sea with Mu'awiya's successors. Arab troops wrought havoc in Anatolia by numerous incursions; churches were desecrated and burned down; all the inhabitants of Pergamum, Sardes, and other towns were led into captivity. The Greek towns of Gangres and Nicaea were destroyed. Contemporary Christian chronicles mention entire regions ravaged, villages razed to the ground, towns burned, pillaged and destroyed, while entire populations were enslaved.

As has been mentioned, town populations were not always spared. They often suffered massacre or slavery, always accompanied by deportations. This was the fate of the Christians and Jews of Aleppo, Antioch, Ctesiphon, Euchaita, Constantia, Pathos (Cyprus), Pergamum, Sardes, Germanicea (Marash), and Samosata—to cite but a few examples. In the course of the Umayyads' last attempt to take Constantinople (717), the Arab army commanded by Maslama carried out a pincer movement by land and sea and laid waste the whole region around the capital.

The religious obligation to fight the Christians required a permanent state of war which justified the organization of seasonal raids (*ghazwa*)—in winter, spring, summer, and autumn. They sometimes consisted of short pillaging incursions into adjacent *harbi* villages to collect booty, steal livestock, and enslave the villagers. Other campaigns, led by the caliph in person, called for considerable military preparations. Provinces were ravaged and burned down, towns pillaged and destroyed, inhabitants massacred or deported. The first Abbasid caliphs—at the head of their Arab troops and Turkish slaves—continued to lead razzias into Byzantine Anatolia and Armenia. When Amorium was ransacked (838) and surrendered by a Muslim traitor, the caliph Mu'tasim had four thousand inhabitants put to the sword; women and children sold into slavery were deported; Greek captives, who could not be deported, were killed

on the spot. A prisoners' revolt was put down by the extermination of six thousand Greeks.

Despite the fragmentation of the Arab Empire into emirates or semi-autonomous provinces, the razzias to collect booty and slaves, carried out in the name of the caliph, continued century after century with varying success. In 939–40, Sayf al-Dawla, famous for his wars against the infidel, laid waste Mush in Armenia and the whole region of Colonia and the surrounding villages. In 953–54, he burned down the Melitene region and took captives. Two years later, he left "to raid Greek territory, going inland as far as Harsan [in Armenia] and Sariha, taking several fortresses, capturing prisoners of both sexes and covering the Greek countryside with massacres, fires, and devastation."²⁰ In 957, Sayf al-Dawla burned down the towns of Cappadocia, the Hisn Ziyad (Harpur) region in Armenia, enslaving women and children. The emigration of the Turkoman nomads renewed the *jihad*. In the eleventh century, "The empire of the Turks had been extended to Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine [. . .] Turks and Arabs were mixed together like a single people."²¹

For centuries after its conquest in 712, Spain became the terrain par excellence for the *jihad* in the West of the *dar al-islam*. Waves of Muslim, Arab, and Berber immigrants appropriated fiefs for themselves which continued to be cultivated by the native inhabitants, who were tolerated as tributaries or slaves, according to the conditions of the conquest. The various Arab tribes originating from the south (Kalbites) or the north and center of Arabia (Qaysites), and who had emigrated to the Maghreb and then Spain, had confiscated the best lands, relegating the Berbers to the mountainous regions.

Breaking out of Arabia and from the conquered regions—Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine—these successive waves of immigrants settled in Spain and terrorized southern France. Reaching as far as Avignon, they plundered the Rhone valley by repeated razzias. In 793, the suburbs of Narbonne were burned down and its outskirts raided.²² Calls to *jihad* attracted the fanaticized hordes in the *ribats* (monastery-fortresses) spanning the Islamo-Spanish frontiers. Towns were pillaged and rural areas devastated. In 981, Zamora and the surrounding countryside in the kingdom of Leon suffered destruction and the deportation of four thousand prisoners. Four years later, Barcelona was destroyed by fire and nearly all its inhabitants massacred or taken prisoner; several years after its conquest in 987, Coimbra remained desolate; Leon was demolished and its countryside ruined. In 997, Santiago de Compostela was pillaged and razed to the ground. Three years later, Castile was put to fire and sword by Muslim troops and the population, captured in the course of these campaigns, enslaved and deported.²³ The invasions by

the Almoravides and the Almohades (eleventh to thirteenth centuries), Berber dynasties from the Maghreb, reactivated the *jihad*.


Jihad on the Seas

Rapidly exploiting sea-warfare techniques of the conquered Christian populations, the Arabs carried the *jihad* to the coasts of Europe. The populations of Cyprus (649) and the islands of Cos, Rhodes (672), and Crete (674) were slaughtered or enslaved. The Cyzicus peninsula was ravaged (670) and Paros was reduced to an uninhabited desert. The coasts of southern France and Italy were plundered.

After the forced Islamization of the Jewish and Christian Berber tribes of the Maghreb and the strengthening of Arab-Islamic power, Maghrebian pirates under the Aghlabid dynasty (800–909) undertook a number of expeditions along the European coasts in conjunction with Arabs from Spain. During the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, such *razzias* depopulated Sardinia, Sicily, the coasts of Italy and southern France and, in the eastern Mediterranean, the Cyclades, the regions of Athos, Euboea, and along the Greek coast.

Landing on Crete in 827 or 828, Arabs from Spain laid waste the island in the space of twelve days, enslaving the populations of twenty-nine towns and sparing one single site where Christians could retain their religion. Moving on to the island of Aegina (gulf of Corinth), they destroyed or deported all the inhabitants as slaves. After having subjugated Bari (842) in southern Italy, then Messina (843) and Modica (844) in Sicily, the Muslim armies set siege to Rome (846). During the 852–53 campaign against Castrogiovanni, Catania, Syracuse, Noto, and Ragusa in Sicily, the Tunisian al-Abbas “took booty in all these territories, ravaged, burned.”²⁴ During the expedition to the island in summer 853–54, al-Abbas “destroyed the Christians’ harvests and sent expeditionary forces in all directions.”²⁵ After a six-month siege, the inhabitants of Butira pledged to hand over to him six thousand prisoners, who were then led away. Every year, harvests were laid waste, villages burned and destroyed, towns conquered and reduced to ruins. In the course of the 857–58 campaign, the inhabitants of Cefalu (Sicily) obtained peace by promising to leave their town and abandon it to the Muslims, who then destroyed it. In 878, Syracuse fell after a nine-month siege: “Thousands of its inhabitants were killed and booty acquired, the like of which had never before been taken in any other town. A very small number of men were able to escape.”²⁶ After pillaging the town, the invaders destroyed it. In 902, the inhabitants of Taormina were decimated by the sword.²⁷

This general picture of destruction, ruin, massacre, and deportation of urban and rural captive populations was common to all the conquered



Arabs in the Mediterranean (9th century)

territories in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Well documented by contemporary Syriac, Greek, and Arabic chronicles, the few examples provided illustrate a general situation as it recurred regularly during the seasonal razzias, over the years, and for centuries. These chronicles, in great part translated and published, are well known to specialized historians and indicate clearly, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the rules of *jihad* concerning booty, the fifth part, the *fay*, levies on harvests, and the fate of populations (conversion, massacre, slavery, or tribute) were not just vague principles laid down by a theoretical treatise on warfare, construed by some obscure theologian. The Arabs, stirred by their profound belief and the conviction of belonging to an elite nation, superior to all others (Koran 3: 106), put them into practice, feeling that they were thereby fulfilling a religious duty and executing the will of Allah.

It must be stressed, however, that massacre or slavery of the vanquished peoples, burning, pillage, destruction, and the claiming of tribute were the common practices during the period under consideration of every army whether Greek, Latin, or Slav. Only the excess, the regular repetition and the systematization of the destruction, codified by theology, distinguishes the *jihad* from other wars of conquest or depredation.

THE SECOND WAVE OF ISLAMIZATION

Despite the ongoing *jihad* in Spain, the Mediterranean, and Asia Minor, the Arab Empire, although fragmented, seemed to have reached its limits by the tenth century. In these territories, the once predominant and powerful Christendoms and the important Jewish communities were already much diminished.

The Islamization of the Turks within the Muslim empire integrated new and unlimited forces. Uncouth and hardy, they had, since the ninth century, supplied contingents of slaves exclusively reserved for the Abbasid caliph's guard and for military service. Thus, quite naturally, the ideology and tactics of *jihad* inflamed the warlike tendencies of their tribes, already roaming the Asiatic borders of the Greek and Armenian lands. They joined its ranks with the enthusiasm of neophytes and their ravages facilitated the Islamization and Turkification of Armenia, the Greek territories of Anatolia and the Balkans. Yet, it is also true that their depredations could not be controlled by the Muslim state and often harmed its economic interests.


Whether Arabic or Turkish, the Muslim state had been founded by nomads. Consequently, nomadism, *jihad*, and Islamization appear as the three related poles of the human geography and the ethnic evolution of the conquered lands.

The defeat of the Byzantine army at the battle of Manzikert (1071) opened eastern Anatolia to Seljuk bands who, from 1021, had devastated Armenia. They ravaged the region, annexed it to the caliphate, and emigrated to Syria. "Such was the commencement of the exodus of the Turks to Coele-Syria and the coast of Palestine. They subdued all these countries by cruel devastation and pillage."²⁸ In the same way as the soldiers of *jihad* flocked to the Arab *ribats* in order to pillage and harass non-Muslim populations on the frontier, the Turkish borders of Anatolia, in their turn, attracted adventurers from the Muslim hinterland. Avid for booty, they, too, became soldiers of holy war (*ghazi*, from the word *ghazwa*: razzia). Arab judges (*qadis*), who knew the regulations of *jihad*, flocked toward the frontiers to instruct and lead them. Thus fanaticized by cohorts of theologians, these bands of *ghazis*, accompanied by regular armies composed of slaves, raided Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia, where gradually some Turkish emirates emerged.

In the thirteenth century, the Mongol advance brought fresh waves of Turkish nomads into Anatolia. From his fief of Bithynia, Osman Ghazi (1299–1326), chief of a tribe of Oghuz Turks and founder of the Ottoman Empire, threw his armed bands against the Christian provinces. His successors united the Turkish emirates of Anatolia under their authority, while launching victorious raids on Byzantium and into Europe. The Latin and Byzantine armies, entangled in an imbroglio of alliances and military, economic, and dynastic rivalries, contributed their share to these destructions.

The Turkish *jihad* is well documented by a considerable quantity of varied sources: Greek, Latin, Serbian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Arabic, and Turkish. This wealth contrasts with the scarcity of sources relating to the early Arab conquests, mostly provided by the Muslim religious legalistic milieu (*hadith*) or later Muslim historians, complemented by a few Syriac, Greek, and Armenian sources. Contemporaries described this second cycle of Islamization in minute detail. Encompassing a span of five centuries during a more recent period, from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries, it expanded over a territory adjoining Europe—Anatolia and the Balkans—advancing as far as Vienna (1683).

The battle waged by the *ghazis* reconciled religious faith, lust for booty, and the capture of non-Muslims destined for enslavement or ransoming. *Jihad*, which had Islamized Anatolia, was pursued by the Ottomans in Bulgaria (1308–11), southern Thrace—with continuous raids launched after 1326—in southern Macedonia and along the Greek coast. The razzia tactics of encroaching on territory and encirclement culminated in large-scale military operations conducted by the Ottomans, first under Suleyman, son of Orkhan (1326–59), then under Murad I (1359–89) in



The Ottoman Empire (15th–17th centuries)

Bulgaria (1371), Macedonia, the Peloponnese, central Greece, Epirus, Thessaly, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Chroniclers of the period testify that the Turks took prisoner all those who did not take refuge in strongholds; they wrought havoc, pillaged, wrecked market towns and villages,²⁹ and carried off farmers, their women, and children.³⁰ A witness at the beginning of the fourteenth century noted:

While civil war was draining Byzantium, the Turks embarked on frequent raids from Asia using morrenes and triremes; they moved with impunity into Thrace, particularly at harvest time, carried away livestock, led women and children into slavery and caused such damage that these regions subsequently remained unpopulated and uncultivated.³¹

In 1390, Bayazid I sent a fleet to burn down Chios and the surrounding market towns, the islands of the Archipelago, Euboea, and part of Attica.³² He destroyed every market town and village from Bithynia to Thrace on the outskirts of Constantinople and deported all the inhabitants. In the course of his campaigns in Serbia (1410–13), Musa pillaged the countryside, “led away the most robust young men and put the rest of the population to the sword. He took three small towns where he spared none of the inhabitants”.³³ He reduced the market towns and villages around Constantinople to ashes.

Possessing an intrepid army and remarkable statesmen, the Ottomans were able to take advantage of the lack of unity and economic rivalries in the Christian camp. The final conquest of the Balkan peninsula was undertaken from 1451 by Mehmed II and his successors. Constantinople was encircled and fell in 1453; Serbia was conquered in 1459; then Bosnia and the Empire of Trebizond in 1463, and Herzegovina in 1483. Turkish expansion continued in Europe with the conquest of Wallachia, Moldavia, and eastern Hungary and was checked at Vienna in 1683 and in Poland in 1687.

Apart from variations determined by specific spatial, historical, and social conditions, the two waves of Muslim expansion—the Arab from the seventh century, and the Turkish four centuries later—are remarkably similar. “Turks and Arabs were mixed together like a single people,” Michael the Syrian commented. Before invading Anatolia, Turkish tribes had already emigrated to Arab provinces in Armenia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt. “Such was the rule of the Turks amidst the Arabs.”³⁴ The great Arab and Turkish conquerors used the same military tactics and the same policies of consolidating Islamic power. This continuity resulted from the fact that the conquests took place within the framework of the common ideology of *jihad* and the administrative and juridical apparatus of the *shari’a*—a uniformity that defies

time, since it adapts itself to diverse lands and peoples, being integrated into the internal coherence of a political theology.

In the course of their military operations, the Turks applied to the conquered populations the rules of *jihad*, which had been structured four centuries earlier by the Arabs and enshrined in Islamic religious law. Here again, one can see the identity and continuity between the fate of those who had been conquered by the Arab armies and those later conquered by the Turks in Asia Minor and Europe. The Byzantine historian Ducas (fifteenth century) wrote:

More than any other people, the Turks love war and pillage. They show it in their relations among themselves, what then is the lot of Christians? [. . .] The Turks went on foot as far as the Danube in order to subjugate the Christians. They invaded this or that province in their tens of thousands; they came like brigands and fled once they had pillaged it. These raids turned all Thrace as far as Dalmatia into a desert. Even the Albanians, who are an innumerable people, were reduced in number. All in all, the Turks destroyed the Wallachians, the Serbs and the Byzantines. When they subdued these peoples, they gave the fifth part of the booty to their sultan in accordance with their law. In this way, they gave up this fifth share, which is the best, to the authorities. Afterwards, when the representatives of the authorities saw a strong, young prisoner, they purchased him at a ridiculously low price and declared him a slave of the state. The sultan called these orphans his new troops or, in his language, janissaries.³⁵

Speros Vryonis has examined the modalities of the Turkish conquest of Byzantine Anatolia.³⁶ For the second cycle of Islamization, the reader may consult this detailed study. The similarity of the Turkish and Arab military tactics and strategies is evident.

THE EMERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE MUSLIM STATE

According to recent theories already mentioned above, it would appear that the process of the Arabo-Islamic invasion of the lands bordering Arabia—Palestine, Syria and Iraq—extended over a period of time, taking place at two levels during the crucial phase of conquest. The first level, mentioned in the sources, refers to the nomadic invasion, pillage, and destructions. The second applies to the negotiations which took place between the Arab chiefs and representatives of the populations from towns or provinces, impatient to be rid of the invaders who were flooding the countryside, their numbers augmented by the local Arab residents. In return for payment of tribute, these representatives—civil

governors or religious leaders, such as patriarchs and bishops—obtained the security of life, property, and civil and religious institutions for the vanquished populations. These treaties varied with local circumstances. They integrated earlier fiscal and administrative practices and ensured the continuity of the Byzantine and Persian administrations, despite the political and military collapse of those empires.³⁷

The first four caliphs (632–61), Abu Bakr, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, Uthman and Ali, engrossed in conquest, left the native inhabitants to administer the conquered countries under the authority of Arab military governors. These arrangements suited the representatives of the conquered populations. Some even saw advantages in it. Monophysite Christians, who had been persecuted by orthodox Greeks, rejoiced at their oppressors' departure. Their clergy interpreted Byzantium's defeat and humiliation as divine punishment:

The God of vengeance [. . .], seeing the evilness of the Romans [Byzantines] who, wherever they ruled, cruelly pillaged our churches and monasteries and mercilessly condemned us, led the sons of Ishmael from the region of the south in order to deliver us from Roman hands.³⁸

Even if this personal comment by a Grecophobic Syrian Monophysite patriarch, living and writing in the twelfth century, expresses a certain reality, it should not be taken as the literal expression of an opinion held six centuries earlier. Yet, whether true or not, there were revolts and local resistance because the Arab invasion—with all its devastation—was considered a calamity. Persians, Syrians, and Egyptians, engrossed in their own conflicts with Constantinople, were unaware of the religious events which had completely changed Arabia. Islam, to most people, appeared as another Jewish or Christian heresy among others, which emerged in those troubled times of religious wars. The scattered leaves of the Koran, written in Arabic, had not yet been collected and in any case, very few Orientals knew that language. As for *jihad*, contemporaries assimilated it to the familiar *razzias* by the nomads who usually withdrew to the desert carrying off their booty. For example, the prince of Nahavend (Susiana) receiving al-Mughira, head of military operations in Persia, told him that his men were “a troop of Arabs, driven to our very door by hunger and poverty: if you wish, I will supply you with provisions and you can then go back whence you came.” To this al-Mughira replied that they were fighting because a prophet, risen from among their people, had given them a revelation and promised them a victory which would make them masters of places where he saw such wealth and luxury “that those who follow me will not wish to withdraw till it has become theirs.”³⁹

On payment of a tribute equivalent to the taxes levied by Byzantium or the Persian state but henceforth paid to Medina, the indigenous Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian inhabitants generally preserved their religious and administrative autonomy. Their respective leaders represented them vis-à-vis the caliph and received a certificate of investiture confirming their authority. Thus one consequence of the disappearance of Byzantine or Persian political power was to reinforce over the peoples subject to Islam the supremacy of their respective religious hierarchies, which henceforth combined temporal and spiritual powers.

The duties assigned to civil officials, collecting the tax and administering justice, now devolved on the clergy. Responsible for the collective tribute which he apportioned among his flock, the patriarch appointed bishops and controlled community finances. All in all, the replacement of Christian or Persian political and civil power by Muslim political power increased the hold of the autochthonous Churches over their communities and added to their economic power. This class of officials also profited from the change in régime. Once the Chalcedonian Greeks left, native Monophysites, and Nestorians replaced them in the administration and in the courts of Arab governors.

At the beginning of the conquest, the Christians held and controlled all the affairs of their country that had come under Islamic domination. A sort of symbiosis stemming from collaboration seems to have been established between the erstwhile minority Muslim occupants and the Christian majority, as well as between the Arab military apparatus and the Christian administration. At this period, the conquered populations of the Orient were still using their national languages: Aramaic (Iraq, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine), Coptic (Egypt), and Pahlavi (Persia), and the foundations of Arab power were still weak. Consequently, notwithstanding their repugnance, the caliphs and their governors had to resort to the services of local Christian or Jewish administrators, a situation which risked jeopardizing the permanence of their power. It therefore became imperative to consolidate Islamic politico-military domination by a demographic increase in Arab numbers and by Muslim legislation to stabilize the situation—the legislative power complementing, reinforcing and structuring the politico-military power by a collection of measures which were adopted gradually. These two phases, which roughly corresponded to the period of Arabization under the Umayyads and of Islamization under the Abbasids, definitively ensured the Arab-Muslim hold on the conquered lands and populations.

In fact, the postconquest period was a time of intensive Arab colonization dictated by strategic requirements. For whereas pursuit of the ongoing *jihad* procured considerable booty and cemented Islamic solidarity, these battles in far-off lands weakened the Arab military presence in the



Various Cures. Damietta, Egypt

Coptic evangelistary (1179–1180)

Ms. Copte 13, fol. 44v. BN

conquered countries. To mitigate this danger, Umar, and particularly Uthman, adopted a policy of Arab colonization pursued by their successors. The various aspects of this colonization in Syria and Iraq—military organization of the emigrant tribes, their origins and the places where they settled—have been examined by Fred McGraw Donner.⁴⁰ It is enough in this context to summarize the general consequences for the indigenous population.

The continuous migration of whole tribes with their flocks—tribes originating from different regions of Arabia and often hostile to one another—not only created problems of settlement in towns and country areas that were among the most fertile and most highly populated, it also gave rise to difficulties regarding subsidies and cohabitation with the native population, the nomads being adverse to agricultural and urban occupations.

This flow of migration, duly controlled by the Arab military administration, was directed toward specific regions. Certain tribes joined up with military population centers: Basra and Kufa in Iraq, Fustat in

Egypt, for example; others received vast domains farmed by the native inhabitants reduced to slavery or bond service (Iraq, Egypt, Spain, the Maghreb). In Palestine and Syria, tribes from Yemen and nomads from Hijaz settled in the towns and countryside where they took over houses and lands. The immigrants collected annual allowances (*ata*), paid from the taxes of the local inhabitants and graded by the Muslim state on the basis of services rendered in the holy war.

This Arabization had disastrous effects on the native populations, as the confiscation of lands by the invaders and the appropriation of houses and villages did not take place without plundering and abuse. This emigration had four major consequences. First, the total area of the conquered lands was seized by a tribe originating from Mecca, who exercised their military authority through nomadic Arab tribes. Second, the massive Arab emigration engendered endemic anarchy in countries where hitherto, in comparison with the native population, they had only constituted tiny minorities on the deserts fringes. In practice, the methods of dividing the booty—land and native inhabitants—between tribes on the one hand, and the Arab state, on the other, or among the tribes themselves, provoked permanent bloody conflicts throughout the Arab Empire from Spain to Armenia. Moreover, during this period of Arabization in the Near East, the caliph Abd al-Malik (685–705) forbade the use of the native languages in the administration, replacing them with Arabic. Thus emigration into countries of settled civilization by nomads, who were strengthened in their bellicose habits by the ideology of *jihad* and by their victories, increased the instability, while plundering turned cultivated areas into deserts.

The predations of the invaders upon the natives, the only taxable labor force, assumed such catastrophic proportions that the revenues of the Umayyad state diminished considerably. The provincial governors had to ensure the protection of the peasantry while subduing tribes who had usurped lands and were ransoming the inhabitants; furthermore, inter-Arab dynastic and religious quarrels increased the economic problems.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONQUERED TERRITORIES

The overlapping of the phases of conquest, of the Arabization and of the consolidation of Muslim power, gives an anarchical and violent character to this period, when transformations were nowhere homogeneous or linear. In fact, contradictions appeared from the start of the conquest between the long-term interests of the Muslim state, represented by the caliph, and the cupidity of the Bedouins. The problem

concerned the booty related to the lands, the native populations, and their property. Motivated by greed, the nomadic tribes demanded that it be shared out immediately and the conquered peoples enslaved, as at the time of the Prophet. However, the redistribution of power within the Qurayshite clan where the caravan merchant bourgeoisie of Mecca was prominent replaced these practices by the concept of an Islamic state monopoly on the bulk of the war booty, which was then conceded in the form of domains (*iqta*) or allowances (*ata*) to the Arab tribes.⁴¹ Anxious to impose this administrative and fiscal policy on the tribes, the authorities turned to the Koran and conferred a normative value on the Prophet's decisions.

An immense collection was gradually built up, recording words and deeds attributed to Muhammad. These Sayings (*hadith*), handed down by a line of transmitters (*isnad*), became the basis of Tradition (*Sunna*), which was interpreted and codified around the end of the ninth century by the four principal schools of orthodox Muslim law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali). These four legal codes laid the foundation of the *shari'a*.

In this context evolved the search for criteria of justice in the embryonic juridical and administrative institutions of the Islamic state, anxious to legitimize its fiscal control of the conquered lands and peoples. Within the area of political government, justice consisted of determining the criteria for attribution and division between the Muslims of the property conquered by *jihad* in accordance with the Koran, the *hadith* and the *shari'a*. This justice was embodied in the strict application of the religious prescriptions on the rights and duties of the immigrant *umma* on the one hand, and, on the other, of the *dhimmi*s, whose religion, linked to taxation, was tolerated.

Jurists of the Abbasid period drew their inspiration from the Koran and the Traditions in order to formulate the status of the *dhimmi*s, the native non-Muslim inhabitants who had negotiated their rights by treaties concerning their lands, which had become a part of the *dar al-Islam*. Some Arab chroniclers attribute this status, also known as the Pact of Umar, to Umar Ibn al-Khattab (634–44), others to Umar b. Abd al-Aziz (717–20). The components of Byzantine and Persian taxation absorbed into Islamic institutions were specified by the concepts of *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims), *kharaj* (tax in kind or in money on their land), *fay* (state property),⁴² which were integrated into a theological conception of a war of conquest: *jihad*.

These jurisconsults endeavored to assign the division of the colossal booty of conquered lands and peoples between the state's share (*fay*) and the portion due to the tribes who had participated in the *jihad*. They adopted a fiscal classification of conquered land based on the modalities

of its conquest and on genuine or fictitious treaties of surrender. Henceforth, this law of conquest determined the fiscal category of the land (tithe or *kharaj*) and governed the status of its inhabitants. The juriconsults of the Middle Ages attributed this classification to the second caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab.

According to these legists, Umar had negotiated conditions of surrender on the basis of the tribute paid by non-Muslims. Allegedly, he had refused to allow enslavement and an immediate distribution of the wealth-producing, settled populations, which would have destroyed the very source of Arab power, as the Bedouins were neither numerous enough to populate these lands, nor able to cultivate them. Composed of caravan merchants and a majority of nomadic shepherds, these clans were ignorant of the complex economic and administrative techniques of the highly cultured civilizations of Persia and Byzantium. In order to impose his decisions, the caliph is said to have invoked Muhammad's policy at the time of his wars against the Jews of Medina. The Prophet had confiscated the property of the Banu Nadhir tribe and pronounced it *fay* in order to administer it for the benefit of the *umma*. As for the Jews of the Khaybar oasis, the Prophet exempted them from slavery on payment of tribute levied on their harvests.

According to tradition, Umar referred to these precedents when stipulating that the conquered Peoples of the Book, having negotiated their surrender, were thereby protected from slavery or massacre by the Islamic state. Security of life, property, and faith was guaranteed by the state which would refrain from intervening in their affairs. These people formed the *fay* (booty) of the *umma* which, as it belonged to the collectivity, would consequently be excluded from the distribution to individuals and would be administered by the caliph.

It was in this way that the specific sociopolitical and religious category of "protégés" or *dhimmis* was formed. Thus, Umar would have introduced a juridical distinction into the laws of war on conquered populations between human booty, divided individually according to the manner of conquest, on the one hand, and the *dhimmis*, a collective booty liable to tribute, on the other. In matters of land, he is said to have referred to the precedent established by Muhammad in respect of the property of the Banu Nadhir, in order to differentiate spoils divided among the individual conquerors and those forming the collective landed property of the Muslim state. Without going into the juridical and chronological complexities, it will be noted that these discussions relating to the conquered peoples and their property reflect the conflicts of the post-conquest period. The survival of these populations was located within these concepts in a sort of middle course between the pro-

tection guaranteed by the Muslim state and the depredations of the nomads.

As modern historians have emphasized, medieval jurists projected on the first centuries after the *Hijra* an idealized picture, which only bears a slight relationship to historical reality. In fact, as Islamic law was still embryonic and barely standardized over the whole *dar al-Islam* at that period, anarchy prevailed and situations were settled by force rather than law.

With the advent of the Abbasids (750), the Muslims were still in the minority among the Monophysite Christian population (Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia), or Nestorians (Iraq). Zoroastrians populated the towns and villages of Iran and a numerous Jewish population still survived, principally in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, but also in Persia, Egypt, North Africa and Spain. Despite fiscal oppression directed at the Jewish and Christian peasantry, who were reduced to slavery or bondage on lands confiscated by the state, under the Umayyads—particularly under the governor al-Hajjaj in the Sawad (lower Iraq)—non-Muslims still constituted a majority in the Arab Empire.

Growing Arabized centers developed in areas destroyed by razzias where the nomads had settled (Palestine, Syria), in regions of colonization (Iraq, Khorasan), and in military cantonments. Syria, with Damascus raised to the status of the Umayyades' capital and the seat of government, was subjected to a more rapid and intensive Arabization. Despite conversions, which the preferential fiscal treatment of Muslims encouraged and the expansion of a slave population that originated from the spoils of war or raids, the ethnoreligious composition of the Near East had not changed dramatically. The complex processes that would reverse the religious-demographic situation of countries—formerly *dar al-harb*, now a part of *dar al-Islam*—were to extend over more than two centuries under the Abbasids. Although it would be artificial to isolate the factors at work as their interaction in the political, economic, and religious realms overlap to a large extent, it is possible to distinguish some components in the transformation.

The policy of Arab colonization, already initiated under Umar Ibn al-Khattab—emigration and stabilization of the nomads in the conquered countries, grants to tribes and Arabization of the administration—prepared the ground for the next phase: Islamization. Under the Abbasids, the abolition of the frontiers between Arabia and the countries of settled civilization (Persia and the Near East) encouraged continuous penetration from the nomadic world: either Arabs or those originating from Islamized Asia (Kurds, Turks). The influx of these bellicose populations helped to generalize an anarchy nourished on dynastic and religious schisms.



Pharaoh on his Throne

Syriac Bible (ca. 6th/8th century)

Ms. Syr. 341, fol. 8, BN

The spread of these foreigners, invested with politico-military power—either by the state or by rebellions—confined the non-Muslim native inhabitants to a role of economic producers. This function was all the more important since the increased military power of Constantinople dried up a primary source of the wealth of the Arab-Muslim state: booty and slaves. This impoverishment occurred at a time when the defense of the frontiers and even the security of the caliph required the financing of an army—purchase, transport, maintenance, and equipment—composed exclusively of slaves. Economic problems, fragmentation of the empire, and the wars against Byzantium caused a toughening of fiscal exploitation of non-Muslim native inhabitants and developed the systemization of religious persecution which was integrated into Muslim governmental institutions.

This period (eighth to the tenth centuries) coincided with the icono-

clastic crisis which tore the Christian world apart and which revived Byzantine religious intolerance of both Monophysites and Jews. These religious conflicts were reflected within the Christian and Jewish communities, weakened by dissensions on dogma, liturgical quarrels, and particularly by disagreements of a venal nature. As a consequence, the ethnoreligious map of the Abbasid Empire was completely altered around the tenth and eleventh centuries. Exterminated or exiled by religious persecution, Zoroastrians survived in scattered and insignificant groups. The millions of Copts, Syriac Monophysites, Jews, and Nestorians who had populated the prosperous towns and fertile countryside of those vast territories were reduced, in varying proportions, to urban communities, enclosed in their own districts or to rural centers surviving in insecurity and impermanence. Despite a literary, philosophical, and economic flowering in Spain, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, which will be discussed later, this was the beginning of the long decline and descent of the Peoples of the Book into the world of *dhimmitude*, of which they were both agents and victims. Four centuries had sufficed to achieve these results by the fusion of political, economic, and social processes and their slow and subtle expansion, nourished by unpredictable conjunctures born out of the historical magma.

The same relationships between nomads and settled populations appeared in the second cycle of Islamization under the Turks from the eleventh century. By then, however, the dogma had already been formulated and the juridical and governmental institutions fixed during what is called the classical period of Arab-Islamic civilization. Consequently, the juridical and governmental organs of the Turkish emirates, later absorbed into the Ottoman state, developed quickly in the conquered lands of Anatolia.

Just as the ethnoreligious conflicts of the Peoples of the Book had permitted the Arab-Muslim state to ensure its permanence by the collaboration of their religious representatives, so the Byzantine dynastic struggles and the inter-Christian wars favored Turko-Islamic expansion in Anatolia and the Balkans. The Greek patriarchate's claim to hegemony over the Slavonic, Armenian, and Monophysite Churches encouraged alliances with the Turks, as did the conflict between the papacy and the patriarchate elsewhere. Worn out by constant wars and poverty, the peasants of Anatolia rallied to the Turks and converted.

Discord among the Christian princes permitted the Turkish armies to help the rival factions and gain familiarity with the topography of their lands, where they devastated the countryside and seized strategic strongholds. These military camps became centers of intensive Islamization, with the construction of mosques served by a large contingent of *qadis* and *ulama*, who flocked from the Arab provinces. Continuous waves

of immigrants from the Arab-Muslim and Asiatic hinterland nourished a process of Islamization through infiltration. Nomadic tribes flooded the plains, encircled the villages, laid ambushes on the roads, and cut communications. This invasion was accompanied by a reverse movement of native populations who abandoned the brigand-infested countryside and flowed back to the towns.

The Ottoman colonization of Anatolia is better known thanks to the many contemporary chronicles. The land was split up into military fiefs composed of towns and villages populated by a multitude of slaves and *dhimmi* taxpayers, a system already practiced by the Arabs in the first wave of Islamization and by the Seljuk emirs. In this way, a class of small and middle-rank Muslim landowners was formed, which expanded under Osman (1299–1326); it was consolidated under his son Orkhan (1326–59).

In Bulgaria, the settlement of Turks in military garrisons established in strategic areas reduced, if it did not eliminate, the indigenous population. The most fertile lands were given to Muslims, while the Christian peasantry fled the pillaging and flowed back to the mountains, an exodus which led to the founding of a large number of new towns.⁴³ Elsewhere, flourishing towns and villages were totally destroyed and depopulated, whereas others became exclusively Muslim as the native population diminished, disappeared completely, or converted.

The large number of travelers who crossed the newly Islamized Christian countries tell the same tales of destruction as those told by the Syriac chronicles a few centuries earlier. The politico-religious rules of the *jihad* gave the Arab and Turkish conquests an overall uniformity. As soon as the Turks seized a province, they summoned judges and *ulama* from the Arab hinterland to set up a full legal administration.

A wave of Christian defectors, rebel princes, governors, soldiers, priests, and renegades, attracted by the sultans' munificence and military power, prepared the ground and set in motion the decline and destruction of that Christendom which they had deserted. Promoted to the highest positions as councillors, officers, and administrators at the Ottoman court, they contributed toward the Turkish victories and led their people ineluctably down the road to serfdom. A modern Greek historian, discussing the Islamized Christians, particularly the fourteenth century Greeks, remarked that:

spiritually reborn into the Islamic world, they became the state's most disciplined, zealous and able soldiers. It was they who dealt the Byzantine Empire its final and most decisive death blows. It was they who were the most merciless persecutors of their fellow countrymen and former



St. Sophia (6th century). Constantinople

coreligionists. It was they who contributed most signally to the organization, extension and consolidation of the Ottoman state.⁴⁴

The sultans had “won hearts” at Serbian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, and Greek princely courts and from among the Slav and Greek clergy by financing a Turcophile party which nourished pessimism, preached the inevitability of the triumph of Islam, and spoke highly of the economic advantages that Muslim markets offered.⁴⁵

Lastly, the effects of the psychological element of fear in furthering the Islamization of the conquered lands cannot be emphasized too strongly. The population fled before the instability created by the spread of nomads, who set ambushes, killed or ransomed villagers, and carried off women and children. Under the reign of Andronicus III the Younger (1328–41), Turkish brigands infested the roads and attacked passers-by,⁴⁶ and “they made raids on the lands of the empire.”⁴⁷ The sources make abundant mention of this fear which prevented women from going out and men from venturing into the fields unarmed and which necessitated collective traveling accompanied by armed guards—a situation which remained the norm till the twentieth century in countries overrun by nomads, particularly in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. This

fear encouraged surrender, betrayal, corruption, and abandonment of invaded lands by the native inhabitants.

The symbiotic relationship between Islam and Christianity, which was created on the lands taken as booty after the conquest—or in anticipation of and in a desire for conquest—was the motive force throughout history behind the permanent Islamization process of Christendom. All the peoples of Anatolia and Europe who preserved their religion after the Ottoman conquest during the second wave of Islamization fell into the category of *dhimmis*, generally called *rayas* in the Ottoman Empire. Their social status had already been defined at the time of the political organization of the Arab conquests and later codified in the *shari'a*.

The inferior status of Jews and Christians under Islam varied depending on time and place, but in traditionalist countries like Yemen, it survived till the twentieth century. In 1856, the Ottoman sultan, under pressure from the European powers, proclaimed the equality of all his subjects. In Algeria and Morocco, it was European colonization that abolished the inferior status of the Jews, and in Persia, the revolution of Reza Pahlavi in 1925 removed religious discrimination. Muslim legal compilations, Arab and *dhimmi* chroniclers, and European consuls and travelers, provide interesting documentation on the *dhimmis'* condition.

3

Dhimmitude: Legalistic Foundation and Historic Conditioning

During the first two centuries after the Arab conquest, Islamic law was still in embryonic form and had not yet acquired the fixed institutional character of later periods. The need to create a uniform legal system to govern the *dar al-Islam* led to the compilation of various legal treatises under the Abbasids.

The picture which emerges from contemporary Syriac chronicles corresponds to this nebulous, and often anarchical, political situation. The position of the conquered peoples was neither final nor uniform, but varied with local conditions, the policies of the administrations, and the interaction of economic and political factors, such as wars, invasions, and uprisings.

Under the Umayyads, the Peoples of the Book, particularly the Christians, represented the large majority of the Islamic state's subjects and—with the Zoroastrians—its principal taxpayers. This economic strength also constituted a political power that had to be controlled, since revolts would have paralyzed the Arab army, which was accumulating booty and slaves for the caliph in the *dar al-harb*. Moreover, these conquered populations had mastered the techniques of civilization: state administration, agriculture, trade, architecture, and various crafts, while their élites were proficient in the complex and varied activities specific to city life and the international economic-political relations of great empires. Consequently, a conciliatory attitude was adopted toward the active and hard-working vanquished peoples; they were left in charge of the administration and collection of taxes but under the control of the Islamic state, whose power and resources they increased.

The two pillars of the nascent Islamic state in the conquered lands were the army—formed of Arab tribes and the slaves taken as spoils of war—and the conquered masses: tributaries, slaves, freed men, and converts, a workforce which fed the economic sector. The third pillar—juridical power—was being elaborated. It would undertake to balance and rectify the enormous demographic disparity between the conquered

Peoples of the Book and the Muslims. Sometimes allied with the political power and sometimes antagonistic, the legal institution would formulate a collection of laws which gradually whittled away the rights of the *dhimmis* and confined them to a cramped condition, by transferring to the *umma* all the key positions that the *dhimmis* had formerly held.

This chapter will attempt to examine this collection of measures which arose separately—sometimes in one place, sometimes in another—at times coinciding with a political event in a loose, yet unstandardized sociopolitical fabric till a subsequent period when Islamic law became fixed. The legal status of the *dhimmis* appears at two levels: one, mobile and enmeshed in history; the other, fixed in legal dogma. These two levels remained interdependent and interactive, but a margin of circumstantial fluctuation developed between them.

THE CHARACTERS OF THE CONQUERED LANDS

The Islamization of the conquered lands was both a principle of religious dogma and, in practice, a political and economic process.

Religious Character

All territory taken from infidels became the property (*fa'y*) of the state. It formed the *dar al-Islam*, lands administered by Islamic law for the benefit of Muslims and their descendants. This principle, established by the Arab conquest, instituted a political and legal dogma rooted in theology. This dogma determined the standardization of specific administrative features in all the countries of Asia and Europe subsequently conquered by non-Arab Muslim conquerors.

Islamic law pertaining to the conquered land forced the non-Muslim natives to observe the specific prescriptions which constituted the comprehensive rules of dhimmitude. No non-Muslim could avoid them unless he enjoyed foreign protection. The introduction of Islamic law into a country consequently implied the status of dhimmitude in all its aspects and regulations.

Islamic law forbade non-Muslims the ownership of landed property and transferred it to the Muslim public treasury administered by the caliph. Military districts were given as fiefs by the caliph to members of his family and to tribes or military chiefs for a limited period or in perpetuity—in exchange for the equipping of a military unit and its participation in expeditions. This military administrative hierarchy survived in the Ottoman Empire till the nineteenth century. It must be specified that this “feudal system”—an inappropriate term in this con-

text—had hardly any of the characteristics of the European feudal system because of the fundamentally different nature of the rights and duties governing relationships between the Muslim military caste and the *dhimmi* villagers.

However, even if the *dhimmis* could retain *possession* of the land, draw its produce and inherit it, in reality the situation established by the Islamic conquest was very different as is attested from numerous sources. The long-term consequences culminated in the disappearance of indigenous Christian and Jewish peasantries. Thus, even if Islamic law recognized the principle of the *dhimmis'* right to possess land, history reveals a process whereby the lands, houses, livestock, and property of the indigenous population were usurped, a situation which does not appear in the law itself.

Fiscal Character

The Muslim jurists drew a fiscal distinction between Arab lands—that is to say, Muslim lands (tithe lands)—and the whole mass of land confiscated from non-Muslims (*kharaj* lands). Islamic jurisprudence again refers to the precedent of Khaybar in order to define the nature of the *kharaj*. In the same way as Muhammad had reduced the Jews of Khaybar to the status of tributaries liable to taxation in money and kind for the benefit of the *umma*, so the conquered populations of both East and West became tributaries bound to hand over a percentage of the produce of their soil to the *umma*.

The *kharaj* was the tax that the Muslim state, owner of the land through *jihad*, levied on the conquered populations who retained possession of their lands as tributaries and usufructuaries. The *kharaj*, paid at first exclusively by non-Muslims, was variously interpreted in different places and at different times. The jurists later made a distinction between the *jizya*, the koranic poll tax (Koran 9:29), and the *kharaj*, a land tax in money and kind, although the two terms were often confused. The land tax, in its various forms, existed in the Persian and Greek empires, but the Islamization of the fiscal system now gave it a new religious and sacred character. All *kharaj* lands were originally lands of booty and war (*dar al-harb*); confiscated from the infidels, they henceforth constituted the permanent property of the *umma*.

As the fiscal and religious sectors overlapped so much in the *dar al-Islam*, the history of the indigenous *dhimmis* and the evolution of their demography can be followed from sources relating to the caliphs' fiscal policy. Consequently, this policy has been examined meticulously in the light of Arabic, Syriac, Greek, and Jewish sources.¹ The broad lines will be summarized.



Annunciation (1179–1180)

Ms. Copte 13, fol. 136r. BN

On the morrow of the conquest of Egypt, the Copts had to supply clothing for every Arab (tunic, trousers, head-gear, boots, and so on.) and provide Muslim travelers with necessities for three days (accommodation, food, fodder); this clause also comprised the upkeep of troops. Moreover, they also had to deliver food to the immigrant Arab populations (meat, poultry, and other commodities), as well as manufactured objects (tents, cables, ropes, and other objects). In addition, a general tribute was levied based on the clauses of the treaties.

After the stabilization of the Arab occupation, the conquerors reorganized the financial system of the vanquished peoples. Under the Umayyads, the treasury levied five types of taxes on the native inhabitants: a land tax (*kharaj*), later also exacted from the monasteries; provisions in kind, proportionate to harvests; a poll tax (*jizya*); a tax covering the expenses and maintenance of the tax-collectors; and a general sum devoted to requisitions, extraordinary taxes, and the upkeep and clothing of Muslims.² The indigenous populations had to provide the state with various manufactured objects such as maritime accessories, carpets, and bags. Other taxes were placed on certain food products (butter,

honey, and so on). In addition, the population was indiscriminately requisitioned for heavy compulsory duties: buildings, roads, and navigation requirements, including naval forces.

It is obvious that some of these impositions and labor duties in force under the Byzantines were simply continued by the Arab administration. However, after the beginning of the eighth century—from Egypt to Armenian Mesopotamia—a new phenomenon appeared, linked to the rapacity of the financial authorities: rural exodus.

This was the period of the “fugitives” and “exiles” mentioned by the papyri and Syriac and Jewish sources, which describe the exodus of Jewish and Christian villagers who fled and hid in the mountains, caves, or other villages to avoid the tax collectors. So as to ensure its revenues, the administration resorted to brutal measures. It ordered a census of the population and the issue of passes to every individual, a sort of identity card showing the names of the holder’s parents and place of birth. Anyone caught without a passport was put to death. Fugitives were brought back to their village, and no one could travel unless he had paid his own and his dead parents’ taxes.

Conversions to Islam and confiscations of lands by nomadic tribes gradually transferred the lands of *kharaj* to the privileged category of tithe lands. Since, moreover, the *dhimmi* peasants abandoned their fields, whereas the Bedouins, not being farmers, left them to lie fallow, the taxable area and the state’s revenues diminished considerably. In order to stem this dual source of impoverishment, the Umayyad and the first Abbasid caliphs took measures to attach the *kharaj* tax to the land. The *dhimmi* peasantry, the main source of taxable productivity, were thereby protected against usurpation and pillage.

Muslim law books specify the nature, basis, and methods of collecting the *kharaj*. The famous *qadi* of Baghdad, Abu Yusuf Ya’qub (731–98), wrote a basic work on this subject at the request of the caliph Harun al-Rashid (786–809) during what is generally called the classical period of Islam, considered the most prestigious in Arab-Muslim civilization both because of its cultural influence and the opulence of a court endowed with fabulous wealth. Invoking the authority of *hadith*, the author recommends tax collectors to treat the tributaries with clemency and justice. Notwithstanding a chapter devoted to restrictive provisions concerning Jews and Christians, this work of theoretical law nonetheless confirms the traditional image of a government inspired by tolerance and equity, a genuine “Golden Age” for the Jews and Christians subjected to Islamic justice.

Yet a remarkable chronicle written by a Monophysite monk, the pseudo-Patriarch Dionysius—a native of Tell-Mahre, a village in Mesopotamia—gives a precise description of the fiscal situation of non-

Muslims. The chronicle, completed in 774, provides almost photographic detail of one of the turning-points in history. The description covers Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine in the eighth century. At that time, the *dhimmi*s formed the majority of the rural population: small landowners, artisans, or share-croppers farming the fiefs allotted to Arabs; a numerous Jewish peasantry lived alongside Christian villagers: Copts, Syrians, and Nestorians. This chronicle reveals the mechanisms which destroyed the social structure of a flourishing *dhimmi* peasantry in the whole Islamized Orient. The continuous process of the confiscation of lands by the infiltration of Bedouin tribes with their flocks or by Arabs who settled at the time of the first wave of Islamization was aggravated by the government's damaging fiscal oppression.

The caliph al-Mansur (754–75) ordered a census of the tributaries subject to the poll tax. He set up a governor in Mesopotamia:

In order to brand men as slaves and mark them above their necks [. . .]. But here they bore it [the sign of the Beast, Revelation 20: 4], not only on their forehead, but on both their hands, their chest and even on their back [. . .]. When he [the governor] entered the towns, all the men were seized by fear and took flight before him [. . .]. He also set up another governor to bring back <every man who had fled> to his country, to his father's house [. . .]. Thereafter, there was nowhere that was safe; but everywhere pillage, cruelty, iniquity, impiety, every evil deed, calumnies, injustice, man's vengeance against man.³

Over-taxed and tortured by the tax collectors, the villagers fled into hiding or emigrated to the towns. There, they hoped to melt into anonymity among the throng of prisoners deported from the conquered regions and the mass of slaves rounded up in the razzias. However, even in the towns the *dhimmi*s barely escaped from the tax collectors:

The men were scattered, they became wanderers everywhere; the fields were laid waste, the countryside pillaged; the people went from one land to another.⁴

Money was extorted by blows, torture, and death—particularly by crucifixion.⁵ Sometimes the whole population of a village—Christians, Jews, and Arabs—were kept in a church for several days without food, and in promiscuity, till a ransom was paid. Arabs who had fraudulently appropriated *dhimmi* lands were expelled by the taxmen. The caliph:

established a Persian at Marda [Mardin] in order to bring back the fugitives and there collect the tribute. There, more than anywhere else, the population had taken flight and the entire region was occupied by Arabs, because the Syrians [the non-Muslim native inhabitants] had fled before them.⁶

This man, “who had no equal in animosity towards the Arabs, either before or since,” gathered from all the towns the entire former population of Marda, which had been driven out by the Arabs two or three generations before.

In this way, he gathered such a great throng in that region that there was not a place, not a village, not a house which was not filled and overflowing with inhabitants. He made the Arabs move from one region to another and took everything they possessed. He filled their lands and houses with Syrians and made them sow their wheat.⁷


Fiscal reasons account for this paradoxical policy. The vanquished non-Muslims formed the *fay*—the caliph’s spoils of war—bound to pay him tribute, while the Arabs, having contributed to victory, claimed from the caliph a share of the booty or allowance. The measures of restitution of property to the native inhabitants and their maintenance in their villages consequently increased the caliph’s lands and his receipts.

The peasantry was not alone in suffering from the tax authority. The chronicle mentions extortions from notables and the execution of “free men.”⁸ This drive to track down *dhimmi* peasants, organized throughout the Abbasid Empire, required a considerable number of participants, who were joined by brigands greedy for plunder and pillage. The accommodation and maintenance of the tithe owners and tax collectors and the gifts they demanded from their hosts completed the ruin of the villages.⁹

The chronicler provides information on the situation in Palestine:

The caliph moved into the western region in order to go to Jerusalem. He wreaked havoc, turned everything topsy turvy, terrorizing and devastating, to a degree worse than in Mesopotamia. He acted as Daniel had prophesied of the Antichrist himself. He turned the temple into a mosque, because the little that remained of Solomon’s [Temple] became a mosque for the Arabs [. . .]. He repaired the ruins of Jerusalem. He attacked men, took their property and livestock, particularly buffalos. He did not willingly leave anything to anyone whomsoever he was. When he had perpetrated every sort of evil there, as he had done in Mesopotamia, he returned in early winter to Mesopotamia to reside there and to continue his destruction.¹⁰

In Egypt at the same period, the *dhimmis*, ruined by taxation, abandoned their lands and villages. Pursued by the tax collectors, they were brought back by force. Taking advantage of the right of conquest over non-Muslims, the state recouped its losses from the insolvent Coptic peasantry by enslaving their children. The contemporary chronicle of pseudo-Dionysius describes in realistic detail a situation totally contrary



Kfar Bar'am Synagogue (3rd–8th century). Galilee, Israel

Inscription on the lintel: *May peace reign in this place and in all Israel*

Louvre Museum

to the one conveyed in the above mentioned theoretical and abstract treatise written later by Abu Yusuf. This is a picture of peasants and artisans stripped of everything, forced to hide and flee from place to place—a hunted population, on whose exploitation was built the ostentation of the Abbasid court and the wealth of the *umma*.

Some centuries later, as a consequence of subsequent emigration by nomadic Turks and *jihad*, there developed a similar situation in Anatolia, in the Turkish emirates, and in the Balkans. The allocation of fiefs and the oppression of the Christian peasantry caused a similar evolution, with exodus to the towns. Like the Arab conquerors of earlier times, the Turkish sultans Osman and Orkhan also adopted measures for their new European possessions which immobilized the Christian peasants on their fiefs and forbade them to flee or to emigrate.¹¹ Anxious to preserve productivity from the land and the volume of taxation, the Ottomans protected the peasants. Some Christian regions, the island of Chios, for example, even benefited from a semi-autochthonous administration which guaranteed a better economic yield and a higher tax. In remote

and inaccessible regions of Serbia, the Turkish administration left a large degree of autonomy to the villages, where mayors, elected by the population, allocated taxes and served as intermediaries to the Turks. In this way the Serbian national language and traditions were preserved.

This relatively tolerant and enlightened policy toward their Christian *raya* subjects on the part of the Ottomans explains the survival of an indigenous peasantry in European Turkey after centuries of Muslim domination, while in the Arabized regions, with the exception of Egypt, the Christian and Jewish peasantries had been almost totally eliminated.

JIZYA

The basis for the injunction to participate in the *jihad* and to exact the *jizya* are found in the koranic verse 9:29.

Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day, and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden—such men as practise not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book—till they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled.

The *jizya* was graded into three rates depending on the wealth of the tax payer.¹²

According to Michael the Syrian, "Umar [Ibn al-Khattab] ordered a new census of all the countries of his empire in order to impose the poll tax."¹³ Jewish sources confirm this fact. In Palestine all the inhabitants and their property were counted, so as to subject them to the tax decreed by Umar in 640. Lands, livestock, and trees were registered. In Iraq, the poll tax was four, six, eight, and twelve dirhams under the Sassanids; Umar raised it to twelve, twenty-four, and forty-eight dirhams.¹⁴

Pseudo-Dionysius attributed the imposition of the poll tax for Syria and Mesopotamia to Abd al-Malik (685–705):

The year 1003 (691–692), Abd al-Malik made the Ta'dil, that is to say, taxed the Syrians. He issued a strict edict for every individual to go to his country of origin, his village, where he was to register his name, that of his father, his vines, his olive trees, his property, his children and everything he owned. This was the origin of the poll tax; this was the origin of all the evils spread out over the Christians. In fact, hitherto the kings took tribute from the land, but not from men. Henceforth, the children of Hagar [Ishmael] began to impose Egyptian servitude on the sons of Aram [Aramaean]. But, to our misfortune, because we have sinned, the slaves rule over us.—This was the first census the Arabs made.¹⁵

The situation barely improved and the chronicler notes, with regard to the caliph Hisham (724–43): “From the beginning of his reign, he set out to oppress men by excessive taxation and tributes.”¹⁶

At this period, only *dhimmi*s were subject to this tax, whereas Muslims paid the alms tithes (*zakat*). The Copts rebelled, most of the insurgents were massacred, and the rest fled by sea. The situation deteriorated under Marwan II (744–50):

Marwan’s main concern was to amass gold and his yoke bore heavily on the people of the country. His troops inflicted many evils on the men: blows, pillage, outrages on women in their husbands’ presence.¹⁷

The caliph al-Mansur (754–75) “raised every kind of tax on all the people in every place. He doubled every type of tribute on Christians.”¹⁸

Pseudo-Dionysius speaks “of the oppressions from the tyrannical power [the caliph] that men had to bear, the flight from one town to another town, from one place to the next place, from one village to a different village.”¹⁹

The poll tax was extorted by torture.²⁰ The tax inspectors demanded gifts for themselves; widows and orphans were pillaged and despoiled. “They mercilessly struck honorable men and old hoary elders.”²¹ These evils afflicted the whole Abbasid empire. In Lower Egypt, the Copts, crushed and ruined by taxation and subjected to torture, rebelled (832). The Arab governor ordered their villages, vines, gardens, churches, and the whole region to be burned down; those who escaped massacre were deported. The previous uprisings of the Copts in Lower Egypt in 725 and 739 had ended in a bloodbath.

Ninth-century sources indicate that the situation was similar in Spain.²² This covetousness and these exactions provoked incessant uprisings by neo-Muslims (*muwallad*) and Christians (*Mozarabs*).

According to some jurists, the poll tax had to be paid by each person individually at a humiliating public ceremony; while paying it, the *dhimmi* was struck either on his head or on the nape of his neck. This blow to the neck, a symbol of the non-Muslim’s humiliation, was repeated over the centuries and survived unchanged till the dawn of the twentieth century, being ritually performed in Arab-Muslim countries, such as Yemen and Morocco, where the Koranic tax continued to be extorted from the Jews.²³

In theory, women, paupers, the sick, and the infirm were exempt from the poll tax; nevertheless, Armenian, Syriac, and Jewish sources provide abundant proof that the *jizya* was exacted from children, widows, orphans, and even the dead.²⁴ A considerable number of extant documents, preserved over the centuries, testify to the persistence and

endurance of these measures. In Aleppo in 1683, French Consul Chevalier Laurent d'Arvieux noted that ten-year-old Christian children paid the *jizya*.²⁵ Here again, one finds the disparity and contradiction between the ideal in the theory and the reality of the facts.

When traveling it was compulsory in the Middle Ages for *dhimmis* to bear the *jizya* receipt, a piece of parchment worn round the neck or a seal worn on the wrist or on the chest; a *dhimmi* traveling without this receipt risked death. The seal of the *jizya*, characteristic of the *dhimmi*, was soon regarded as a stigma. In the Ottoman Empire, the receipt had to be produced at the demand of tax collectors on pain of immediate imprisonment, for the *dhimmis* were easily recognizable by their distinctive costume and could be controlled in the street.


OTHER TAXES (*AWARID*: IRREGULAR TAXES)

Apart from taxes, considerable ransoms were arbitrarily extorted from the communities, generally by the imprisonment and torture of their representatives, prelates, or notables. Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of tax collectors who "seized notables and taxed them mercilessly; to the point where they caused their death and destroyed many of them as a result."²⁶ If tribute was not given, the women and children were reduced to slavery. It was not only the state that levied taxes. Nomadic tribes and all the rebels and heads of bands—those floating, migrant, or displaced populations without a stable habitat and professional occupations—satisfied their needs by pillage and ransoming *dhimmis*, whose labor formed a providential and inexhaustible source of wealth. Nasr b. Shabat, chief of the Arab rebels against the caliph Ma'mun in the ninth century, made a living, together with his troops, by pillaging the *dhimmis*.

A considerable number of documents provide evidence that these ransoms or *avaniyas* (*awarid*) were exacted by torture or the threat of a general massacre.²⁷ Sixteenth to eighteenth century chronicles of the Jewish community of Fez describe the poverty caused by fiscal extortions and repeated pillage.²⁸ This situation was endemic in Morocco and in the Berber regencies of the Maghreb.

In the seventeenth century, d'Arvieux noted that the peoples of the Greek archipelago suffered continual pillage and *avaniyas*.²⁹ As late as the nineteenth century, the constant anarchy and insecurity in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, regions overrun by nomads, forced the Jewish and Christian communities to pay ransoms to the Turkish or Kurdish emirs and Bedouin chiefs in order to protect themselves from pillage and massacre. The same situation prevailed in Turkish Armenia.

Over the centuries, paying for their security and survival became the



Convent of Chaqqa (5th century). Hawran, northern Syrian desert

Abandoned, ca. 7th–8th century

de Vogüé, vol. 1 (1865), pl. 18

characteristic of the *dhimmi* communities and the prime condition of their tolerated existence in their own countries. However, instead of buying their survival from the state—the sole representative of the *umma*—regional fragmentation and the weakness of the authorities allowed the various clans to practice their pillage.³⁰ Fiscal exploitation and the ransoming of non-Muslims—whether Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Christian: Nestorian, Jacobite, or Orthodox—remained endemic in the whole *dar al-Islam*: in Persia, Yemen, the Ottoman Empire, and the Maghreb, till the emergence of modern states.

PUBLIC OFFICE

The exclusion of *dhimmis* from public office was based on numerous verses of the Koran (3:27, 114–15; 5:56) and on *hadith* which forbade either a Christian or a Jew from exerting authority over a Muslim. Umar I (634–44) had already prohibited native inhabitants from taking up governmental posts. Nonetheless, under Abd al-Malik (685–705), Chris-

tian leaders still ran the administration in the Greek language. Despite the replacement of Greek by Arabic, *dhimmi* officials remained in their jobs. Twenty years later, Umar II (717–20) ordered the dismissal of all *dhimmi* officials in his empire. In the Middle Ages, the appointment of *dhimmis* to high administrative office inflamed fanaticism and provoked massacres. Such examples were mentioned regularly in Mesopotamia, the Levant, Egypt, the Maghreb, and even in Andalusia.

INEQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW

All litigation between a Muslim and a *dhimmi* was under the jurisdiction of Islamic legislation, which did not recognize the validity of the oath of a *dhimmi* against that of a Muslim. Michael the Syrian attributes the origin of this decree to Umar II. In practice, the decree ensured Muslims of impunity before Islamic courts in interfaith litigation. It determined the chronic corruptibility of Muslim judges and witnesses, bribed by *dhimmis*, who were thereby forced to purchase their innocence. Adopted throughout the *dar al-Islam*, these regulations continued in existence up to the middle of the nineteenth century and even longer in some regions.

According to *hadith*, the refusal to accept the testimony of the *dhimmi* was based on the belief in the perverse and mendacious character of the infidels since they stubbornly persisted in denying the superiority of Islam.³¹ The same prejudice forbade a Muslim, even when guilty, to be condemned to death on account of an infidel. According to a *hadith* attributed to Muhammad (in the compilation of Muslim, d. 874): “No Muslim would die but Allah would admit in his stead a Jew or a Christian in Hell-Fire.”³² In Ifriqiyya, ninth- and tenth-century decrees stipulated that Jews should swear their oath in court on Saturday and Christians on Sunday.³³

The refusal to accept a *dhimmi*'s testimony was particularly serious in view of the frequent accusations of blasphemy levelled against Christians and Jews—an offense punishable by death. Thus threatened with execution and powerless to deny a Muslim's accusation, a *dhimmi* faced death or conversion. A faithful observer, Consul d'Arvieux, commented:

It will always be impossible to prove that a Turk [Muslim] is a false witness, and a Turk will never give evidence against another Turk in favor of a Christian; that is their custom, that is their constant practice. Besides, the French are not authorized to bring evidence against a Turk. We are regarded as Infidels, whose testimony should not be recognized in law.³⁴

In Bosnia, the British vice-consul, Edward Freeman, reported in 1877:

The present Cadi [Muslim judge] of Travnik resolutely refuses to admit all Christian evidence before the Tribunals, and though the Mussulman witnesses are always, it is true, to be found for money, nothing but a miscarriage of justice can be expected where such practices prevail.³⁵

In 1895, the British consular agent in Jaffa indicated that:

False witnesses are always ready to appear in any accusation or claim brought by Mussulmans against Christians and Jews.³⁶

Nonetheless, there were exceptions to this rule; in some cases the testimony of *dhimmi*s was accepted—even in Muslim religious courts. In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans introduced a new administrative system—the *mejjele* (1840)—which dealt with civil and criminal affairs according to modified codes of law derived from European, mainly French, jurisprudence. This change provided the base of a different system of justice that recognized the *dhimmi*s' testimony. Even if the majority of Muslim judges ignored these innovations and preserved the traditional discriminatory legislation against the Peoples of the Book, this procedure was henceforth considered illegal.

Muslim law applies the *lex talionis*:

In retaliation there is life for you, men possessed of minds; haply you will be godfearing. (Koran 2:175).

The *lex talionis* could be applied only between equal parties, that is, between Muslims. It was not applicable between a Muslim and a *dhimmi*, due to the latter's inferior status as a human being. According to pseudo-Dionysius, the caliph Yazid II (720–24):

fixed the price <of the blood> of an Arab at twelve thousand <dinars> and that of a Syrian [non-Muslim native inhabitant] at six thousand. This is the origin of these immoral laws.³⁷

Muslim superiority was a deeply rooted dogma. When the Byzantine emperor asked for an exchange of prisoners, al-Mu'tasim (833–42) replied:

We, Arabs, can not admit the possibility of comparing Muslims with Romans [Byzantines], because God values the former more highly than the latter.³⁸

The punishment that a Muslim received for a crime was halved if his victim was a *dhimmi*. Except in Hanafi law, the blood of the *dhimmi*s was valued at half that of a Muslim. Often by custom, if not by law, a *dhimmi*

who dared raise a hand against a Muslim, even in legitimate self-defense, was punished by having his hand cut off or by death.

[That] any Christian who threatened a Turk should have his hand cut off and be burned alive if he has struck him and that the only favor that can be expected is the repurchase of one's life with much money after many torments.³⁹

In the course of his duties as consul in Aleppo in 1679, d'Arvieux was faced with such a case:

I was informed that there was in the prisons a Maronite Christian manservant of Sieur Jean Fouquier, a Dutch merchant who had lived in this town for a very long time and I was asked to claim him back. He had beaten a Turk and the Qadi had sentenced him to have his hand cut off.⁴⁰

WORSHIP

Places of Worship

In theory the laws concerning places of worship depended on the circumstances of the conquest and the terms of the treaties. Construction of new churches, convents, and synagogues was forbidden, but restoration of pre-Islamic places of worship was permitted, subject to certain restrictions and on condition that they were neither enlarged nor altered.

Political motives dictated the restrictions affecting the indigenous Jewish and Christian religions. Islam was an alien religion, still un-institutionalized and in a minority throughout the *dar al-Islam*. It needed to be protected against the seduction of the ancient and brilliant civilizations of the Peoples of the Book. Michael the Syrian notes that, from the beginning of his caliphate, Umar II promulgated laws that were hostile to Christians "because he wanted to strengthen the laws of the Muslims."⁴¹ The privileges of the conquerors and the degradation of the other religions convinced the Bedouins of the superiority of Islam. Religious discrimination, determined by the requirements of Arab-Muslim colonization, became fixed in custom through intransigent fanaticism, even when Islam succeeded in supplanting the indigenous religions. Indeed, the mentalities of the Middle Ages everywhere shaped such prejudices, whatever the religion.

From the beginning of the conquest—in Syria and Spain, as well as in other conquered provinces—the Christians had ceded to the Muslims half their churches, which became mosques as a result of the Muslim

influx. Moreover, it was obvious that this cohabitation could not last, in view of the Muslim aversion to the Christian religion. Prohibitions affecting bells, burials, ceremonies, and the construction of places of worship were applied in Andalusia as well as throughout the *dar al-Islam*.⁴²

The religious oppression of the state in the period under the Umayyads and Abbasids—regarded as the “Golden Age”—began under Abd al-Malik (685–705). The caliph Walid (705–15), who detested Christians, ordered the demolition of several churches and their replacement by mosques. Mahdi (775–85) permitted the suppression of all the churches which had been built after the conquest. The destruction of churches and convents was perpetrated on such a scale in the whole Arab Empire that in 830 Ma'mun forbade further destruction without his permission. Yet during the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (847–61) a wave of religious persecution, forced conversions, and the elimination of churches and synagogues plagued the whole Abbasid Empire. On the death of the caliph, Muhammad al-Mudabbir arrived in Egypt as minister of finance (861), coming from Palestine where he had long subjected the inhabitants to every type of misery. He tripled the *jizya* on Christians and Jews “so that he filled the prisons in every place.”⁴³ He ordered churches to be pillaged and confiscated for the *diwan* (Islamic treasury) the money and alms intended to maintain bishoprics and monasteries. Monks were imprisoned and put in irons,⁴⁴ while the patriarch, unable to pay the taxes demanded from the Coptic episcopate, fled from place to place and went into hiding.

The pages of the Coptic, Armenian, and Syrian chronicles are filled with details of religious harassment, certainly motivated by the intolerance specific to the Middle Ages, but also by fiscal extortion. However, it is important to distinguish official tyranny, imposed on the whole empire by decree of the caliph or governor, from tyranny subsequent to popular fanaticism or devastation by nomads.

Regularly renewed, state persecution could be abolished by Christian kings exerting pressure on the Muslim authorities. Even *dhimmi*s sometimes succeeded in getting measures countermanded in exchange for a sum of money through the intervention of an ex-Christian slave or a court physician. For example, through the intermediary of Christians close to the caliph, the “peoples of the *dhimma*” (Jews and Christians) were able to recover their property—places of worship, houses, domains—confiscated by al-Mudabbir in Egypt and Syria-Palestine.⁴⁵

Even outbursts of popular fanaticism, so frequent in the Middle Ages, could be brought under control by the slave militias. But the repeated destruction caused by nomads or bands of brigands, an endemic evil throughout the empire, escaped all control. The general insecurity prompted villagers, townsfolk, and even Muslim officials to entrust their

wealth to the monks. Acting as a kind of modern bank, the monasteries became the object of endlessly repeated plundering that caused them to resemble remote strongholds, entrenched behind high walls.

The situation varied from one region to another depending on the humor of a governor, political conditions, or the extent of nomadic settlement in towns and villages. In Elam (Persia), at the end of the eighth century, the once-flourishing Nestorian Church had dwindled. Several dioceses were without bishops to run the churches; monks refused to take up their episcopal seats, pretexting the danger, insecurity, and poverty of the region.⁴⁶ This situation was repeated some centuries later in Turkish Anatolia.⁴⁷

Constantly summoned to move from place to place in order to visit the churches within their diocese or to demand justice from governors or caliphs, patriarchs and catholicos have left descriptions of the regions through which they passed that describe the gradual process of religious, social, economic, and cultural disintegration of their congregations.

Churches and synagogues were rarely respected. Regarded as places of perversion, they were often burned or demolished in the course of reprisals against infidels found guilty of overstepping their rights. The exterior of these buildings looked dilapidated and the extreme wretchedness of their interiors was often the consequence of looting or was intended to discourage predatory attacks. This state of decay—also an obligatory social component of the *dhimmi* servile status—is often mentioned in *dhimmi* chronicles and described by European consuls and, later, by foreign travelers.


In Algiers, Consul d'Arvieux noted in 1660:

Although there are a large number of Jews [ten to twelve thousand], they have very few synagogues. The Turks [Muslims] who despise them to the highest degree do not willingly allow them these places of Assembly and make them pay a considerable tribute for them.⁴⁸

Whereas, for example, at Smyrna in 1655 the Turks were very tolerant and let the Greeks hold their religious processions, numerous Muslims of Maghrebi origin settled in Ottoman ports and towns were often violent and fanatical.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, in transit at Famagusta (Cyprus) in 1651, recounts that all the churches there had been converted into mosques and that Christians did not have the right to spend the night there.⁵⁰

Describing the difficulties in repairing the church of Alexandretta and the Hospice, d'Arvieux commented:

Muslims do not allow anything whatsoever to be added to churches, nor the slightest repair to be made without a *hatt-i-sharif* [permit] from the Grand Seigneur [Ottoman sultan] which is always very expensive.⁵¹



Church of St. John the Baptist (12th century). Samaria

Engraving: L. Meunier; T. H. Taylor's drawing, from a photograph
Lortet (1875), p. 191

In 1697–98, a French traveler noticed several churches throughout Ottoman Palestine converted into stables.⁵² A permit to restore a Jerusalem synagogue in 1855 forbade any enlargement or decoration of its premises.⁵³ Engravings of Jerusalem in 1840–50 show the dilapidated condition of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; its dome was only provided with a cross after the edict of emancipation (1856).⁵⁴ Public latrines remained adjacent to the Temple's Western Wall in Jerusalem till 1967.

Conversely, accounts by nineteenth-century European travelers indicate that Jews and Christians entering a mosque could incur capital punishment. In January 1869 in Tunis, a Jew passing in front of the great Zaytuna mosque was killed on the false charge of having the intention of entering it. In 1888, when a Jew from Isfahan was falsely accused of having struck a Muslim and profaned a mosque, the Jewish community was collectively punished and closely escaped a general massacre. In Yemen in 1910, Yomtob David Sémach notes that a Jew, having entered a mosque, would never hope to leave it alive. On the other hand, around the middle of the nineteenth century, the authorities of the Ottoman Empire tried to accustom the population to a more tolerant attitude.

Thanks to the special relationship between Turkey and Great Britain,

the Prince of Wales in 1862 became the first Christian to be officially allowed by the Islamic authority to visit the cave of Machpela in Hebron, barred to Jews and Christians since 1266.⁵⁵ The British Mandate (1922–48) removed the prohibition on Christians, but the Jews were forbidden to visit the tombs of the Hebrew patriarchs and matriarchs till after the Six Day War in 1967. Since then, the sharing of what was originally a Jewish place of worship incensed the Palestinian Arabs. It provoked uprisings against the Israelis with the same fanaticism which, since the conquest, had motivated the destruction or Islamization of indigenous churches or synagogues in the countries which had become *dar al-Islam*. Hebron is one typical instance of innumerable cases of former Jewish or Christian holy sites having been Islamized, thereby feeding mutual fanaticism.

Ritual

According to Islamic tradition, the rules restricting ritual and forbidding the ringing of bells and the display of a cross, banners, icons, and other ritual objects date from the beginning of the conquest. In order to halt the destruction of churches and religious persecutions, *dhimmi* leaders reminded the caliphs of the terms in the surrender treaties from documents—genuine or forged—certifying the pre-Islamic origin of those buildings. Some Muslim theologians authorized *dhimmis* to hold processions in towns where they formed the majority. In the sixteenth century, Jérôme Maurand noted that church bells were not rung in Constantinople.⁵⁶ In 1655, Tavernier, traveling in Persian Armenia, observed that bells were rung there, whereas they were forbidden throughout Turkey.⁵⁷ It is true that from Tokat (Docea) in eastern Anatolia to Tauriz in Persia the country was almost exclusively populated by Christians.⁵⁸

Sometimes *dhimmi* notables purchased some privileges that aroused popular revolts. Thus, the *dhimmis* were placed at the center of a conflict between the venality of the authorities who sold them these privileges and the fanaticism of the masses who clamored for the degradation of the *dhimmis*. Religious discrimination, propitious to corruption, constituted a source of profit. The more meddlesome the oppression, the more remunerative it was. Al-Mu'tasim (833–42), at the instigation of his son, Abu Da'ud, promulgated an edict against the Christians. Thenceforth, wrote Michael the Syrian, "men became the prey of prefects who hardened or softened this edict as much as they wished and in proportion to what they received."⁵⁹ In 1173, the bishop of Jazira (Iraq) was persecuted by Arabs who used forged documents to seize a

convent. The people of his diocese were able to free both the convent and the bishop after payment of large sums of money.⁶⁰

Dhimmi religious ceremonies and burials had to take place discreetly. Muslim graves had to be distinguished from those of *dhimmis*. As the infidels' cemeteries warranted no respect, they were frequently razed to the ground and the graves desecrated, practices which still continue today in certain Muslim countries.

As in Christendom in the Middle Ages, apostasy⁶¹ and blasphemy were punished by death.⁶² Whether true or false, an accusation of blasphemy against Islam or the Prophet often provoked summary executions of *dhimmis*. The most famous case in the nineteenth century concerned a Jew, Samuel Sfez, executed in Tunis in 1857.⁶³ Accusations of blasphemy provoked collective reprisals against Jews in Tunis (1876), Aleppo (1889), Hamadan (1876), Suleymaniyyah (1895), Teheran (1897), and Mosul (1911).

FORCED CONVERSIONS

The Koran forbids forced conversions. However, the wars and the requirements of Islamic domination over the conquered lands and populations relegated this principle of religious tolerance to the realm of theory. At no period in history was it respected. The *jihad*, or rather the alternative forced on the Peoples of the Book—namely, payment of tribute and submission to Islamic law or the massacre and enslavement of survivors—is, in its very terms, a contravention of the principle of religious freedom. The constant aggression by Muslim armies against the *dar al-harb*, the *razzias* on non-Muslim populations condemned to slavery for their religion, the piracy on the seas in order to ransom travelers, the regional deportations of the conquered, the destructions of towns and villages—all these recurrent acts of aggression in a compulsory *jihad*, repeated over the centuries, constituted permanent violations of religious freedom.

After the Arab conquest, a number of Christianized Arab tribes suffered defeat, enslavement, and forced conversion.⁶⁴ In 704–5, Marwan's son, Muhammad, assembled the Armenian nobles in the church of St. Gregory in Naxcawan and the church of Xram on the Araxes and burned them to death. Walid I (705–15) had Christian captives killed in the churches of Syria. He used various forms of torture to make the Christian Taghlib tribe apostasize. Umar II ordered that Jewish and Christian apostates be exempt from the poll tax. Under al-Mansur (754–75), the whole Christian population of the Germanicea valley (Marash, north of Aleppo) was taken prisoner and deported to Ramla in Palestine.

Mahdi (775–85) used torture to force the Christian tribe of the Tanukiyya, which lived in the vicinity of Aleppo, to become Muslim. Five thousand men apostasized and the women escaped.⁶⁵ During his reign, the persecution of Manicheans intensified. Idris I (789–93):

having arrived in the Maghreb, caused the last traces of the religions <Christian, Jewish and pagan> to disappear and put an end to the independence of these tribes [Judeo-Berber].⁶⁶

The Christian resistance had its martyrs in Andalusia, under Abd al-Rahman II (822–52); his successor, Muhammad I, yielded to the *ulama* of Cordova and obliged some of his Christian officials to convert so as to keep their positions. Religious disturbances continued in the province of Elvira in 889, and in 891 Seville and its surrounding areas were drenched in blood by the massacre of thousands of Spaniards—Christian and *muwallads*. At Granada in 1066, the whole Jewish community, numbering about three thousand, was annihilated.⁶⁷

In the Maghreb, where endemic anarchy prevailed, sources mention the massacre in 1033 of five to six thousand Jews in Fez. The Almohad persecutions in the Maghreb and Muslim Spain (1130–1212) eliminated Christianity there. In Tunis in 1159:

The Jews and the Christians who live in this town had the choice of Islamism or death; one part became Muslim and the remainder were executed.⁶⁸

As these crypto-Jews practiced Judaism in secret, the Almohad inquisitors removed the children from their families and entrusted them to Muslim educators. A similar law existed in Yemen, obliging the conversion of every Jewish orphan child.⁶⁹ It was repealed by the Turks during their brief occupation after 1872 but reintroduced by the Imam Yahya in 1922 and confirmed in 1925, remaining in force till the exodus of the Jews to Israel in 1949–50.

Persecution under the caliph al-Hakim (996–1021), and later under the Seljuks, provoked the Crusades and brought about the return of intolerance and fanaticism. In Antioch around 1058, Greeks and Armenians were converted by force, torture being used to persuade the recalcitrants.⁷⁰ After the defeat of the Mongols by the Mamluks in Syria (1260), the Christians of Damascus were pillaged and slaughtered, others were reduced to slavery, and churches were destroyed and burned down. Then “the inhabitants of Damascus plundered the Jewish houses leaving not the smallest thing within. The shops they owned in the markets were reduced to piles of rubble.”⁷¹ In 1261, the slaves of Malik Salih, governor of Mosul, looted the Christians and killed anyone who did not become

a Muslim. In 1264, Jews and Christians in Cairo paid heavy ransoms to escape being burned alive, "payment being extorted by whipping; and a large number of these unfortunate people died under torture."⁷²

During the centuries of Muslim expansion, a continuous flow of non-Muslim peoples supplied the slave markets. In 1658, Consul d'Arvieux observed that Christian slaves—Polish, Muscovite, Circassian—were brought like animals for sale on the market.⁷³ The Jews were not spared, their community budgets being heavily burdened by the repurchasing of Jewish slaves carried off by Arab, Maghrebian, or Turkish pirates, or by military raids. The trauma resulting from captivity or slavery prompted unransomed prisoners who had lost family, money, and friends to convert to Islam.

Following the Perso-Turkish wars, Shah Abbas I (1588–1629) deported Armenians from Armenia and Azerbaijan and dispersed them in several villages between Isfahan and Shiraz. When the old men died:

all the young people gradually became Muhammadan and today it would be difficult to find two Armenian Christians in all these beautiful plains where their fathers were sent to farm.⁷⁴

Governed by strict discriminatory laws, the *dhimmi* condition itself was a religious constraint.

In Persia, instances of forced conversion of Jews took place in 1291 and 1318, and those of Baghdad in 1333 and 1344. In 1617 and 1622, a wave of forced conversions and persecution, provoked by the slander of Jewish apostates, swept over Persian Jewry, sparing neither Nestorians nor Armenians. From 1653 to 1666, during the reign of Shah Abbas II (1642–66), all the Jews in Persia were Islamized by force. However, as in most cases of massive conversions—which the Koran forbade—religious freedom was eventually restored. A law of 1656 gave Jewish or Christian converts to Islam exclusive rights of inheritance. This law was alleviated for the Christians as a concession to Pope Alexander VII but remained in force for Jews till the end of the nineteenth century.⁷⁵ David Cazès mentions the existence in Tunisia of similar inheritance laws favoring converts to Islam.⁷⁶

For strategic reasons, the Turks forcibly converted the populations in the frontier regions of Macedonia and northern Bulgaria, particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Those who refused were executed or burned alive.⁷⁷ Traveling in Anatolia in the Salt Lake region, Tavernier observed that in the village of Mucur, "there are numbers of Greeks who are forced every day to become Turks."⁷⁸ In fact, the whole history of the Islamic conquests is punctuated with forced conversions. In 1896, Armenians in the vicinity of Biredjik on the Euphrates were



Troglodyte Dwellings and Churches. Cappadocia, Turkey

Photo: Daniel Littman (1986)

forced to convert and had to go into exile in order to revert to Christianity. After the great massacres of 1915–16, a small number escaped death by converting to Islam. It would be tedious to enumerate all such cases, repeated over the years and recorded in Christian and Muslim chronicles.

The abduction of Jewish and Christian *dhimmi* children also represented a form of forced conversion. Although illegal, there is substantial evidence that it occurred throughout the course of history, either sporadically—ransoming, supplying harems or as a contribution to the tribute—or in an institutionalized way, as in the *devshirme* system that functioned over three centuries in the Balkans for Christian children (see p. 113).

SEGREGATION AND HUMILIATION

The *dhimma* required the humiliation of the *dhimmis*, who were accused of falsifying the Bible by deletions, distortions, and omissions of the prophecies heralding Muhammad's mission. Their persistence in error, regarded as the mark of a diabolical nature, condemned them to degradation.⁷⁹ The tributaries were generally assigned special quarters

where their houses had to be inferior, shabbier, and smaller than those of Muslims. Often those houses considered higher than authorized were demolished. *Dhimmi*s could not have Muslim servants nor possess arms, although exceptions seem to have been made, such as for some of the Jewish tribes in the Moroccan Atlas and central Asia and for the Maronites in Lebanon.

Arab honorific titles and the use of the Arabic alphabet by *dhimmi*s were forbidden. Consulting them as physicians and pharmacists was discouraged, for they were generally suspected of wanting to poison Muslims; but, despite this mistrust, caliphs and Muslim princes could not dispense with their services.⁸⁰ Marriage and sexual relations between *dhimmi*s and Muslim women were punishable by death, but a Muslim could marry a *dhimmi* woman.

In Kurdistan, Armenians, Jews, and Nestorians were subject to tallage and liable to corvées on any occasion.⁸¹ In Yemen, Jews had to carry away dead animals and clean the public latrines on Saturdays. This corvée, decreed in 1806, remained in force till the Jews left for Israel in 1949–50. In Yemen and Morocco, the *dhimmi*s had to extract the brains and salt the decapitated heads of the condemned which they then exposed upon the walls of the town. Louis Franck, physician to the Bey of Tunis at the beginning of the nineteenth century, noted:

When a Turk [Muslim] is condemned to death by strangulation, several Christians or Greek innkeepers from the town are commandeered and forced to act as executioners. Two of them tie a rope, well rubbed with soap, around the neck of the victim, two others grab the rope, which they also fasten to their foot; and all four pull together with feet and hands till death ensues. [. . .]

Usually, the bey orders the hands of thieves to be cut off. Once sentence has been pronounced, the condemned men are led to the Moorish hospital for the operation, which is performed by a Jew, who carries out the judgement as best he can with a bad knife, amputating the hand at the joint.⁸²

It was regarded as a grave offense for a *dhimmi* to ride upon a noble animal, such as a camel or a horse. Outside the town he could ride a donkey, but at certain periods in the Middle Ages this concession was restricted to special cases. In the late seventeenth century, d'Arvieux observes:

Only consuls are permitted to have a horse; even then the Pasha has to give or lend it to them. His [the consul's] officers, as a special favor, have mules, and all the others, whatever their status, have only donkeys—in truth, a fairly comfortable carriage—but indicating the scorn with which

the Turks regard Christians and Jews whom they treat almost indiscriminately.⁸³

In 1697, a Frenchman visiting Cairo noticed that Christians could ride only donkeys and had to dismount when passing distinguished Muslims, “for a Christian must only appear before a Muslim in a humiliating position.”⁸⁴ Till the beginning of the twentieth century, in Yemen and in the rural areas of Morocco, Libya, Iraq, and Persia, a Jew had to dismount from his donkey when passing a Muslim. An oversight authorized the Muslim to throw him to the ground.⁸⁵ A Spaniard, Domingo Badia y Leblich, who traveled in North Africa and the Orient between 1803 and 1807 and who wrote under the name of Ali Bey, related that no Jew or Christian in Damascus was even allowed to ride a mule inside the town. In the Yemen, the prohibition on riding horses remained in force till 1948, as well as a rule obliging the Jewish *dhimmi*s to ride donkeys sidesaddle.

In some legal opinions (*fatwas*), jurists required *dhimmi*s to walk with lowered eyes when passing to the left—the impure side—of Muslims, who were encouraged to push them aside. In the presence of a Muslim, the *dhimmi* had to remain standing in a humble and respectful attitude, only speaking in a low voice when given permission. Jews and Christians were humiliated and maltreated in the streets of Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed till the middle of the nineteenth century. Travelers to the Maghreb and Yemen mention similar customs even later; in the early twentieth century Nahum Slousch observed at Bu Zein, in the Jabal Gharian (Libya), that it was customary for Arab children to throw stones at Jewish passersby.⁸⁶

In Persia and Yemen, at the beginning of the twentieth century, foreigners noticed the low doors that forced the *dhimmi*s—as an additional humiliation—either to stoop or knock their heads when entering their own homes.⁸⁷ The Jewish quarter of San’a, inhabited by several thousand, was the only district with no garbage collection and without lighting at night.⁸⁸ In Bukhara, a piece of cloth had to be hung over Jewish houses to distinguish them from those of Muslims; their height also had to be lower. At certain periods, the Jews of Bukhara were forced to wear nothing but black and had to crouch in their shops so that only their heads and not their bodies were visible to their Muslim clients,⁸⁹ a practice reminiscent of the obligation for Jews and Christians in fourteenth-century Damascus to keep the threshold of their shops below street level so that they would always appear in an inferior position before a Muslim.⁹⁰ The houses in the Phanar district of Constantinople, where the Greek notables lived, were painted in dark colors till the middle of the nineteenth century.⁹¹

The locked doors of the *dhimmis'* quarters were not always adequate to protect their inhabitants from rape and pillage. In Yemen, the Jewish houses were like labyrinths, allowing fugitives to hide and throw pursuers off their track.

Till the end of the nineteenth century, Jews in Persia, Yemen, and North Africa were not allowed to enter certain Muslim districts. They lived in separate areas where they were locked in at nightfall, a practice that continued in Yemen till 1950. They were forbidden access to certain towns for the same reason of sanctity that today prohibits a non-Muslim from desecrating Mecca or Medina.

The restrictions imposed on foreign Christians could be even more severe than those applied to the local *dhimmis*. In North Africa they were tolerated in a few coastal towns only, grouped together in a *funduq* (inn) under the authority of a consul. If they wished to visit the interior of the country, they had to obtain special permits or pass themselves off as Jews, lodging in the Jewish quarter. Nineteenth-century European travelers, who for reasons of security were obliged to reside among the Jews, have left abundant and detailed descriptions of their wretched existence.

In certain inland regions of Tripolitania, in the Atlas mountains and in Yemen, the Jew was often the property of his Muslim master and was unable to leave him. Only this condition of servitude guaranteed survival; the master exploited—yet also protected—his Jews against aggression from other tribes, in the same way as he protected his property, tents, and flocks.

Charles de Foucauld—a French officer and aristocrat—who travelled in the disguise of a Jew, described regions of Morocco in 1883–84 where Jews and their families were the property of the Muslim ruler and could not flee. The religious nature of the servitude was handed on from parents to children; they themselves were part of the master's inheritance. As late as 1913, the Jews of Dades in the Greater Atlas of Morocco still belonged to this category of serfs, specific to tribal society.⁹² It is noteworthy that the protection by the Muslim master guaranteed the life of his Jewish serfs. This shows—in its purest form—the Arab notion of protection, which supercedes the principle of the natural rights of the individual. Muslim protection—*aman* for the foreigner, *dhimma* for the tributary—governed and circumscribed the rights of non-Muslims and established their ties of dependence.

Some of these discriminatory regulations were derived ultimately from the Code of Justinian (534) concerning Jews and Christian heretics and were probably in force to a greater or lesser degree at the time of the Arab conquest of Byzantine territory. Others, as has already been noted, belonged to the arsenal of prejudice, superstition, and fanaticism



Maronite Priest and Pilgrims in Jerusalem

Only Turks [Muslims] could wear a turban [. . .] Christians being content to wind round their bonnet a striped cloth in imitation of a turban. The belt of the under-jacket is of rough narrow linen about three fingers wide. Cf. Dandini, *Voyage* (1536), p. 41. Engraving: Ludwig Mayers (1804)

of the medieval period, irrespective of country or religion. Nevertheless, discrimination by way of clothing seems to have been an Arab innovation. A number of laws regulated the *dhimmi*'s clothes (color, shape, and length), the way their hair was cut (Christians had to shave the front of their heads), the shape of their turbans, footwear, and saddles, as well as the attire of their wives, children, and servants. In some regions (Persia, Ifriqiyya), the *dhimmi*s were barred from public baths; in others, such as Egypt and Palestine, they had to wear small bells to signal their identity in the absence of clothing.

In Ifriqiyya, the wearing of distinctive clothing was strictly supervised. In ninth-century Qairuan, the belt round the garments of Christians and Jews had to be ostensible. Those who omitted to wear the distinctive signs—the belt (*zunnar*) or the badge (*riqa'*)—were whipped, imprisoned, and publicly humiliated.⁹³

*Dhimmi*s who infringed these humiliating obligations were punished by reprisals. In the Middle Ages, constant Muslim-Christian conflicts engendered a propitious climate for anti-*dhimmi* riots, as well as stimulating fanaticism. Christians were often accused of collusion with neighboring Byzantium and with the enemies of Islam, thereby becoming the principal victims of religious passions.

The distinctive vestimentary regulations constituted a binding custom attached to the tributaries' status, and it would be tedious to list all its variations. Reliable sources indicate that *dhimmi*s were subject to these regulations into the nineteenth century. Until 1875, the Jews of Tunisia could wear only a blue or black burnous, black trousers, and caps. In Tripoli (Libya), the Jews wore a distinctive blue badge. At the same period throughout Morocco, with the exception of a few coastal towns, they were obliged to go barefoot outside their quarter (*mellah*). Nahum Slousch reported that in 1912 at Zenaga, in the Algerian Sahara, the Arabs did not allow Jews to wear shoes or ride animals. In the Mzab (southern Algeria), before the French colonization, the Jews paid the *jizya*, lived in their own quarter, and wore only black when leaving it; they were forbidden to emigrate. The same conditions applied to the Jews of Tefilalet and the Atlas mountains.⁹⁴ Ali Bey also mentions the dark colors which Jews and Christians had to wear in early nineteenth-century Jerusalem.⁹⁵ A converted German Jew and Anglican missionary, Joseph Wolff, who visited Bukhara in 1831–34, noted that in addition to the usual restrictions regarding synagogues, the Jews were obliged to wear a discriminatory badge.⁹⁶ At Hamadan in 1892 and 1902, the mollahs forced the Jews to wear a red circular patch on their upper garment as well as distinctive clothing. The same intolerance was displayed in Shiraz and Teheran in 1897. In Yemen, Sémach was struck by the dis-

criminy clothing which made the Jews objects of ridicule; in San'a, as late as 1947, Louise Février observed:

They [the Jews] were not allowed to own horses and generally were bullied by the Arabs. I saw a tribesman whose badly loaded donkey had shed its lucerne [alfafa], seize the nearest Jew and compel him to pick it up and replace it.⁹⁷

On the other hand, discriminatory clothing and the ban on carrying arms did not exist in European regions of Turkey—in Greece, Albania, and the towns and villages of the empire where Christians were in a majority. But in Turkish Bulgaria, according to the historian Dujcev, Muslim judges refused to accept testimony given by Christians against Muslims. Bulgarians could not carry arms and wear fine clothing; nor could they mount a horse in the presence of Turks, build new churches, or repair old ones without first obtaining an authorization; lastly, they suffered plundering and arbitrary humiliations.⁹⁸ Considerable differences existed with regard to the detailed and humiliating nature of the regulations that were imposed in the Turkish European provinces on the one hand and in Arab and Persian regions on the other.

This brief historic summary indicates the development and diversity of a specific juridical condition and its regional variations according to economic and political situations. Sometimes a sultan or a well-disposed governor removed or alleviated these constraints; sometimes they were reinstated at the demand of theologians during periods of war and fanaticism. Often a community fled from persecution in one region and succeeded in surviving by placing itself under the authority of a more kindly Muslim prince. For example, *dhimmis* who were oppressed in Persia often took refuge in Afghanistan, and, in certain periods, the Jews of the Maghreb and Yemen emigrated to the more tolerant Ottoman Empire.

Nevertheless, even with such precautions, generalizations covering long periods and vast areas may often prove misleading. For example, at the beginning of the seventeenth century:

Several princes and officials from Azerbaijan—Muslims and Christians—had gone to the Persian monarch, because the Osmanli race was cruelly oppressing the country, crushing it by requisitions, stripping it by spoliations and plunder, forcing apostasy, torturing in a thousand ways not only the Armenians but even the Iberians [Georgians] and Muslims. These persecutions had thrown them into the arms of the king of Persia, who would perhaps relieve them and deliver them from the slavery of the Osmanlis. [. . .] Armenians from Aghovania <Karabagh> also went there. [. . .] In addition, (the inhabitants of) four villages in the land of Dizac have emigrated en masse to Persia, and the shah has settled them

in Isfahan. What had caused the emigration of the people of Dizac and the plain was the excessive requisitions, vexations, depredations, apostasy imposed on Christians and the merciless massacres. All reduced to indigence, burdened with debts, they had sought refuge in the land of the Persians.⁹⁹

However, the motives for this exodus varied with the category of populations: Muslim Kurds, Armenian tributaries, and Georgian Christian princes. The latter knew that the shah intended to invade Armenia and wanted to win his goodwill and avenge the murder of the Georgian princes taken away as hostages to the Osmanli court. It was in fact common practice, during campaigns, for Muslim princes, caliphs, sultans, and emirs to take the children of the Christian kings hostage in order to neutralize them, ensure their obedience, and—should the occasion arise—meddle in dynastic quarrels and place their pupils, duly converted, on the throne.

The application of the *dhimma* varied according to economic and political circumstances and the extent to which the Islamic power favored one community at the expense of another. Some practices were common to the whole Islamized Orient while others remained localized. In Yemen alone the decree of 1806, which remained in force till 1950, obliged Jews to clean the latrines and remove dead animals. The obligation to go barefoot outside the Jewish quarter existed only in Yemen and the Maghreb. The legislation relating to the impurity of Jews and Christians was particularly harsh in Yemen and Persia but not in the Ottoman Empire. In his *Voyage en Orient*, Gérard de Nerval depicts the Egyptian people in 1843 as hospitable, easy-going and tolerant. The contrast between this behavior and the fanaticism which raged in the Maghreb, Syria, Persia, and Yemen at this time demonstrates the great variations in customs which existed from one region to another.

The conditions of life differed, depending on whether the area was rural or urban and on the composition of the surrounding majority: Muslim or *dhimmi*. Even the geographical relief of the land determined the map of dhimmitude; mountains offered refuge, but plains, open to nomadic depredation, were abandoned by the population. It seems that the Christians in European Turkey escaped the niggling tyranny which was a characteristic of the Arabized regions, where only anemic communities survived at the beginning of the Ottoman conquest. Michael the Syrian makes several references to persecution by leaders anxious to consolidate their popularity. In Syria, for example, the Arabs regarded Nur al-Din (1146–74) as a prophet:

Consequently, he did his utmost to harass the Christians in every way in order to be considered by the Muslims as an assiduous observer of their laws.¹⁰⁰

Unfortunately, there is no comparative study of the way indigenous Jews and Christians were treated in regions which were Islamized by Arabs or Turks. For example, the typically rigid discrimination affecting religion, clothing, riding, and the prohibition to enter certain streets and towns in all the Arabized countries did not exist in regions of European Turkey and even Anatolia.

The *dhimmi*'s condition also depended on the code of legislation applied in each country. The more tolerant Hanafi and Shafi'i schools predominated in Turkey and Egypt. On the other hand, the most fanatical Hanbali school developed in Iraq and Syria and was prevalent in Palestine till the fifteenth century. In some regions of the Maghreb and in certain periods in Persia, the principle of collective responsibility was applied. If a single tributary caused harm to Muslims, all the others forfeited their protection; their property was confiscated, considered as booty, and subject to the quint.¹⁰¹ It is easy to imagine the excesses caused by such regulations, which amounted to legalizing the periodic pillage of a community, bearing in mind that any testimony given by its members had no validity.

This system of oppression and humiliation covered vast areas and periods. The practice of contempt molded customs and shaped traditions, the collective consciousness, and behavior. Habits were established, often perhaps without any specific legal justification. From an Arab viewpoint, barefoot Jews in the Maghreb or the short black tunic exposing their legs in Yemen were justified by timeless customs based on religion, even though the Koran did not mention them.

Arab-Muslim sources rarely refer to the *dhimmi*, as they were conveniently rejected into nothingness. For this reason, the history of these indigenous peoples of lands which were integrated into the *dar al-Islam* through *jihād* could not be described with all its diversity in works by Muslim authors, imbued with the prejudices of their time and acting as apologists for the system. Even the evidence from *dhimmi* sources would benefit from an assessment based not only on a psychological conditioning in which the notion of *collective protection* supplanted the notion of *individual rights*, but also highlighting the antagonisms that opposed *dhimmi* communities among themselves—and even the social conflicts within each of these specific communities. The observations of Western travelers often complement other sources, though allowance must still be made for prejudice and personal interest. Indeed the reader cannot be warned too strongly against the prejudices of Latin Westerners regarding Jews, Greeks, Monophysite Christians, and Muslims; nonetheless, their descriptions often contribute indispensable information.

4

The Conquered Lands: Processes of Islamization

The term “Islamization” here designates a complex political, economic, cultural, religious, and ethnic process whereby Islamized Arabs or Turks supplanted those indigenous peoples, civilizations, and religions in the countries which they invaded. In this process one distinguishes factors of fusion—absorption of local cultures by the invaders, conversions of the natives to Islam—and conflicting factors: massacres, slavery, deportation, and the systematic destruction of the cultural and religious expressions of the native civilizations. This evolution does not exclude the simultaneous coexistence of situations both of conflict and of fusion.

It would appear that the Islamization of the conquered lands developed in two stages. The first phase consists of a military conflict defined by specific rules, the *jihad*. The second phase represents the *dhimma*, or the government of the conquered peoples. While the *jihad* stipulated the modalities of dividing the booty (land, property, conquered peoples) between the belligerents, the *dhimma* assigns a long-term economic function to the *dhimmis*, which consists of supplying the needs of the Muslim community. It was within this functional economic structure that, as in a matrix, the process of Islamization developed.

The extinction of the *dhimmi* peoples was the consequence of a multitude of complex factors, either of a fluctuating or permanent nature. These factors took root in an interdependent ensemble: the *jihad*, as already mentioned; the depredations of the nomads in zones of settled habitation; the stabilization of Islamic jurisdiction over the lands of *dhimmitude*.

THE NOMADS: FACTORS OF ISLAMIZATION

The seventh-century Arab conquest was carried out in the tradition of large-scale nomadic warfare, whose practices, known since antiquity, were integrated by the Islamic conquerors into a religious concept: the

jihad. The consecration of nomadic power in the Arab-Islamic state and, especially, the dependence of that state on the nomads who had provided the military contingents for conquests and Arabization,¹ eliminated the obstacles which protected the sedentary civilizations from the usual *razias*. The Islamization of the nomads transformed their permanent conflict with the settled populations into a religious conflict: Arab Muslims on the one hand; and on the other, the Peoples of the Book, against whom the Islamic state discriminated.

Even though a jurisprudence, codified two centuries after the conquest, theoretically ensured to the *dhimmis* the conditional inviolability of their lives and property, the actual situation was governed by force, not ethics. Although in towns *dhimmis* could appeal for justice if the need arose, through the intermediary of their leaders or often purchase it from a vizier or *qadi* capable of applying the law, recourse to such persons was barely possible in the provinces or in towns distant from the capital.

The customs of Bedouins and of nomads in general have been described profusely from antiquity to the nineteenth century. As their lifestyle has remained consistently unchanged for millennia, there are no grounds for imagining that the Arabization process of the lands of dhimmitude took place under a "gentleman's agreement." Irrefutable historical and archaeological sources confirm that it was perhaps the greatest plundering enterprise in history.

The domains which the Arab invaders appropriated were not limited solely to landed property belonging to the conquered states. They also included the property and dwellings of vast populations mentioned in the sources who were put to the sword, enslaved, deported, or forced to flee or go into exile. The capitulation treaties often mention that half the churches and houses of the natives were conceded to the Muslims, and it would be naive to believe that the latter had any qualms about rapidly evicting their hosts. Expropriations of indigenous *dhimmis*, either by the Islamic state or by tribes acting without the state's knowledge—or also by individuals in the course of wars, tribal uprisings, or religious persecution—were endemic in the *dar al-Islam* until the early twentieth century.

From the beginning of the conquest, as has already been noted, Umar Ibn al-Khattab pressed Arab tribes, particularly those converted to Islam, to migrate to the conquered lands as a means of ensuring the control and loyalty of these tribes.² He awarded them land and pensions taken from the *dhimmis'* property. This Arabization began in 638 and expanded systematically under the caliph Uthman.

In Mesopotamia, the Near East, North Africa, and Spain, the *jihad*


preceded the long-term processes of decline and regression subsequent to the implantation of pastoral peoples into settled and cultivated regions. On the other hand, in the phase of Turko-Islamic expansion, the same phenomena—agricultural deterioration, abandonment, and destruction of towns—preceded and facilitated the *jihad*. In the twelfth century, Anna Comnena, sister of the Byzantine emperor, describes towns and regions which from Smyrna to Attalia had been reduced to an uninhabited desert by Turkish nomads.³ A contemporary, the historian Nicetas, mentions Turks who, while grazing their flocks around Dorylaeum, were burning villages and crops and ravaging the countryside.⁴

By carefully studying numerous sources, Speros Vryonis meticulously analysed the causes and effects of nomadism in Anatolia, their interaction with the *jihad*, and the Islamization of the conquered lands. Although documentation relating to the Arab conquest is less plentiful, it nonetheless offers an interesting field for a similar study. The Syriac and Armenian sources in particular, but also the Arab, contain information on the process of decline in the rural regions of the Arab Empire. One notes that the demographic decrease in the *dhimmi* populations, the agricultural decline, the abandonment of villages and fields, and the gradual desertification of provinces—densely populated and fertile during the pre-Islamic period—are phenomena linked to the immigration of Arabic, Berber (in Spain), and later Turkoman nomadic tribes.

The spread of the nomads engendered insecurity, depopulation, and famine. In 750 Berber raids, the burning of crops, and the taking of slaves caused such a famine in northwest Spain that the conquerors had to return to the Maghreb. At the same period, Palestine and Syria, seats of the Umayyad caliphate and consequently subjected to strong Arab colonization, were weakened by epidemics resulting from famine. The once-flourishing villages of the Negev had already disappeared by about 700, and by the end of the eighth century the population had deserted the greater part of the region stretching from south of Gaza to Hebron, fleeing back northwards, abandoning ruined churches and synagogues.⁵ The same scourges—brigandage, tribal wars, epidemics and famine—afflicted Mesopotamia under the last Umayyad caliph, Marwan II (744–50).

Behold, the sword of the Arabs has <turned> against themselves; behold, such a depredation that it was impossible to go out without being robbed and stripped of one's possessions; behold, the famine rages outside and in. If a man enters his house, he meets famine and plague; if he goes out, the sword and captivity follow him. On every side there is nothing but cruel oppression, lamentable grief, suffering and upheaval.⁶

In Armenia (749–50) in the region of Mogk and the Arzanenus,



Church of St. Theodore (6th century). Avdat, Negev desert, Israel
Abandoned, ca. 7th–8th century

Arabs from Maipherkat spread out over the region and began to do much harm to the inhabitants of the mountain and the whole countryside.⁷

The chronicler describes Arab attempts to seize the property of Armenians and the execution of their notables. John Bar Daday (Mamikonian?) assembled the inhabitants and

spoke to them in these terms: “Today, as you know, there is no king to avenge our blood at the hands of these people. If we allow them to do as they wish, they will join forces against us and will take us away from here into captivity, us and all that is ours.”⁸

Extortion and torture drove the Armenians to revolt under the leadership of Musheg Mamikonian.

From that moment, evils were added to evils. The inhabitants of the mountain and the Arabs continually attacked and killed one another. The mountain dwellers took possession of the gorges and no Arab was to be seen any longer in the mountain.⁹

The cruelty of Abu Ja'far al-Mansur, governor of Armenia, the Jazira and Mosul (750–54), and the famine resulting from the destruction of the harvests caused large-scale emigration.

The whole of Armenia emigrated to escape the famine which occurred and [its inhabitants] invaded Syria, driven by the fear that they and their children would die of hunger [. . .] They went forth and filled the whole land: towns, monasteries, villages, countrysides; they sold everything they had in order to buy bread and caused famine in the country.¹⁰

Anarchy was propitious to banditry; a certain Ibn Bukhtari, from the region of Edessa in Mesopotamia,


rebelled and did a great deal of harm to a large number of men, particularly at Beit Ma'ada, where he seized the principal inhabitants [. . .] In order to lay hands on their gold, he killed, took prisoner or caused the death of a large number of people. He destroyed all the monasteries in the region of Edessa, Harran and Tela [between Mardin and Edessa], seized all their property and put their superiors to death by burning them at the stake.¹¹

The settlement of Arab colonists in Erzerum (Theodisiopolis) (756) and the invasion (760) by Khurasanian troops of the Abbasid caliph, and then the deportation of the inhabitants of Marash and Samosata (769) by the Arabs drove the Armenians to revolt in 771–72; they were defeated at Bagravan.¹²

The situation in the western provinces was scarcely better. At the beginning of the ninth century, the Qays tribes, which had settled in the Egyptian delta, held the natives to ransom. Conditions deteriorated in 814–15, when fifteen thousand Arabs from Cordova (Andalusia), not counting women and children, landed at Alexandria. The Umayyad emir, al-Hakam, after slaughtering traitors, had given them three days to leave Spain, on pain of crucifixion. These Arabs took possession of Alexandria and settled in the houses of the Christians and Jews, all of whom were driven from the town. At this period,

the whole town [Alexandria] was already in ruins. On all sides, nothing but vestiges remained of the various places, the famous temples and the houses—and a few human dwellings surrounded them as did a few villages.¹³

These Arabs from Spain left Alexandria (827) and then ravaged Crete, which they put to fire and sword. After the death of Mutawakkil (861) and during the civil war between al-Musta'in and al-Mu'tazz (862–66), as the Coptic chronicler pointed out: "All the tribes were joyful on



Dayr al-Abyad, Coptic Monastery (5th century). Sohag, Upper Egypt

account of the fear which had been upon the country, for the Arabs ('Arab) in the land of Egypt (Misr) had ruined (the country)."¹⁴ They had devastated Upper Egypt, plundering and killing, and destroyed the monasteries, including those in the Fayyum and the delta.

They burnt the fortresses and pillaged the provinces, and killed a multitude of the saintly monks who were in them [the monasteries] and they violated a multitude of the virgin nuns and killed some of them with the sword.¹⁵

It was around the mid-ninth century that most of the monasteries bordering the desert were abandoned. In fact, as the Arabs knew the dates of Christian religious festivities, they used to come down from Upper Egypt in secret to raid them and take booty and slaves from among the pilgrims. A moving account of one of these raids has been left by a victim of it, the patriarch Shenouti I. During Easter 866, Arabs pillaged all the monasteries in Wadi Natrun. They emptied the places and carried off everything they contained, including furnishings and food. The monks were robbed and most of the pilgrims led away at swordpoint. After carrying off their booty, the Arabs came back several times to harass the monks and force them to apostasize, stealing everything down to their clothing and wounding with swords those who resisted. The chronicle continues with a description of events in the days which followed and of the terror of the Copts, besieged by Arabs who threatened to kill them or to lead them into slavery.¹⁶ The patriarch notes that the hardships did not cease for the churches of Egypt.¹⁷

The same chronicle gives a faithful description of the conduct of the nomads in the lands they invaded. At that period, a Muslim from Alex-

andria formed a band to which large numbers of Bedouins rallied. They set fire to towns, killed the people, and collected taxes from the regions they controlled. "They were greater murderers than any people and they could not be withstood."¹⁸ They seized the property and domains of the churches which they pillaged in the region of Alexandria and in other places.

When they had committed oppressions and injustices and had increased their wealth, their men, their beasts, their women, their children and their habitations, the chief among them and those of the warriors who were with him whom he had selected resolved to besiege the city of Alexandria. He demanded that it should be given up to him for pillage as he had pillaged the other cities. He took captive the children and the women, and he slew the men and seized the money.¹⁹

As they lacked the necessary siege machinery to attack the town's fortifications, the Bedouins invested it. Whoever traveled from one place to another with a single dirham risked death for that coin. The only way to travel safely was to wear rags.²⁰

These rebellions resulted from the Abbasids' land policy which deprived Arab tribes of the domains received from the Umayyads at the time of the conquests or during the Arabization of the Near East. These measures were aggravated in 833 by the abolition of the pensions (*ata*) paid to them by the Muslim state. Deprived of their means of existence, the Arab tribes attacked the caliph's representatives and reimbursed themselves for the unpaid pensions by pillaging the *dhimmi* populations. This anarchy primarily affected Palestine and Syria, the most Arabized regions, but Egypt and Iraq also suffered.

Despite a period of stability under Ibn Tulun and his successor (866–96), the general situation in Egypt deteriorated constantly. The numerous contingents of slave soldiers, with which the governors surrounded themselves, were made up of elements that could easily be subverted by the rival factions. In Syria and Palestine, the decline in the urban and rural agglomerations, which had already begun under the Umayyads, was increased by the transfer of the capital to Iraq and the disappearance around the middle of the eighth century of a once flourishing Mediterranean trade.

A brief historical summary is needed here in order to understand the significant decrease of the indigenous peasant population, that is to say, the Peoples of the Book. Actually, this development can be explained only by integrating it into the expansion of the nomadic populations throughout the cultivated lands from the eighth to the ninth and tenth centuries.

Infiltrated by Bedouins on all sides, Egypt became the prey of clan

warfare, while in about 861 most of the towns and plains of Syria and Palestine fell into the hands of the Tayy tribes, natives of northern Arabia. Their alliance with the Carmathians, heretical Bedouins from the eastern Arabian shores, heightened pressure from the desert at the beginning of the tenth century. Homs and Damascus were pillaged (902), then the towns of northern Syria (903), and the Hawran and Tiberias on several occasions between 906 and 969. The ascendancy of the Jarrahites—nomad pastoralists from the Tayy tribe who were firmly settled in Palestine—transformed the whole region, from Arabia to the shores of Palestine, into a vast land overrun by nomads who robbed and extorted excessive tribute from the local inhabitants.

The incursions by the Carmathians and Tayys, aggravated around the mid-tenth century by Fatimid Berber invasions, devastated Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and lower Iraq. The Syro-Palestinian oases cultivated since antiquity, the agricultural and urban centers of the Negev, the Jordan, and the Orontes, Tigris and Euphrates valleys—particularly the Sawad, center of Jewish and Nestorian Babylonia—had disappeared and became ghost towns, abandoned to pasturage, where herds of goats and camels grazed amid the ruins.

In northern Iraq, the Hamdanide governors from the Banu Taghlib tribe fought against the armies of Baghdad and crushed the settled populations of the Jazira, using extortions destined to maintain their sumptuous court, their *ghulam*, and their slave militias. This situation was darkened by Byzantine conquests: Aleppo (962), Antioch (969), and northern Palestine (972). They increased the tribulations of the indigenous inhabitants and barely altered the general ethnogeographical development, represented by the Bedouins' total domination over the cultivated lands. This nomadic thrust northwards, essentially aimed at acquiring booty,²¹ put the Fertile Crescent under the control of Bedouin dynasties in the tenth century: the Hamdanides and the Uqaylids (Jazira); the Numayris (Hawran); the Kalbis (Damascus); the Tanukhis, Lakhmids, Judhamis, and Taghlibis (Syria); the Tayyis (Palestine); the Tamimis and Shaybanis (Iraq); and the Asadis (Kufa).

Indeed, the caliphs endeavored to pacify these regions and establish order by numerous expeditions. The disorder remained endemic, since the nomads not only invaded the regions but also appropriated the politico-military apparatus through the emergence of semi-independent Bedouin dynasties in Syria and upper Mesopotamia. The constant intrusion of the nomadic-Arab world reached its peak with the invasion by the Banu Hilal in the tenth century. Coming from the Arabian peninsula, these tribes reduced settled habitation still further by wreaking destruction over an area stretching from the Sudan toward the Near East and as far as the Maghreb.

This general situation prevailed throughout the *dar al-Islam*, from Spain to Armenia. The chronicles indicate that even if the conquered populations theoretically enjoyed a protected status under the treaties, they were in fact subject to pillage and violence from rebel or uncontrollable Arab clans, when such assaults did not come from the government itself, as strategic or political needs dictated. Whether it be in Armenia, Mesopotamia, the Syro-Palestinian region, Egypt, Anatolia, or Spain, details about this endless booty seized from the *dhimmi* villagers fill the chroniclers' pages relating the incessant rebellions and civil wars within the *dar al-Islam*.

In Mesopotamia, *dhimmi* villages were reduced to isolated and dispersed nuclei. This situation remained unchanged for more than a millennium; in the nineteenth century insecurity still prevailed in all the regions controlled by the nomads, whether in Armenia, Kurdistan, the Euphrates valley, Syro-Palestine, or the Maghreb. Foreigners and even indigenous *dhimmi*s and Muslims only traveled under armed escort or in a caravan, and no one escaped the "protection money" levied by every chief over the portion of territory he controlled.

SLAVERY: DEMOGRAPHIC, RELIGIOUS, AND CULTURAL ASPECTS

In this section, only a survey of the Islamic slave system, as it affected one category of the *jihad*'s victims, will be mentioned and not the slave trade itself.

The *jihad* slave system included contingents of both sexes delivered annually in conformity with the treaties of submission by sovereigns who were tributaries of the caliph. When Amr conquered Tripoli (Libya) in 643, he forced the Jewish and Christian Berbers to give their wives and children as slaves to the Arab army as part of their *jizya*. From 652 until its conquest in 1276, Nubia was forced to send an annual contingent of slaves to Cairo. Treaties concluded with the towns of Transoxiana, Sijistan, Armenia, and Fezzan (Maghreb) under the Umayyads and Abbasids stipulated the annual dispatch of slaves from both sexes.²²

However, the main sources for the supply of slaves remained the regular raids on villages within the *dar al-harb* and the military expeditions which swept more deeply into the infidel lands, emptying towns and provinces of their inhabitants. This strategy, practiced from the beginning of Arabo-Islamic expansion by the first four caliphs and then by the Umayyads and their successor, remained constant over all the areas covered by *jihad*. The depopulation and desertification of once-flourishing and densely peopled regions, described in full by Muslim and

Christian chroniclers, was the result of the massive deportation of captives. Musa b. Nusayr brought back thirty thousand prisoners from his expeditions to Spain (714).²³ In 740, the governor of the province of Tangiers provoked an uprising by Kharajite Berber Muslims when he wanted to "levy the quint on the Berbers, on the pretext that this people was a booty gained by the Muslims." The chronicler states that no emir had dared to levy the quint of slaves on the vanquished who had converted to Islam, and he concludes: "Governors only imposed this tribute on populations who refused to embrace Islam."²⁴ In Andalusia, Abd al-Rahman I (756–88) had more than forty thousand non-Muslim slaves among his troops. His successor Hisham is said to have received forty-five thousand. Razzias and perpetual military campaigns in Spain procured a considerable number of captives reduced to slavery.

At the other end of the *dar al-Islam*, seven thousand Greeks were deported into captivity when Ephesus was sacked (781). At the fall of Amorium (838), al-Mu'tasim "ordered that prisoners be put up for auction only three times," so as to accelerate the sale. Being so numerous, they were sold in groups of fives and tens.²⁵ At the sack of Thessaloniki (903), twenty-two thousand Christians were shared between Arab chiefs or sold into slavery. In 924, a naval expedition "brought back a thousand prisoners, eight thousand heads of heavy cattle, twenty thousand light cattle and a large quantity of gold and silver."²⁶ During the summer campaign against Amorium in August 931:

The Muslims entered the place and found large quantities of merchandise and provisions, which they seized. They set fire to all the enemies' buildings, then penetrated further into Byzantine territory, carrying out pillage, murder and devastation, and came to Ancyra, a town today called Ankuriya [Ankara]. They returned successfully and without having encountered the slightest hostility. The value of the captives reached one hundred and thirty-six thousand dinars.²⁷

In 1064, the Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan (1063–72) covered Georgia and Armenia with ruins, perpetrated massacres, wiped out populations, and carried off innumerable prisoners, "bringing death and slavery everywhere."²⁸ The whole male population of Ani was massacred and the women and children deported. In the thirteenth century, the Mamluks of Egypt put the kingdom of Armenia-Cilicia to fire and sword. In the expedition by the Sultan Rukn-ad-Din Baybar in 1266, twenty-two thousand people were killed at Sis. The Egyptians set fire to the town, devastated the surroundings, and drove the populations of Adana, Ayas, and Tarsus into captivity.

The conquerors, having penetrated the town of Sis, destroyed it from top to bottom. They stayed in this district for a few days, spreading fire and



Sale of a Christian Family in Constantinople

Ellendigh (1663)

carnage everywhere and carrying off a large number of prisoners. Then the emir Ugan (Igan) turned toward the land of Rum [Byzantium] and the emir Qala'un toward Masisah, Adana, Ayas, and Tarsus. Both slaughtered the population, took prisoners, destroyed a large number of strongholds and set fire to everything.²⁹

During their 1268 expedition, the Mamluks put all the men of Antioch to the sword and seized all the women and youngsters. The town became a pile of uninhabited ruins.³⁰ During the 1275 expedition, Baybar and his troops perpetrated massacres everywhere and collected considerable booty. Mopsueste was burned down and its population wiped out. Sis was once again pillaged. According to the Syriac chronicler Bar Hebraeus, sixty thousand people were killed and an incalculable number of women, youngsters, and children deported as slaves.³¹

The populations which were reduced to slavery within the geographic area covered by this research were mainly Christian, but they also included Byzantine and European Jews. Dislocated families were broken up haphazardly into batches distributed among soldiers or at slave auctions and deported to distant, unknown countries. This captive humanity, constantly replenished by *jihad*, vanishes in the collective generic term of booty—the Muslim *fay*. Individuals who had been atomized by the

loss of family, religious, and social solidarities through slavery and deportation, these captives formed the hordes of *mawali* (emancipated slaves) who filled Arab military camps at the beginning of the conquest. This demographic increase, resulting from the spoils of war, began the process of urbanization which emerged from the eighth century. The chronicles talk of provinces and entire towns of the *dar al-harb* emptied of their inhabitants.

However, the historical role of these hordes drained off from the *dar al-harb* by the conquering Muslim armies should not be underestimated. The Christians and Jews driven from the Mediterranean countries and Armenia—scholars, doctors, architects, craftsmen, and peasants, country folk and town dwellers, bishops, monks, and rabbis—belonged to more complex civilizations than those of the Arab or Turkish tribes. The military and economic power of the caliphs was built up and the process of Islamization carried out through the exploitation of this slave manpower.

The prisoners were directed toward countryside and towns depopulated by war. They revived the abandoned land and farmed the fiefs that the Muslims had appropriated in the conquered territories. Their proficiency, mastery of traditional techniques and manual skill in the various professions added to the wealth of the *umma*. The most brilliant rose to high office through the influence they gained over their masters. Infiltrating every social level, peopling harems and military militias, most converted to Islam. Some took advantage of their privileged position to protect their former coreligionists, such as, for example, the eunuch—formerly a Christian from Antioch, probably kidnapped during a raid or sold as war booty—who became governor of Mosul in 1171.

Being favorably disposed to the Christians, as was Mordechai in former times to his fellow citizens, he was viewed with disfavor by the jealousy of the Taiyayes [the Arabs].[. . .] Nur al-Din himself said that his zeal [wrath] had been stirred up and that he had come to Mosul because of that man. [. . .] When that man left [1173] for Berrhoe [Aleppo] it was an affliction for the Christian populations who were in Assyria and Mesopotamia.³²

Villagers captured by the rebels, travelers who were the victims of piracy, prisoners forming war booty to be disposed of by soldiers, or the quint reserved for the caliph—they worked in the fields, populated the towns, filled the administration and the army, and sometimes rose to the highest positions in the state.

The number of captives, some Jews, but mainly Christians—eunuchs, men, women, and children—was so great that redeeming them was beyond the financial resources of the impoverished communities. Nonetheless, according to Jewish and Christian sources, some drew nearer to

their coreligionists who redeemed and freed them. They then joined the *dhimmi* communities. When Zangi seized Edessa (1144–45), five to six thousand were put to death, and, from among the ten thousand youth enslaved, the Syriac patriarch of Mardin redeemed and freed a large number.³³

The barrier between the social category of *dhimmis* and that of slaves was hardly ever impervious, since abduction of *dhimmi* women and children, razzias on villages or *dhimmi* districts, tribal revolts, or the insolvency of the *jizya* tax were sufficient to transfer individuals from one day to the next from the category of *dhimmi* to that of slave. Nothing could be more illusory than to imagine the *dhimmi* populations enjoying a definitive guaranteed and stable status. On the contrary, the history of dhimmitude shows how fragile were the constantly threatened legal structures which protected it. Thus, Harun al-Rashid (d. 809) received a considerable number of slaves in place of the *kharaj*.³⁴ Ma'mun reduced thousands of Coptic *dhimmis* of Lower Egypt to slavery and deported them to the lower Iraq area.

The state was not alone in drawing its supplies of slaves from the *dhimmi* populations. The nomads also replenished their stocks through razzias and ambushes. A moving poem by Joseph Ibn Abitur describes the pillage, massacres, sodomy, and slavery inflicted on Palestinian Jews in 1024 by Tayy Bedouins, led by Hasan b. Jarrah, who controlled the region. These disorders, caused by the weakening of Fatimid power on the death of al-Hakim, also tore Syria apart. Yet these indigenous Palestinians and Syrians, victims of tribal turmoil, were *dhimmis* whose lives and property were theoretically protected. These few examples indicate the disparity between the abstract, simplistic theory of the legal texts and the reality of daily life. Moreover, as the complexity of the historical fabric shows, dhimmitude cannot be defined in an exclusively religious context, for it intrudes upon the ethnic, cultural, and economic conflicts and, notably—due to the Islamization of the Arab and Turkish nomads—on the antagonism between nomads and sedentary populations.

The sources relating to Palestine, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and later Anatolia, the Balkans, and Safavid Persia indicate that tributary families who were unable to pay the Islamic taxes were forced to surrender their children in part payment of their *jizya*. Traveling in Armenia, Tavernier observes that Armenians, too poor to pay their poll tax, were condemned to slavery together with their wives and children.³⁵ At Cyprus where he put into port in 1651, he learned that: "during the last three or four months, over four hundred Christians had become Muhammadans because they could not pay their *kharaj*, which is the tribute that the Grand Seigneur levies on all Christians in his states."³⁶ In Baghdad, in 1652, the Christians incurred such expenses "that, when

they had to pay their debts or their *kharaĵ*, they were forced to sell their children to the Turks to cover it.”³⁷ Historical sources on collective groups, official documents, individual behavior which history has fortuitously preserved—all provide abundant evidence to indicate that the *dhimmi*’s offspring were regarded as a reservoir of slaves for economic or political purposes.

In 1836, the Ottoman sultan ordered the transfer of Armenian children:

By royal decree, many [thousands of] Armenian children [from eight to fifteen years of age] from Sebastia [Sivas] and from other towns in Anatolia were assembled in Erzerum and taken to Constantinople for forced labor at the *iplikhane* [spinning mill], the Sultan’s shipyard, to manufacture sails for ships and at [the foundry] forging hot iron. They were given bread and clothing, but no salary. And this order is renewed year after year and they collect hundreds of Armenian children from every town, depriving them of their parents and their homeland, and during this thirty-day march [journey] in bare feet and rags, [they] take them to Constantinople. Several die of cold and want on the way and later through the tyranny of their masters, while others convert to Islam, hoping thus to obtain their freedom. None of the Armenian leaders dare protest to the government against this diabolic evil.³⁸

In the firman of 13 February 1841, the Sultan Abdul Mejid ratified the governorship of the African provinces of Darfur, Nubia, Kordofan, and Sennar to his vassal Muhammad Ali, and added:

The raids that the troops are accustomed to make from time to time on villages in the above-mentioned countries and as a consequence of which robust young men, taken as slaves, remain in the hands of the soldiers as payment of their wages, necessarily bring about the ruin and depopulation of these lands and are contrary to Our Holy Law and the principles of equity.³⁹

The chronicles bear witness to these seizures from the indigenous populations by regular troops, rebels, or nomads in regions of the *dar al-Islam*, either close to the central government or remote from it. It is impossible to assess the number of Christians and Jews who passed from *dhimmitude* to slavery over the centuries; the last significant group were the thousands of Ottoman Armenian women and children in 1915–17.

Devshirme

Another important process of Islamization was the *devshirme*.⁴⁰ This practice, introduced by the Ottoman sultan Orkhan (1326–59), consisted of a regular levy, as tribute, of a fifth of the Christian children from the

peu de terre seulement, comme vn chien & cheual. Et c'est pitié quand les Officiers du Seigneur font assembler ceste enfance, apres auoir veu le papier des Prestres, & ouy à sermēt peres & meres, & choisy ce qui est de plus fort & plus beau. pour seruir au plaisir & volonté d'vn Roy barbare, & ennemy de nostre foy : où souuent vous voyez les peres & meres en mourir de rage & despit. Et telle fois en emmenerōt quinze ou seize cens, lesquels sont conduits à Constantinople ou Adrianopoly, & autres

*Chate Lamé
table aux
Chrétiens
Ieuaniens.*



*Figure de
la prise
des enfans
Chrétiens.*

Devshirme. Assembling of Christian Children for Slavery. Balkans

“And it is shameful when the Officers of the Ruler assemble these children, after seeing the paper from the Priests and heard the fathers and mothers under oath, and chosen the strongest and most beautiful. [. . .] It was Sultan Selim, the first of the name, who introduced this evil and damnable ordinance, to wit that every three years people would go into every house of the aforesaid Christians, in the provinces subject to him, and would take one of every five children: but often they actually take two, even three of them from every house despite father and mother, and today [they] observe this even more closely than ever. But if the parents offer even the slightest refusal, God knows how they are beaten, battered, sometimes even killed, however great and rich they are; and they still do not neglect to bind, pinion, and drag these poor adolescents after them, in the way that can be seen in this present illustration, drawn from life.”

conquered Balkan regions. The interval between levies varied with needs. Some places were exempt: Constantinople, Jannina, Galata, Rhodes. These youngsters, aged between fourteen and twenty, were converted to Islam and entered the corps of janissaries, military militias formed almost exclusively of Christians. The periodic levies, which took place in contingents of a thousand, subsequently became annual. The Christian children were requisitioned from among the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Albanian aristocracy and from among the children of priests. At a fixed date, every father had to gather with his sons at the central place of the village. The recruiting agents, themselves janissaries, then selected the handsomest and most robust in the presence of the *qadi*. No father could avoid this blood tribute on pain of severe punishment.

These levies of children gave rise to abuses, the recruiters taking a surplus of children in order to sell them back to their parents. If their poverty-stricken families were unable to redeem them, they remained slaves. To discourage runaways, children were transferred to remote provinces and entrusted to Muslim feudal masters who treated them harshly as slaves. Removed from their families, hardened by painful experiences, and turned into fanatics by their education, these soldiers became the cruelest weapon against their own people. According to the Byzantine historian Ducas, the janissaries in the personal guard of Bayazid I (1389–1402) were “all hired and gathered from various Christian nations.”⁴¹

Another parallel recruitment system operated. It provided for the levy of children aged six to ten (*ichoghiani*), reserved for the sultans' seraglios. Confined in the palaces and entrusted to eunuchs, they underwent a tyrannical training for fourteen years and furnished the highest hierarchy of officials to the Ottoman state. This regular bloodletting from the conquered peoples increased the Muslim population and correspondingly reduced that of the Christians. The *devshirme* was theoretically abolished in 1656, but recruitment of *ichoghiani* continued until the mid-eighteenth century.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

In so vast an empire conquered by the sword, the power struggle and the rebellions of nomadic tribes frustrated by the division of booty (land and slaves) unleashed—from the death of the Prophet onward—politico-religious schisms, civil wars, and endemic anarchy from which the *dhimmi* populations suffered most. Indeed these peoples, with their lands, property, and wealth remained the stake in the fight for power within the

Arab clans. The Umayyad period, which initiated an intensive Arab colonization, particularly in Syria and Palestine, was a period of civil war, anarchy, and insecurity.

The confrontations between Shi'ites, Sunnis, and other secessionist factions exceeded the strictly religious framework concerning the process of the caliph's election, since his duties were not restricted exclusively to the religious domain; they also encompassed political and economic control of an extensive empire, the administration of its immense wealth, and the taxes paid by a vast tributary population. The weakening of a caliph's power, challenged by rebel clans, implied the destruction of the economic foundations of his strength and the usurpation of his territories, and the workforce from which he drew his revenues. Consequently, the politico-religious disputes between Arab tribes engendered an anarchical situation in conquered lands contested by rival clans; fields and villages were set ablaze and the tributary populations taken prisoner or held to ransom in order to supply the troops and provide them with accommodation. At a period when Islamic legislation was not yet either formulated or standardized over a territory fragmented by the secessionist tendencies of provincial governors or heretical clans, the tributaries resigned themselves to relative security procured by clientelism in the absence of jurisdiction. This situation, observed and experienced by a contemporary, is well described for eighth-century Mesopotamia in the chronicle of pseudo-Dionysius.

The first Abbasids strove to break up the hotbeds of rebellion but when Harun al-Rashid died (809), his sons al-Amin (809–13)—supported by the Arabs—and al-Ma'mun (813–33) wrangled over his empire. Amr, a murderer at the head of brigands, "went to Palestine where he set about plundering, killing and pillaging."⁴² Amr joined up with Nasr b. Shabat from the Qaysite tribe, which was taking prisoners and booty in the Jazira and throughout the Damascus and Emesa regions, and

they massacred and pillaged mercilessly, violated married women, virgins and children. They plucked the wealth from these countries and came to Harran and Edessa; they burned villages, churches and monasteries.⁴³

The Edessa Christians escaped by paying a heavy ransom. The Arab rebels ravaged Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine.

Then rebels and brigand chiefs appeared throughout the West, in Egypt and in Africa; the property of Christians was taken by the Yamanaye, the Aqulaye, the Gannawaye <?>, the Sulaymanaye, who brought about the ruination of Christians in every place.⁴⁴

The caliph sent his army to subjugate them, under the command of Abdallah b. Tahrir, who

forced the inhabitants to collect the corn and straw required for his army, while besieging Kaisum. All the Jazira and the West [Syria] was under such oppression that they begged for death. They were so hard pressed that they harvested the wheat, barley and other cereals before the proper time, threshed them and delivered them [to Abdallah]. Nasr went to and fro, massacred the harvesters and burned down everything there was [in order to prevent the caliph's army obtaining supplies].⁴⁵

When Abdallah went to besiege Kaisum (824–25), the fortress of Nasr: “There had been great oppression in the whole country because the inhabitants [*dhimmis*] were forced to bring provisions to the camp; and in every place it was a time of famine and a dearth of all sorts of things.”⁴⁶ To protect themselves from their assailants' cannon balls, Nasr and his Arab troops used a stratagem that had already been tried at the siege of Balis: they made Christian women and their children mount the walls so that they were exposed as targets for the Persians, who, on Abdallah's orders, aimed only at the walls.⁴⁷ Nasr renewed these tactics at the second siege of Kaisum.

In 842, an Umayyad supporter from the al-Yaman tribe, nicknamed Abu Harb, assembled a troop of brigands and embarked on massacre and pillage in Palestine and Syria. He went up to Jerusalem where Jews, Christians, and even Arabs took flight. “The patriarch sent him a great deal of gold.” On the death of al-Mu'tasim (842), the revolt reached Damascus. An army was dispatched to northern Mesopotamia where brigands and raids prevailed.

The uprisings and the continual pursuit of *jihad* required constant troop movements over the territory. The obligation on the *dhimmis* to accommodate these numerous armies and to provide for their needs ruined the villagers who were often robbed by their guests.

In 997, in Dakuka (south of Kirkuk), two Christian jurists governed the district. Local Arabs went up to the soldiers, who were preparing to go off to pillage the land of the Greeks, and asked them: “Why is it necessary for thee to go so far away? Behold, we have here two Christians who do unto us things which are far worse than anything which the Rhomaye [Byzantines] ever do to us.” The Christians were dealt with accordingly.⁴⁸ In 1001 the Arabs stirred up revolts against the Christians of Baghdad, whose churches were destroyed and pillaged.

The chronicles abound in such incidents, which recurred over the years. At times, Turks, Kurds, or Arabs pillaged the *dhimmis*, carrying off women, youngsters, and cattle; at other times, accusations by renegades unleashed persecutions. The documents frequently mention persecu-

tions and extortions committed against *dhimmis* by semi-independent governors or emirs.

The creation of militias of Turkish slaves by al-Mu'tasim (833–42) introduced an additional element of ethnic conflict and anarchy. From the ninth century, the leaders of this armed rabble controlled the government by conspiracies and revolts. Provincial governors, who came from this military caste, later pursued a policy of monopolizing the land and controlling the fiscal system.

From the tenth century, the continual infiltration of Turks and Islamized Kurds depopulated urban and rural regions of Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Georgia, and Anatolia, which were the arena for confrontations between the numerous Turkoman tribes who founded autonomous, rival emirates and sultanates. Thus when the Sultan Tughril Beg (1038–1065) saw his bare treasury and his starving troops during his campaigns in Iraq in 1057, he looted the town of Baladh on the Tigris, near Mosul.⁴⁹ The populations escaped pillage by paying ransom in gold. In the Nestorian monastery of Akhmul a hundred and twenty of the four hundred monks were killed and the remainder redeemed by payment of a ruinous ransom. When Ma'sud, sultan of Iconium (Anatolia), laid siege to Melitene in 1143 after he had destroyed the town of Sebastia and drove out Ya'qub Arslan, Ayn ad-Dawla, who was defending Melitene, extorted excessive ransoms from the Christian leaders in order to pay his troops.⁵⁰ These situations recurred in 1152 and 1170.

In their struggle during the twelfth century to control the lands and towns of Anatolia, Georgia, Armenia, Syria, and Iraq, various warring Turkish and Kurdish princes in the *dar al-Islam* pillaged their rivals' villages and deported their *dhimmi* populations in order to repopulate their own domains, which had become barren.⁵¹ The victims of these measures were not the enemy populations within the *dar al-harb* but the indigenous *dhimmis* of the *dar al-Islam*. The town of Tagrit (Iraq), which belonged to the Seljuks, was totally destroyed by the caliph al-Muktafi in 1153 (?). So violent was the hatred that Taqi al-Din Umar, governor of Armenia and nephew of Salah al-Din, bore toward Christians that, according to the chronicler, "without mercy he shed the blood of the oppressed Armenian peasants in the country of Jabal Jur."⁵²

The ongoing *jihad* against the Christians exacerbated fanaticism. "At that time [1140], every Christian who mentioned the name of the king of the Greeks or of the Franks, even unwittingly, the Turks slew. And because of this many of the people of Melitene perished."⁵³ Following the defeat of the Franks (1149) at the hands of Nur ad-Din: "the Turks carried away the whole land [the region of Antioch] into captivity."⁵⁴ After the victories of Salah al-Din, the chronicler, Bar Hebraeus, com-

ments: "And it is impossible for words to describe the extent of the scoffing and mockery and insult which the Christians who lived in the dominion of the Arabs bore at that time."⁵⁵

The consideration which the Mongols bestowed on the Christians—particularly the Nestorians—singled them out for the hatred of the Muslims. In 1261, Muslims of Mosul pillaged and killed all those who did not convert to Islam. Several monks and community leaders and others from the common people recanted. The Kurds then descended from the mountains and attacked the Christians of the region, massacring many of them; they pillaged the convent of Mar Matai, only withdrawing after extorting a heavy ransom from the monks.⁵⁶

In 1273, brigands from Ayn Tab and Birah in Syria infiltrated the region of Claudia (upper Euphrates) and led a great part of the population—women and a multitude of the youth—into captivity.⁵⁷ In 1285, a horde of about six hundred brigands—Kurds, Turks, and Arab nomads—fell on Arbil, pillaging and massacring the *dhimmi*s in the surrounding villages. After devastating the whole Mardin region, they left with a considerable booty in flocks and enslaved women and children. The following year, another force of four thousand brigands, composed of Kurds, Turkomans, and Arabs, devastated and pillaged the whole region around Mosul.⁵⁸ In 1289, marauders attacked a large Nestorian village on the Tigris; after killing five hundred men and ravaging the place, they withdrew bearing booty, cattle, and some thousand prisoners—men, women, and children.⁵⁹

These few examples culled from Christian and Muslim chronicles, testify to the permanence of this situation. One of the causes—probably the main one—for the extinction of the indigenous *dhimmi* communities was not only the permanent state of war against the external infidels (*harbis*), but also the inter-Muslim wars and the anarchy within the *dar al-Islam* itself.

Caliphs, sultans, emirs, or provincial governors—whether Arab or Turkish—encouraged the emigration and settlement of their tribes on the conquered lands in order to consolidate their power against their rivals. The nomads, whose numbers increased incessantly, could only maintain their essential needs by pillaging villages and towns, confiscating goods, extorting money under torture, and ransoming and abducting the youth who were a marketable commodity and a source of wealth as slaves. Remote from the central power, whose armies were fighting on the frontiers of the *dar al-harb*, these brigands would devastate with impunity a fertile and densely populated province, leaving nothing but ruins and carrying away the population into slavery. Towns offered more security than the countryside, although anarchy and the

love of booty remained a constant incitement to pillage and burn or ransom *dhimmi* districts.

The same processes appeared during the Turkification of Anatolia and the Balkans. The Anatolian territories, which the Seljuk sultans had appropriated by *jihad*, formed *ghazi* states which attracted an influx of semi-nomad Turkoman tribes.⁶⁰ The society of these "frontier states" was dominated by the Islamic concept of holy war and the prescriptions of the *shari'a* concerning infidels and their property.⁶¹ The *ghazi* spirit and the demographic impact of Turkish immigration in Anatolia and the Balkans sustained the expansion of the Muslim population.⁶² Consequently, the demographic map of the provinces of Thrace and Aydin was totally changed in the fifteenth century by the massive immigration of Muslims who, by then, formed eighty percent of the population.

The holy war being the cornerstone of the Ottoman state⁶³ and the source of its expansion, strength, and wealth, the government and administration of the empire was entirely dominated by militaristic imperatives. When resistance from the Habsburgs in central Europe and from Persia in the East halted Ottoman expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the war machine lost its external combat zones and imploded, devastating the territory of the empire itself. As in the Arab period when an anarchical phase followed a period of conquests, so the immigration of semi-nomadic tribes engendered uncontrollable disorders in Anatolia, Armenia, and the Balkans. Turkish immigrants, adventurers, fleeing slaves, and peasants, driven from their lands or deported, formed a floating, rootless population living from banditry; rebel chiefs recruited their troops and their liege men from such groups.⁶⁴

The Jelalis movement (1595–1628), made up of dismissed officials of the Porte, put Armenia to fire and sword; with their bands, they joined Kurdish or Turkoman tribes and ravaged the towns and countryside of Asia Minor and Armenia, pillaging and killing, causing famines and the exodus of populations.

They tied and hung people up, some by their feet, some by their arms, some by their testicles, beating them mercilessly and setting them free half-dead, barely breathing: some died during the torture. Some had their eyes gouged out; others were paraded with an arrow through their nostrils and forced by atrocious pain to reveal their stores of barley and corn, and the hiding-places in which their property and wealth were locked away. Floors of houses and buildings were dug up in order to find the hoards; walls knocked down, hiding places in roofs explored by the seekers after possessions; the result was general ruin.⁶⁵


The people fled and hid themselves in caverns, mountains, and caves. "So it was that all the villages of the Ararad were sacked, devastated and all the food grain removed, as well as the inhabitants."⁶⁶

Ethnic changes were accompanied by the transfer to the Muslim state of land ownership (*fay*), religious property, buildings (churches and synagogues which had become mosques), and of property in mortmain (*waqf*). With these recurring infiltrations, the indigenous groups entered a phase of irreversible extinction caused by flight, ruin, the destruction of traditional ways of life, and of the homogeneity of the human, social, cultural, and religious fabric.

Speros Vryonis has carried out a detailed analysis of these processes expanding from the eleventh to the fifteenth century in Anatolia and Armenia. His methods of investigation and analysis would lead to the same conclusions if applied to the Arab cycle of Islamization in Mesopotamia, Spain, and the Levant. The general picture that emerges from this ninth to tenth century transitional period in the Middle East evokes that of a Christian society still wealthy and forming the majority, but resigned to a process of decomposition through the surrender of its political future and its security to peoples who would eventually replace it.

THE DHIMMI: ECONOMIC FUNCTION

The economic function of the non-Muslims is a crucial and fundamental factor which governed the *dar al-Islam—dar al-harb* relationship. It was the demands for tribute that unleashed the *jihād*; it was its payment by the vanquished that ended it. The origin and legal justification of the tribute was based on a Koranic verse (9:29) and on the tribute which the Prophet levied on Jewish and Christian villagers in Arabia. The tribute was the *umma's* primary source of wealth, which rescued it from poverty. Tribute in cash, in kind, and in manpower was constantly invested in the machinery of war and conquest which it fed, thereby strengthening its power and domination. Egypt, which refused to pay the required tribute, was invaded for a second time and its tribute tripled. Syria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia were subject to tribute, as were the Greek islands and coastal towns further west. Booty and tribute were the basic foundations of the politico-theological system of *jihād* and justified raids and razzias. Towns, regions, provinces, and countries were invaded according to the tribute required; the besieged only obtained peace by submitting to tribute, a sum paid regularly by the conquered peoples who were shielded from pillage, death, or slavery as long as they remained tributaries. It was tribute which theoretically guaranteed the lives and safety of the multitude; laborers, craftsmen, traders, villagers, and town dwellers, whether Christians—Nestorians, Jacobites, Melchites—Zoroastrians, or Jews who peopled the territories Islamized by



**Church and Convent of St. Simeon Stylite (5th century)
Qal'at Sim'an, northern Syrian desert**

Abandoned after the Arab conquest

de Vogüé, vol. 2 (1877), pl. 145

the *jihad*. That is why tribute links the concept of *jihad* to that of the *dhimma*. Obviously, tribute levied on vassal states or in the form of personal taxes had always existed, but it was not integrated into a theological conception of conquest.

The nomad practice of holding settled population to ransom was well established in Arabia and encapsulated the principle of clientelism. It sealed the alliance between the settled population—laborers or craftsmen—and the nomads, shepherds, and warriors. The latter refrained from pillaging the settled population and protected them from other tribes on payment of a ransom in money or in kind. The ransoming of *dhimmis* was a fundamental component of dhimmitude and continued over the centuries in a variety of forms. In a country such as Palestine, dominated by nomads from the beginning of the conquest, the Jews paid protection ransoms until the end of the nineteenth century to the Arab and Turkoman tribes which roamed throughout Judea, Samaria, and Galilee.

From the seventh to the nineteenth century and even at the beginning of the twentieth—whether one studies the situation of the Jews, Armenians, or Syrians settled in the Orient, or Greeks and Slavs in Anatolia

and Europe—the system of holding tributary populations to ransom, even if practiced unbeknown to the government and against its interests, covered the whole *dar al-Islam* and infiltrated all levels and all aspects of dhimmitude. Raids on villages and *dhimmi* districts, imprisonment and torture of notables, abduction of women and children—profuse evidence testifies to every form of exploitation. The deportation of the populations of Armenia and the Karabagh by Shah Abbas I, for example, was based on economic motives.

The fiscal extortion practiced by tribal chiefs or governors constituted a more significant erosive factor in the destruction of *dhimmi* societies than the excessive taxes levied by the state.⁶⁷ Moreover, the geographical demography of dhimmitude corroborates this crucial fiscal phenomenon, which is, however, absent from official governmental regulations.

Apart from its economic and ethnic characteristics, tribute had a religious role which determined its perception and destination. This theological dimension, which transcended the economic aspect, excludes any assimilation with the principle of taxation.

THE TRIBUTE: FACTOR OF RECUPERATION AND OF COLLUSION

After the Arab conquest, the Christian notables kept the economic and administrative power whereas executive, political, and military power became exclusively Islamic. The majority of the population was indigenous and Christian, the minority foreign and Arab-Muslim. The Syriac chroniclers single out the Christians in the various Islamic provinces by the following terms: Egyptians, Syrians, Mesopotamians, Armenians; Palestine was still called the land of the Jews. The term “*Taiyaye*” (Banu Tayy) designated Arab-Muslims, who were duly distinguished from the natives.

The collection of different forms of tribute was delegated to the religious leaders of the vanquished peoples. They divided the total amount due among their communities and paid the Islamic treasury the fixed sum, having deducted their part. The disappearance of the Byzantine state thus transferred to the patriarchates the temporal, judicial, and fiscal duties which the Christian state no longer assumed.

The caliph gave his seal to the appointment of the notable or patriarch who pledged to extort the highest tribute from his community. Thus the Muslim state profited doubly from the rivalry between the notables of every community: not only did it increase its wealth as a result of fiscal overbidding by the tributaries' leaders, it also gained converts.

Henceforth, the Christian religious leaders, assisted by the notables,

administered the colossal revenues constituted by the taxes levied on their coreligionists. Under the Umayyads this fiscal role assigned to the religious authorities contributed to the enrichment of churches and convents and to the accumulation of considerable fortunes by Christian notables and bishops. The treasurer of Amr b. al-As was a Christian named Sabunji who had supported the Arab invaders at the time of the conquest of Egypt, although he was a Melchite. As reward for his services, he was appointed treasurer to the caliph, an office which remained in his family and was inherited by his grandson, Bishop John of Damascus.

Michael the Syrian quotes the example of a certain Athanasius, tutor to Abd al-Aziz, emir of Egypt, younger brother of the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik. A Monophysite from Edessa, he accumulated immeasurable wealth and built churches. When he was denounced, the caliph said to him: "Athanasius, we do not judge it fitting that a Christian should have such great wealth. Give us a part of it." Athanasius paid up, without becoming impoverished.⁶⁸

In his chronicle, pseudo-Dionysius mentions the misery of the villagers and the wealth of the notables, bankers, merchants, prelates, and others who exploited their coreligionists. As intermediaries between the caliph and the mass of tributaries, the community leaders and notables accumulated power and prestige, growing rich from farming the taxes, the sale of bishoprics, and the ecclesiastical offices. In addition, trade and banking enabled them to play an important economic role.

This most powerful class of notables and ecclesiastics survived throughout the long period of dhimmitude, of which it was the necessary by-product; being the beneficiaries of Muslim power, they always remained loyal to it. Behind its screen, whittled away over the centuries, the cogs of a relationship would be constructed between Christian economic power and Islamic political power. The evolution of this relationship, modified by historical circumstances, was to culminate in the stifling of eastern Christianity and the reversal of the demographic proportions of the two forces. The success and survival of the Islamic conquest depended precisely on the conjunction of interests between the leaders of the subjected peoples and the caliphs: the former grew rich from their people's servitude; the latter consolidated their power through the compliance of the *dhimmi* leaders.

THE CALIPHATE: PROTECTING POWER OF THE *DHIMMIS*

The advancing tide of Arab migration across the Orient, wave after wave, was not a peaceful phenomenon. For years, even centuries at a

time, provinces were devastated by recurrent wars. The enrollment of militias of Kurdish and Turkish slaves for the *jihad* extended the destructive attacks to Asia Minor, the Balkans, and into the heart of Europe.

In this violent upheaval, the caliph represented order, authority, and stability. In his capacity as ruler, he initiated peace or war inside the *dar al-Islam*, judged conflicts between *dhimmis*, and ensured that the law was carried out. The caliph protected his subjects against the hordes of immigrants who left barren Arabia for the rich lands of booty. As they coveted the wealth of the tributaries who peopled the towns and countryside of the empire, their ambitions clashed with the policy of the caliph, whose economic resources depended on stability and the productive labor of the conquered peoples. By combating the nomads' rapacity, the cultivation of the soil was protected and commercial exchanges in the cities and towns, as well as the collection of taxes, were guaranteed; for not only did the Arabs profit from a privileged fiscal system, in addition their depredations and raids on the sedentary tributaries undermined the state revenues. This conflict between the caliphs and then the sultans, protectors of the conquered Christians and Jews; and on the other hand, the Arab and then the Kurdish and Turkish nomad tribes, pervades the whole period of dhimmitude.

This struggle began at the start of the conquest with the discussion between Umar Ibn al-Khattab and the Arab warriors, who demanded immediately their share of the rural populations and their property. The conflict is expressed in a large number of *hadith*, which mirror the concerns of the Muslim rulers in the early days of Islamic domination. What would the Arabs do when they could no longer rely on "a dinar or a dirhem of tax being paid?"⁶⁹ And this would be the inevitable consequence if, as a result of ill usage, "God will harden the hearts of the tributaries who will refuse to pay the tax on their property."⁷⁰ This economic imperative lay behind the numerous recommendations attributed to Umar, prescribing the Arabs to respect the rights of the tributaries, who "provide for the sustenance of your families."⁷¹ Abu Yusuf, in his juridical treatise, expressed the same circumspect policy vis-à-vis the tributaries, while still "devouring them within the legal limits." Thus the caliphate appeared as the authority protecting the indigenous tributaries against the exactions of Bedouin tribes.

This conflict between the state and the nomads, renewed over generations throughout the *dar al-Islam*, explains the tendency of Christian and Jewish *dhimmis* to refer with gratitude to the supreme Islamic authority, which represented and guaranteed order and continuity—the foundations of civilization—against anarchy and destruction. It was an ancient conflict of an ethnic, political, economic, and social nature on which Islam conferred a theological dimension by a jurisdiction that fixed the

prerogatives of the Muslims and their domination over the Peoples of the Book. Whatever the political issues in the recurring wars and revolts, the *dhimmis* always ranged themselves under the protection of the party in power, entrusting their safety and their rights to the religious and judicial bodies of the Muslim state: the *shari'a* and the *dhimma*. This feeling of gratitude and confidence toward the caliph, or the representative of authority, may be gleaned from the chronicles of the Syriac patriarchs.

Moreover, the intransigence of Byzantium, which was pursuing its policy of religious unification, incited the persecuted Christian communities to request Islamic protection. The forced conversion of the Jews decreed by the emperor Leo III the Isaurian (717–41), the persecution of Monophysites, Armenians, Syrians, and Nestorians, provoked an emigration into the *dar al-Islam*. Not only did the caliph welcome Jewish and Christian victims of Byzantine fanaticism, he even protected the Peoples of the Book from the rapacity of pillaging bands. Through the mediation of their representatives, the *dhimmi* were able to pass their complaints on to the caliph and appeal to him for justice. It was no easy task to unravel the true from the false nor to understand the intrigues, and it is therefore all the more remarkable that, despite the burden of an immense empire, caliphs and sultans strove to resolve the grievances of their tributary subjects equitably.⁷²

Often the Muslim authority also intervened impartially in conflicts between communities—Jacobites against Melchites, Melchites against Nestorians, Christians against Jews, and vice versa—and even in conflicts inside each community. Much emphasis has been placed on the way the caliphate exploited schisms in order to destroy communities; however, it seems more likely that the different communities destroyed themselves by the intensity of the hatred and fanaticism which set them against each other even before the advance of Islam. Indeed, neither the restraining action that the Muslim state took in these confrontations nor its positive role in the interplay of conflicts between *dhimmis* should be minimized.

There is abundant evidence of the goodwill of the Islamic authorities, caliphs or regional governors, toward the *dhimmi* notables who represented their community: high officials, doctors, astrologers, and administrators. It is at this level that the plurireligious symbiosis in the *dar al-Islam* is apparent. It was based on a community of interests, a participation in government through the management of the administration and the economy by a powerful class of merchants and scholars who lived in the cities, close to the decision-making power. Won over to the regime, this class could only survive and advance in its shadow, through its protection and its goodwill. Thus, it is in this contradictory relationship of

ارمنی پاتریارخ (Armenian Patriarch, ou, Patriarche armenien.)



Armenian Patriarch (1720)

Costumes turcs

protection and oppression, determined by economic, ideological, and political factors, that the condition of dhimmitude was perpetuated in history, with positive or negative variations.

OPPRESSION AND COLLABORATION

Islamic domination over Christian populations was successfully imposed and consolidated due to a close collaboration between the Muslim state and *dhimmi* leaders, who combined spiritual and temporal power.

In general, the whole system of dhimmitude was based on the combination of the relationships between the domination by the *umma* and the subjection of the vanquished, which implied collaboration. Collaboration was inescapable since the appointment of the civil or religious leaders of the *dhimmi* peoples was subject to the approval of the Muslim power, which thus secured the allegiance of valuable assistants.

In the first centuries of the Arab conquest, mainly Christian and Zoroastrian notables, but also Jewish—as well as innumerable *mawalis* and Christian and Jewish slaves originating from the spoils of war—held important positions, not only close to the caliphs but also in the administration and the army. Under the caliphate of Abd al-Malik (685–705): “Christian leaders still directed all government business in the towns and countryside.”⁷³ In Andalusia, the head of the Christian community of Cordova, the *comes* Rabi, commanded the slave militias—all Christian—of al-Hakam I (796–822). At the request of Abd al-Rahman II (822–52), the metropolitan of Seville, Recafred, and the bishops of the Andalusian diocese disavowed the Mozarab Christian resistance. The caliph’s spokesman was a Christian official in the finance administration, the *comes* son of Antonian, who later converted to Islam.

Scribes, secretaries, treasurers, accountants, architects, craftsmen, peasants, doctors, scholars, diplomats, translators, and politicians, the Christians formed the base, the texture, the elite, and the sinews of the Muslim empire. It is probable that without their collaboration the creation and expansion of this empire would not have been possible. The conquered Christian masses placed all the resources—all the proficiency, the accumulation of technical skills, and sciences built up by earlier civilizations—at the service of nomad chiefs or seminomad Arabs and, later, of Turks. Islamic literature, science, art, philosophy, and jurisprudence were born and developed not in Arabia, within an exclusively Arab and Muslim population, but in the midst of conquered peoples, feeding off their vigor and on the dying, bloodless body of dhimmitude. The Islamic power knew how to recognize this loyalty and devotion. The caliph’s closest collaborators—his counsellors—were often Zoroastrians con-

verted to Islam, but mainly Christians, whereas his personal militia, the backbone of his army, was formed of Christian prisoners. Not only were they more clever and more skillful than others, but their vulnerability as *dhimmi* or slaves assured him of loyalty that he would not have found among his coreligionists.

The powerful class of *dhimmi* notables, merchants, bankers, and traders grew and prospered in the capitals—Baghdad and Damascus—during the period of destructurement of the rural zones, begun under the Umayyads and accelerated under the Abbasids. The wealth and economic power of this class and its influence at court concealed the process of disintegration of the rural classes. Peasant revolts, as in Egypt, remained localized; lacking leadership and the support of notables, they were doomed to failure and the peasants destined for massacre. However anti-Christian their policy, the Muslim leaders always utilized the services of eminent Christians in their closest entourage. For example, Nasr, who terrorized the Christians of Mesopotamia at the time of Ma'mun, had a Nestorian secretary.

This privileged class of merchants, bankers, diplomats, or counsellors survived for centuries, remaining permanent in its structure, while varied in its composition. Under the Ottomans, Greeks and Armenians generally replaced Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, who had served the Arab caliphs. Present from the beginnings of the Arab Empire, one recognizes this class in the stern but faithful description by Abdolonyme Ubicini, a contemporary observer in 1840, at the decline of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, as has often been emphasized, the Christian leaders and the Churches easily adapted to the domination of Islam, which allowed a privileged minority to grow rich by farming tribute, and the Churches to retain their rites and the fiscal, legal, and spiritual control of their communities. This situation endured, even if historical conjunctures—unforeseeable during one lifetime—reduced their power to the ossified traditions of phantom peoples in the course of their long decline through *dhimmitude*.

Although the sources for the Arab period contain plentiful information on this relationship, the symbiosis in economic and political relationships—between the Turkish conquerors and the Greek and Slav representatives of the subject peoples—can best be understood from the wealth and variety of Greek and Latin writers who recount the history of the Balkans in the Middle Ages. This cooperation, which preceded and facilitated the Turkish victories, was only the natural continuation of alliances between several sultans and Christian princes.⁷⁴

Less stunning than the Arab conquest of the eastern Byzantine provinces, the Turkish advance toward the centers of Christianity—Byzantium and Rome—covered a time span of more than four centuries. This

long period was punctuated by wars and alliances between populations who moved from confrontation to collaboration. Thus one may discern a self-perpetuating Christian Islamophile current running consistently through history, even swelling the ranks of the Islamic armies, which strengthened and guided them toward the conquest of their former homelands. Princes, adventurers, and frustrated ambitious men flowed in a continuous wave toward the sultans, whom they advised and to whom they gave precise information on the state of the Christian provinces. The Islamic advance, greatly helped by the contribution of Christian defectors and renegades, circumvented the fierce defenses, progressing in an alternating sequence of encroachments, peaceful invasions, and war.

In the Balkans, the fragmentation of the Serbian and Bulgarian territories into a number of rival, independent domains and the dissensions between the Serb, Greek, and Bulgarian national Churches resulted in numerous alliances between Christian princes and Turkish emirs. In Constantinople, dynastic quarrels made the throne itself dependent on the Turkish armies. Alliances were sealed by marriages and the dispatch of princely hostages and Greek advisers to the sultans' court. Anarchy was even greater in Bosnia, where revolts against the monarchy by feudal lords were inflamed by a religious dispute between followers of Bogomilism and the Catholics.⁷⁵

This Christian-Islamic collaboration, embedded in the struggles and goals for power, was not confined to the field of politics. It existed at the highest levels of the Orthodox religious hierarchy, anxious to protect the numerous peoples it controlled from Catholic proselytism. The old rivalry between the papacy and the patriarchate, the intransigence of the positions adopted, and the fanaticism and cruelty of the confrontations between Christians created a powerful Latinophobe and Turcophile party within the Greek Orthodox clergy. Mehmed II (1451–81) rewarded the Turcophile zeal of Gennadius Scolarius, fierce enemy of the union with Rome, by entrusting him with the civil and religious administration of all the Christians in the Balkans.

Collaboration also occurred at the military level as well as in the political and religious spheres. Spanish, Greek, Slav, and Armenian mercenaries considerably strengthened the Arab and Turkish troops. Christian princes, reduced to Ottoman vassalage, paid tribute and had to provide contingents of Christian soldiers to fight alongside the Turks. Whether it was on the military, economic, religious, political, and social plane in the relationships between states or the prolonged relationships in the submission to dhimmitude—collaboration and alliance, fusion and inte-

gration, constituted a dynamic of syncretism and evolution which traversed and molded history.

OTHER PROCESSES OF ISLAMIZATION

The dangers inherent in the demographic imbalance and the economic and administrative power held by the conquered Christians were well perceived by the Arab caliphs and the Turkish sultans. While economic interests restricted measures for the expulsion or forced conversion of the *dhimmi*s, military security required an increase of the Muslim population in the conquered lands, so as to neutralize and break any local resistance by the subjected peoples. The continuance of Arab and Turkish colonization relied on the demographic density of the Muslim hinterland, which constantly renewed the human momentum. In this migratory flow, however, one should differentiate the migration of pastoral peoples in search of pasturage and attracted by the wealth of urban centers from the caliphs' immigration policy. Arabs emigrated throughout the Mashreq, the Maghreb, Spain, and the Italian and Greek islands. In the ninth century, al-Abbas b. al-Fadl settled Muslims in Sicily, Calabria, and Logobardia. In his expedition against Amorium (833), al-Ma'mun allegedly said:

I will seek out the <Bedouin> Arabs, I will bring them from their deserts and settle them in all the towns that I will conquer, until I attack Constantinople.⁷⁶

Arab colonization policy was accompanied by a reverse movement: the transfer and deportation of *dhimmi* populations. This policy corresponded to economic and strategic imperatives. The workforce was exported to regions where the population had been decimated and deported as slaves. But this ethnic transfer destroyed particularly the homogeneity of the social fabric; it fragmented populations into enclaves, often hostile to each other, and contributed to the disintegration of the community ties of these groups, torn from their homelands.

Syrians, Copts, Armenians, Jews, Christian Nestorians, Melchites, and Hindus were deported in the course of the Arab conquest and colonization. During the conquest of Babylonia (Iraq), a considerable mass of inhabitants were transferred to the Hijaz; at the taking of Cesarea in Palestine, four thousand inhabitants reportedly were deported as slaves to Medina.⁷⁷ In 670, Mu'awiya transferred large numbers of families from Bassora to Syria; al-Walid and Yazid II also resorted to deportations. Al-Mansur deported Armenians from Marash and Samosata. Al-

Ma'mun, in his expedition to subdue the Coptic uprising in Lower Egypt, had rebels deported to lower Iraq and others exterminated on the spot. The Almoravids deported Christians from Seville (Andalusia) to Meknes (Morocco). According to the *qadi* Abu l-Hasan al-Maghribi (fourteenth century), as the Christians were expert in masonry, arboriculture, and irrigation, skills in which the Muslims rarely excelled and which they did not practice, it was profitable to settle them among Muslims in order to develop the city and weaken the infidels. Consequently, the deportation of the *dhimmi*s to Morocco by the Almoravids resulted in a considerable increase in wealth.

Arab colonization policy, through the transfer of native inhabitants and the settlement of tribes on the conquered lands, was adopted by the Seljuks (eleventh century) and later by the Ottomans in the Turkification and Islamization of Armenia, Anatolia, and the Balkans. In 1137, Mas'ud, sultan of Iconium, captured Adana (Cilicia) and took its whole population into captivity.⁷⁹ In 1171, Kilij Arslan II deported all the people of the region around Melitene as prisoners.⁸⁰ After conquering the Balkans, the Ottomans ordered the transfer (*surgün*: exile) of indigenous populations.⁸¹ Peasants from Wallachia and Rumelia were deported to Bosnia.⁸² Murad I (1362–89) took Adrianople (1362) and the surrounding area and peopled it with Muslims from Anatolia.⁸³ Under Mehmed II, thousands of Hungarians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks were transferred from their native provinces—now a part of the *dar al-Islam*—to other regions. When Constantinople fell in 1453, fifty to sixty thousand people were enslaved and deported. The deserted city was then repopulated with thousands of Muslims, Christians, and Jews transferred from different provinces of the empire. In the second half of the fifteenth century, Greek populations were deported from the Peloponnese to depopulated areas of the empire.⁸⁴ In 1573, twenty thousand Turks with their families and livestock were transferred to Cyprus⁸⁵ and distributed among villages and towns, where these small groups became active hotbeds of Islamization.

Islamization also took place via renegades, who constituted such a considerable number at every period and played such an important role that this subject, by itself, would merit a monograph. Here, we will only mention the renegades of Bosnia who, according to a number of sources, regarded themselves as the best believers and were the most violent oppressors of their former coreligionists. The influence that the Islamized Bosnians exercised, particularly on the Turkish administration, army, and corps of janissaries was notorious.

Sometimes links with the community of origin—particularly of a cultural nature—were maintained despite conversions. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, Serbian became the official language



Azamoglan. Child of the Tribute (18th century)

Ms. Biencourt, BN

“Azamoglan, who are the Christian children, subject to the Turks, who are taken both in war and otherwise [. . .] not to mention the other Christian places where these corsairs pursue their normal raids: and without [mentioning] those [places] too, which they pillage in Armenia, Mingrelia, and other Levantine countries [. . .] as also the forays that are made every three years through Greece, Slavonia, and other places subject to the Turks, in order to learn from the Priests of each parish how many children from each house are under their control since their last inquiry, without the poor Priest daring to conceal anything from them: for [to do] it would be like making their own path to perpetual servitude.”

Thevet (1575), vol. 2, bk. 18, fol. 817v.

of the Turkish chancellery for affairs related to the Balkan peninsula. One of the grand viziers from among the Islamized Serbs, Mehmed Sokolovic, restored the Serbian Patriarchate in 1557 and extended its jurisdiction. This important factor preserved Serbian national consciousness, cultivated in the churches and convents, which were protected by the Islamized Serbs, aware of their origins.⁸⁶

A similar situation occurred among the Byzantines. Before the Turkish conquest, positions of control in the state were shared among members of the same families from the Greek nobility. Family connections cemented political, military, and religious solidarity, while the higher ecclesiastical offices—bishops and patriarchs—were reserved for the nobility. After the conquest, nobles who converted in order to retain their landed property and privileges still maintained their connections with their family, which had remained Christian, and particularly with the higher clergy. A remarkable study examines the relationships between the Islamized nobles and their Christian families in Cyprus after the Turkish conquest (1570–71).⁸⁷ Although this is a detailed study of a special case, it throws light on the process of Islamization by renegade nobles in the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and in the Orient some centuries earlier.

Conversions were motivated by material considerations: participation in government and the retention of privileges and social status. The converts maintained their connections with their families, notables or high clergy, who managed the fiscal and juridical affairs of the Christian populations for the Muslim state. The convert could play a part in moderating the policy of the caliph or sultan toward their community of origin while still controlling the army, administration, and politics. Thus a tripartite polarization of power was actually established over all the conquered territory in the form of Islamic (Arab or Turkish) military power; the administration (Islamized officials, *ulama*, *qadis*, and others); and the representatives of the conquered peoples (clergy, linked by family ties with Islamized officials). The retention of power by the Islamized Christian nobility (Monophysite, Melchite, or Nestorian) provided continuity, guaranteed the transition from the Christian state to the Muslim state, and ensured the transfer of technology and administrative skills.

At the beginning of the Arab conquests in the Levant, the Monophysites, who had been persecuted by Byzantium, were triumphant, whereas the Greek Orthodox cult was forbidden. At the fall of Constantinople, the Greek Orthodox patriarchate was granted the administration of all the Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire, while the Slav national Churches were suppressed. These relationships, based on collusion and collaboration between converts to Islam, notables and the Muslim power, interpenetrated the dynamic of political, economic and

strategic interests. They did not escape the Crusaders' attention, inspiring their mistrust of the Greeks and Monophysites, who betrayed them on more than one occasion. In fact, without these relationships, the Arabs and Turks could not have ruled the conquered Christian peoples or remained on their territory.

The converts introduced their factionalism and their political and religious sectarianism into Muslim government, yet by their moderating role they probably became the artisans of those so-called periods of "humanistic tolerance," although these modern terms express nothing more than absurd anachronisms when applied to medieval contexts. In fact, these periods which followed the conquests ensured the transition from the indigenous civilizations to a Muslim civilization, characterized by a Zoroastrian or Christian demographic majority, although governed by a Muslim minority thanks to the aid of converts closely linked to the local *dhimmi* aristocracy. However, with the passage of generations and the long-term stabilization of the consequences of the conquest—transfer of populations and ethnic alterations through immigration—the transreligious family solidarity disintegrated, undermined in the course of time by the emergence of new factors.

Under this general heading can also be placed the category of schismatics, albeit a somewhat different category than that of renegades, even though a schismatic was often driven to conversion in order to save his head. Rivalry, ambition for power, desire for wealth and domination, engendered and kept alive chronic secessionist tendencies in the communities like so many seeds of self-destruction. Blinded by their schemes or their rancor, the schismatics had no qualms about resorting to defamation or denunciations, which provoked collective reprisals against their coreligionists. If their intrigues did meet with a favorable response from some Muslim circles at times, these underhand practices could also lead to their imprisonment or execution, depending on circumstances or the strength of their adversaries. Disguised under a variety of motivations, these characters appeared with remarkable consistency in every community. Too frequent to be listed, these schisms and denunciations were permanent components of the sociological and human fabric of *dhimmitude*, forces of disintegration but also of challenge and evolution within the internal dynamic of the communities.

As factors of Islamization, one should also add the Koranic religious laws which allowed a man to possess four wives simultaneously, an unlimited number of concubine slaves, and to divorce at will. Islamization by the utilization of women—nobles or infidels obliged to marry Muslims—and through harems filled with female prisoners and slaves, favored rapid growth in the Islamic population. Christian monogamy, on the other hand, the prohibition of divorce, and the various procedures used

to Islamize Christian children inexorably led to a demographic reversal. The massive waves of conversions following the wars and conquests accelerated this movement.

CONCLUSION

The period stretching from the eighth to the eleventh century seems to have been the time when—under the pressure of historical or ideological events—there occurred those processes that would in the long term lead to the decline of the pre-Islamic populations and their cultures. This evolution was embodied in the symbiotic relationship between the Islamic state and the non-Muslim tributaries, combining their reciprocal dependence and their forced alliance against the nomads.

From its origins, the Arab-Muslim state evolved, prospered, and survived through the productivity and fiscal yield of the workforce formed from the indigenous peoples who were neither Arab nor Muslim. Such was the regime of the *dhimma*, a contract which terminated the *jihad* warfare: these populations farmed, built, and worked in order to feed, clothe, house, and enrich the *umma*. Their taxes covered the wages of the military and the subsidies granted to the tribes settled on their lands. The natives were conscripted for the galleys and for all *corvées*: agriculture, roads, civil and military construction, naval workyards, navigation, military and civil equipment, food supplies, manufactured goods, and so on. Their labor added to the colossal sums levied on Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Iran, and the other provinces. Without this incalculable wealth, extorted by their clergy on behalf of the Islamic treasury, the Arab-Muslim state would not have been able to function. It was in its interest to safeguard these populations, to discourage conversions which would reduce revenues, and to win over their leaders by leaving them the crumbs and illusions of power. This situation shows a relation of interdependence between the Arab dominant minority relying for its economic needs on the non-Muslim majority, and the Christian majority's reliance on the Islamic state for its military and legal protection.

The policy of the first caliphs was to administer the wealth-producing workforce. But the influx of nomads into the conquered lands and inter-Arab schisms fostered conflicts of a political, economic, and religious nature between Muslim immigrants and native inhabitants. The finalization of the latter's status occurred within the context of these conflicts and in the cultural clash between conquerors and conquered. The contrast between nomadic wretchedness with its cultural poverty on the one hand and, on the other, the prodigious material and cultural wealth, arts, sciences, and literature of the most prestigious civilizations—Judeo-

پادشاه گریک
Koum Patriarchi, Patriarche grec.



Greek Patriarch (1720)

Costumes turcs

Christian and Persian—was counterbalanced by the Arab sense of racial superiority and of the divine election of the *umma*. Thus the contradiction between conviction and daily reality gave rise to reactions of hostility, contempt against *dhimmis*, and hatred, which were expressed in institutional regulations.

A distinction, however, must be made between the nomads' depredations, which the Muslim government fought, and the state's policy of systematic oppression. Under the Umayyads, attacks against non-Muslims seem to have resulted from the chaotic postconquest situation and the problems of cohabitation between invaders and native inhabitants, although the traditional nomad-sedentary conflict had already become a religious conflict. John of Nikiou, an eyewitness to the conquest of Egypt, writes that the Muslims designated the Christians as "enemies of God."⁸⁸ Henceforth the nomadic invasion was integrated into a religious ideology of *jihad*, a fact which had escaped contemporaries. Consequently, religious discrimination against non-Muslims occurred as early as the reign of Umar Ibn al-Khattab, under Walid and again under Umar b. Abd al-Aziz in the early eighth century. But it was during the Abbasid period that their degrading status developed and was integrated into the legal system of the *dar al-Islam*.

Concurrent with the growing hostility toward the natives—resented by an Islamic community which was constantly expanding through immigration and by converted freed slaves (*mawalis*)—the juridico-religious and institutional foundations of nascent Islamic civilization were developing. Implanted among a dense population endowed with a rich cultural heritage, this civilization could flourish only by eliminating those it supplanted. Meticulous in details, zealous at all times, constant in the long term, this destruction was the conscious, methodical work of jurists and theologians. Sometimes imposed on the authorities by popular pressure and sometimes decreed by fanatical caliphs, the persecution of the indigenous religions and cultures was manifested in all aspects of life.

At the fiscal level, the *dhimmis* were penalized by the payment of exorbitant taxes. On the legal level, legislation favored the economic, religious, and cultural rights of the immigrant community to the detriment of the rights of the local inhabitants. The waves of general destruction that struck churches, convents, and synagogues canceled religious celebrations and were tantamount to a prohibition. The pillage of churches, the confiscation of religious property in mortmain, and the holding of communal leaders to ransom deprived them of the means of supporting the clergy, the schools and, above all, the mass of indigent beggars, invalids, peasants, and workers pursued by the tax collectors. The wealth of the conquered peoples, transferred to the Islamic treasury, was reserved exclusively for the *umma*: the proliferation of mosques and koranic

schools, endowments in money and land (*waqf*) to the mosques, proselytism, pensions for the Muslim colonists in frontier regions, the construction of palaces and luxurious dwellings for the Muslim elite, and so on. Aside from the impoverishment of the Churches, repeated attempts to exclude non-Muslims from bodies controlling administration and finance, stripped the indigenous inhabitants of their economic and political power at the same time as it deprived them of their means of livelihood.

Under the Abbasids, the system of degradation and denigration of the indigenous populations was developed in conjunction with the glorification of the *umma*, as if their vilification was necessary to compensate for the cultural abyss dividing the Oriental peoples from their conquerors, who benefited from their customs and culture. Muslim superiority became a dogma, which was all the more prescribed in the laws and in daily life because it was cruelly belied in reality. Non-Muslims provided the administrators, secretaries, scholars, craftsmen, and peasants in the very places where the evidence of their genius still existed (town planning, architecture, monuments, sculpture), not to mention the minor arts (textiles, glass, metal, and other artifacts), examples of which can still be seen in museums today, unparalleled for their skill and delicacy.

All the decrees concerning the degradation of the Christian and Jewish cults, the humbling of houses, the mockery induced by their clothing and mounts, the expulsion from positions of prestige that accompanied forced conversions, helped to establish a perfidious and pernicious state persecution. *Dhimmi* sources contain plentiful examples of the great suffering caused by these humiliations, which inevitably led to conversions.

Consequently, the period from the eighth to the eleventh century seems to indicate an irreversible turning point in the evolution of the *dhimmi* populations. From Egypt to Mesopotamia, this was the time of the "fugitives" and the "exiles" mentioned in Christian and Jewish sources. Populations hunted down by the tax collectors tore themselves from their native village, fleeing from razzias and slavery. The structure of this rural society disintegrated; lands which had once been irrigated, ploughed, or arborized were now abandoned to nomads who roamed everywhere with their flocks. This mass uprooting encouraged brigandage by bands of robbers who infested the roads. The greed of the state, the usurpation of land by semi-independent governors belonging to the military caste, and the chronic uprisings of slave militias cut off the treasury's supplies at its source: the taxation of a substantial *dhimmi* workforce integrated into its geographical environment. This tyrannized population flowed into the towns, already swollen by slaves who had been deported from the battlefronts or dispatched from Asia, Africa,

and Europe. In the capitals, the insubordination of slave contingents provoked recurrent riots, aggravated by pillage and massacres.⁸⁹

The combined and cumulative effect of these diverse factors stemmed the demography of the *dhimmi* populations. Their gradual decline accompanied the degradation process of those lands of ancient civilization. Even if a few *dhimmis*—bankers, merchants and doctors—could still acquire wealth and prestige in the shadow of a slave who had influence at court, these illusions could not change realities.

Before the first Crusade set off for the East in 1096, the destiny of the native Christian and Jewish inhabitants in the Orient was already firmly fixed to the irrevocable path of dhimmitude, with local variations from Armenia to the Maghreb. The Nestorians could still shine with an ephemeral brilliance under the pagan Mongols; yet it would disappear with the Islamization of their rulers in the same way as the persecutions by the Mamluks and the populace dealt the coup de grace to the Copts of Egypt, who had courageously maintained a substantial community.

These three centuries, which were the centuries of classic Islam and which saw the creation of its munificence and radiance, were precisely and perhaps ineluctably those of the decline and downfall of the non-Muslim indigenous populations.

5

Relations between *Dhimmi* Communities

The relations between the numerous *dhimmi* peoples of the Orient, and later of Europe, evidently constitutes a most complex historical field. It is practically impossible to examine here every aspect of this intermingling, which covers three continents and thirteen centuries and where, in the ebb and flow of time, conjunctural elements mixed with permanent structures. One can at most recall among these latter some characteristics which existed before the Islamic conquest and were subsequently perpetuated through dhimmitude. Onto this area of interaction, intrinsic to the *dhimmi* peoples, were grafted alien elements of evolution and change, such as interference by Islamic rulers or by European powers.

INTRINSIC FACTORS OF INTERACTION

The many and varied peoples who composed the vast Eastern Roman Empire from the first to the seventh centuries constituted a conglomerate of ethnic groups, jealous of their respective cultures and of their religious, economic, and political privileges. Bloody ethnoreligious or economic and political conflicts opposed these indigenous peoples among themselves: Egyptians, Judeans (Jews), Samaritans, Syrians, Persians, and Armenians, while national particularisms set them against the Greeks and Romans, linked to the military and administrative apparatus of the imperial metropolises.

From 337, the Christianization of the Roman Empire aggravated national irredentism, which degenerated into religious fanaticism. Persecution and civil war accompanied doctrinal controversies. Even if the quarrels were mainly concerned with the definition of Christ's nature, with the hierarchic rank of the patriarchs and the boundaries of their diocese and with rites and liturgical formulas, the real issues were political and economic. Heirs to the vast domains of the erstwhile pagan priestly caste, the Oriental patriarchs strove to protect from Constanti-



Juif.

Arménien.

Jew and Armenian from Constantinople (18th century)

Charles-Roux, pl. 20

nople's supervision their considerable wealth, their control of churches and monasteries, and their independence in the appointment of bishops within their zones of influence. From the fourth century, the remarkable development of monasticism—linked, as it was, with the vast increase in ecclesiastical properties—ensured to every bishop his cohorts of ignorant monks, who dragged the populace into bloody confrontations between rival Christian factions. The forced conversion of the ancient pagan world and of Jews through violence had created a proliferation of heresies and schisms which degenerated into fratricidal wars.

Egyptians, Syrians, and Armenians expressed their national resistance to Constantinople in the rejection by their religious hierarchy of the dogma defined at the Council of Chalcedon (451). This Council had adopted Pope Leo's doctrine on the nature of Christ: a single Lord, of one substance, recognized in two natures, without separation. Approved by the emperor, it became *orthodox* and obligatory throughout the empire; its adherents were called Orthodox Greeks, Melchites, or Chalcedonians. The policy of religious unity pursued by the Byzantine emperors and the Greek episcopate provoked the persecution and torture of anti-Chalcedonians (Monophysites): Copts (Egyptians), Jacobites (Syrians), Armenians—and against the Nestorians of Mesopotamia, considered as heretics since 431.¹

The ascendancy over the emperor acquired by the Greek clergy introduced persecution into government and administration. The Theodosian Code (438), the Justinian Code (534), and canon law formed a coherent and structured jurisprudence that justified the persecution of pagans, schismatic Christians, and Jews within the Byzantine Empire. These laws were taught and interpreted in the academies, monasteries, and schools sponsored by Justinian and disseminated throughout the empire. Persecution of the Monophysites intensified under the emperors who succeeded Justinian; at certain periods, they were tortured and expelled or killed, even crucified, while the Chalcedonians appropriated their churches, monasteries, and dioceses.

In Sassanian Persia, the situations was reversed: the authorities favored the Nestorians and Monophysites, both enemies of the Chalcedonians but no less divided among themselves. The wars between the two empires provoked vendettas and religious persecution, depending on the military victories of one or the other—Monophysites and Nestorians benefited from Persian victories to expel Chalcedonian bishops from their seats, and vice versa. Incensed by the Byzantine clergy's intolerance, Monophysites and Nestorians, Jews and Samaritans preferred Persian victories as a means of ridding themselves of the Greeks.

Civil wars between Orthodox Christians and Monophysites did not prevent occasional alliances in order to persecute Jews and expel them

from towns. Their property was seized and synagogues were burned or converted into churches in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and North Africa. The Church's claim to be the New Israel intensified Christian persecution of the Jews, particularly in Palestine. Melchites or Jacobites, bishops who were more brigands than prelates, led their fanatical monks in attacks on Palestinian synagogues.

In the seventh century, edicts for the mass forced conversion of Jews or for their banishment with the seizure of their property were renewed throughout Christendom, from Visigoth Spain under King Sisebut (612–20) to the Byzantine Empire where Heraclius, yielding to pressure from Jerusalem's bishop and monks had ordered baptism of the Jews (632 or 634). In 633 the Council of Toledo ratified the Byzantine anti-Jewish laws and once again, in 681, Spanish Jews were forced to accept baptism on pain of torture and death. The seventeenth Council of Toledo (694) promulgated the enslavement of Jews converted to Christianity, the removal of their children from the age of seven, and the appropriation by the treasury of all their property. As the word "Jew" had become an insult in the current vocabulary, synonymous with depravity, it was commonly used as an epithet for particularly pernicious Christians or Muslims. Pseudo-Dionysius used it when speaking of an outstandingly tyrannical governor, and Michael the Syrian applied it to a Chalcedonian bishop he abhorred.

It was in this climate of civil strife and fanaticism that the Arab-Muslim offensive began. In Egypt, the Greek governor Cyrus, who was also the Melchite patriarch, had subjected the Copts to a reign of terror for a decade. Using torture, the seizure of churches, and persecution, he strove to bring the Monophysite clergy of Egypt under the control and authority of the Constantinople patriarchate. The search for doctrinal unity failed, in spite of the publication by Heraclius of the "monothelite" formula (638). In this context, denunciations and betrayals in order to be free of Byzantine oppression benefited the Arab invaders.

The first to betray were the Christianized Arab tribes, the Monophysite Ghassanids, and the Nestorian Lakhmids, who rallied to the Muslims from the start of the conquest. At the battle of Yarmuk (636), Armenians enrolled in the Byzantine forces revolted and the Christian Ghassanids went over to the Muslims. Damascus was surrendered to the armies of Khalid b. Walid (635) by the treachery of Mansur b. Sarjun, a Melchite, grandfather of St. John of Damascus.

In Egypt, Cyrus surrendered the fortress of Babylon (Old Cairo) and Alexandria to Amr without a struggle. John of Nikiou mentions several Melchite and Monophysite Christians who apostasized and helped the Arabs. The Armenians, whose territory was ravaged so often either by Byzantines or Arabs, changed sides frequently in favor of the highest

bidder. In Spain, apart from the help allegedly offered by the Jews, the Arab invaders also benefited from the collaboration of the *comes* Julian, who guided them, and lent them boats. He confirmed the collaboration of the faction loyal to the former King Witizia (702–10). Seville was handed over more treacherously by its archbishop, Oppas, a relative of Witizia. The island of Cos was surrendered by its bishop and Sicily was conquered thanks to the betrayal of the Greek admiral Euphemius.

These few examples, far from being exhaustive, illustrate the political conflicts. Faced with the collapse of the Sassanian armies and the inglorious Byzantine defeat, Christian high officials pursued their own interests. Anxious to spare the civil population from razzias, particularly on villages, they negotiated with the nomads. After the Arab victory, the Chalcedonian prelates were expelled from the East and the Monophysite clergy was able to recover its churches, monasteries, and bishoprics.

The recurrent Arab-Byzantine wars increased the division between the Monophysites—now living in the Islamic Empire—and the Constantinople patriarchate. Obviously, the Islamic authority was hardly predisposed toward a unification of the Churches, which would place the majority of its subjects under the spiritual authority of Constantinople. Caliphs approved the appointment of Monophysite patriarchs, who were among the most intransigent in their hostility to Byzantium. Consequently, it is not surprising to find some favorable comments on the Islamic government, such as those by Michael the Syrian who, in addition, expresses a virulent animosity toward the Chalcedonians. In actuality, the comments amount to only two passages in the voluminous chronicle by the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch, yet they have been quoted *ad nauseam*, to the neglect of the innumerable laments torn from the patriarch by the persecution suffered by his coreligionists throughout the Islamic Empire.

Under Arab rule, the inter-Christian disputes expanded into wars between the patriarchates in order to preserve or protect churches, convents, and relics from a rival faction. The iconoclastic crisis (726–843) in Constantinople, which had repercussions in Islamic lands, opposed the iconodules—supporters of the fabrication and worship of images—to the iconoclasts, anxious for a reform of the cult in order to eliminate superstition and restrict the clergy's power. Antagonism hardened as the Byzantine patriarchate used persecution in an effort to convert the Monophysites to the Chalcedonian dogma in the Asiatic provinces reconquered by Byzantium.

By the ninth century the power, and consequently the pugnacity, of the Eastern Churches had diminished considerably in certain regions, particularly Egypt. The progressive impoverishment of the clergy, the seizure and destruction of churches, the pillage and repeated holding

of monasteries to ransom, and the decline or disappearance of entire villages had taken away from the clergy its former colossal economic power, which had enabled it to sow political anarchy through excessive fanaticism.

Dhimmitude henceforth transferred the former politico-religious conflicts of Christian peoples to the economic domain. Century after century rivalries prevailed between notables, merchants, and bankers who protected their community through harem intrigues—a favor from a Greek eunuch, the complicity of a Christian concubine—or by bribing a Muslim official. But this ephemeral brilliance, glowing here and there, was restricted to an illusory power, purchased with money and intrigues by ghost peoples from the foreign slaves dynasties who now governed those territories where formerly their ancestors had forged the foundations of great civilizations.

Although relations on the theological plane remained hostile, it seems that in their everyday contacts, the *dhimmi* communities in the Orient developed a sort of solidarity and compassion deriving from their common condition of insecurity and opprobrium. Christians and Jews alike suffered massacre, deportation, ransoming or slavery at times of war, uprisings, and *razzias*. History forged the rules for a coexistence which survived until modern times between congregations closed within the walls of their ghetto and by a weight of prejudice going back a millennium.

In a quite different region—Anatolia and eastern Europe—events were preparing the dhimmitude of other peoples, also creators of brilliant civilizations. When the demographic thrust in central Asia drove the Islamized Turks toward Armenia in about the eleventh century, wars between the Greek and Slav Orthodoxies were ravaging the Balkan peninsula. In 1054, while schisms weakened the Bulgarian and Serbian Slavonic Orthodox Churches then trying to throw off either Roman or Byzantine tutelage, the break between the Latin Church of Rome and the Greek Orthodox Church of Constantinople occurred.

The Turko-Islamic domination from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries, which spread over these territories from the Adriatic to the shores of the Black Sea, covered with a glacial these interminable religious and ethnic conflicts embedded in the history and traditions of the conquered peoples, who were reduced to the *millet* condition (ethnoreligious communities).² Far from disappearing, these religious, economic, and political conflicts were exacerbated under the rule of the Ottoman sultans who, fearing an alliance of the Christian peoples against them, exploited their disagreements. Over the vast conquered Christian territories, Islam consolidated and expanded while Christianity faded, eroded by schisms. Smoldering under centuries of servitude, these old

vindictive animosities flared up during the wars of liberation of the Balkan peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

EXTRANEOUS FACTORS OF INTERACTION

Domination and Interference of the Islamic State

Islamic rule, taking over from Byzantine theocracy, extended over populations which were already strongly impregnated with religious intolerance. The Byzantine state had promulgated numerous discriminatory laws in the administrative, political, religious, and economic sectors. Collaboration with the Muslim invaders having motivated many members of the Greek ruling classes to convert to Islam, those officials formerly responsible for the implementation of these laws now introduced them into Islamic legislation. These former Byzantine laws, based on religious dogma, were henceforth integrated into Islamic legislation, now justified by other theological principles. In an ironic twist of history, Islam found—in the countries which had come under its domination—an outstanding instrument of oppression for the destruction of Christianity, already formulated and perfected by the Church itself. Risen to the height of their power, and even while they were devising anti-Jewish legislation, the Fathers of the Church—unwitting agents of history—were simultaneously digging the grave for Eastern Christianity, then in its prime. And just as the Church had demonstrated the superiority of its dogma by Israel's degradation, so Islam, in its turn, demonstrated its own superiority by casting opprobrium on both the Church and the Synagogue. The more the enemy religions were degraded, all the more true appeared the dominating religion, enhanced by temporal power.

Similarity exists in the two sets of legislation concerning the possession of slaves, proselytism, blasphemy, apostasy, religious buildings, conversions, exclusion from public office, prohibition of mixed marriage, social segregation, and the refusal to accept testimony in court. These former Byzantine laws, often infringed, gradually formed the general components of the *dhimmi* status. The Arab conquerors added the *jizya*: the blood ransom in exchange for the right to life.


Later, additional degrading legislation brought persecution to a level of refinement rarely attained. It decreed the form and color of the *dhimmis'* clothing and shoes, their haircut and headgear. It specified the type of mounts and saddles permitted and the way in which they could be ridden, as well as greetings and behavior in the street.

However, it should be noted that although Christian legislation on Jews and heretics was dominated by religious criteria, it was formulated

and fixed within the juridical structure of Roman law. The status of the *dhimmi*, on the other hand, despite an apparent similarity arising from the adoption of these rules with few variations, developed in an entirely different conceptual structure. In fact, Islam placed all these juridical elements within a general conception of religious war, where the principle of the right of the non-Muslim depended on a relationship of protection and patronage, borrowed from practices in Arabia. It is in the *hadith* that the elements taken from Byzantine law appear. Reworked and recast into a new conceptual religious and juridical system, these borrowings establish the Islamic realm of dhimmitude. The link between the *dhimmi* peoples and the war of conquest determined the course of their history and their specific destiny. Any comparison of Christianity and Islam that only considers their similarities on points of detail without taking into account the essential differences in their overall ideological conceptions can only be superficial. These variances influenced differently, in the West and under Islam, the emancipation process, equality of rights, and the national integration of "minorities."

In addition to the constraints of the *dhimma*, the Islamic authority found multiple grounds for interfering in the life of the communities. It has already been seen that the need for the caliph to ratify the patriarch's and exilarch's certificates of investiture created a permanent source of interference and internal conflicts. Similarly, the proliferation of schisms among the tributary peoples and the crumbling of their cohesion corresponded to the political interests of the caliphs. The grant of official status to the leader of the Karaites by al-Ma'mun (813–33) endorsed the division in Judaism. In 825 an edict by the caliph recognized that the votes of ten men—either Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians—would be enough to form independent communities. This edict could only undermine the authority of the *dhimmi* leaders over their peoples—still in the majority—and break up their homogeneity by an anarchical proliferation of warring micro-communities.

The tributary peoples tried to limit the caliph's meddling in the choice of patriarch and exilarch who, having become his puppets, gave him control over the senior functional hierarchy of the communities, thus creating or increasing internal divisions. The venality of offices encouraged bribery and consequently the malleability and control of the representative organs governing the Jews and Christians. Bishops granted ordination in return for gifts. The patriarch Dionysius, while in Egypt (830), describes the ignorance and great poverty of the Coptic Church, forced to sell high ecclesiastical positions. It was not the only one to do so. Michael the Syrian speaks of the "trade in priesthoods which was, as it were, a law among the Armenians."³ In fact, this traffic was an indissociable component of dhimmitude. Christian chroniclers



Armenian Evangelic Canons: Fourth Gospel (1265)

Painter: Thoros Roslin

Ms. no. 1955, fol. 4, Gulbenkian Collection,
St. Thoros Manuscript Library, Jerusalem

lament the decadence and corruption that was vitiating the very heart of the Church and paralyzing it, a situation which finds similar echoes in Jewish chronicles.

Examples of Islamic interference abound in Syriac chronicles. Christian rebels had no qualms about using bribery or denunciation to obtain the sultan's support.

God has delivered the Christians into the hands of [their] enemies, those who detest them have rule over them. They have risen against us in order to suppress the freedom which resided in the laws of the Christians, not to mention the persecutions which they brought down on them.⁴

Communities were divided by quarrels between patriarchs appointed by caliphs or sultans and those who were elected by the episcopal synods. The Umayyad caliph Marwan II (744–50) ordered the Chalcedonians to recognize his goldsmith, Theophilactus Bar Qanbara of Harran, as their patriarch. This man proceeded to lead an army to persecute and torture the Maronite monks in order to foist his liturgical formulas on them. Al-Saffah (750–54), the first Abbasid caliph, appointed as patriarch of the Monophysites the murderous monk Athanasius Sandalaya, who had promised to transform lead into gold. When the patriarch Georgius was freed after nine years in a Baghdad prison, Mahdi (775–85) forbade him to take the title of patriarch and to act as such, even though he was supported by his flock. Two or three rival patriarchs often officiated simultaneously and fought each other with the weapons of excommunication.

Constantly solicited, the Islamic authority intervened in the quarrels between bishops, patriarchs, and monks. It also settled disputes over a remunerative diocese or the retention of a church or monastery coveted by a rival faction, the judgment being bought by bribery.⁵ These scissions were often accompanied by diverse accusations warranting the death penalty—the conversion of Muslims to Christianity, collusion with Byzantium or Rome—and denunciations which provoked the pillage and destruction of convents and churches. Syriac chronicles frequently mention the work of Melchites converted to Islam or influential with the caliphs as one of the Monophysites' misfortunes. In Damascus, for example, the wealthy Athanasius was denounced by the Chalcedonian scribe of Abd al-Malik. The frequency of this sort of accusation, even if not necessarily justified, nonetheless illustrates the virulence of the religious conflicts.

During the formative period of Islamic power, when the *hadith* were being collected and compiled and when a Muslim juridical and administrative corpus was evolving in the very heart of the conquered lands and

populations, the Eastern Churches were principally engaged in eradicating paganism and its practices, still alive even in monasteries. They were endeavoring to define the dogma and the official rules of their liturgy and were working to extend and strengthen Christianity by combatting the continual rebirth of heresies, a source of division and weakness. The Monophysite clergy were refuting the iconoclast movement (eighth to ninth centuries) and, above all, defending themselves against the encroachment and exclusivism of the Byzantine patriarch, stimulated by Byzantium's temporary military successes in Asia Minor, Syria, and Armenia.

The Jews, the great majority of whom still lived in the Levant, were also divided and weakened by internal schisms. The Karaite movement, which emerged in the mid-eighth century, stood for a rejection of the Talmud and rabbinic authority. This rejection was grafted on to the political intrigues concerning the election of the exilarch, the temporal representative of the Jewish people to the caliph. The gaons, heads of the rabbinical academies in Babylonia and Palestine, participated in these negotiations via the candidates they proposed. In these struggles, orchestrated by the financial power of the merchants, each rival faction tried to extend its juridical and religious influence, and consequently its fiscal control, over all the Jewish people in the Diaspora. These internal rivalries widened the divisions within Diaspora Jewry and weakened it at a period when the destruction and pillage of Palestine by nomadic bands was contributing to the decline of Palestinian Jewry.

The subordination of *dhimmi* courts to the Muslim executive through the *qadi's* mediation for the enforcement of their penal judgments diminished their authority and opened the way to malpractices. Constantly canvassed by opposing parties, Muslim juridical power played the role of arbiter and peacemaker, not only by reconciling warring communities or remedying injustice, but also by settling sectarian quarrels within the communities. Consequently *dhimmi* judges forbade their coreligionists to resolve their quarrels by frequent and costly appeals to Islamic authority. This situation continued in Turkey until the nineteenth century, as is confirmed by many sources, including a report of 1835 by John Cartwright, British consul general in Constantinople:

The Mussulman law governs all the Subjects of the Sultan indiscriminately in differences between each other, and whatever degree of authority may be granted to the heads of the different Christian Communities existing in the empire over the members of them, their decision and those of their delegates may be successfully resisted by appeal to the Mahometan law. The Greek may cite his fellow Greek to the Mehkemé [tribunal] in opposition to a decision of the Patriarchate in civil suits.⁶

The right claimed by Muslim judges to meddle in the tributaries' affairs considerably diminished the effectiveness and prestige of their courts and encouraged corruption.

Like the situation in the Orient a few centuries earlier, the Turkish conquest of Anatolia and the European provinces froze the age-old religious and political conflicts. Henceforth, it was no longer Christian kings and princes who grabbed power but a class of notables and prelates who exercised over their people an authority which they owed to the Islamic yoke. Dependent on the sultan for their investiture, these notables were totally subjected to his authority.

Paradoxically, it was under the Ottoman servitude that the Greek patriarchate gained a control over the Serbian and Bulgarian Churches which it could never have achieved even by interminable wars. Better still, it could now win back the administration and civil and religious government of subjugated Christian peoples and could free itself from imperial tutelage in matters of dogma, religious discipline, patriarchal elections, fiscal control, and the other interferences from the Byzantine emperor.

Strengthened by its privileges, the Greek Church imposed its language and ritual on the Christian Slavs. This religious tutelage was combined with the financial power of an important Greek bureaucracy, grown rich from the collection of taxes on behalf of the sultan. The spiritual and economic ascendancy of the Greeks over the other *raya* peoples, in addition to Turkish oppression, did not fail to create persistent resentment. In Constantinople, the old Byzantine aristocracy, the Phanariots, who were connected with the patriarchate, formed a class of high officials completely dedicated to the sultan's interests. From 1711, the governors (hospodars) of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were recruited from among their ranks. Greek hospodars continued to control the administration of these countries until 1822 and earned a reputation for corrupt and venal management, detrimental to the population.

Despotism and corruption determined not only the internal organization of congregations but also the fate of rival groups wishing to win the favor of the authorities in order to survive or expand. Intolerance toward non-Muslims depended on a variety of factors, born of the specific circumstances of each region in the *dar al-Islam*. Persecution was harsher in places where only a single community survived, for example: the Jews of Yemen or those in the Maghreb; while their condition was often better where they formed a minority among the masses of subjected Christians, as in Arab Spain and the Ottoman Empire.

Interference by the Christian States

The protection that Islamic jurisdiction accorded indigenous Jews and Christians functioned within the legal framework of the *dhimma*, that is

to say, within a treaty of submission. However, Christian tributaries benefited from a different sort of protection external to the *dar al-Islam*. It emanated from Byzantium and those Latin countries which endeavored to protect the religious rights and property of Christians and to maintain economic, cultural, and spiritual links with them. This interference from the *dar al-harb* (i.e., Christendom) resulted ineluctably from the *jihād*, which had transformed former Christian countries into Islamic lands.

The protection practiced by Christendom, generally called "foreign protection," developed in diverse areas and forms one aspect of the history of diplomatic relations between *dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam*. It was incorporated in the clauses of peace treaties, pacts of political alliance, or trade agreements signed by the caliphs or sultans with Christian sovereigns.

Religious Protection

After the Islamization of the Christian lands of the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Maghreb, Byzantium and later the Latin states endeavored to provide religious protection in order to save the indigenous Christian patrimony from destruction. It was imperative to ensure the security of pilgrimages to Palestine, which remained the historic land of the Bible despite its Arabization.

By means of concessions and gifts offered to Muslim princes, Christendom obtained relative safety for pilgrims who otherwise were often assaulted, taken hostage, or forced to convert. It also negotiated an alleviation of the restrictions in the *dhimma* concerning the destruction, repair, or building of churches. Depending on their political interests, the caliphs granted these favors to the Christian suzerains by temporary pacts of friendship or alliance. In the ninth century, when he was waging war against the Greeks, Harun al-Rashid obtained an alliance with Charlemagne by granting him rights of protection over the pilgrims and the Christians of the East, who thus benefited from the Frankish emperor's bounty.

Byzantine emperors sometimes intervened to protect Christian *dhimmis*. Thus, the attempted rapprochements between Byzantium and Egypt before Caliph al-Hakim's death (1021) ended the harsh anti-Christian persecution. In 1036, a clause in the treaty between the Fatimid caliph and the emperor Romanus III authorized him to rebuild all the churches which the Muslims had destroyed in Jerusalem and restore the Holy Sepulchre. Under the Fatimid al-Mustansir (1036–94), many Melchites held official positions in Cairo. In 1064, the Greek patriarch became official protector of the Christian district in Jerusalem, whose walls were built in 1069 at the expense of Romanus IV Diogenes.⁷

These concessions were not unilateral; in return, the caliphs obtained

equally important privileges from the Christian suzerains. Mosques are mentioned in Ephesus in the ninth century and in Athens in the tenth and eleventh. In 1027, prayers were recited in the name of the Fatimid caliph of Egypt, az-Zahir, at the Constantinople mosque attributed to Maslama, who failed to capture the city in 717. A Muslim population composed of captives, merchants, and travelers is reported in several towns in Anatolia,⁸ at Trebizond, and in Armenia.

The truces which interrupted the *jihad* provided for an exchange of prisoners, the offering of sumptuous gifts, and the dispatch of ambassadors on missions. Basileus John Cantacuzene (1341–54) sent an embassy asking “the sultan of Egypt, Syria and Judea” for an edict in favor of the Christians in his states, “whereby it was forbidden to harrass Christians who inhabit the holy places in Jerusalem, or desecrate their Churches or their Monasteries.” This edict should confirm the Muslim governor’s duty to protect the *dhimmis*, and pilgrims, so that they would be neither insulted nor struck.⁹ The ambassador asked that Greek slaves be set free and that Greek merchants be allowed to remain on the sultan’s lands. In 1391, Bayazid secured the right to install a *qadi* in Constantinople so that Muslims—merchants and others—could be judged according to Islamic law.¹⁰

Byzantium and the Latin kingdoms, which intervened in favor of indigenous or foreign Christian communities, saw their consulates’ budgets heavily burdened by the presents or gratifications required by Muslim authorities in return for their respecting these rights, which were always challenged or arbitrarily cancelled.¹¹ The Greek Orthodox and Latin *dhimmi* communities, which benefited from the religious protection of powerful states, were in a privileged position compared with the Monophysite, Nestorian, and Jewish *dhimmis*—albeit, in periods of conflict, they were more persecuted.

In the sixteenth century, France’s privileged relationship with the Ottomans enabled it to protect the Catholic schools and missions in the Turkish Empire. By a *firman* of October 1596, France obtained guarantees that foreign Christian pilgrims would be neither molested nor forced to embrace Islam. In the following year, at the request of Henry IV of France, the sultan revoked a decision to imprison monks of the Holy Land and to convert the Church of the Holy Sepulchre into a mosque. However, the Muslim officials constantly visited the churches to ensure that no repairs had been carried out and always found a pretext for extorting money from the monks. In 1740, the ambassador of France, M. de Bonnac, obtained an agreement that these oppressive visits would be limited to an annual inspection; he also obtained permission to repair the roof of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, after forty years of negotiations.


As the majority of the Christians in Islamic regions were either Orthodox or Monophysite, the papacy endeavored to bring them under its authority through their conversion to Catholicism. The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which Pope Gregory XV created in 1622, sent missionaries to Ottoman and Persian territories. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, French Jesuit and Lazarist missionaries spread over the Levant and Persia. The Capuchin order set up branches in Constantinople, Aleppo, and Persia in 1626; Carmelites and Jesuits founded a mission in Aleppo in 1627; Dominicans were established in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Anatolia.

Missionary establishments grew up in towns and villages with Christian populations: Aleppo, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Saida, Damascus, Mosul, Diyarbakir, Baghdad, Mardin, and so on. These missions enjoyed the protection of France, whose consuls became the instruments of Rome's unionist policy in the seventeenth century. The missionaries opened schools and tried to convert the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Jacobites, Nestorians, and Armenians in order to extend the Pope's spiritual power and the sphere of French influence by increasing the number of Catholics.

The Orthodox, Armenian, and Syriac patriarchs reacted violently to these encroachments which diminished their power and entailed, within their congregations, rival schismatic Churches united with Rome. On the other hand, the Porte was displeased to see its subjects abandoning the spiritual leadership of the Constantinople patriarchs under its control in order to place themselves under the tutelage of its hereditary enemy, the Pope in Rome. It intervened to support the patriarchates and forbade its Christian subjects to transfer from one rite to another.

Political motives combined with religious divergences had always thwarted sporadic attempts at "unionism" in Muslim states. Monophysite bishops or laymen who converted to the Latin or Greek rite were denounced to the Muslim authorities by their own Church. Accused of collaborating with the enemies of Islam in order to reestablish a Christian power, the neophytes were only spared death by apostasy or flight. Like the caliphs before them, the Ottoman sultans were the best allies of the Eastern patriarchs whose separatisms they strictly maintained. The political interests of the Muslim power coincided with those of the Eastern Churches, whose Grecophobia and antipapist zeal were rewarded by the official recognition of their particularisms or by the grant of a church or convent taken away from a rival Church.

In 1700, the Armenian Monophysite patriarch procured a *firman* forbidding the presence of Catholic missionaries in Constantinople. The Jesuit college in Erzerum, where three hundred Armenians had converted to Catholicism, was closed and the priests were forced to flee and seek refuge, for the most part in Persia. Helped secretly by the French



*Dergumidas,
Docteur Armenien condamné par le Grand Vizir Ali Pacha,
mourut Martyr le 5^e Novembre 1707*

85

J. de Fraussières del.

Condemnation of Dergumidas by the Grand Vizier

Dergumidas and two other Armenians were beheaded on November 5, 1707 for adopting the Roman Catholic rite. The deposed Patriarch Saary and seven other Armenian notables converted to Islam in order to escape death.

Engraving (no. 85): J. de Fraussières, from J.-B. Vanmour's painting
Le Hay (1715), pl. no. 85, and pp. 44–47

ambassador, Charles de Feriol, the Armenian Catholics took their revenge by abducting the Monophysite patriarch. The sultan settled the internecine Armenian strife with a severity that created martyrs and apostates.

However, the commercial and political advantages enjoyed by Catholics encouraged conversions, which proliferated among Jacobites in northern Syria in the mid-seventeenth century. The French consul at Aleppo, François Picquet, even intervened in the elections of the patriarchate and obtained from the Porte *firmans* of investiture for his candidate. Provincial governors, *qadis*, and consuls meddled in the appointment of patriarchs. Catholic and Jacobite services were held in the same churches with a curtain between them.

France's religious protection promoted schisms within every *millet*, which were reflected in the emergence of Eastern Churches: Armenian, Jacobite, Greek, and Chaldean (Nestorian), joined to Rome. By the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), Russia, too, reserved its right to intervene in favor of the Orthodox *rayas*. In the nineteenth century, Lutheran and American Protestant missionaries, operating under the protection of their embassies, increased their respective countries' powers of intervention by converting *dhimmis* to their rite. The patriarchates defended their community by denunciations, by excommunicating turncoats, and by forbidding association with them. The fractures within each *millet* were integrated into the religious schisms in the West and corresponded to the economic and political rivalries of the European protector states.

The increase in the economic and political power of Europe in the nineteenth century intensified proselytism among the *dhimmis* and the financing of missionary establishments: hospitals, hospices, schools, and dispensaries. One of them, the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, founded in 1809, sent converted European Jews to the most desperate, hence the most vulnerable, communities.¹² At the beginning of the twentieth century, a large number of Chaldeans (Nestorians) from Azerbaijan converted to Orthodoxy in order to place themselves under Russian protection.

It is impossible to assess the effects of religious protection, so important—even crucial—was it for the *dhimmis*. It also had negative aspects, however, since its interference, through conversions, developed schisms and hatreds within the *millets* and within families. Nevertheless, the missionaries' proselytism forced the *dhimmi* clergy and notables to improve their schools, hospitals, and the communal organization. Against such formidable opponents operating under the protection of their respective embassies, and benefiting thereby from considerable resources and superior knowledge, the leaders of the *dhimmi* communities had to face the challenge. The struggle against negligence, prevarica-

tion, and degradation, inherent in dhimmitude, led to the renovation and modernization of communal structures.

Commercial Protection

Religious protection was linked to the fragmented nature of Christianity (Orthodox, Monophysites, Catholics, Nestorians). Economic protection, on the other hand, which was dependent on commercial relations and trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa, developed in a national framework which was relatively free from religious criterion. These exchanges, going back to remotest antiquity, had stimulated the expansion of Greco-Roman culture and the growth of the biblical religions throughout the whole Mediterranean basin and beyond. Limited by Muslim domination, these relations between Christian and Islamic countries were determined by pacts and treaties.

Such commercial agreements, which governed economic exchanges between Islam and Christianity over the centuries, originated in the Byzantine Empire. In Byzantine towns, especially Constantinople, Latin merchants grouped according to their nationality controlled foreign trade. In 1082, Alexius I Comnenus granted fiscal privileges and extraterritorial status to Venetian merchants. Soon, Genoa, Pisa, and other Latin trading towns also obtained customs privileges. Byzantium granted foreign merchants—Latins, Muslims, and Jews—exemption from local jurisdiction, a practice which was adopted by the Christian kingdoms of Jerusalem, Cyprus, and Armenia. Grouped by nationality in a street or district, foreign merchants came under their own national jurisdiction, administered by their consul.

In Islamic lands, the same structure, with a few variations dependent on regional religious particularisms, determined trading practices with Christian countries. In their empire, the Ottomans merely renewed and confirmed the privileges which Latin merchants had already enjoyed under the Greek emperors. These privileges, written into charters or *Capitulations*, guaranteed the security of the property and persons of non-Muslim foreign merchants. They confirmed their individual, commercial and religious freedom, their extraterritorial status, customs exemptions, and the safety of shipping. The geopolitical and economic situation in the sixteenth century gave the Ottomans the opportunity to expand these international commercial relations by preferential trade treaties with certain European countries.

The *Capitulations* forbade investigations, searches, and the attaching of seals within the consulates. They proscribed the imprisonment of consuls and exempted their *dhimmi* interpreters (*dragomans*) from paying tribute and other arbitrary taxes. The presence of the consul and his

interpreter was obligatory in law suits between Muslims and foreigners referred to Ottoman courts, as judgment had to be based on documents and records, whereas Islamic law only required the testimony of Muslims. Foreign merchants could not be harassed or molested, taxed arbitrarily, reduced to slavery, executed, or punished for an offense committed by another foreigner. The property of a deceased foreigner was protected and returned to his heirs. As the *Capitulations* could be unilaterally abrogated by the sultan, they were confirmed with every new reign. These commercial conventions implied reciprocity; Muslim subjects thus enjoyed the same rights and privileges in Christendom as did foreign merchants in the Ottoman Empire.

From 1597, provisions—both ineffective and constantly renewed—were introduced into all the *Capitulations* forbidding the abduction of European travelers and their enslavement in the Maghrebian pirate states, vassals of the Porte, whose galleys roamed the seas, making considerable profits from capturing infidel travelers and holding them hostage until ransom was paid.

In 1528, France obtained the right to protect all Christian foreign merchants living in Turkey. The 1535 treaty between Francis I and Sultan Suleyman served as a model for the *Capitulations* subsequently granted to various European states which would free their trade from French tutelage. The nationals of these countries lived in *fondouqs* or *okels* (Egypt) or *khans* (Syria). These trading centers (*Échelles*) comprised fairly spacious accommodations to house the merchants, their consul, officials, and travelers, as well as a chapel, a tribunal, and a warehouse.

The expansion and diversity of the commercial sectors induced consuls to admit into their centers merchants lacking consular representation. These persons constituted a category of “protégés” as distinct from “nationals”; they benefited from the *Capitulations*, but were fiscally and socially discriminated against by comparison with “nationals.” The class of protégés which had formerly existed in the Latin kingdom of the East and Byzantium comprised native inhabitants of the East—Jews and Christians: Melchites, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Armenians—as well as Europeans. Thus, in the Islamic lands the economic interests of Christian states took precedence over the religious prejudices of their own countries.

In a number of towns, particularly in the islands of the Greek archipelago and Barbary Coast, some *raya* subjects acted as consuls of European powers. Aside from these *raya* consuls, consular protection covered other *rayas*, either interpreters or officials employed in the consulates. But these *raya* “protégés,” like all the sultan’s non-Muslim subjects, were compelled to wear distinctive clothing, pay the *jizya*, symbol of infamy, and suffer humiliations and insults in the streets. Sometimes the sultan or

pasha, dissatisfied with a consul, took revenge on his Christian interpreter by having him beaten, impaled, or hanged.

The consuls therefore strove to extend consular protection to their *dhimmi* personnel in order to shield them from the humiliations of Islamic jurisdiction. A privileged class of notables, generally merchants protected by European states, was thus formed within *dhimmi* communities. Their living conditions were considerably different from those of their coreligionists, subject to the *dhimma*. Consular reports and contemporary evidence show, however, that the *Capitulations* did not always shield them from the rapacity of governors.

Economic rivalry in occupations where *dhimmis* competed among themselves was grafted onto religious hostility. This rivalry was all the more virulent in that opportunities were limited and subject to the whims of corrupt despots. This desperate economic competition between *dhimmi* minorities was most probably at the origin of the bloodlibel charge which Syrian Christians and the French consul, Count Rattimenton, leveled against the Damascus Jewish community in 1840 (the "Damascus Affair").¹³ Between emancipated Western Jewry and the Jewish *dhimmi* communities, relations were thus established which transformed the structures of Eastern Jewry.

This encounter between emancipated European Jewry and the subjected Jewry of Islam initiated radical changes in the communities. From 1862 the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), supported by European Jews, modernized education in North Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia.¹⁴

Indeed, in the nineteenth century the school system and institutions of modern education constituted a major problem that was linked to the modernization of the Islamic regions. The Christian *rayas* already had institutions of a high educational standard, run by European monks or missionaries, in Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and other Islamic regions. The AIU schools were the Jewish equivalent of the Christian schools sponsored by Europe.

One cannot overemphasize the cultural, economic, and even political importance of this education to the different categories of *rayas*—particularly the Greeks and Armenians who retrieved their language and national culture. The modernization of education transformed the indigenous *raya* communities, then vegetating in humiliation, into elites actively engaged in the industrialization and development of their country.

Christian *dhimmis* benefited from the protection of European states—France, Russia, and Austria, in particular—and the respect accorded to their hospitals and their educational and cultural institutions; whereas the Jews only enjoyed the support of recently emancipated European



Damascus Blood Libel (1840)

“Here lie the bones of Father Thomas from Sardinia. A Capuchin Apostolic Missionary assassinated by the Hebrews on the 5th day of February 1840.” (Translation of Italian inscription; the Arabic reads: “the Jews.”)

Photograph: Damascus, summer 1987

This epitaph, still on view in a church situated in the old Christian quarter of Damascus, perpetuates the 1840 blood libel against “the Jews.” Originally consecrated in the Chapel of the Latin Convent of the Capuchins, it was copied and described that same year in a letter to Sir Moses Montefiore by British naval Lieutenant Charles F. A. Shadwell. Since then, every appeal at the highest Church level for it to be destroyed—beginning with that of Montefiore in 1840—has failed.

Littman, *Human Rights & Human Wrongs*, no. 10

Jewry. However, this numerical, economic, and political inequality between the different *raya* communities was counterbalanced by the quality of the AIU schools and by the motivation of the Jews for modernization and their struggle against ignorance, the attribute and companion of dhimmitude.

The countless letters and reports by the delegates of the AIU—and from the Anglo-Jewish Association after 1872—provide valuable source material for the sociological study of dhimmitude in a society in transition. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, eminent French and British Jews, helped and supported by their consuls, battled for the emancipation of Eastern and North African Jewries and struggled to improve their cultural and economic position in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and North Africa.

Political Protection

The political situation, the alliances or wars between Islamic lands and the various Christian countries, had repercussions on the different *raya* communities, linked by religion or protection with the belligerent or allied European states. These situations affected not only the communities' relations with the Muslim state, but also the relative strength of the different communities. In the sixteenth century, the Latin Churches thus gained certain advantages from the privileged relations between France and Persia, and with the Ottomans. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the situation turned in favor of Great Britain and its protégés, and for the Orthodox and Armenian Churches supported by Russia. From the nineteenth century, the fear inspired in the *umma* from military reprisals by powerful European states helped to improve conditions for the Christians.

By means of protection, Europe expanded its trade and later embarked upon its precolonial policy. Within the *umma*, as has been seen, the *dhimmis* were the pivot of a conflict between a power which increased its own wealth by selling them their liberties and the fanaticism of the masses who deprived them of these privileges—a situation which obliged the *dhimmis* to bribe their oppressors. Likewise, *dhimmis* were also obliged to play an ambiguous role in the Islam-Christendom relationship. In fact, the European states benefited doubly from the growth in the numbers of their protégés in Islamic lands. The extension of commercial protection also ensured the expansion of their economic exchanges at preferential rates, while in addition, protection also enabled them to intervene in the affairs of the Muslim government.

It should be stressed that Muslim merchants enjoyed the same prerogatives in Christian countries. However, the status of Muslim mer-

chants and individuals traveling for commercial reasons was totally different from the status of the *dhimmis*—conquered indigenous peoples, subject to restrictive and humiliating legislation. Christians and Jews, tempted by offers from consuls, courted the protection that would free them from a degrading yoke but which, simultaneously, served the interests of European countries. Freeing themselves from dhimmitude, they became the unwitting instruments of European penetration. This collusion between the *dar al-harb* and the *dhimmis*—themselves former *harbis*—in order to circumvent the oppressive Islamic laws, laid the foundations for future reprisals.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the Christian peoples of European Turkey—the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, and other Slavonic *rayas*—attempted to throw off the Islamic yoke. The restoration of their rights and their freedom as Christians involved a revolt against dhimmitude. These nationalist, and necessarily religious, conflicts inflamed anti-Christian feeling within the *umma*.¹⁵ Throughout the nineteenth century, Greeks, Slavs, Maronites, and Armenians suffered reprisals and massacres, tempered by the presence of European armies. In these Muslim-Christian wars, the Jewish population—much in the minority compared with the Christians—was more timorous, humble, and, inevitably, apolitical. This prudent neutrality, combined with the protection of eminent British Jews (the Rothschilds, Moses Montefiore) and Anglicans (Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Shaftsbury, and others) at a time when England was Turkey's most loyal ally, inspired sympathy for the Jewish *rayas* from the Turkish government, anxious to appear tolerant and liberal in European eyes. This disparity between Jewish and Christian *rayas* at a political level and the economic ascendancy of the Jews in Turkey, Egypt, and Syria exacerbated intercommunity tensions.

Political reasons aroused the interest of European powers in the Christian *rayas*. Anxious to deprive Russia of any motive for military intervention on behalf of the Orthodox *rayas*—a pretext for annexing the decomposing Turkish Empire—they obliged the Porte to accept the principle of equal rights (1839–56). European protection thus exercised considerable influence on the political, economic, and social condition of the *dhimmis*. It not only altered their relationship with the *umma*, but also the relative strength of the different communities. One *dhimmi* group was favored in comparison with another due to the force of its protecting country and the influence of that country over the sultan. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the protection of European countries and Russia improved the general condition of Christians in comparison, for example, with Jews of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Persia.

Without European intervention and protection, would the pre-Islamic

peoples have disappeared entirely in the course of the Islamization of their former lands like the Jews and Samaritans who were almost totally eradicated from their Palestinian homeland? The situation was less serious but still tragic for the Christians in the Arabized territories where they had once formed a powerful majority. Yet at the turn of the twentieth century, Jews, not Christians, were still living in Yemen, where no external influence had ever been felt. The same situation prevailed in the Maghreb, where Jewish communities, mostly of Spanish origin, were able to survive, whereas Christianity disappeared. Although it is difficult to determine the influence of Europe on the evolution of the *dhimmi* communities, it can at least be said that the help provided by the West to Greece, the Balkan countries, and Lebanon opened new horizons of dignity and freedom for the *dhimmis*.

Actually, contact with Europe set off a struggle by all the *dhimmi* peoples—though divided among themselves—against the old traditional values of the *dhimma*, which had consecrated the usurpation of their territories and their degradation. These struggles were waged simultaneously by the different communities, albeit disunited through hatred, rivalry, and the servility of alliances.

European protection unleashed two contradictory forces. On the one hand, it slowed down the process of the annihilation of non-Muslim indigenous communities; on the other hand, the annulment of the *dhimma* aggravated dhimmiphobia and generated the various processes which accelerated the decay and disappearance of these communities.

European protection cannot be dissociated from the movement for the emancipation of the *dhimmis*, for it not only provided an ideological inspiration but also gave it practical support, with military force when necessary. At an ideological level, the emancipation of the *dhimmis* is linked to the Declarations of the Rights of Man and the principle of the self-determination of peoples. In its most radical expression this movement became a war of national liberation of the *dhimmi* peoples.

6

From Emancipation to Nationalism (1820–1876)

THE EUROPEAN HUMANIST MOVEMENT

The emancipation of the *dhimmis*, nourished on European revolutionary ideas, was one of the many achievements of that prolific nineteenth-century Europe. Linked to circumstances external to the *dar al-Islam*, emancipation could be imposed willy-nilly, thanks to the unusual convergence of a number of cultural, social, scientific, and economic factors at a period when Europe was militarily strong.

The movements for national independence and for social rights, inspired by the American and French revolutions, generated political theories in Europe based on egalitarian and secular values. Simultaneously, a passion for history, archaeology, and the discovery of the ancient world encouraged travel to distant lands. Rail and steam were reducing distances; telegraphy was quickening communication, creating immediacy and thereby expanding the role of newspapers. Born from the industrial revolution, a wealthy and literate European bourgeoisie, interested in exploring new horizons, now ventured into those hitherto dangerous regions, hostile to Christians. Indeed, even if an armed escort was needed in areas dominated by nomadic tribes—such as Palestine, Syria and Iraq—the European powers could henceforth muzzle fanaticism and enforce the inviolability of their nationals' person and property.

On these pilgrimages and journeys back to their cultural roots, Europeans and Americans discovered the ruins of ancient Greece, of Israel, and the churches of early Christianity. They could observe the decay of those peoples, heirs to great civilizations, yet now humiliated and vilified under a foreign yoke in their own lands. They saw them reproachfully haunting the devastated remnants of a glorious past. Propelled into an age of science and mechanization, these travelers discovered, at the very gates of Europe, a world of stagnation and obscurantism with masses of eunuchs and slaves, harems, a biased and summary justice, and poverty-stricken *dhimmis* subjected to a poll tax and discriminatory dress. In

this political and cultural climate, there developed among the European intelligentsia a bond of compassion and sympathy for the victims of a millennium of oppression.

THE POLICY OF THE WESTERN POWERS

During this century of European expansion, the competing interests of the Western powers combined, so as to reconcile the *realpolitik* of the state with precisely that humanist trend of public opinion. At times, particularly in the case of Greece, pressure from the humanist current obliged France and England to overcome their reservations and help the *rayas* militarily.

Moreover, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire encouraged its immediate neighbors—Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire—to harbor expansionist ambitions that alarmed France and England, anxious to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The European states, who watched each other closely and lacked consensus on the division of the Ottoman Empire, preferred to freeze the situation and thwart any Russian or Austrian schemes to assist the Christian populations in the Turkish border provinces.

As the instigator of this policy, Great Britain defended the principle of the Turkish Empire's territorial integrity. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Porte, it acted as *éminence grise* at Constantinople and controlled the sea routes for trade with the Indies. Just as Britain would not tolerate Russian or Austrian expansion at Turkey's expense, so it opposed the emergence of independent micro-Balkan states that might gravitate into other powers' spheres of influence.

Meanwhile, extortions, tyranny, and religious fanaticism provoked revolts by *rayas*, causing bloody Turkish repression and military interferences by Russia and Austria. To eliminate any pretext for intervention, Europe attempted to abolish the abuses by introducing reforms in Turkey. These upheavals involved a number of changes intended, in particular, to reorganize Turkish government finances, strengthen its military power, and guarantee the juridical equality of Muslims and non-Muslims.


Such were the political motives—there were other economic ones—that unified European policy and the humanist current in order to force Turkey to adopt the principle of the equality of rights for Muslims and *rayas*. But the emancipation of the *dhimmis* implied a fundamental transformation of values. A new, universal concept—*rights*—replaced the former concept of *toleration*, derived from a subjective and hierarchical relationship between a superior and an inferior, a concept that had created, sustained, and perpetuated a situation of inequality. Rights are

inalienable but toleration, based on good will or political opportunism, can be withdrawn at will. Rights guarantee dignity and security but toleration, being the negation of rights, generates guile, intrigue, and corruption as the sole possible means of survival in a condition of permanent insecurity. Here it is important to note that the word “emancipation” for the *rayas* relates to a very different process from that of the emancipation of Protestants and Jews in European countries. Indeed, the *dhimmis* cannot be ideologically and politically assimilated to the religious minorities of Europe, but the term “emancipation” will nonetheless be adopted for want of a better word, even if it expresses a dissimilar context from the European process.

A considerable difference distinguished the principle of European *protection* from that of *emancipation*. Protection emerged from a collection of commercial agreements between states in order to promote trade on a reciprocal basis. These conventions concerned Ottoman merchants who went to Europe and foreign traders who settled in the Turkish Empire, with the later addition of *rayas* employed in the consulates, whose number remained limited and contested. However, by forcing Turkey to rescind the *dhimma*, Europe was taking a totally different approach. Not only did it intervene directly in the government of a suzerain state but, in addition, it abolished, on its own authority, a fundamental principle of Islamic policy: discrimination and inequality in every aspect of the lives of the conquered, non-Muslim, indigenous peoples. It was no longer a question of agreements concerning a limited number of individuals, as in the case of protection, but of an initiative which encompassed millions of Christian *rayas* who were living in their own countries—in varied density, according to historical or geographical vicissitudes—subjected to those laws emanating from the Arab-Islamic conquest. By imposing on the Porte the principle of equal rights, Europe hoped to pacify the Balkans, while justifying to public opinion its support for a reformed Turkish Empire, which would have abolished discrimination against Christians.

On 3 November 1839, the sultan Abd al-Majid proclaimed the *Hatt-i Sharif* of Gulhane. After a crushing military defeat a few months earlier at Nezib, inflicted by his vassal, Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt, the imperial throne had only just been saved thanks to the intervention of the European powers. In this *firman*, the sultan announced his intention to carry out a series of reforms (*tanzimat*) which would improve the lot of his subjects, irrespective of their religion.

During the Crimean War (1853–56), Turkey again realized its weakness vis-à-vis Russia and its dependence on Anglo-French military assistance. On 18 February 1856, the sultan Abd al-Majid read out the *Hatt-i Humayun* at an official ceremony. He announced reforms which would



Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Jerusalem

Note the absence of a cross

Pierotti (1864), vol. 2, pl. 31

abolish abuse and injustice and would guarantee the safety of property and persons and the equality of all his subjects before the law, irrespective of religion.

These two *firman*s were proclaimed at the end of two wars which would have been fatal for the Porte without Europe's assistance. They were sponsored by Great Britain: the first by the foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston; the second by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British ambassador at Constantinople and proponent of the Turcophile movement. Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, signed a few weeks after the *Hatt-i Humayun*, specified that the five European signatory powers—France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Sardinia—accepted the Sublime Porte as a participant in the advantages of international public law; they also pledged to “respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.” Article 8 confirmed the preceding point and specified that conflicts with the Sublime Porte must be settled by joint consultation and not by force. As if to associate the emancipation of the *rayas* with respect for Turkish territorial integrity, the following article referred directly to the 1856 *Hatt* and confirmed the sultan's intention to establish the equality of his subjects “without distinction as to religion

or race.” Europe’s position was thus clearly defined: respect for the territorial integrity of Turkey was linked to a cluster of administrative reforms, including the equality of rights which the sultan had promised.

Contrary to appearances, this policy promoted Turkish interests and was detrimental to the aspirations of the Balkan peoples it claimed to protect. True, only the Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians were showing any inclination for independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Centuries of humiliating servitude had destroyed—even among the best educated *rayas*—the qualities they needed to unite and liberate themselves. Their sociopolitical decay was worsened by chronic discord and by internecine denunciations. Watched over by their powerful neighbors, the *rayas* of the Balkans risked exchanging an Austrian or Russian yoke for Turkish despotism.

For its own interests, Europe had determined that the Turkish Empire—once reformed—was inviolable. Thus European propaganda used specious arguments to prove the toleration of the Turkish government toward its *rayas*, going even so far as to depict their condition as better, even preferable, to that of the Muslims. The European Turcophile movement extolled the privileges and liberties favoring the *rayas*, who were described at length as having negative features. Such arguments, which have become conventional, even in some contemporary studies, should be replaced in the context of Anglo-French policy concerned with maintaining the balance of power in Europe.¹

Although crucial, the abolition of discrimination and insecurity from which all *raya* populations suffered was, in effect, only a preliminary measure. Every *millet* was reorganized in an effort to eradicate, from the summit of the all-powerful religious hierarchy, the causes responsible for abuse, corruption, nepotism, and ignorance. These measures were accompanied by a program of educational and cultural development. In the field of administration, *rayas* were permitted to share with Muslims in the local responsibilities of provincial government, as well as in the proportional representation of each community in the central government. Equal rights also implied military duties. Britain regarded participation by the *rayas* in the rigors and dangers of war as a means of hardening populations who had been forbidden to carry weapons and whom the laws had reduced to cowardice.

This transformation of the tributary peoples into citizens equal to Muslims was integrated into a vast program for the modernization (*tanzimat*) of the Ottoman Empire, undertaken with the collaboration of European experts. It involved the introduction into the *dar al-Islam* of western administrative techniques, together with the whole corresponding juridical, cultural, and scientific apparatus.² The Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39), impressed by the industrial expansion of Europe, had already

undertaken to reform his empire; *a fortiori* the increase in the military strength of the neighboring Austrian and Russian powers could only further incite the Porte to secure the loyalty of its *raya* subjects.

The Turkish reformist movement, therefore, set out to eliminate religious divisions and unite all the disparate peoples in the empire around a new ideology: *Ottomanism*. This nationalist ideology advocated the equality of all Ottoman subjects; its secular conception of society clashed totally with the values of the *umma*, which was based on religious solidarity. Ottomanism underestimated the basic specificity of the *rayas*, however, whose demands for religious emancipation overlapped with their national aspirations. The Greek, Serb, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Armenian struggled more for their land, their language, their culture, and their history than they did for their religion.

Inspired by abstract concepts imported from abroad, Ottomanism remained superficial and restricted to a limited number of politicians. As a vehicle of emancipation, it proposed a reformist policy which would completely transform the political and hierarchical traditions of the *umma*. A preliminary step for this new society, envisaged by realistic Ottoman politicians who were eager to improve the cultural and economic level of their peoples, first required the abolition of the archaic social structure, which by degrading the infidel had encouraged oppression and juridical corruption.

European consuls frequently mention the deficiencies of Ottoman justice. William Holmes, the British consul at Bosna Serai (Sarajevo) summarized this situation in a letter dated 24 February 1871 to the foreign secretary, Earl Granville:

The unnecessary delay and neglect, to the prejudice often of innocent persons, the open bribery and corruption, the invariable and unjust favour shown to Musulmans in all cases between Turks and Christians, which distinguish the Turkish administration of what is called "justice" throughout the Empire, cannot fail to suggest the question—what would be the lot of foreigners in Turkey were the European Powers to give up the capitulations? I am convinced that their position in the provinces, at all events, would be intolerable, and that they would quit the country to a man, while the outcry and feeling in Europe against Turkey would ultimately cause her ruin. The universal ignorance, corruption, and fanaticism of all classes precludes all hope of an efficient administration of justice for at least another generation.³

A new factor emerges here: *public opinion*, an element which conditioned European moral and political support for Turkey and saved it from collapse. It explains the prime concern of European chancelleries, particularly the British Foreign Office, to use the Turcophile movement

to paint an idyllic picture of *raya* life, which—however necessary it may have been for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe—hardly conformed to reality.

As the condition of the Christians in the Balkan peninsula had taken on an international dimension which ran the risk of provoking a European conflict, Europe was preoccupied with the question of reforms until World War I. Innumerable volumes of reports, analyses, and letters piled up in the chancelleries as a result of this diplomatic activity; they still constitute today an invaluable source of information on the Christian *rayas*. The reforms—Europe's last hope of avoiding the dismemberment of an empire, which it desperately defended—met intense resistance in Muslim circles.

THE ISLAMIC REACTION

In nineteenth-century Islamic societies, the inequality between *dhimmis* and Muslims constituted not only an ideological and juridical dogma, it also corrupted the whole system of relationships in daily life. Muslims, therefore, interpreted the concepts of rights and equality as a subversive heresy forced on them by Christendom in order to weaken Islam. The reforms, particularly those concerning religious equality, met violent opposition.

Opposition to Europe

In the Ottoman Empire, the adoption of the Western principles of the equality of men and of the freedom of peoples raised religious and political problems relating to the legitimacy and even the empire's security. Indeed, the emancipation of the *rayas* was embedded in a vast context of cooperation, exchanges, and cultural interactions between Christendom (*dar al-harb*) and the *dar al-Islam*. Yet modification in the relationships between these two entities constituted in itself a ferment for an ideological, social, and political revolution. The concept of permanent and obligatory war against a satanic *dar al-harb* was replaced by a peaceful relationship that encouraged the adoption of reforms and ideas inspired by a non-Muslim world, henceforth absolved from contempt and theological reprobation. This rehabilitation opened the way to the emancipation of the *rayas*, themselves former *harbis*, whose lands had been absorbed into the *dar al-Islam*. Inevitably, this process of emancipation contained the germs of territorial conflict, since the adherents of the "tolerated religions" were in fact dispossessed peoples. Therefore, the internal logic of *jihad* prohibited religious emancipation. Permanent

war, the perversity of the *dar al-harb*, and the inferiority of the conquered *harbis* formed the three fundamental and interdependent poles on which the expansion and the religious and political domination of the *umma* was based.

The political situation increased religious intolerance. France, which had proclaimed its friendship for the Muslims, nonetheless invaded Egypt (1798) and Algeria (1830). Britain, Turkey's close ally, had subjugated Muslims in India. Those two powers had scuttled the Egypto-Turkish fleet at Navarin (1827) and facilitated Greek independence, albeit with the aim of weakening their reliance on Russia. Russia, for its part, had seized vast regions on the Black Sea: Crimea (1783), Georgia (1800) and Bessarabia (1812), and, while dreaming of a Byzantine renaissance in Constantinople, lent a hand to revolts in Serbia, Macedonia, and Rumania. It gained Armenian territory in Persia and assumed the right of inspection over the whole Armenian population of the Turkish Empire (Treaty of San Stefano, 1878). Christendom, perceived in its entirety as *dar al-harb*, irrespective of country or politics, represented the hereditary enemy which Islam had fought since its triumphant march from Arabia and which it had subjugated in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The heroic feats of this *jihad*, waged over twelve centuries, were kept alive in edifying narratives and popular legends.

Opposition to Ottomanism

The Muslim religious class blamed the sultan for obeying foreign courts and transgressing Islamic laws which had secured the lightning victories of triumphant Islam. The doctrine of pan-Islamism, preached by the *ulama*, called for a return to the Islamic policy of the first caliphs and an alliance of all Muslims in a *jihad* against their modernist co-religionists and against Christendom. Contrary to Ottomanism, which expressed a unified, secular nationalism, pan-Islamism glorified the supremacy of Islam and the values of *jihad*.

The Ottomanist doctrine provided Turkish reformers with a secular formula which would facilitate their Christian subjects' integration and the empire's modernization on the basis of the separation of spiritual and temporal power. On the other hand, the *ulama* preached pan-Islamism, which taught precisely the opposite and proclaimed the supremacy of religion. This religious movement, deeply rooted in history, tradition, and law, grew vigorously among all classes of the population.

In the last decades of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, endemic revolts by Christian *dhimmis* in the Balkan, the Greek regions, and in Anatolia increased religious hatred on both sides. The violence of the confrontations and the expulsion of Muslims from

liberated regions awoke the *umma's* old fear of losing its conquests and suffering vengeance from the despoiled peoples, who had been so long oppressed. In heavily populated agglomerations, dervishes preached holy war, thereby corroborating the general feeling of an imminent catastrophe that would strike Islam: Allah's punishment of his community, which had abandoned the Divine Law, adopting that of Europe.

This pessimism was fed by an uninterrupted stream of Muslim refugees fleeing from Christian domination over the lost Turkish provinces of Europe. Victims of war, humiliated by defeat, stripped of their omnipotence by their despised Christian subjects, these refugees sustained the popular hatred of Christendom.

The Ottoman government settled this multitude of Muslim emigrants (*muhajirun*) in troubled regions, thereby tightening its control through a policy of Muslim colonization. The *muhajirun* from the Balkan provinces were directed to Armenia. In 1874–75 those from the Caucasus settled in the Danube provinces, then in the full fever of nationalism, in Galilee, on the Golan in Palestine, and at the gates of a strongly Christianized Lebanon. In 1878, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, Bosnian Muslim colonists arrived in Macedonia and in Palestine. In 1912, Russia tried to prevent their immigration into Armenia. From the nineteenth century into the twentieth some three million Muslims flowed back, wave after wave, from the liberated European countries, settling in Asian Turkey and its Arab provinces.⁴

Opposition to Emancipation

In 1841, Hugh Rose, the British consul general in Beirut noted:

It is a curious fact that only a little more than half a year after the reading and proclamation of the Hatti Sheriff of Gülhané in this country there has been a general reaction in favour of the Koran and of the exclusive privileges of the Mahometans over Christians in diametrical opposition to the doctrine of equality of all before the law which is the essence of the Hatti Sheriff.⁵

Not only did the emancipation of the tributary subjects have religious and political implications, inherent in the dualist nature of dhimmitude; in addition, the union of religious and temporal powers in the Islamic government inextricably blended confessionalism with the political sphere. The laws of *jihad*—the basis for the government of the conquered peoples—only tolerated the *dhimmi's* existence in a context of discrimination, within which the payment of the *jizya* symbolized the subjection of the infidel peoples to Islamic supremacy.

Traditionalists therefore interpreted the reformists' abolition of the


jizya and the acknowledgment of the equality of Muslims and *rayas* as a breach of the *dhimma*. According to them, this breach thus restored to the *umma* its initial right over the *dhimmis'* life and property, the enslavement of women and children, or their expulsion—measures that had only been suspended by the pact of submission (see p. 322). Henceforth, reprisals against emancipated *dhimmis* were not only justified but became both mandatory and praiseworthy, since followers of the tolerated religions were only spared within the sole framework of a politico-religious ideology of conquest. As even the very principle of equal rights was considered a sacrilege, it could only be imposed by an external force, backed by military might. However timidly the reforms were implemented, they scandalized traditionalists. *Dhimmis* were consequently attacked, sometimes killed, often with the tacit support of the authorities, who hastened to revoke unpopular measures on the pretext of preventing a bloodbath.

Thus the *dhimmi* found himself once again in the center of a conflict between a reactionary religious movement and a liberal Muslim movement, eager to modernize the country's military power and win European support against Russian encroachment. This conflict between reformist and conservative forces—and sometimes their collusion—gives to this nineteenth century its contradictory character as a period of hope but also of mourning, a century of emancipation but also a century of persecution and massacres (Greece, Lebanon-Syria, Serbia, Bulgaria, Armenia).

Reactionary forces were kept alive not only by religious prejudice but also by cultural imperialism. The interest of European scholars in the Ancient World reawakened the pride and desire for freedom of the *rayas*, and this precisely at a time when Turkish reforms were depriving Muslims of their traditional privileges. Both Jews and Christians (Greeks, Copts, Armenians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians) remembered that they had not always been degraded religious minorities, but formerly great nations, tolerated—after the conquest of their lands—only in a religious context, implying tribute and humiliation. The annihilation of communities was accompanied by the eradication of their culture, language, and art, which symbolized their national creativity. It was thus with profound hostility that the *umma* viewed national patrimonies from the pre-Arab past emerging from ruins and oblivion. These cultural implications of the process of emancipation caused the destruction of monuments and the conversion of churches into mosques, as in the case of the Armenians.

EMANCIPATION

These vicissitudes, surveyed briefly here, explain the reasons why the struggles for the emancipation and liberation of the *dhimmi* peoples in



Kfar Nahum Synagogue (3rd–8th century). Sea of Galilee, Israel
Abandoned, together with the adjacent church, ca. 700

the Ottoman Empire assumed the fanatical and violent character of wars of religion. Consular correspondence and reports provide a vivid, almost daily account of the battle for the emancipation of the *rayas*. A similar political pattern emerges, conspicuously, everywhere. The *ulama*, custodians of politico-religious values, stirred up popular reprisals. The motivations for these uprisings were religious: the *rayas* were accused of having broken their pact by insolent and arrogant behavior. But their aims were political: to intimidate the Turkish governors responsible for implementing the reforms. In Armenia, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, the Turkish officials disregarded the reforms, fearing assassination. When collective or individual reprisals against the *rayas* might anger the Christian protecting powers, pressures and threats were brought to bear on those *dhimmis* who sought emancipation.

The Jews, who neither demographically nor religiously had ever represented a political asset for Austrian or Russian ambitions, had in some ways benefited from the backlash of emancipation. In Muslim countries, such as North Africa and Yemen—devoid of Christians and in no way threatened by Russian annexation—the *dhimma* concerning Jews was maintained without unduly disturbing European governments, other than for its deplorable economic consequences. This situation prompted Ottoman Jews to use their new rights with caution and moderation.

The emancipation of Christian and Jewish *rayas* was consequently set in different political contexts, dependent on religion; and among the various Christian groups themselves, on the basis of the proximity and power of each protecting state and its political interests.

The forms of power available to the protectors of the two groups were also different. The Christian nations could exert political pressure backed up by military force: Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774); Anglo-Franco-Russian fleet siding with the Greeks (Navarin, 1827); European protectorate over the Christians in Turkey (Treaty of Paris, 1856); military assistance to the Maronites (Syria, 1860); Russian army protecting the Armenians (capture of Kars, 1878) and support for the Slav rebellions (1877–78); Austrian protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878); and Russian protection of the Armenians (San Stefano, 1878).

As for the Jews of Europe (and later of the United States), they could act only in the name of a universal ethic for the emancipation of their coreligionists. They denounced fanatical excesses before public opinion in their parliaments and in the press. Such excesses discredited Muslim regimes which incited or tolerated them—or the Eastern Churches when they were responsible. Either by necessity or out of sincere conviction—it is hard to disentangle the two in the labyrinths of power—the Muslim authorities took measures to restrain fanaticism. Church leaders disavowed accusations of ritual murder and other public antisemitic practices particularly common among the Greek Orthodox communities,⁶ and Muslim political leaders issued edicts protecting their Jewish subjects.⁷ After 1860, Jewish organizations in Britain and France, co-operating with foreign consuls, worked uninterruptedly for the inclusion of Jews in the emancipation process, first intended for Christian *dhimmis*.

These attempts to promote religious equality in the Ottoman Empire, although important, were only operative at the highest political level. The main task remained: getting the regional governors and the people to respect the sultan's orders. In effect, Turkish authorities often failed to impose the reforms out of fear of popular prejudice, of revolts, and the *ulama's* hostility. Powerless to control the corruption and general instability of the provinces, the central Ottoman administration abandoned the minorities to the tyranny of local governors or tribal chiefs. In 1875, the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, reported that the grand vizier Mahmud Pasha acknowledged the impossibility of allowing Christian testimony at courts of justice in Bosnia. Thus, he noted that:

The professed equality of Christians and Mussulmans is, however, so illusory so long as this distinction is maintained that I shall take the earliest opportunity of reverting to the subject with the Grand Vizier.⁸



Fresco (13th century). Monastery of Sopočani, Serbia

This juridical situation had serious consequences due to the system of justice, as he explained:

This is a point [the refusal of testimony] of much importance to the Christians, for, as the religious courts neither admit documentary nor written evidence, nor receive Christian evidence, they could hope for little justice from them.⁹

In fact, this intolerance concerned all social and professional relationships, as this trivial incident shows, described a year later by the British Consul in Bosna-Serai (Sarajevo), Edward Freeman:

About a month ago, an Austrian subject named Jean Udilak was attacked and robbed between Serajevo and Visoka by nine Bashi-Bazouks. The act was witnessed by a respectable Mussulman of this time named Nouri Aga Varinika, and he was called as a witness when the affair was brought before the Serajevo Tribunal. His testimony was in favour of the Austrian, and the next day he was sent for by the Vice-President and one of the

members of the Tribunal, and threatened with imprisonment for daring to testify against his co-religionists.¹⁰

The difficulty of imposing the reforms in so vast an empire provoked this disillusioned comment from Sir P. Francis, consul general and judge at the British Consular Court in Constantinople:

The Porte hitherto has not appointed independent judges. Indeed, the modern perversion of the Oriental idea of justice is a concession to a suitor through grace and favour, and not the declaration of a right, on principles of law, and in pursuance of equity. The latest appointments to the judgeship, ever since the promulgation of the Firman [12 December 1875], do not inspire one with confidence as to the genuine desire of the Government for an independent and incorruptible judicial body.¹¹

Briefly, one may discern three distinct but simultaneous forces that destabilized the *dar al-Islam*: emancipation, the *dhimmi* liberation movements, and European colonization. These three movements, linked to the military, intellectual and economic development of Europe, shook the traditional Islamic societies and hastened the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

Without neglecting regional differences, it is clear that the process of emancipation of the *dhimmis* followed the same pattern both in the Ottoman Empire and later in the Maghreb and Persia. Wherever the weakening of Islamic societies favored the European policy of the *dhimmis'* emancipation, the attempt to end religious discrimination provoked conflicts between the Muslim reforming authority, however weak it was, and the hostility of the *ulama*.

In Egypt the emancipation of the Christians—followed by that of the Jews—took place relatively smoothly. Muhammad Ali, eager to preserve the economic and military support of France, muzzled religious opposition. In the Maghreb, the emancipation of the *dhimmis*—almost exclusively Jews—sponsored by Europe, provoked a confrontation between the Muslim authorities, and the fanaticism of the populace. The Pledge of Security, imposed by France on the Bey of Tunis in 1857, had to be abrogated in 1864, following an uprising. The same pattern recurred during the third quarter of the nineteenth century in Morocco and Persia, where the reformist, and often impotent, authority of sultan or shah was incapable of imposing reforms upon the people, led by the *ulama*. Algeria, after France's occupation in 1830, was a special case, as the Jews acquired French citizenship by decree in 1870.

Documents attest that legislation concerning the *dhimmis* was less severe in Egypt and Turkey than in the Maghreb, Palestine, Syria, Iraq,

Yemen, and Persia. In Palestine and Syria, the reforms imposed on the Arab population by the Ottoman sultan led to violent disturbances. In the Maghreb, a total upheaval—that of colonization—was necessary in order to change traditional behavior. In Persia, the minorities were emancipated by a revolution (1922) and, in Yemen, the situation remained unchanged until the mass emigration of the Jews to the State of Israel in 1948–50. These differing patterns correspond to the diverse historical currents and the specific characteristics which differentiated the numerous peoples of the *dar al-Islam*.

Although nationalism and emancipation were two distinct processes—nationalism aimed at the liberation of a homeland and emancipation sought the abolition of legal discrimination—these two movements were nonetheless interconnected. In effect, each *dhimmi* group took part in both these movements stemming from its dispersion within the *dar al-Islam*. While Christians and Jews demanded equal rights in places where history had scattered them, these demands evolved nevertheless into nationalist movements in those provinces which had formally been their own homelands: Greece, the Balkans, Armenia, Palestine. Thus, persecution and massacre struck the *dhimmis* indiscriminately, wherever they happened to be; in its total rejection, the *umma* embraced both Europe—which sponsored movements of liberation and emancipation, while simultaneously engaged in colonization—and its protégés.

The *umma's* retreat left its mark on many *dhimmi* communities. The Crimean war (1853–56) aroused reprisals against the Armenians, dispossessed for the benefit of fleeing Circassian Muslims. Massacres in Greece and “Bulgarian horrors” in the Balkans accompanied the wars of Greek and Balkan liberation. Emancipation caused the extermination of twenty thousand Christians in Syria and Lebanon (1860).¹² Pogroms in Turkish Armenia in 1895–96, which caused the death of between 100,000 and 200,000 Armenians, also swept away Christian Syrians, whose villages were burned and pillaged, the men killed, and the women abducted. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Armenian nationalism was first crushed by the massacres of 1909 and the genocide perpetrated between 1915 and 1917, which also engulfed Catholic and Protestant Jacobites, Chaldeans, and Syrians. As many as ninety-six thousand Jacobites were massacred in the town of Mardin (Mesopotamia) alone.¹³

In the space of less than a century, wars of liberation and movements for the emancipation or economic improvement of the *rayas* had caused the extinction of these people and their almost complete disappearance from the *dar al-Islam*. Except for Egypt, controlled by England during

this crucial period, the disintegration of the non-Muslim indigenous populations of Turkey and the Levant resulted from the abolition of the *dhimma* and the alliance—so greatly feared and stubbornly rejected in the past—between Eastern Christians and a seductive Europe, which hid its political calculations beneath a varnish of humanitarianism.

7

Nationalisms (1820–1918)

In the mid-nineteenth century, Ubcini described the *rayas* of the Ottoman Empire:

The history of enslaved peoples is the same everywhere, or rather, they have no history. The years, the centuries pass without bringing any change to their situation. Generations come and go in silence. One might think they are afraid to awaken their masters, asleep alongside them. However, if you examine them closely you discover that this immobility is only superficial. A silent and constant agitation grips them. Life has entirely withdrawn into the heart. They resemble those rivers which have disappeared underground: if you put your ear to the earth, you can hear the muffled sound of their waters; then they re-emerge intact a few leagues away. Such is the state of the Christian populations of Turkey under Ottoman rule.¹

At first glance it seems a hazardous undertaking to embrace the evolution of the varied and numerous *dhimmi* peoples in one comprehensive conception. However, it is noteworthy that these peoples had at least one common feature: Jews and Christians—whether Greeks, Spaniards, Slavs, Bulgarians, Armenians and others—all were subject to the same Islamic laws. It is therefore possible to examine whether they reacted similarly or differently in relation to this common feature.

The next step is to define our terms. In fact, “independence” and “liberated land” presuppose national legitimacy and imply that these peoples possessed national characteristics, diminished by the condition of dhimmitude; that is to say, by their subjection to Islamic political authority. It would therefore be inadequate to define these groups solely as “religious minorities.” Moreover, these terms, which have come into use fairly recently, belong to the Christian context relating to the emancipation of the Jews in Europe or to the Protestants in a predominantly Catholic country. However, the considerable differences between Europe and the Orient introduce misconceptions into these borrowed terms. The Arab expression *ahl al-dhimma* (Peoples of the Pact), which refers to a treaty between conquerors and the conquered, is more accurate.

Millet, used by both the Turks and European consuls, corresponds to the word "nation" and designates the ethnoreligious communities.

These non-Muslim groups show distinctive national and religious characteristics that are not easily dissociated due to their overlapping and entanglement. Moreover, these national characteristics evolve with time; depending on circumstances, sometimes they blur, diminish or disappear; sometimes they are more pronounced and assertive. This mobility, which determined the specificity of each *dhimmi* group, varied according to their geographical implantation, religion and history, as well as to endogenous causes such as demography, deculturation, assimilation, social class, and other factors. Consequently, while recognizing the existence of particularisms which differentiate one *dhimmi* group from another within their respective sociocultural components, one can nonetheless distinguish similarities in their shared status of dhimmitude, resulting from their subjection to the same laws.

ANATOLIA AND EUROPEAN TURKEY: COMMON CHARACTERS

Without going into the details of the liberation process specific to every *dhimmi* group, it is possible to discern the common stages which enabled each of them to gain independence. These stages, which occurred at the cultural, economic, religious, and political level, were set in a context of interactions and interdependence. The process was marked by the rebirth of the national language that vitalized literary activity. Thus, the cultural movement stimulated historical research and encouraged the modernization of the communities' school system. The reform of communal organizations and their secularization converged to reduce the despotism of the clergy and the power and corruptibility of the notables. Lastly, the fermentation of cultural nationalism unleashed rebellions and a political struggle for the abolition of the *dhimma*.

The Cultural Renaissance

The heritage of popular legends and war epics, religiously preserved in convents and monasteries—particularly those of Mount Athos, the Rodhope mountains, and Armenia—fertilized the revival of *dhimmi* cultures in the Balkans and Armenia. The old national languages—Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Wallachian (Rumanian), and Armenian—fallen into oblivion and contempt, were refined and elaborated. Linguistic reforms codified orthography in dictionaries and grammars. The language was modernized and became more flexible in modern literary works. Draw-



The Visitation. Boiana Church (1259). South of Sofia, Bulgaria

ing on the national folklore of the wars against the Turks, historians and philologists renewed the peoples' awareness of their past and stimulated research. This cultural renaissance, within which converged philology, literature, and history, developed in Greece due to writers such as Rhigas Velestinlis and Adamantios Koraïs; in Serbia, with Vuk Karajich, Dimitriji Obradovic, and Ljudevit Gaj; in Rumania, with Samuel Klein, Radulesco, and Cogalnitcheanu; and in Bulgaria, with George Rakovski, Ljuben Karaveloff, and Zankoff.

Like the Greeks and Jews, the Armenians had been able to preserve their national language by setting it down in a number of works of historiography and literature. The Mechitarists of Venice (Catholic Armenians) had built up large libraries. Their printing presses published historical and philological books which kept the national and religious identity alive. Crossing frontiers, this vast cultural movement of the Balkan peoples linked up with the flourishing historical, archaeological, linguistic, and sociological research that developed in the capitals of western Europe in the nineteenth century.

Reorganization of the Milletts

In the Ottoman Empire, all Christian Dyophysites, whether Greeks, Slavs, or Syrians, had been combined into a single *millet* represented by the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. It assumed leadership of the other, hitherto independent, national patriarchates: the Serbian patriarchate of Pec, abolished in 1766, and the Bulgarian archbishopric of Ohrid, suppressed in 1767. The Armenian *millet*, less hierarchized, was administered by various regional bishops (Catholicos). Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople succeeded in imposing its authority on all Monophysite Christians and grouped them under its jurisdiction.²

The civil and religious administration of the *rayas*, which devolved on the patriarch assisted by the Holy Synod, conferred far more extensive powers on the religious authority under the sultans than it did under the Byzantine emperors. Subject to the sultan's consent for their investiture, obtained through venality and intrigue, the heads of the *millet* became the instruments by which the sultan could interfere and exercise political control. Moreover, except in religious matters, the confirmation of a patriarch's decision required a ratification from an official of the Porte. This procedure offered opportunities for corruption and meddling.³

The Byzantine nobility, which had survived the massacres of the conquests and had not gone into exile, entered the sultan's service through the *devshirme* system or the state civil service, becoming rich in farming taxes. This collusion, or collaboration, with the Muslim conquerors by

vanquished Christians was particularly widespread among the Greeks; they thus became indispensable to the maintenance of Turkish government and controlled all the administrative services. The specific character of this collaboration, stamped with mutual hostility and contempt, probably developed the negative features of the Greek *millet* that so many contemporary observers had described, however philhellenic they may have been.

It is noteworthy that civic positions and ecclesiastical offices were granted by the sultan to the highest bidder. The purchase of bishoprics obliged incumbents to recoup their funds by selling minor clerical positions, while Greek bankers and usurers of the Phanar quarter of Constantinople prospered from dealings in administrative posts. This practice, repeated at all levels of the social hierarchy—a replica of a similar situation experienced by Eastern Christendoms under the Umayyads and Abbasids—poisoned institutions. Frequently solicited by ambitious opponents, the Porte intervened in the affairs of the patriarchates, playing on discords and intrigues in order to impose appointments or arbitrary dismissals.

The reform and modernization of the *rayas'* school system and the study of national languages and history stimulated the pride of the new generations. A class of intellectuals educated abroad, as well as craftsmen and petits bourgeois, challenged the despotism of the notables and the high clergy. This development within each *millet* stirred up struggles for the democratization of community institutions. At this stage, *dhimmi* nationalisms, though rooted in religion, appeared to be movements of intellectuals fighting against their own clerical hierarchy, the instrument and ally of Islamic domination. Thus the destruction of the community structures underpinning the whole system of dhimmitude that had been established and controlled by Muslim power, appeared as a necessary preliminary stage to political independence. In effect, this phase corresponded to the evolution of mentalities in the nineteenth century and to the anticlerical trend. Regrettably, these internal communal struggles have not been thoroughly researched. Indeed, the democratic and secular trends within these internal conflicts menaced the *dhimmi* patriarchates' economic power and led to demands for independence.

The struggle for independence was not limited solely to the battle against the Turks, a battle which the *raya* peoples would have been incapable of sustaining. It also implied a total transformation of each *millet* by an ideological revolution and an administrative reorganization. These changes would have enabled a secular counterpower to abolish the abuses and corruption that had prepared the way for the regime of dhimmitude and had maintained it. The reforms consisted of allocating fixed salaries to patriarchs and bishops and of separating the temporal

and spiritual in community affairs. The emergence of a secular authority to administer the revenues of the community and manage the schools aroused heavy opposition from the clergy, particularly among the Greeks.

During this period of transition from dhimmitude to independence, each *millet* embarked on an internal reorganization (1860–65). Their representatives, freed from the sultan's tutelage, included both clergy and laymen, who administered the funds to run their educational and philanthropic institutions. The organization of information by community publications, written in the national language, revitalized by current usage, ensured communal cohesion, introduced modernity, and opened new conceptual horizons. This development, strengthened by the auspicious changes of the *tanzimat* and the support of the protecting European nations, transformed the subjected *dhimmi* populations and paved the way to their freedom.

Uprisings

Despite centuries of submission, the Christian peoples of the Balkans, Greece, and Anatolia had always retained the hope of freeing themselves. Poor, ignorant, and fanatical, but still guardians of the faith, village priests kept national consciousness alive in the people. The desire for independence was expressed in popular elegies born of oppression and in poems that glorified national heroes and resistance to the Turks.

This explosive mixture of hope and impotence made the *rayas* vulnerable to intrigues by countries prepared to utilize or abandon them as their self-interest dictated. The sporadic uprisings and revolts, encouraged by Russia or Austria, provoked bloody reprisals. Nonetheless, hopes survived, sustained in particular by the agents of those two powers, by circumstances, and by the decomposition of the Ottoman Empire, its weakness, and the military superiority of the Christian states.

Political resistance was first organized in the border provinces, the Moldo-Wallachian principalities (Rumania) near Russia, in Montenegro and Croatia, which alternatively received the support of Austria and Russia.

In 1711, an uprising by the Moldo-Wallachians helped by Russia failed. The Porte entrusted the administration of the principalities to Greeks from Phanariot families (*hospodars*). In 1769, the Russians fomented an uprising in the Peloponnese, but Catherine II, after securing major advantages from the Porte, abandoned her plan and left thousands of Greeks (fifty thousand?) to be slaughtered (Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, 21 July 1774). These disappointments discouraged neither Greeks nor Slavs, who tried to obtain funds, weapons, and military aid

from Russia. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the rebirth of Hellenism accompanied the uprisings of the Klephts in the Greek mountains and islands. The *Hetairia Philiké*, a patriotic revolutionary society founded in Odessa and reorganized in 1814 by Alexander Hipsilanti—member of a powerful Greek Phanariot family from Moldavia and an officer in the Russian army—stirred up the underground nationalist movement in Moldavia; a few years later the Peloponnese revolted. The Turks responded to the uprising of the *dhimmis* and to the massacre of the small Turkish minority by the laws of *jihād*: the massacre and enslavement of rebel Christian populations. At Chios alone, in 1822, all but 1,800 of the 113,000 inhabitants of the island were either massacred or sold into slavery. The general indignation obliged France, Russia, and Britain to intervene. They managed to procure for the Greeks the status of an autonomous province with a Christian governor, vassal to the Porte. Greek independence was recognized in 1830.

Beginning in February 1804, Kara George led an uprising in Serbia with an army composed of peasants and drove out the janissaries in 1806. Encouraged by Russia, the movement gained strength and, in 1830, Serbia obtained administrative autonomy while still remaining a vassal of the Porte which maintained military garrisons in the country. Later, under the Treaty of Paris (1856), the European powers replaced Russia as the protecting power of Serbia and guaranteed its independence.

Influenced by the European revolutions and by Russian pan-Slavism and encouraged by the movement for Balkan cultural renaissance, the Christian uprising reached Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Rebellions by the Klephts (Greeks), the Haiduks and Comitajis (Bulgarians), and bands of nationalist partisans were supported by Serbia, Austria, Russia, and Montenegro.

The long and bloody march toward independence of the diverse Christian peoples of the Balkans shows the following common features: recovery of the national language and of culture and history toward the end of the eighteenth century. Likewise, this cultural renaissance, linked to the expansion of historical studies and to European revolutionary thought, led to the democratization and secularization of the *millet* by reducing the administrative power of the clergy and notables. This evolution was punctuated by revolts and uprisings fomented and supported by external powers.

DIFFERENT CHARACTERS

The similarity of the general processes of emancipation, nonetheless, cannot conceal the considerable differences which divided, when they



The Combat of the *Giaour* and Hassan
Eugène Delacroix (1826)

did not oppose, the many ethnic groups in Turkey's European provinces. These differences arose mainly from geography and history. Unlike the Bulgarians, the Rumanians, for example, benefited from their remoteness from populated centers that had been mainly, or totally, Islamized. Wallachia was subject to Turkish rule during four centuries, Moldavia during three centuries; these principalities, later united under the name of Rumania, were never reduced to the status of provinces administered by Muslim governors. Controlled by boyars from the indigenous aristocracy and by their voivodes, these regions retained their institutions, national culture, and relative autonomy. Tributary to the Porte, those provinces were expected to maintain the Turkish garrisons stationed on their lands, to provide military contingents, and to obtain the sultan's approval in the investiture of the voivodes, elected by the boyars. A Latin people, although Uniate Orthodox (joined to Rome), the Rumanians lived on the borders of the *dar al-Islam*, which gave them an advantage over the tributaries whose lands had been totally submerged and incorporated into the Muslim world. This privileged peripheral position allowed the Rumanians to maintain links with the West, particularly France, and to share in the cultural and political evolution of European civilization. Wedged between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, they tried to break away from the encroaching protection of Russia which had acquired the right of inspection over the hospodars in 1802.

The Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians were in a different position. Their territories, administered by the Turks, suffered not only from a substantial Muslim immigration and colonization, but also from a policy of deporting indigenous populations. However, the Greeks were privileged in comparison with the Serbs and Bulgarians, since they could preserve their national Church and also acquire considerable economic and political power through their control of the Turkish administration. From Constantinople, the wealthy Phanariot families protected their compatriots and built up relationships with Europe, particularly in peripheral regions of the Empire which enjoyed a wide degree of local autonomy. As for the Serbs and Bulgarians, deprived of their national Churches and evicted from their episcopal and metropolitan seats by the Greeks, they underwent a profound deculturation under the spiritual and religious domination of the Greek clergy. The paucity of their elites through massacres, conversion, or emigration had deprived the illiterate peasantry of guidance. Serbs who had taken refuge in the mountains of Montenegro were able to retain a spirit of independence and join the Austrian armies, but the Bulgarians were ill-served by the flatness of their plains and their proximity to Constantinople, which had become the beacon of expansionist Islam.

The struggle against dhimmitude by the Christian peoples of Euro-

pean Turkey was a vast and complex movement, determined by manifold factors: geographical position, demographical density, or atomization in the diaspora (deportations). Events were influenced by factors such as the degree to which language and culture had survived, autonomy or the suppression of the national clergy, and overseas contacts or isolation. The assimilation of the elites or political irredentism, the role and involvement of the protecting powers, the nature of their interests, and the hazards of international policy affected the historical process.

Some revolts were organized by the elites (Rumanians) and some by mountain dwellers and peasants (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians). The revolutionary dynamic combined an internal effort and overseas assistance.⁴ This external interference—overlapping with the rivalries and interests of the various European states—at times accelerated and, at other times, diminished or obstructed the process of independence. After the 1774 treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, Russia accredited indigenous Greeks as consuls in the *échelles* (trading posts) and extended protection to their employees and servants. This Russian protection stimulated Greek trade and fostered the birth of a new class of businessmen. Remote from Turkish political centers, they were able to finance the Hellenistic cultural renaissance.

Bulgaria was created by Russia (Treaty of San Stefano, 3 March 1878). Serbia, adjacent to Austria, benefited from Russian sympathy but had to be wary of its two “protectors,” to whom was added a third party, no less voracious: Germany. Rumania was occupied on many occasions and devastated by the “protection” of the Russian army, while Greece’s strategic position meant that its “liberators”—Russia, France, and Britain—could keep a close watch on it. Acting always in accordance with their own strategic or economic interests, the European states exploited the national aspirations of the *raya* peoples in order to enlarge their own territory or spheres of influence.

National quarrels were grafted on to religious conflicts. A preliminary requirement for the autonomy of the Slav Churches was their cultural, administrative, and economic liberation from Greek tutelage. In 1870, the Porte, fearing Russian intervention, recognized an autonomous Bulgarian exarchate at Constantinople, which was immediately excommunicated by the Greek Orthodox Church.

In the Armenian *millet*, religious schisms reacted on national discords. The Monophysites (Gregorians) had retained their culture, but the Catholics had split into two opposing sects: nationalist Mechitarists—who hoped to achieve their independence by union with Rome—and antinationalist, Latinized Armenians.

Maneuvers by European Protestant and Catholic missionaries added to these conflicts and tore the communities apart: laymen against the

clergy, Slavs against Greeks, nationalists against notables. The *raya* Churches appealed to the Muslim authority for protection. Following a complaint in 1817 by Policarius, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, Mahmud II issued a *firman* to the governors of Damascus and Saida and to the *qadi* of Jerusalem, once again forbidding Catholic proselytism. The patriarch had complained that Greek Catholics were insulting and harassing the Orthodox. Confirming previous orders on the subject going back to 1732, it was specified that the sultan “prohibited such proceedings, forbade the Greek Orthodox from entering Catholic churches, and Catholic priests from entering Greek Orthodox houses and teaching their children, on pain of exile and confiscation of their property.”⁵

Although the sultan, true to the hallowed Islamic tradition, intervened to settle differences between his subjects with justice, nonetheless he acted harshly at the political level. A few years later, in 1821, he sent a firman to his vassal Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, concerning the revolt of the Greek *rayas*. It ordered him to comply with the *shari'a* which, on the advice of the religious authority, required that “the rebels be openly fought and put to the sword, that their property be plundered and their wives and children reduced to slavery.”⁶

The call to *jihad* (30 March 1821), provoked by the uprising in Moldavia and Morea, was answered by hordes flocking from Asia, led by dervishes whose fanaticism turned the people against the infidels. In two months the terror spread to Constantinople, Thrace, Asia Minor, and Macedonia. Archbishops and prelates were tortured, hanged, or murdered, while churches were demolished and Greeks massacred, their property pillaged and burned. Europeans hardly dared to walk in the streets. The Greek patriarchate excommunicated Greek nationalists; Greek or Rumanian notables or informers denounced secret nationalist organizations. Terror of reprisals created general suspicion; the rebels were betrayed and opposed by their clergy and coreligionists.

After the defeat of the Egyptian fleet of Muhammad Ali at Navarino on 20 October 1827 by British, French, and Russian naval squadrons supporting the Greeks, the Monophysite Armenians denounced the Catholic Armenians to the sultan, accusing them of seeking emancipation with the collusion of France and the pope. The sultan ordered that the Catholic Armenians of the Empire be forced to return to the authority of the Monophysite patriarch and those in Constantinople expelled. Intervention by France halted the persecution and brought about the recognition of the autonomy of the Catholic Armenian *millet* in 1831, under the authority of a patriarch who enjoyed the same prerogatives as his Monophysite colleague. Some ten years later, the schism in the Armenian *millet* worsened, with the autonomy of an Armenian Protes-

tant Church. Observing the violence of the inter-*raya* conflicts, Ubcini noted that:

The hostility of the *raya* populations towards Turkish domination is in no way comparable to their hatred of one another, and instead of uniting to make sure that the Christian element predominates over the Muslim element, Greeks, Armenians and Latins would rather prefer a hundred times to be condemned to eternal servitude and would not hesitate, if the need arose, to join with the Turks in order to prevent their rivals triumphing [. . .] Fortunately for the Porte, if the *rayas*, deep down, have little sympathy for Ottoman rule, they detest each other even more than they detest the Turks, and that is enough, I repeat, to secure these latter against the threat of a general uprising such as would put their existence in danger.⁷

In order to subdue Christian uprisings, the Porte embarked on the massive Islamization of the Balkans. In the period 1855–66 alone, a million Kurdish and Circassian Muslim refugees were settled there, pillaging and holding peasants to ransom. Every uprising provoked massacres, whose horror terrorized the populations.

It took the Christian peoples of the Balkans more than a century to extricate themselves, bled white, from dhimmitude. The change involved a complete internal revolution at the cultural and social levels, conducted simultaneously with the political and military struggle against Turkey. Lacking weapons or cohesion, disorganized and divided by age-old quarrels stirred up by their allies, these peoples had to defend themselves against their enemies and be wary of their protectors, who liberated them solely in order to swallow them all the more easily (Russia, Austria); or to impose arbitrary and artificial frontiers on them (Congress of Berlin, 1878); or by every means to keep them under Islamic authority (France and Britain).⁸

ARMENIA

Situated on the northern fringe of the Umayyad Arab Empire, Armenia escaped the fate of Palestinian Jewry and of Eastern Christendoms, which were overwhelmed and annihilated by the many invasions and civil wars in the *dar al-Islam* from the seventh to the tenth centuries. In this remote and often rebellious province, Arab-Islamic power was not able to maintain itself firmly. Alternately a vassal of Byzantium and of the caliphate, Armenia preserved its language, culture, and administrative autonomy despite devastation and havoc. When the Seljuk Turks ravaged Armenia in about 1050, the Christians emigrated to the Byzantine-controlled Taurus region, in southwestern Anatolia, where land had

already been given to Armenian princes. After the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert (1071), Turkish tribes drove the Armenians into Anatolia, where they populated several localities (Little Armenia). With the progressive Islamization of Asia Minor, Greeks and Armenians constituted the *dhimmi* populations of the various emirates into which Anatolia was divided.

In the late 1820s, the Russian government, which then ruled over the Armenian provinces of Persia, became interested in the fate of the Armenian *rayas*. It encouraged them to emigrate to their former homeland, now integrated into Russia, and facilitated the renaissance of the Etchmiazin monastery, the national seat of the Catholicos. The spiritual authority of this primate over all Armenians soon eclipsed that of the patriarch of Constantinople, subjected to the sultan. Russo-Armenian lands—enlarged by the 1877–78 war with its numerous Christian populations—became a center of nationalist activities. Encouraged by the nationalist agitation in the Balkans, the Ottoman Armenians drew closer to their compatriots in Russia, hoping, thereby, to throw off an oppressive yoke and recover their own independence. These pro-Russian sympathies aroused the animosity of the Muslim populations and its rulers, worried by the collusion of a considerable *raya* population in the heart of their empire with their most fearsome enemy.

Saved from Russian occupation by the European intervention of 1877–78, Turkey was forced to accept Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, which linked the evacuation of Russian troops from its territory to the implementation of administrative reforms in six Armenian *vilayets* in central Anatolia from the Cilician coast to Erzerum. These reforms were intended to abolish the discrimination and humiliation of the Christian *rayas*, imposing a juridical and administrative equality on both Muslims and the numerous Armenians living in those regions.

However, far from embarking on reforms, the sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876–1909) organized an armed militia composed of Kurds who harassed Armenian villagers. In addition, he directed the flow of Muslim refugees fleeing from the Turkish provinces—restored to Christian national sovereignty or conquered by Russia—toward the Armenian provinces, distributing land to encourage them to settle there.

At a political level, several factors specific to the Armenians acted to their disadvantage. The most important was their geographical implantation throughout regions which went right across central Anatolia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Whereas loss of the peripheral European provinces did not represent a mortal danger to Turkey, the emergence of an autonomous Armenia in the very heartland would have reduced it to a microstate, cut off from its Arab-Asiatic Muslim hinter-

بر ارمنی فرسید *bir armeni karidi ile, ou Armenien avec sa femme.*



An Armenian with his Wife (1720)

Costumes turcs

land in the east, and threatened in the north and west by a Russo-Greek “reconquista.”

In addition, the Armenians could not play on the rivalries of other “protector” states; their isolation condemned them exclusively to Russian protection. But no state would tolerate the collapse of the balance of power in Europe, nor a Russian annexation of Turkey through the intermediary of Armenians. And in the conjuncture that prevailed at the end of the century, even this single protector proved of specious assistance. Thus not only did the Armenians’ collusion with Turkey’s hereditary northern enemy arouse suspicion but, above all, Tsarist Russia—on the eve of its collapse—took only a minor interest in the Armenian question. If the sultan was concerned that Armenians were enlisting in the Russian army, the tsar, for his part, distrusted Armenian militancy in anarchist and revolutionary committees, including the Marxist-inclined *Hentshak*, founded in Geneva in 1887, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaksutiun*) created in Tiflis in 1890.

However, it is probable that the extermination of the Armenians—the first genocide of the twentieth century—could have been mitigated, if not avoided, had it not been for the sudden outbreak of World War I, whose extension, coupled with new military techniques monopolized all the Allies’ energies. Unlike the Greeks, Slavs, and Maronites, help failed the Armenians at a crucial moment in their history because the European armies were engaged in massacring one another and the Marxist-Leninist revolution paralyzed their protector country, Russia.

The Massacres

After the extermination of 100,000 to 200,000 Armenians at Trebizond, Sassun, and other towns in Mesopotamia (1894–96), and about 30,000 in the Adana region (1909), Russia obliged the Porte to accept the Accord of 26 January/8 February 1914. This agreement entrusted to two European inspector-generals the supervision over the government of the Armenian provinces and recognized Armenian as their official language. It abolished the restriction on the number of Armenian schools and the administrative and legal inequality between Christians and Muslims.

This European protectorate over a population spread over a vast territory in the heart of Turkey undermined the policy of Turkification and Islamization pursued by the Young Turk government. World War I seemed an opportunity to liquidate the Armenian problem, all the more so as Armenians from the Caucasus, enrolled in the Russian army, made no secret of their intentions to liberate Turkish Armenia, destined



Convoy of Armenians, escorted by Turkish guards, on the way to their place of execution. Harput, Turkey, 1915

Photo: Armenian Museum, Jerusalem

to enjoy—according to Tsar Nicholas II—a brilliant future. The Russian advance in the Caucasus at the beginning of the war and the maneuvering of Armenian revolutionaries gave the Young Turks an excuse to eradicate Armenian nationalism.

The genocide of the Armenians was a combination of massacres, deportations, and enslavement. In the central regions of Armenia, the male population over the age of twelve was wiped out en masse: shot, drowned, thrown over precipices, or subjected to other forms of torture and execution. The deportations consisted of transferring certain populations, particularly women and children, from Armenian villages to the desert of Dayr al-Zur, between Syria and Iraq.⁹

Convoys were pushed on foot over interminable routes through difficult country, where dearth of water, food, and shelter at night increased the suffering. All along the way, the cortèges of women and children were subjected to rape, robbery, and cruelties by brigands, plunderers, villagers, and by their exclusively Muslim escorts. In every town and village they passed through, the Armenians were massed in front of the town hall and displayed to the Muslims, who alone could choose slaves from among them. In some cases, women with their children were able to escape death or slavery by their conversion to Islam, ratified by an

immediate marriage to a Muslim. Those who survived the ordeals of the journey—the hunger, thirst, exhaustion, and rape—arrived at Dayr al-Zur. Informed of a convoy's arrival, Arab and Kurdish tribes and Muslim peasants lay in wait to inflict the final outrage. The corpses were abandoned in the desert.

The genocide of the Armenians was the natural outcome of a policy inherent in the politico-religious structure of dhimmitude. This process of physically eliminating a rebel nation had already been used against the rebel Slav and Greek Christians, rescued from collective extermination by European intervention, although sometimes reluctantly.

The genocide of the Armenians was a *jihad*. No *rayas* took part in it. Despite the disapproval of many Muslim Turks and Arabs and their refusal to collaborate in the crime, these massacres were perpetrated solely by Muslims and they alone profited from the booty: the victims' property, houses, and lands granted to the *muhajirun*, and the allocation to them of women and child slaves. The elimination of male children over the age of twelve was in accordance with the commandments of the *jihad* and conformed to the age fixed for payment of the *jizya*. The four stages of the liquidation—deportation, enslavement, forced conversion, and massacre—reproduced the historic conditions of the *jihad* carried out in the *dar al-harb* from the seventh century on. Chronicles from a variety of sources, by Muslim authors in particular, give detailed descriptions of the organized massacres or deportation of captives, whose sufferings in forced marches behind the armies paralleled the Armenian experience in the twentieth century.

This policy was not an isolated phenomenon. It was part of a defensive strategy to maintain Islamic jurisdiction over a territory which had been conquered by war and to eliminate *dhimmi* nationalism. The Armenian tragedy was therefore accompanied by the destruction of Jacobite and Nestorian Christians in the Euphrates valley north of Syria. In September 1915, at Jabal Musa (Antioch), French ships took on board 4,000 to 5,000 Armenians, *in extremis*, who had been encircled by the Turks and Arabs. However, the British and French authorities, fearing the hostility of the Muslim populations, refused permission for the Armenians to disembark in Egypt, Rhodes, Cyprus, Tunisia, and Morocco. In the end, the British High Commissioner of Egypt agreed to let them go ashore temporarily at Alexandria.

All these connected circumstances demonstrate that the genocide of the Armenians was a Muslim affair exclusively, both in its aim and in its execution, and that there was no participation at any level by a *raya* community. On the contrary, aside from Europeans, reports of the massacres which reached the Allies came from Ottoman Christians and Jews. On the international plane, Germany and Austria, Turkey's allies, were

not devoid of responsibility. In what way did the accounts by men who participated in these massacres influence Hitler? Some twenty years later, on 22 August 1939, just before the invasion of Poland, Hitler declared to the commandants in chief of his armies, meeting in Obersalzberg:

Thus for the time being I have sent to the east only my Death's Head units [*Totenkopfverbände*], with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women and children of the Polish race or language. Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians? (*Wer redet heute noch von der Vernichtung der Armenier?*)¹⁰

Alibis advanced to exonerate the populations which had collaborated in these cruelties resulted from the international context and the will of the colonial powers to follow a policy of appeasement toward their Muslim populations. These powers—Russia, Britain, France, and Italy—ruled over millions of Muslims in the Caucasus, Asia, the Indies, Egypt, the Levant, and the Maghreb; consequently, they tried to minimize this tragedy. Responsibility was attributed to scapegoats, Freemasonry, or others—a useful diversion to resume good relations with Turkey and other Muslim populations, particularly those of Syria and Iraq who were hostile to the French and British protectorates. In addition, no European state at that time was anxious to see the territory of the Soviet Union enlarged by the creation of a Sovietized Armenia.

The specific character of Armenian history as compared with Balkan nationalism is related to their particular geopolitical context. In effect, Armenian settlements covered the center of Turkey, whereas the European *raya* groups were concentrated on the peripheral provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan peoples could thus play on the rivalries of adjacent states, while the Armenians were dependent solely on Russia, whose ambition—the restoration of Byzantium from Constantinople to Mesopotamia under tsarist rule—aroused opposition from all of Europe. It is in this context, only sketched here, that the tragic destiny of the Armenian people was played out, in the fracas and mass slaughter of World War I.

OTTOMAN ARAB PROVINCES

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire of Asia and Africa included Arabia and extended from the frontiers of Persia to the southern coasts of the Mediterranean to Algeria. Islamization had been more prolonged and more complete in these regions, particularly demographically. Remoteness from those European countries that could serve as places of refuge or sources of armed aid—as

well as the absence of outside protectors for the Monophysites, Nestorians, and Jews—had contributed to create a quite different situation from that of the *dhimmis* in European Turkey. Thus during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the processes which would lead Anatolia and southeastern Europe into dhimmitude were evolving, the fate of the East had already been decided. The Jewish Palestinian homeland and the lands where Christianity had first flourished—Palestine, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa—were already totally Arabized and Islamized. The large Jewish and Christian communities of Mesopotamia had been destroyed and Armenia devastated. The equivalent of the considerable European Christian *raya* populations, which, although subjugated, still outnumbered the immigrant or converted Muslims in certain regions of the Balkans, no longer existed in the ancient lands of the East.

The numerical weakness of the Jewish and Christian *dhimmis* (*rayas*) in their respective homelands and their dispersion in the Arab *umma* consequently present a very different demographic picture from that of the Balkans. Only ruins survived of these ancient peoples, so physically mutilated that any hope of independence seemed impossible. To the evils of dhimmitude were added the discords, encouraged by the Porte and by the economical and geopolitical rivalries of the powers and their missionaries.

Hence, the rejection of dhimmitude was not expressed by a nationalist revolt, but rather within the framework of emancipation which Europe created and imposed on the *umma*, as well as on the *rayas*. For the reluctance of Jews and Christians in Arab regions to seek emancipation was a symptom, not of cowardice, but rather of a deep-rooted terror of Muslim reprisals inspired by a millennium of bloodstained experience endured in the Arab-Islamic environment.¹¹

In this context of zealous fanaticism, the semi-autonomous Turkish *pashalik* (province) of Egypt was the exception. Emancipation, which preceded the 1856 reforms, took place unhindered. Relying on France to free it from Turkish suzerainty, Egypt under Muhammad Ali embarked willy-nilly on the path of modernization and secularism. This process continued under the British protectorate (1882) and until the Nasserian revolution (1952), which sealed the victory of pan-Arabism. Under the dynasty founded by Muhammad Ali, the Copts—a peaceful and industrious community—pursued historical, archaeological, and philological studies. This cultural revival, accompanied by economic and political progress, was integrated into the whole policy of Westernization under colonial patronage. In fact, the emancipation of the Copts, Syriacs, and Arabic-speaking Melchites took place within the framework of religious emancipation, devoid of the national features which had characterized the Balkan uprisings.

Despite this dissimilarity, the emancipation of the Christians provoked—with the Porte's collusion—bloody destructions in Syria and Lebanon where, unlike Egypt, the Turkish governors could not control the situation. The same rivalries between European states were played out for the spoils of the Ottoman Empire in Syria and Lebanon, through the intermediary of *dhimmis*. Two *dhimmi* political movements—one Christian, the other Jewish—emerged and clashed, while following totally different paths.

Christian Emancipation: Arabism

Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt (1798–99) laid the early foundations of a French Arab policy which was continued by Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim (1805–48). It consisted of establishing French patronage over Egypt and Syria, combined into a single province, cut off from the Ottoman Empire on the basis of a distinction between Turks and Arabs. From 1842, France took advantage of the Maronites' semiautonomy to play a cultural and political role in Lebanon. After his journey to Algeria in 1860, Napoleon III—whose colonial empire now encompassed millions of Muslims—defined his Arab policy by declaring himself emperor of the Arabs as well as of the French.¹² This Arab policy was accompanied by Turcophobe propaganda which contrasted the magnanimity of the Arab caliphs and early Islam with the obscurantist fanaticism of the Turks, blamed for all the ills of the Empire.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, Catholic missionary establishments (Jesuits, Lazarists) and Presbyterians (American) in Syria and Lebanon tried to work out a cultural basis for a political scheme integrated into a literary and linguistic framework. Their pupils, mainly Christian *rayas*, became active militants in this task. The idea of "Arabism" as a common cultural heritage capable of uniting Christian Churches divided by religious schisms developed among the Maronites, traditionally protected by France, and through the Syrian Melchites, anxious to free their clergy from Greek tutelage. Thus took shape an Arabophone zone, factor of Christian unity, and hostile to the policy of Ottomanism supported by Britain.

The massacres of Christians in 1850–60 (Lebanon and Syria) prompted France and later Britain—particularly during World War I—to politicize the cultural concept of Arabism, which became the new battleground for inter-European and Russian rivalries in the Levant. Arab culture formed the ideological basis of the "Arab nation," a European-inspired and secular concept intended to replace the segregationist religious notion of the *umma*. Propounding a secular Arab solidarity which implied political equality and the separation of religion

from the state, this nationalism eliminated the religious element, the main obstacle to the integration and assimilation of Arabic-speaking Christians.

Wishing to play a political role and free themselves from the marginal life of the *millet*, the Syro-Lebanese Christians militated actively for Arab nationalism. Christian elites—trained in European academic disciplines and straddling two civilizations—had always acted as intermediaries between Christendom and Islam. Henceforth, they felt invested with a vanguard mission to regenerate the *umma* by leading it toward modernity. Yet the proliferation of foreign missions (French, American, German, and Italian), absorbed in the imbroglio of clerical hostilities and aggravated by competing European ambitions, did not fail to revive local Christian dissensions. Antagonism between France and Russia set the Maronites and Melchites Uniates, protected by France, against the Syrian Orthodox, manipulated by Russia. After the 1914–18 war, the schisms that were deeply rooted in the traditional discords of the local Churches divided Arab Christian nationalists into fighters for Lebanese independence (Bulus Nujaym, Khazin family) and supporters of a Greater Syria (Butrus al-Bustani, Khalil al-Khuri, Qustantin Zurayq, Jurji Zaydan).

The first group wished to secure, by a guarantee from the Powers, the autonomy of a Lebanon in which Christians would be in the majority. Aware of the realities of history and deeply nationalistic, these Lebanese Christians mistrusted pan-Islamism which identified Islam with Arabism.¹³

The partisans of a secular, Arab Greater Syria with a Muslim majority were recruited from among French-educated Christian Syrians (Samnah, Azury). But they came mainly from among the Orthodox faith, close to Russia, and from Protestants educated in American missions and opposed to the predominance of Maronites in Lebanon.¹⁴

The Christian proponents of a secular Arab nationalism were inspired by the European concepts that had permitted the emancipation of the Jews in the West.¹⁵ But they failed to recognize the deep-seated differences between the *dar al-Islam* and the continent of Europe, where anti-clericalism and the concepts of liberty and equality emerged from a cultural and political evolution rooted in specific realities. The factors at work in the emancipation of the Jews in the West—particularly the separation of religious and temporal power, the secularization of the state, and the social upheavals resulting from changes in customs and techniques—were nonexistent in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the legal condition of the Christians in the *dar al-Islam* was fundamentally different from that of the Jews in Christendom, at a political, religious, and historical level. An added ambiguity came from the identification of Arabism with Islam, actually fixed in the dogma and symbolized by

the expulsion of Jews and Christians of Arab stock from the Hijaz. The concept of Arabism itself, which historically embodied Islam, was incompatible with secularism. The Arab could only be a Muslim.

From the nineteenth century, the Syro-Lebanese Arab option determined their political future. This movement shows analogies but also dissimilarities with the contemporary Balkan nationalist trends. Like them, it was split by European imperialist interferences. Its rival factions remained dependent on the protecting powers who maneuvered them according to their own interests via Levantine notables. These notables, sacrificing the collective interest to their personal ambitions, promoted a shortsighted policy which was financially profitable but disastrous in the long term.

However, Christian Arab nationalism differed in essence from Balkan nationalism. The Balkan peoples opposed Turkish rule on grounds of the legitimacy of a *specific linguistic, cultural, and historical national character*, rooted in a geographic framework. The Arabophone Christians chose a reverse procedure. Far from recovering and defining their true identity, they chose to assimilate with the culture of their conquerors.

This political choice had several consequences. In the first place, Arabization implied abandoning the Syriac culture and language and repudiating twelve centuries of *dhimmi* history. Obviously, Christians could not claim kinship with the greatness of Arab civilization and still remain loyal to a past history of oppression which testified to the contrary. The glorification of the Arab-Islamic conquests and the civilization of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods led them to conceal the ideology and processes that had extinguish Eastern Christianity.

The literary and cultural movement of Christian Arab nationalism idealized the wisdom and tolerance of early Islam, the traditional harmony between Christians and Muslims—both allegedly belonging to the same Arab origin—and entangled itself in anti-Westernism at the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, far from purifying and modernizing their own Syriac language and recovering their Christian history, the Christians of Syria and Lebanon overshadowed it in order to adopt, wholeheartedly, the culture of their conquerors. While the Balkan peoples chose independence, the Arabophile Christians, remnants of extinct nations, opted for assimilation, which would eventually have succeeded were it not for the political and religious characteristics of Islam, which created quite different conditions from those existing in Europe.

Propounding secularism, the Arabophile Christians rejected the religious solidarity of the *millet*, which had maintained national cohesion around the Church. Arabophilia, a factor in religious emancipation, engendered a process of ideological alienation and destroyed the historical cohesion forged by more than a millennium of Eastern Christianity's

dhimmitude. Contrary to the situation in the Balkans where the Churches were hotbeds of nationalism, the national Churches of the Levant were disowned and denigrated in order to allow the values and culture which they had fought to be assimilated by way of secular Arab nationalism. Thus, the renunciation of *dhimmi* history and religious disinterestedness—inherent in secular Arab nationalism—predisposed Arab Christians to communism or Islamization, or sometimes both, depending on political expediency.

In so far as this orientation combined Islamic and Christian Judeophobia, it attracted supporters from the Eastern clergy. Via anti-Zionism, they became the most intransigent advocates of Arabism at the beginning of the twentieth century. Once again, the *umma* took advantage of the divisions within the *dhimmi* peoples.

During World War I, Britain discarded the Ottoman corpse and most opportunely filled the resulting political void by promoting the cause of Arab nationalism, and of Faysal, son of the Sharif of Mecca. Henceforth, Arabism represented a program of modernization and secularism rooted in the hallowed tradition of Arab tolerance which only an Arab prince, descended from the Prophet, could impose in the Orient.¹⁶

France, on the other hand, was concerned with saving its colonies and expanding its zone of influence, which would encompass Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Christian Arab nationalists were the most enthusiastic and active proponents of this vast European political vision for the restoration of a seventh-century *umma* and the renaissance of a Umayyad and Abbasid “Golden Age.” Serving French, British, and Russian aims, Christian Arab nationalism—formulated and refined in Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox missions in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine—developed a strong anti-Zionist and antisemitic movement.

Some historians have contrasted the political militancy of the Christian minorities with the timid apathy of the Oriental Jewish communities. Many reasons account for this dissimilarity, in particular the Christian *dhimmis'* role as middlemen in the channels of economic, political, and cultural exchanges between the *dar al-harb* and the *dar al-Islam*. Besides, the secular Arab nationalism of the Christian militants developed under the protection of foreign missionary establishments which enjoyed the support and protection of powerful Christian states, a situation which could hardly apply to the Jews. In addition, Christian Arabophilia implied the obliteration of a specifically Christian collective identity prior to Islam; but, for Oriental Judaism, the claim of an Arab origin was inconceivable, since the civilization and political institutions of Israel had developed in the course of the two millennia that predated the Arabs' appearance in history and had radiated far beyond its ancient homeland. The Jews of Islamic lands chose to abstain from the self-repudiation

implicit in an identification with Arabism—the only political route open to non-Muslims—while still adapting the realization of Zionist aspirations to their environmental conditions.

Jewish Dhimmi Nationalism: Zionism

At first glance, it might seem aberrant to classify the Zionist movement as a *dhimmi* nationalist movement, since the modern political formulation of Zionism developed within European Jewry. Nevertheless, it is important to note that all *dhimmi* nationalist movements were born in Europe and waged their struggles from outside the *dar al-Islam* or in semi-independent provinces. It should be noted also that dhimmitude is a notion attached to a territory conquered by *jihad*. Every non-Muslim people falls into dhimmitude if it continues to live in its homeland, subjected to Islamic law, which itself generates dhimmitude. Zionism becomes a *dhimmi* nationalism if its aim is to free Palestine from the *jihad* rules in order to restore the independence of an *indigenous, but non-Muslim* people.

The restoration of the Jewish people to their land, predicted by the prophets—basic to Christian values—had nourished, from the sixteenth century, a fervent Christian Zionism, parallel to Jewish messianism, particularly in countries of the Reformation. This trend strengthened nineteenth-century movements for the liberation of the *dhimmi* peoples.¹⁷

Like Balkan nationalisms, Zionism was first expressed by a cultural revival. Linguists—Eliezer Ben Yehuda in particular—and poets like Chaim Nachman Bialik resuscitated and modernized Hebrew. The specific problems linked to the dispersion of the Jewish people were redefined in political terms by thinkers and politicians such as Judah Alkalai (1798–1878), Moses Hess (1812–75), Leon Gordon (1831–92), Leo Pinsker (1821–91), Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), and Ahad Ha'am (1856–1927). Political Zionism, impregnated with nineteenth-century socialist and secular theories, became a revolutionary ferment of liberation in certain communities of Eastern Europe attached to Talmudic literalism and subject to a despotic rabbinate. As in the case of the European *millet*, the retrieval of the national dimensions of a community proceeded with the rejection of a religious tyranny within the dispersed nation, which had replaced the absence of the centralizing power of a sovereign state. In certain *shtetl* communities of Eastern Europe controlled by an omnipotent rabbinate, secular Zionism met virulent opposition from the religious authorities, whose hold over the congregations was challenged.

In the Levant and North Africa, however, the absence of fanatical rigidity in the Jewish communities avoided the breach between religion

and political Zionism. It fitted naturally into the people's historico-religious aspirations. The problems came from the Islamic environment, contrary to the situation in Europe, where non-Jewish opinion varied between indifference and encouragement, while anti-Zionism appeared within Jewish circles themselves: among the orthodox, the assimilationists, the socialist Bundists, and the Communists.

If Zionism was perceived as an exclusively European movement, it was because the specificity of the *dhimmi* condition, with its elements of insecurity and deadly vulnerability, was obscured. In the late nineteenth century the Ottoman sultan had already declared that he would not allow Palestine to become "a second Armenia." Quite obviously, the slightest manifestation of Jewish nationalism in the small, isolated, and scattered communities of his immense empire would have been crushed with as great a ferocity as occurred against Armenian nationalism, however well it had been organized and armed by neighboring Russia. The massacres of Christian nationalists in the Balkans and the first massacres of the Armenians, in the 1890s, had shown the Jews of the *dar al-Islam*, devoid of any protection, the bloody price of liberty.¹⁸ Fettered by this reality, they refrained from militating openly for Zionism, since even in the transition period of European colonization their very existence was at stake. Moreover, later events proved them right, when most of the independent Arab countries decreed that Zionism was a political crime punishable by death.

However, other forms of clandestine or disguised participation existed even if some incentives specific to Zionism in the West were lacking in the East, such as antisemitic reactions against assimilation, illustrated by the Dreyfus affair at the end of the nineteenth century. But evidently a "Dreyfus Affair" could not have occurred in the East, where no Jew or Christian could have held a high rank in a Muslim army staff headquarters. *A fortiori*, no Muslim country would have been split, as was France, by the unjust condemnation of a Muslim, let alone of a Jew or a Christian. The study of Zionism within the *dar al-Islam* would gain if it ceased referring solely to foreign Western patterns and, instead, examined the historical and political elements in the *umma-dhimmi* relationship with its modalities of evolution. Consequently, the liberation of a *dhimmi* land subject to the *jihād* rules of conquest could only be initiated from outside the *dar al-Islam*—as had happened in other cases, particularly for the Armenians—and this role was indeed the role of Ashkenazi Jewry in respect of Palestine.

According to Constantin-François Volney, the population of Palestine had declined to about 300,000 people at the end of the eighteenth century,¹⁹ increasing in the following century with the arrival of Muslims

fleeing Europe. In 1878, an Ottoman law granted lands in Palestine to Muslim colonists, with a twelve-year exemption from taxes and military service. Thus lands in the Carmel region, Galilee, and the plain of Sharon and Cesarea were distributed to Muslim Slavs from Bosnia and Herzegovina; Georgians were settled around Quneitra on the Golan Heights and Moroccans in Lower Galilee. In Transjordan and Galilee, Turkmenians, Circassians, and Cherkes—driven out by the Russian conquest of the Crimea, Caucasus, and Turkestan—were added to the tribes who had preceded them in the eighteenth century and had settled at Abu Ghosh, near Jerusalem. About eighteen thousand Egyptians fellahs immigrated to Jaffa, Gaza, and Jericho in the 1830s. After the French occupation in 1830, thousands of Algerians went into exile with the Emir Abd al-Qadir, settling in Syria and on the Golan Heights in Galilee and Jerusalem.

In Palestine itself, the Christian populations—indigenous or new immigrants from the Levant and Greece—enjoyed European or Russian protection which the Palestinian Jews lacked. After the Crimean War, considerable domains were granted to France and Austria for Catholics, to Britain for Protestants, to Germany for Lutherans, and to Russia for the Orthodox and Armenians.

In 1887, the prohibition on immigration, on settling, on the purchase of land in Palestine—and residence in Jerusalem—applied only to Jews, foreigners, and *rayas*, but not to Christians or Muslims. The sultan's efforts to halt the return of the Jews to Palestine were, nonetheless, partly ineffective. Indeed, the law banning only European Jews, and not Christians, from visiting and living in Palestine or from buying land constituted a religious discrimination not included in the *Capitulations* agreed between the Porte and European states. By virtue of these treaties, based on reciprocity, only European Jews could undertake this first and essential phase of the Zionist struggle, whereas the Jews of Islamic lands—either Ottoman subjects or others—who were deprived of this advantage, were turned back.²⁰ Thanks to European philanthropists and supporters, the Palestinian Jewish community was able to build dispensaries and hospitals and even to acquire lands.

In fact, the marginalization of the *rayas*, in conjunction with the specific circumstances of European Jewry, gave to this first phase of Zionist immigration to Palestine its mainly European origin. These facts are mentioned only in order to stress the general ignorance regarding the context of dhimmitude.

The dispersion of the Jewish people formed the major obstacle to the realization of its national independence. In contrast to the Levantine Christians—remnants of mutually hostile peoples—the Jews, despite their fragmentation, presented a relative homogeneity and benefited



Mosaic from the Jericho Synagogue (7th century). Judean desert
 Inscription in situ: *Peace on Israel*. Abandoned ca. 8th century

from a substantial demographic strength in the early twentieth century. However, unlike the Christians of the Balkans who remained numerous in their homelands, Palestinian Jewry—which had survived more than a millennium of dhimmitude—represented a debilitated community, all the more humble and vulnerable in that it attracted mainly pious, elderly Jews coming to live their last years in the Holy Land.²¹

However, in the modern period the conjuncture which had formerly been favorable to Arab domination changed. Henceforth, persecution of non-Muslims, reported by the consuls in Constantinople and condemned in the European capitals, provoked sanctions. In addition, the development of the press and of means of communication and locomotion gave Zionism the dynamic of a coherent national liberation movement that affected the Diaspora worldwide, while modern technology rectified numerical deficiencies. Small regional emigrations, formerly diminished by persecutions, expulsions, and assassinations were transformed into a mass movement which, this time, was destined to culminate in the restoration of a Jewish state.

The return of the Jews to their homeland (Ingathering of the Exiles) constituted the most tragic and the most heroic episode in that struggle. On the external front, in Hitler's Europe, the Jews had to face the Nazi policy of extermination applied throughout occupied Europe. They had

to run the British blockade, which willy-nilly combined British interests, Nazi aims, and Arab policy. In Palestine itself, they fought against Arab-Palestinian opposition and terrorism, while creating the institutional structures of an independent state.

In Arab anti-Zionism, the Muslim current should be distinguished from the Christian one, as their ideology and their aims are fundamentally different. Muslim opposition to Zionism is based on the values of *jihad* and the desire to establish, in Israel, Islamic law which generates dhimmitude for the indigenous non-Muslims. The *umma* denies the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty with the same fury as it had formerly tried to crush Christian nationalisms. Israel constitutes the *dar al-harb*, as do all non-Muslim lands destined for conquest. Moreover, Muslim anti-Zionism is fundamentally anti-Christian, since all Jews and Christians—the Peoples of the Book—must necessarily be governed by *the same divinely inspired rules*.

The more complex anti-Zionism of the Arabophone Christians originated partly from the traditional, theological Judeophobia which, particularly in Palestine, was manifested in the persecution and humiliation of Jews. Eastern Christians, especially indigenous Palestinians or recent immigrants (Syro-Lebanese and Greek), could not tolerate the reestablishment of a Jewish state, freed from dhimmitude, whereas they themselves stagnated within it. These subjective reasons were supplemented by the maneuvering of the protecting states—France and Russia being fiercely hostile to Zionism. On the level of political ideology, Zionism ran counter to the theses of the Christian Arab nationalists, which dissolved the identity and spirit of their peoples in the myth of a secular Arab nation, a myth formulated in European chancelleries in order to serve their colonial and post-colonial policies. Nevertheless, a Maronite Christian current did emerge in Lebanon which was in favor of Zionism, together with the creation of a Christian state as a land of refuge for all those persecuted within the *umma*. This movement, which preferred the realities of history to woolly ideologies, was muzzled by French diplomacy, actively pursuing a pro-Islamic policy in its colonies.

However, the real seedbed of Christian anti-Zionism, from whence it drew its virulence, its sap, and its hue remains the poisoned soil of dhimmitude. Arabophone Christians represented a vulnerable minority, maneuvered by British, French, or Russian interests and closely watched over as hostages by the *umma*. Henceforth, they utilized anti-Zionism, the cement of a unifying Islamic-Christian hatred, as a means—perhaps their only one—of assimilating into the *umma*.

A few salient points emerge from this active phase in the fight against dhimmitude. Except for Rumania, privileged by its status as a peripheral

tributary province, the liberation of the *raya* peoples appears as a vast popular movement perpetuated from one generation to the next, for more than a century, and achieved by the peoples themselves, despite and against their notables and high clergy—the agents and regulators of the system that oppressed them.

Historical and geographical factors determined each people's mold that shaped its multifaceted struggle. The situation differed according to the physical relief of the country: easily crossed open valleys such as Palestine or Bulgaria; or inaccessible mountainous regions that provided refuge, like Lebanon or Montenegro.

The march to freedom comprised several pluridimensional phases and developed in stages. Each group embarked on internal reforms which accompanied, supported, and conditioned the success or failure of the external struggle. These internal changes in the domain of culture (school system), the administration (suppression of nepotism and corruption, struggle against the ruling oligarchy), and the institutions (secularization, conflicts between reform and conservative elements) prepared the way for the transformation of the *millets* into nations bound by a civic consciousness, now able to replace religious solidarity and clientelism. This slow, difficult, internal reorganization destroyed the endogenous structures of subjection secreted by the group itself. It opened the way—in the lands of dhimmitude, within the *dar al-Islam*—for the emergence of independent states, which renewed links, after centuries of servitude and forced exile, with the legacy of the ancient indigenous peoples, reviving their specific languages and institutions.

During this period, external dangers from without aggravated sectarian struggles and betrayals. Threatened with destruction by the *umma*, the *raya* peoples also had to beware of obstacles and traps laid by their protectors and find their own way to freedom. Sometimes France and Britain collaborated to prolong Ottoman domination, to their detriment; sometimes these powers fomented internecine conflicts in order to weaken and manipulate them. At times, *raya* peoples were devoured by Russia and Austria; at others, they were abandoned when the powers were not dismembering them so as to control them more easily (Treaty of Berlin, 1878; Treaty of Bucarest, 1913). The alliance of *dhimmi* peoples with Western states was based on a convergence of interests. One side depended on Europe to liberate it from the *umma* while the other supported their struggle only in order to expand its own zone of influence. The *dhimmi* peoples were scarcely more than pawns, cynically manipulated or abandoned on the international chessboard on which the states were playing out their cruel games.

The destabilization of the *millets* by the pressures of the competing protecting powers was increased by the inter-European wars. The Porte

responded to the uprisings of *raya* peoples by ordering their annihilation. Greeks, Bulgarians, and Slavs were only saved by the intervention of European armies, dispatched under pressure from public opinion or from political self-interest. The Armenians, however, abandoned by their Russian protectors, provided a twentieth-century example of the millennial fate of *dhimmi* rebels. It was the first genocide of the century, perpetrated with the knowledge of the German army, which collaborated with the Turks on all battle fronts. Thirty years later, witnesses of these massacres planned the extermination of the Jews.

Britain protected the Jews and Zionism, but did so in order to supplant France or Russia in Palestine. After having received the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine in 1922, it wasted no time in partitioning it in order to offer three-quarters of the land to Abdallah, a son of the deposed Sharif of Mecca. The strict restrictions placed on the emigration of Jews to Palestine by the 1939 *White Paper*—"the violation of the pledge"—²² condemned many of them to death in Europe. Britain, after having protected and utilized Zionism for its own imperial ends—now at the zenith of its prestige and power—intended to destroy it, thus sacrificing the Jews to its Arab interests.²³

In 1948, Israel seemed threatened with the Armenian fate when the armies of several Arab states attempted to destroy it under the vindictive eyes of Britain, humiliated at having been booted out of Palestine by its "protégés."²⁴ A century after the wars of the Turks against the Greeks, Bulgarians, Slavs, and Armenians, Arab reprisals fell on the defenseless Jewish communities of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and North Africa. But unlike the Turks who, after their harsh defeats, were able to accept the independence of their former tributary nations, Arab peoples—whose ancestors created the *jihād* and the *dhimma*—are still challenging the legitimacy of the State of Israel.²⁵

The struggle against dhimmitude was waged by unarmed peoples, their bodies broken by oppression, their spirit humiliated and dimmed by centuries of degradation. Notwithstanding fratricidal betrayals as well as being duped by their allies who played on their weaknesses and challenged by implacable enemies, they still managed to raise themselves from slavery to freedom.

8

Some Aspects of the Past's Revival in Modern Times

THE LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL ERA

In this prolific nineteenth century, the inquisitive West penetrated the ancient Orient like an enthusiastic and fecundating tidal wave. Explorers and geographers drew the map of mysterious countries; archaeologists and historians deciphered the traces of millennia, while physicians laid down the foundations of modern medicine. Seething social revolutions accompanied technological progress whose precision tools revealed the expanse of the universe. Contracted by the railroad, the earth offered from one end to the other the multifarious diversity of its cultures, the relativism of values, and the universal sameness of humanity.

Armed with revolutionary concepts, politicians and jurists created new legislatures establishing the equality of man, freedom of peoples, secularity of laws, and the inalienability of natural and humanitarian rights. European civilization and its armies overwhelmed the *dar al-Islam* like an irresistible hurricane. Some hundred years later, bled white by two world wars and traumatized by its hecatombs, Europe—vilified and expelled—retired to its own shores in humiliation and disgrace. Thus ended the colonial adventure! Another began: the conquest of space . . . Lavish with its genius, Europe abandoned to the deserts of the Orient the towns it had built with such ease, while its ideologies of liberty crumbled into mirages of sand and shrivelled caricatures.

From the second half of the nineteenth century, the ancient *dhimmi* communities, privileged by a European education and freed from the shackles of oppression, actively participated in the modernization and industrialization of their own countries. The emergence of a bourgeoisie and a multifaith civil service abolished the age-old religious isolation imposed by the *dhimma*. Merchants, industrialists, and officials, employed in the colonial administrative machine, served as agents and cogs

in the wheels of modernization and catapulted the *dar al-Islam* from the Middle Ages into the twentieth century.

The European colonial regime hastened the evolution that transformed the *dhimmi* communities from within. The emergence of a petite bourgeoisie, educated in European schools, crystallized class tensions, which quickened the democratization of the community's structures and the disintegration of the notables' power. This evolution—copied from the European model, albeit ineluctable—had its own drawbacks. In effect, the impact of Western civilization—all the more attractive to the *dhimmi* since it liberated him—further undermined the historical identity of the group. This process of acculturation grafted itself onto the alienation caused by a thousand years of oppression, so deeply internalized and socially integrated that it escaped any critical reflection. The cultural hybridity strengthened the amnesia of communities, summarily described as “the minorities.”

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the social and economic ascension of the Christians and Jews in the East and the Maghreb was incorporated into the dynamic of the “Westernization” of Islam conceived by the colonial regimes. A movement to reinterpret the religious and political dogmas of Islam thus began in order to remove from them the inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. This ideological change slowly emerged from state structures which replaced the political principles of the *shari'a* and substituted a national consensus for that of the *umma*. Generations of Muslim intellectuals and politicians were educated within this mold by the colonial schools and European universities.

The intellectual and industrial revolution, required by modernization and linked to European colonization, transformed and overturned the traditional Arab-Muslim societies so profoundly that the patterns of dhimmitude were buried in oblivion. This amnesia strengthened the wish of the Christian pan-Arab trend to spare Muslim feelings. Keen to utilize “Arabism” as a tool of equality, Christian Arab nationalists set to work to blur the history of dhimmitude. France and Britain, ruling over more than a hundred million colonized Muslim peoples, shared in this policy of appeasement and entente.

This conciliatory spirit increased between Europe and the new independent Arab states, which henceforth represented important economic and geostrategic stakes. The old Christian religious and educational institutions had to refrain from criticizing Islamic history in order to survive. Historians, professionally or economically connected to the Arab-Muslim world, published historical interpretations relating to the *dhimmis*, which were either tendentious or combined facts with apologetics and fantasy. After World War II, the predominance of a left-wing

intelligentsia and the emergence of Arab regimes which were "socialist" or allied to Moscow consolidated an Arabophile revolutionary internationalism that reached its apogee from 1973 on, thanks to the economic oil boom.

Previously the objects of European and Russian concern, the *dhimmi* communities were now linked to a comprehensive reprobation of the West, described as imperialist, colonialist, clerical, and reactionary. Those communities were henceforth branded as agents of imperialism, accused of the crimes of nationalism, confessionalism, isolationism, and labelled with a pejorative adjective, "*compradore*."

The opprobrium attached to Europe's imperialism discredited its protégés and reversed the roles in the Near East's history. *Dhimmi* groups in Arab and Islamic lands found themselves assigned with a past of "religious minorities," having enjoyed a general and unvarying hospitality and tolerance more appropriate to mythology. In addition, being Jews or Christians, these groups—whose original cultures were Aramaic (Hebrew, Syriac), Copt, Armenian, and Greek—were described as *foreigners* in relation to the Arab-Muslim environment! The concealment of the forces which molded Near Eastern history made it possible to designate the State of Israel as a colonial fact and the interpretation of Lebanese Christian resistance as a reactionary form of clerical fanaticism. Thus, the political situation (i.e., the interests of Western states, the assimilationist Christian "Arabs," and the current of revolutionary internationalism) combined definitively to erase dhimmitude from history.

At the political level, the Arab states regained the regional particularisms of the *umma* in the form of nationalisms (Egypt, Syria, Iraq). These new states were set up within the frontiers defined by colonization, which often restored the ancient pre-Arab geographical entities.

However, European colonization of the old Ottoman Arab provinces and the Maghreb covered 50 to 130 years, depending on the region concerned. This period saw a series of accelerated changes resulting from the legal and administrative reforms of the *tanzimat*—emancipation of the *dhimmis*, independence of *raya* peoples, abolition of slavery, among other transformations. Political evolution was accompanied by technological changes, such as the creation of an important infrastructure of civil engineering and the industrialization of the colonies.¹ New needs demanded the construction of roads and towns and the expansion of school and university education. This accumulation of multifarious upheavals, with their political, economic, cultural, and ideological repercussions, took place between 1830 and 1960 (i.e., in a minimal period compared with the millennial history of the Islamic Orient). It is conse-

Arabic script text at the top of the page, likely a preface or introductory text.



Arabic script text at the bottom of the page, likely a continuation of the text or a concluding prayer.

Wedding at Cana (1179-1180)

quently legitimate to question the solidity and durability of foundations established in such a short period of time.

While withdrawing from the *dar al-Islam*, Europe prided itself on having left behind a political card: secular Arabism and a modern institutional infrastructure, based on the interdependence of technology and Western values, which would be perpetuated in the universities it had set up. But the current resurgence of traditional Islam—now called fundamentalism, Islamism, integrism, or radicalism—reflects the exact opposite and a rejection of foreign concepts which were only assimilated by a limited Westernized elite, today in the process of withering away. Henceforth, it is these same universities, established by the West in order to perpetuate its values, that train the leaders of an Islamic anti-Western militancy. And it is Western military and scientific technology that is arming the modern *ghazis* or *feddayins*, as Western telecommunications synchronize their activities and propaganda over the whole of the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*.

Europe had planted, *inter alia*, the concepts of emancipation, equal rights, and secularism in the *umma*, and while withdrawing it took back all of its paraphernalia.

THE ROOTS OF MODERN ISLAMISM

This chapter does not claim to give even a summary of the modern period, the fluidity and complexity of which baffle the most experienced Arabists, whose Arabic fails them. Here, it will be enough to outline the present-day extensions of past ideologies. Of course, they are hardly representative of the diversity of the Islamic world; however, their growing importance today is helping to structure Islamism into a powerful political current sweeping over Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Actually, the current rise of Islamism hardly represents a revolutionary ideological innovation, since Islamism is embedded in a permanent historical trend—the same trend which, over the centuries, has nourished and sustained the *jihad*, the conquest of new lands, and the dhimmitude of its indigenous inhabitants. Contained by European military superiority and sporadically controlled from the nineteenth century by the regenerative forces of modernization, Islamic radicalism crystallized under the impact of political and social tensions which drew the people toward religious leaders who radiated charisma and an aura of sanctity.

A distinction should be drawn between the religious character of the Islamist movement and its political ends. The first belongs to the realm of piety, to man's metaphysical dimension, and does not come within our brief which is limited to the political aspect.

In the Egypt of the 1930s and in pre-Khomeinist Iran, Islamism served as a valve to channel into religion the popular discontent and the rebellion of white-collar workers, any other form of political opposition being forbidden. Modern Islamism—with its multiple and contradictory causes—reflects the violent tensions and disarray in eminently religious societies shattered by the West's intrusion. Its aim is the restoration of the Koran and the *shari'a* as the sole authority for jurisdiction and government in Muslim countries.²

However, the return to a strict orthodoxy first necessitates a purification of Islamic society from foreign legislation—that is, from all legislation borrowed from the *dar al-harb*. In fact, the return of land to the *dhimmi* peoples and the humiliation caused by military setbacks are attributed to these pernicious influences, responsible for the divine chastisements, punishing the community of Allah, presently governed by heretical rulers. Therefore, Islamism expresses primarily a rejection of the transformations introduced by exchanges with the civilizations of the *dar al-harb* and refuses *dhimmi* sovereignties. This attitude is justified by the perception of the *dar al-harb* through demeaning stereotypes which neutralize its attractiveness—for example, materialism, colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, Great Satan, enemy of humanity.

In Iran, the mullahs fomented revolution against the pro-Western Shah by stirring up fanaticism in order to seize power. The misery and ignorance of the people were the leaven of an uprising which was controlled and guided by the clergy. The Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79) that had attempted to modernize Iran since the 1920s was swept away by the Islamist tide. In Egypt, President Sadat endeavored to win over the Islamist movement in order to control it from within and suppress it. However, political overtures to the *dar al-harb*—the West and Israel—inspired by a modernist vision of a society freed from the shackles of religion made him, like the Pahlavis and the Kemalist Turks, Islam's enemy.

Islamism, however, does not only represent rejection, for it bears within itself the people's sufferings and hopes. Thus it is proclaimed as the means to the redemption of the *umma*, corrupted by the West. The Muslim peoples, it teaches, will regain their lost supremacy in our time if they adopt the institutions which were defined in the seventh century and which secured their power then. This power was founded on *jihad*, on the annexation of land, the spoils of victories, the pillage of conquered civilizations, and the exploitation of an enormous source of slaves and manpower from Africa, Asia, and Europe. Thus the rejection of the West, coupled with nostalgia for power based on war and conquests, help to make Islamism the vehicle and mainstay of *jihad*.

The political program of the Islamist trend is well known. It advocates

a return to the *shari'a* in all Muslim states. This first step would enable the political and military command to be unified and bring back the *ghazi* mentality. It would then be possible to take the subsequent, ultimate step: world conquest and the universal supremacy of Islamic law, the destruction of non-Muslim civilizations, and the application of the *dhimma* to the populations of the *dar al-harb*, conquered and integrated into the *dar al-Islam*. The Islamist trend justifies its ideology by the past, when the periods of Islam's glory were actually linked to the two great waves of Arab and Turkish conquest. It was neither in Arabia, exclusively peopled by Arabs, nor in Mecca or Medina that Islamic civilization glowed in the full blaze of its glory. Its radiance came from the lands of dhimmitude, in periods when the *dhimmis* still formed majorities subject to the conquering Muslim minorities. Under the Arabs, it reached its apogee in the Christian East and in Spain. Similarly, it was not in their central Asian homeland that the Seljuks and Ottomans founded a prestigious empire, but in Anatolia and in the Balkans, through the subjection of its Christian Orthodox populations. Today, except in the oil-producing countries, the Muslim peoples are among the poorest in the world. They are just as fascinated by the wealth of Europe and America as were the erstwhile nomads of Arabia and Turkestan by the flourishing, civilized cities of the pre-Arab Orient and Byzantium.

The Islamist movement makes no secret of its intentions to convert the West. Its propaganda, published in booklets sold in all European Islamic centers for the last thirty years, sets out its aims and the methods to achieve them. They include proselytism, conversion, marriage with local women and, above all, immigration. Remembering that Muslims always began as a minority in the conquered countries ("liberated," in Islamic terminology) before becoming a majority, the ideologists of this movement regard Islamic settlement in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere as a chance for Islam.

DHIMMITUDE OF THE WEST?

The *jihād*, which the Islamist trend is waging against the West, is a many-sided, multidimensional struggle which cannot be defined precisely. It emerged in the terrorism of *ghazi* groups—terrorists in the service of certain states (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya)—in economic pressure or threats (the oil weapon) and in psychological conditioning.

Hostage-taking is a classic tactic of the *jihād*. At the theological-judicial level, it is legal and moral. The hostage—a *harbi* prisoner—represents a military asset for the exchange of prisoners or for obtaining a ransom to finance the war effort. In both cases, the *harbi* (American,

European or any other), becomes a dehumanized object, deprived of the inalienable rights attached to any human being. This dehumanization is a fundamental aspect bound up with the concept of the *harbi*. A particular occasion can transform any *harbi*, no matter who, into a hostage. In the past, frontier raids and piracy at sea, particularly from the Maghreb, provided a considerable reserve of hostages destined for slavery, if they were not redeemed financially. Until 1815, Morocco and the Barbary Coast constituted veritable pirate states, growing rich on the human booty carried off from the *dar al-harb*.³

Modern terrorism is linked to the border raid. The means of transport now available allow the contemporary *ghazi* to sow death in the very heart of the *dar al-harb*, as their ancestors used to massacre the inhabitants of border villages. In recent times it fell to Arab-Palestinian terrorism to revive the heroic glory of the *ghazis*, who set ambushes in order to attack civilians. The Arabs of Palestine, some of whom were grouped in military camps in Lebanon, often near the border with Israel until 1982, formed a warlike society, fanaticized by the ideology of an anti-Israel *jihad*. Like the *ghazis* of the Middle Ages, fighting in the *ribats* on the Christian *limes* with the support of the whole *umma*, the Palestinian modern heroes of *jihad* won popular admiration by their terrorist attacks against civilians and by their air piracy begun in 1968. Spiritual heirs of the *fedayyins*, these Islamic heroes—"fighters for the faith"—who had, for more than a millennium, dug the graves of the Christian states in the region, focused and revived anti-Western warlike traditions. Arab-Palestinian terrorism thus modernized, ideologically and tactically, the age-old anti-Christian *ghazwa* (*razzia*).

If anti-Zionism nurtured and stirred up hostility to Christianity, a millennium of Christianophobia—institutionalized by centuries of *jihad* and by a corresponding cultural and political tradition—in its turn embittered and re-enforced modern anti-Zionism. The historical tradition of wars for the conquest of Christian lands (Orient, Byzantium, Europe) and the subjugation of the Christian peoples overflowed into contemporary anti-Zionism.

Christian anti-Zionism in the East and West, which found an ethical justification for the Palestinian *razzia* and *jihad*, simultaneously provoked the destruction of Lebanese Christianity, the weakening of the Eastern Churches and, lastly, cast the shadow of dhimmitude over the West. For, at a historical level, the *jihad*, whether it be anti-Israel or anti-Western, only represents two interdependent and interactive facets of the same battle against the two Peoples of the Book, united under Islam in the same condition of dhimmitude. The source of these conflicts does not lie in these peoples' desire for independence in their ancient homelands, but in the nature of international relationships established by Islamic

dogma concerning Jews and Christians. The war to annihilate Israel provided a reprieve for the Christians of the East and temporarily diverted the offensive of the *jihad* away from the West.

It is futile to attribute to Israel responsibility for the resurgence of traditional Islam, as certain Eastern Christians do, for this argument results from the concealment of twelve centuries of Christian dhimmitude. Indeed, even if Israel did not exist, the rest of the *dar al-harb*—from Europe and Africa to Asia and America—would remain, as in the past, the object of cupidity and conquest (i.e., lands of booty and of future dhimmitude). The solution, therefore, scarcely consists of eliminating the states targeted by *jihad*, but lies more in a reform of mentalities and in maintaining the independence of these states.

If one were to analyze the antiterrorist infrastructure that criss-crosses Europe today—and this situation is spreading to other continents—including military protection at certain public places and airports, the cost to the taxpayers for the armed protection of their liberties, the psychological impact of intellectual terrorism, the political and judicial coercion of terrorist blackmail, and the infringement of the laws, one might wonder if the West has not already entered into a phase of dhimmitude without even realizing it.

Investigation of the contemporary period scarcely comes within the framework of this book. Nonetheless, certain facts emerge from these comments on the prolongation of history and its revival in the present-day situation.

First and foremost, the resurgence of traditionally Islamic policies is clearly no passing phenomenon. These behavior patterns are rooted in thirteen centuries of history and develop in accordance with permanent realities of an ideological, religious, demographic, and political nature. The last *jihad* advance was halted at Vienna in 1683. Yet the stabilization of frontiers barely interrupted the Islamization process of those territories originally populated exclusively by non-Muslims. As in the earlier Arab conquest, the processes whereby the original *dar al-harb* was transformed into *dar al-Islam* stretched over several centuries and extended the aims of *jihad* to domestic policy. With military backing from Europe, an Islamic retreat then began, progressively liberating the European lands from dhimmitude.

During the colonial period Europe attempted to “expurgate” and Westernize traditional Arab Islam and to replace the *shari'a* by secular jurisdiction. But the pan-Arab movement, encouraged by Europe and the Eastern Christians, was inevitably destined to revive and renew the values created by the Arabs, those same values that had borne them to the height of their power at the time of the conquests and which had presided over the formulation and application of the *shari'a*. Nostalgia

for the period was a factor in the recall, revival, and satanization of the *dar al-harb*. The astuteness of Ubicini, a Turcophile nineteenth-century writer who attempted to reform or neutralize hostility to the West by camouflaging modern Western concepts under an Islamic veneer, seems clumsy trickery today. Rather than attempting to fabricate gratifying lies on an ephemeral base of a glaciis, an in-depth criticism, following the example of modern Turkish reformers, would have been better.

Although a number of Muslim governments—Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and others—are trying to fight today's Islamist trend, this effort cannot succeed without a complete recasting of mentalities, the desacralization of the historic *jihad* and an unbiased examination of Islamic imperialism. Without such a process, the past will continue to poison the present and inhibit the establishment of harmonious relationships. When all is said and done, such self-criticism is hardly exceptional. Every scourge, such as religious fanaticism, the crusades, the inquisition, slavery, apartheid, colonialism, Nazism and, today, communism, are analyzed, examined, and exorcized in the West. Even Judaism—harmless in comparison with the power of the Church and the Christian empires—caught, in its turn, in the great modernization movement has been forced to break away from some traditions. It is inconceivable that Islam, which began in Mecca and swept through three continents, should alone avoid a critical reflection on the mechanisms of its power and expansion.

The task of assessing their history must be undertaken by the Muslims themselves—not by Muslims settled in the West who are in no way representative, but by those living in their own countries among hundreds of millions of individuals. This is a challenge worthy of a brilliant and motivated intelligentsia which, from Pakistan to Turkey, from Cairo to the Maghreb, possesses a large reforming movement to guide it—Kemalists, rationalists, and scholars who are the pride of their country. Today, when a whole empire—the Soviet Union—with its European satellite states and colonies shakes on its foundations, pursuing *perestroika*, opening its archives, dismantling its detention camps and, through this self-questioning, begins its redemption, there is room to hope that the ending of the contentious *dhimmi* past will open the way to the harmonization of the whole human family.⁴

9

Characters of Dhimmitude

The previous chapters described the multiple facets and interactions of specific groups throughout the course of their history. Punctuated by dates, carried along by events, this history—or rather, these divergent or parallel histories—seem to crumble into the ephemera of a fragmented duration, diversified within a geographic space. Nonetheless, beyond the historical situations, whose infinite variety projects on the surface of time a heterogeneous and disparate composition, another aspect of *dhimmi* societies reveals itself: a fixity, a permanence rooted in the long duration, as if dhimmitude emanated from fixed self-perpetuating structures. Yet, the static structures of all communities are essentially the ideologies (religions), institutions, and laws by which conditioned and molded mentalities repeat the same behaviors of collective life. This chapter will attempt to elucidate this timeless aspect of dhimmitude, its foundations and its structures, and will, thereby, set out—with the inevitable repetitions—the basic framework beneath the abundant material contained in the previous chapters.

Dhimmitude can be defined as the totality of the characteristics developed in the long term by collectivities subjected, on their own homeland, to the laws and ideology imported through *jihad*. Dhimmitude represents a collective situation and is expressed by a specific mentality. It affects the political, economic, cultural, sociological, and psychological domains—all these aspects being interdependent and interactive. However, dhimmitude is primarily apparent as a dynamic process of interaction and not as a passive phenomenon; it is a combination of activity, collaboration, and fusion between separate groups; consequently, it is determined by the structures emanating from the conquering group as much as by the structures of the subjected group.

FACTORS IN THE RULING GROUP IMPOSING DHIMMITUDE

The ideological drive of dhimmitude is expressed in this comment by Ibn Khaldun, the famous fourteenth-century historian:

In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the <Muslim> mission and <the obligation to> convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority [religion and politics] are united <in Islam>, so that the person in charge can devote the available strength to both of them at the same time.¹

Although the *jihad* is scarcely different from ordinary battles as far as its tactics are concerned, on the ideological plane the *jihad* is an exceptional, even a unique, war. It is, in fact, the only war of an everlasting and universal offensive nature attached to a religious system. Of course, innumerable peoples have waged as cruel, or even crueller, offensive or defensive religious wars, but the aims of these wars remained limited in time or circumscribed in space.

All those strategies which constitute the *jihad* represent the means to compel by force the targeted populations to enter into dhimmitude. Despite analogies with other political régimes, dhimmitude remains an irreducible and specific structure, linked to a particular ideological and political order. It can only be compared with other systems by a superficial amalgamation. In fact, dhimmitude emanates from the *jihad* and the *shari'a*.

Circumstantial political factors can abolish dhimmitude, but its archetype will not necessarily be destroyed, since it is located in ideology, legal texts, and collective perceptions. Preserved as an abstract model, the archetype becomes a source of reference. Endowed by history with an obsessive force, it selects and organizes present political trends in terms of its future realization in suitable circumstances. Thus the archetype preserves the potential of recreating dhimmitude in the future, even if it has been abolished temporarily by historical contingencies, such as the successful revolt of the oppressed group. Even devoid of actual content, the concept of dhimmitude thus projects in the future an ideological structure for its eventual realization.

THE REALM OF DHIMMITUDE

Dhimmitude is a specific category in the history of human societies. Like other politico-social categories, it possesses its own structure and evolution.

It is characterized by three factors: (1) a general character: it affects any human group victimized by *jihad*, irrespective of ethnic or social particularisms; (2) it covers a vast, almost unlimited geographical extent: tens of millions of human beings became *dhimmis*; and (3) its durability: it is perpetuated for centuries.

Dhimmitude possesses a general and overall character of unicity which, however, does not preclude a great diversity within its components. It embraces a multitude of heterogeneous and varied elements but within a system of fixed and stable relativities. It forms a conceptual schema, a general framework within which diverse interactive phenomena determine the specific evolution of each group. This notion is not static but evolutive, if only because of the disintegration and gradual disappearance of the nations concerned (Eastern Christendoms) or their sudden resurgence (Greeks, Bulgarians, Israelis, and others). Fixed in legal texts of a religious nature, therefore transhistoric, dhimmitude has a typology and a coherence that dominates the chaotic multifariousness of history and the entanglement of events. Consequently, some constant and fundamental features emerge, despite the innumerable circumstantial factors of a social, political, religious, ethnic, and psychological order that it embraces.

Dhimmitude had progressed and was established through diverse processes, often subtle and imperceptible at the time, but cumulative over a period. Thus during centuries, a realm of dhimmitude emerged with a varied human geography but showing, sociologically, specific and relatively homogeneous characters. This does not imply that these populations were similar—far from it—but indicate only that the processes whereby the groups concerned disintegrated were similar and that they had similar structures for survival, which were more or less effective in the long term, depending either on circumstantial factors (temporal) or constant factors (geographical).

Some of the processes responsible for dhimmitude may be discerned in the collapse of Byzantium. Three phases, covering five centuries, can be discerned: prequest, conquest, and postquest—or the administration of the conquered lands which had become lands of dhimmitude. Paul Wittek emphasizes the fusion and alternation between the *ghazi* trend—the modalities of *jihād*—and what he calls the “Muslim tendency,” that is to say, the implantation and development of the governmental organs of a state.² It is precisely in this dialectic between war and the components of a state set up on territory won by this war that the institutional, legal nature of dhimmitude appears, codified and prescribed by innumerable *fatwas* and compulsory ordinances.

STRUCTURES WITHIN THE TARGETED GROUPS CONDUCTIVE TO DHIMMITUDE

These structures appear in the *dhimmi* groups' relationships of economic and political dependency on the Islamic power. Consequently,

they are situated at the highest level of the inner hierarchy of these groups. Enough has been said in previous chapters about the functions of the higher clergy and notables—bankers and merchants—to avoid repetition. One need only recall that the renewal of this hierarchy over the centuries represented the supremacy of *dhimmi* forces, allied with Islamic authorities, in the conflicts which tore the communities apart, through religious or national schisms. The growth of *dhimmi* nationalisms and their expansion broadened these conflicts within the *millet*s; they became more visible and violent to the point of shattering and destroying these structures by the resurgence of sovereign states.

The endogenous structures of dhimmitude are rooted in short-term political aims, financial interests, and the primacy of profit and personal ambition at the expense of the community and its long-term interests. These structures are mainly located in the relationships of domination imposed on the conquered community by a privileged *dhimmi* class, sprung from its ranks, thanks to a foreign military power. They are based on the corruptibility of the leaders and their reliance on armies of mercenaries to protect wealthy populations, subjugated to greed and incapable of defending themselves.

Differences of behavior can be noted among the populations reduced to dhimmitude, depending on whether they were settled on the northern or southern shore of the Mediterranean. Catholic Spaniards, Orthodox Greeks, and Slavs never abandoned their dream of liberation and, during centuries, waged their wars of independence, helped by the Christian hinterland; whereas the Copts, Syro-Aramaicans, Monophysites, and Nestorians on the southern shore—ousted from politics and the army and isolated by their religious separatism—opted for alliance with Bedouin armies to whom they delegated the task of their protection and their defense. Intrepid, long-suffering, gifted with remarkable political intelligence, the Arab or Turkish mercenaries acquired an immense empire by their skill and tolerance, and, in the process, eliminated their “protégés.”

THE COMMUNITIES: ORGANIZATION WITHIN DHIMMITUDE

Even though the laws of the *dhimma* were theoretically implemented in a uniform manner for Jewish and Christian ethnic groups—whatever their respective worship—various factors of a geographical, demographic, political, and economic order affected the organization and development of these groups. Monographs on each *millet* can be con-

sulted for details on such a vast, complex, and most diversified subject. Here, we will only hazard hypotheses of a general nature.

At the community level, the cohesion of the group resulted from a solid structuration which bound all the individuals by a feeling of collective responsibility which, moreover, the Muslim authorities recognized. The various community organs supplied the needs of religion, education, and welfare (hospitals, dispensaries). A community fund paid the *jizya* for the elderly, the needy, and the sick, as well as the irregular taxes (*avanas*), and for the redemption of Christian and Jewish hostages reduced to slavery. The community distributed provisions, money, clothing, and free treatment for widows and the poor, orphans and the elderly. It looked after foreigners in transit and helped other communities in distress.

Although supplied by the tribute from the conquered peoples, the Islamic treasury only covered the needs of the *umma*; the Christian and Jewish communities had to finance their own needs. This fiscal burden encouraged the trend toward Islam; conversions which reduced the number of *dhimmi* taxpayers, increased the tax liability of each person. The gradual decline in community receipts, particularly through the repeated confiscations of *dhimmi* religious property and by *avanas*, reduced the services provided to the community and, particularly the subventions to the masses of the spoliated, the sick, and the needy. This impoverishment of the communities, confirmed by innumerable sources, stimulated even more the cycles of conversion to Islam.

At this period of intense religiosity, respect for religious traditions and social taboos governed behavior and molded mentalities from birth to death. These beliefs formed a rigid armature, restrictive certainly, yet reassuring. The religious law infallibly distinguished good from evil, dispensed pardon or damnation— notions whose emotive charge dominated the lives of individuals. The religious establishment, responsible for preserving sacred scholarship, maintained the identity and cohesion of the group which it guided through the twists and turns of history. This role as spiritual guides was intensely experienced by the religious leaders, particularly at periods of distress and confusion. Moral strength, fed by religious faith, helped to overcome hardship.

In addition to religious bonds, the *millet* strengthened the solidarity of family, social, and professional relationships. It guaranteed the rights of the individual and ensured his protection. Christian and Jewish jurisdictions operated in the economic sphere and even in the realm of personal status (marriage, divorce) in collaboration with the Islamic courts. The *dhimmis* often appealed to these courts in order to circumvent the punishments of their own judges. In other areas, particularly property transactions and the recording of loans, the *dhimmi* judges themselves

had the documents drawn up in the registers by the *qadi*.³ Even though the *millet*s were jealous of their legal autonomy and strongly disapproved of this overlap in jurisdictions in everyday activities, it did weave a flexible and dynamic network of relationships and safeguards between the different communities. The various organs of the *millet* and their connections with Islamic institutions provided a protective framework for the *dhimmis*.

The Role of the Notables

The position of the notables was not without ambiguity. Intermediaries between the *dhimmi* populations, whom they administered, and the Muslim authorities, who used them, they became—through the privileges attached to their positions—the agents of oppression and its mainstay. The better they served the empire, the richer they grew, and the more they strengthened their hold over their community.⁴

Thanks to the abundance of sources, this ambiguity—connected with the social and economic position of the head of the community—appears particularly obvious in the collusion on the part of the Phanariot Greeks with the Ottoman sultans. The alliance of the Byzantine emperors and princes with the Turkish emirs and sultans before the conquest continued into the period of dhimmitude to the great advantage of the *umma*.

All observers concur in acknowledging a considerable variety of types not only among the *raya* peoples but also within a single *millet*. At the top of the hierarchy, the patriarchs and notables administered the *millet*. At this level, the power of the Islamic state and that of the notables best combined, while their interests through religious influence and fiscal administration converged. To the extent to which their *millet* constituted a majority, the notables could control the finances of the empire by the volume of tribute which they levied on their own people. According to Ubicini, a critical observer of the Greeks, the latter formed the largest and most active *millet* in the Ottoman Empire and therefore maintained its whole economy, while the majority of internal commercial dealings were in the hands of Armenians, the nation which “had the most interests in common with the Turks.”⁵

This convergence between the personal ambitions of the notables and the interest of the state gave to the Islamic government its character of tolerance. A tolerance restricted to the administrative and economic domain since, from the beginnings of the conquest, the economic function of the *dhimmis* represented an essential element in governing the conquered countries. The extent of the tribute depended on the demography of the *dhimmis* and their commercial activities. Maintaining *dhimmi* demography by limiting the advantages attached to conversion and en-

sureing commercial stability by safeguarding the security of persons and property guaranteed the volume of the state's receipts. In effect, it would seem that—in the Ottoman Empire, as in the Arab Empire—periods of economic wealth and expansion coincided with times when the *dhimmi* peoples still constituted majorities.

The extent of tribute and taxation, correlated with the demographic size of the *dhimmi* population, determined the power and prestige of the notables in the sultan's eyes. Although *dhimmi* majorities represented an economic asset, they nonetheless constituted a threat to Islamic power on the political plane. Throughout the centuries, this conflict between political and economic interests provoked a variety of reactions, depending on the impact of wars. At the beginning of the Arab and of the Ottoman conquests, the collaboration of the *dhimmi* elites ensured the stability of the régime. In the long term—in the Orient, as later in Anatolia—it produced the gradual disappearance of these peoples, with, as a consequence, the depreciation of the notables who, henceforth, represented only insignificant groups within the *umma*.

Patronage and "Golden Age"

The *dhimmi*'s role as intermediaries in north-south exchanges and their contacts with Christendoms enabled the notables to be both patrons of their community and the agents of evolution. *Dhimmi* cultures developed as a result of this patronage, each in accordance with its own specific spirit, tied to its pre-Islamic roots, but also in interaction with the Muslim, Byzantine, and Latin milieu. These borrowings were not one-way only, since Islam and the Christian West drew substance from the material and the spiritual inspiration provided by the *dhimmi* civilizations.

In Jewish historiography, the term "Golden Age" is applied to those ephemeral and circumstantial periods when high-ranking *dhimmi* officials acted as the patrons of their community and attracted intellectuals fleeing from regions devastated by anarchy. The mobility of the Jewish communities ensured the survival of intellectual research in philosophy, exegesis, and law which had thrived since the Hellenistic period. The Jews formed a numerous population dispersed among the towns and villages of Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, and Iraq. In the pre-Islamic period they had created centers of scholarship which had flourished in Palestine, Babylonia, and Alexandria.

In the first centuries of Islam, before dramatic demographic changes affected the population, this rich cultural tradition continued with varying degrees of success. However, sources are lacking in relation to Spain,

North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, although some information is provided by later Jewish and Muslim authors and from the profuse rabbinical compilations of Babylonia. Thus, any hypothesis must be limited to conjectures.

Almost nothing is known about the large Jewish community of Egypt until the tenth century.⁶ Yet, individual mobility is documented by correspondence between the various communities where foreign merchants or scholars resided, fleeing from regions in the throes of anarchy or seeking knowledge from illustrious teachers.⁷ This mobility, inherent in the Jewish Diaspora since biblical times—a factor of survival, of communications, and of exchanges—can also be observed among Christians.

Whereas Syria, Palestine, and Egypt—given over to the forces of tribalism—are shrouded in silence, the centers of Babylonia, close to the Abbasid capital and enjoying relative security, flourished and attracted fugitives. Although razzias by Arab Carmathians and the Banu Tayy dispersed whole communities in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia in the ninth and tenth centuries, other centers sprung up, where political conditions were favorable to economic wealth and intellectual life.

The disintegration of the Abbasid caliphate triggered off Jewish emigration to Fatimid Tunisia and resulted in the emergence of a prosperous community at Qairuan, where physicians, philosophers, grammarians, and philologists gained distinction in the tenth and eleventh centuries. When anarchy returned to this region, other centers sprung up at Fustat in Egypt and in Spain. Some of the emirs holding power, such as the Fatimids, came from heretical religious minorities; they surrounded themselves with *dhimmi* counselors who formed an intelligentsia that dominated the tribal world, remaining loyal and stable and serving as agents of economic development.

Andalusia offered favorable circumstances for Jewish communities to prosper. Amid uprisings by Christians, Berbers, or Arab immigrants from Arabia, the Jews—with their traditions of craftsmanship and trade, their linguistic knowledge and their scholars—represented a dependable population able to generate prosperity. Lexicographical and philological work, poetry and prose, flourished under the patronage of Hasday Ibn Shaprut (905–75), a diplomat and doctor as well as a fine scholar and counselor to the caliphs Abd al-Rahman III and al-Hakam II. This Jewish patronage probably met with the approval of the Umayyad caliph of Spain, who was anxious to develop a Jewish spiritual center in his capital, Cordova, independent of the Babylonian center which gave its allegiance to his rival, the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad. In the eleventh century at Granada, another Jewish vizier, Samuel Ibn Naghrela, protected a flourishing community. He was assassinated during a

revolt in 1056 and was succeeded as vizier by his son Joseph, also assassinated in 1066 when the populace annihilated the community.⁸

The decline of the Jewish communities began in the eleventh century in Morocco and Spain under the rule of the Almoravids—natives of Mauritania—and continued with the destruction in the twelfth century of Spanish Judaism and Christianity by the Almohads, a Berber dynasty. Fleeing from Muslim persecutions, these populations dispersed throughout Christian Spain, Sicily, or—like Maimonides, in 1160—via the Maghreb, to the East, and particularly Egypt, where more affluent communities could welcome the fugitives.

In the east of the Islamic Empire, after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate, *dhimmi* cultural centers again emerged in Iran, ruled by pagan Mongols. A Jewish scholar, Sa'd ad-Dawla—doctor and vizier to Arghun Khan (1284–91)—could protect his community until the conversion of Arghun's successor to Islam and the murder of the vizier ended this ephemeral “golden age” in a bloodbath.

The prime interest of these privileged historical moments of patronage and protection by notables, lasting for one or two generations—shining at Qairuan at times, in Andalusia, Fustat, or Baghdad at others—lies in the richness of the literary, scholarly, legal, and philological creativity within a very short period. This phenomenon can be explained precisely by the mobility of the scholars who sought refuge in places propitious to the pursuit of learning. The immigrants arrived in the host towns with trades, cultural traditions, a whole heritage of knowledge, and skills which enriched the local community and the state. The example of the Jews driven out of Spain (1492) and Portugal (1497) and welcomed in some regions of the Maghreb and in the Ottoman Empire is well known. Likewise, in the course of the Middle Ages, the cultural flame—no sooner extinguished in one place than rekindled elsewhere—testifies to the permanence and vitality of a Jewish spiritual life, rooted in its origins but still mobile and varied, until its decline caused by falling numbers and general decadence.

Dhimmi Christendoms seem to have followed a parallel evolution, although they never used the words “golden age,” probably because they did not consider themselves particularly privileged when foreign invaders allowed them to participate in the government of their own country. Moreover, even though the Judeo-Islamic symbiosis is better known, the Islamo-Christian symbiosis was much more generalized, deep-seated, and vital at all social levels. Politicians, counselors, ambassadors, scribes controlling the state secretariat, writers and translators, bankers and merchants were Christians—Jacobites, Melchites, or Nestorians—not to mention the conversions to Islam which affected all the secular and

religious social classes at every level of the hierarchy. While caliphs or dissident leaders enlarged their empire and their power, the Christians—protected by their patrons, their renegades or their slaves—maintained their culture.

The Umayyad period, which was both the incubation period of *dhimmi* society and that of Islamic civilization is also the period of the greatest Islamo-Christian symbiosis. However, this symbiosis did not prevent the destruction of renowned centers of culture: Ctesiphon, Jerusalem, Caesarea, Alexandria, Carthage. Nor was it a bar to an anarchy attributable to large tribal migrations, apparently responsible for the almost total lack of contemporary vestiges of previous cultures. This multifaceted symbiosis was integrated into the convergence of the caliphs' interests and that of the sedentary populations and their common efforts to maintain and preserve the economic structures.

In addition to this economic and administrative cooperation, without which the Arab state could not have been built, a cultural symbiosis occurred. The situation prior to the Arab conquest explains its strength and prodigious richness. In effect, following Constantine's recognition of Christianity as the state religion of the Roman Empire, the Fathers of the Church had striven to lead the Hellenized pagan world toward the biblical precepts and to secure its doctrinal unity and religious cohesion. This recasting of pagan thought and civilization required a conceptual construction of enormous breadth and the formulation of a theological, philosophic, and legal corpus which reconciled the Greco-Roman heritage with biblical ethics.

Despite the political upheavals of the Arab conquest, this work continued in the numerous centers of scholarship that existed in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Babylonia within the Melchite, Jacobite, and Nestorian monasteries. The culture was transmitted behind their high walls—spared by the nomads on payment of protection taxes—or under the patronage of notables and eunuchs close to the central power. Research embraced all fields of religion, philosophy, and law: works of exegesis, asceticism, theology, canon law and polemical treatises, definition of dogma and liturgy, chronicles and historiography. Crossing frontiers, these cultural currents evoked those vast movements of ideas which had in the past revolutionized the pagan world and gradually implanted Judeo-Christian culture on the shores of the Mediterranean. Links with Byzantium and Rome were maintained, if only through the clash of ideas and the violence of the polemics, but also through various contacts and contributions by the countless Christian captives brought from regions stretching from Armenia to Spain. Propelled by its own earlier dynamic, theological productivity was maintained with varying success


depending on political vicissitudes. In its Melchite form, it died with John of Damascus (d. ca. 748), a theologian, philosopher, and musician.

In Egypt, the revolts of the Copts and the anarchy which followed the accession of the Abbasids (750) had destroyed the Church. The brightest jewel in the crown of early Christianity and champion of Jacobite resistance at the time of its splendor, the Coptic patriarchate at the beginning of the ninth century was crippled by poverty, debt, and ignorance. It was incapable of maintaining its once flourishing, now dilapidated monasteries, and its cohorts of monks, so militant in the past, were scattered or converted to Islam. After repeated razzias, Alexandria, the beacon of Mediterranean civilization in the fifth century, was no more than a decaying village in about 814, lying amid the ruins of its pillaged monuments.

Jacobite culture then took refuge in northern Syria and Mesopotamia, in the monasteries of Antioch and Tagrit, while Babylonia remained the fief of the Nestorians. Favorable political circumstances account for this situation: the proximity of the capital, Baghdad, and the fact that the Banu Taghlib, a tribe of Christian origin, controlled northern Syria and Mesopotamia. The proximity of Byzantium and particularly the conquests of Aleppo (962), Antioch (969), and Galilee (972) placed all of these regions under Byzantine protection. Between 950 and 1050, Jacobites were even encouraged to emigrate and repopulate the reconquered provinces. In addition, the Hamdanid emirs of Aleppo and their successors, the Mirdasids (1023–38), threatened from the west by the Fatimids of Egypt, from the south by the Carmathians, and on the east by the Byzantines, had adopted a conciliatory policy toward Christians.

The Islamic-Judeo-Christian Cultural Current

Parallel with the theological current specific to each community, a field of Islamic-Judeo-Christian interaction developed, integrated into all the economic, administrative, legal, political, and cultural life. Due to their geographical isolation, the new Muslim masters of the Aramean and Persian populations possessed rather limited cultural attainments. A new civilization had to be created, suited to the intrepid warriors who pursued their hunt for booty as far as Europe. While nomads grazed their sheep in the ruined towns and collected their tribute by levies made on the *dhimmi* peoples, these latter were applying themselves to this task. It consisted of making available to the Arabs the sum of knowledge, which had both nourished and stimulated the expansion of their cultures. Zoroastrians, Jacobites (Copts and Syrians), Nestorians, Melchites, and Jews translated into Arabic treatises on astronomy, medicine, alchemy, and philosophy, as well as literary narratives and stories. This work necessi-



Ellath Kul Ellan (late 11th century)
 Anonymous work: *The Cause of all Causes*
 Syriac Encyclopaedia of the Sciences

Kamal, vol. 3, fasc. 3, pl. 749v.

tated the invention of new words and the forging of the Arabic language and grammar into new conceptual molds, not only philosophic, scientific and literary, but also administrative, economic, political, and diplomatic.

It is impossible to list here the innumerable artisans of this intellectual leaven, nor their fundamental contributions to every sector. Despite political vicissitudes and razzias, these populations—whether *dhimmi*s or slaves—preserved and perpetuated their cultural heritage. The centers of their civilization, which had illuminated the East, collapsed in ruins, but others emerged. Scholars flocked to Damascus, Kufa, Baghdad, Fustat, Qairuan, Cordova, Seville, and elsewhere, fleeing from destroyed

towns and devastated villages, transferring their precious knowledge from one place to another.

The first known scientific work in Arabic was a treatise on medicine, written in Greek by Ahrun, a Christian priest from Alexandria, and translated from Syriac into Arabic in 683 by Masarjawayh, a Jewish doctor from Basra (Iraq).⁹ In Babylonia, under the first Abbasids, medicine was still taught in Aramaic. Ibn Bakhtishu (d. ca. 771), a Nestorian physician summoned to Baghdad by the caliph al-Mansur, established a hospital there, where his son (d. 801) became the leading practitioner. Yuhanna b. Masawayh (777–857), a Jacobite physician, translator, and ophthalmologist, wrote the first treatise on ophthalmology in Arabic.

Artists, architects, masons—all recruited from the local work force—swelled by contingents of captives, contributed to the continuity of styles and techniques. The rich animal, floral, and geometric subjects of Persian and Hellenistic art decorated Umayyad and Abbasid creations. The Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, built in 687–90, was of Byzantine conception and execution¹⁰; Baghdad was allegedly built in 762 by one hundred thousand architects, workers, and artists brought from Syria and Mesopotamia.

This vast undertaking of transmitting knowledge by incorporating it into the Arabic language reached its apogee under the first Abbasids, whose court—under Iranian influence—strove to reproduce the splendors of Khosroes. This was the period of translations (750–850), encouraged by al-Ma'mun, who created a library-translation office (Bayt al-Hikma) in 830, where works were translated into Arabic from Sanskrit, Persian, Aramaic, and Greek. Until the eleventh century, state education was given in semipublic institutions, but primarily in mosques, the main educational centers where libraries were installed.

This intellectual movement constituted a “brain drain” from the communities by the Islamization of intellectuals anxious to retain favorable conditions for study. Multiple reasons led to the conversion of *dhimmi* scholars, such as easier access to knowledge and endowments or the jealousy and frustration of Muslim rivals. Persecution, pressure, and threats could be exercised by caliphs wishing to obtain the conversion of a scholar, who would thereby enhance the prestige of Islam and confirm its superiority over the infidels' civilizations. Famous converts included the Jewish astronomer Sind b. Ali; two Zoroastrians, Ibn al-Muqaffa (d. 757) and a blind poet, Bushr b. Burd (d. 783)—both of them executed with thousands of others at the time of the persecutions against the Persians; the magus al-Khawarizmi (ca. 780–850); Ali al-Tabari, a Jacobite physician, philosopher and astronomer, and the Nestorian physician, Hunayn b. Ishaq (809–73), both converted under Muta-wakkil's persecutions. To these could be added the Christian-born

Qudama in the tenth century, author of *al-Kharaj*; Ya'qub Ibn Killis (930–91), a Jew from Baghdad, patron of the arts and sciences, who laid the foundations of the economic prosperity of Fatimid Egypt and “who, according to some sources, was responsible also for the foundation of al-Azhar”¹¹; and the geographer Yaqut (1179-1229), a converted Greek.

This stream of converts to Islam was swelled by the throng of freed men and captured slaves. Ibn Ishaq, biographer of the Prophet, was the grandson of a Christian captured in 633 by Khalid b. al-Walid at Ayn al-Tamar (Iraq).¹² Abu Hanifa (d. 767), founder of the school of Hanafi law, was the son of a Zoroastrian slave; the Persian Ibrahim al-Mawsili (742–804), who composed classical Arabic music, had been taken captive as a child at Mosul; Jawhar al-Siqilli (the Sicilian), who conquered Egypt (969) for the Fatimid al-Mu'izz and founded al-Qahira (Cairo) and the al-Azhar mosque (972), was a Christian slave sold at Qairuan.

Islamic-Perso-Christian integration and fusion took place in harems crowded with Ethiopian, Armenian, Greek, Slav, and Frank captives, whereas eunuchs, *ghulam* Mamluks, and janissaries surrounded the caliph. Architecture and the arts have preserved the memory of the anonymous mass of captives: Greek and Latin mosaic workers from the Umayyad and Abbasid expeditions; Byzantine experts in marble cutting and decorating walls; Armenian and Latin architects and masons whose skill is imprinted on the design of Mamluk mosques.

Until the tenth century, in the former Aramean and Persian lands a cosmopolitan population intermingled, still tied to a non-Muslim past and well disposed toward their ancestral communities. Converts to Islam were not yet the majority in these mobile, varied, “multicultural” societies, despite the strong bouts of persecution, forced conversions, and uncontrollable nomad migration. From Spain to Armenia, the neo-Muslim superstructure (politicians, soldiers, writers, and scholars), which governed this changing society, retained childhood memories of churches and synagogues or Buddhist and Zoroastrian temples. And while being dragged by Islam into the crucible of history, this elite simultaneously engendered a new civilization; albeit in the chains of slavery and oppression, but also in the munificence of power and through a mutual collaboration in which it gave of its very best.

Three centuries after the first Arab invasions, the decline of Christianity was particularly apparent in North Africa, where the number of bishoprics diminished from five hundred to about forty. The kingdom of Nubia remained Christian until the end of the fourteenth century, in spite of the slave trade. Rural areas of Egypt, Syria, and northern Iraq were still predominantly Christian, but nonetheless the broad outlines of an irremediable evolution were already shaped into the future. Imperceptible in the span of one lifetime, neither direct nor uniform, they

varied from region to region depending on circumstances and geography.

Historians view the period 950–1050 as the culmination of the penetration process by pastoral and nomadic peoples. This process had been active from the pre-Islamic period and expanded with the Arab conquest, although the caliphs, flanked by indigenous converts, strove to restrain it. Yet the dynamic of Islamic strength, based on slave militias to whom the caliph became hostage, destroyed authority and accelerated a political and demographic transformation. This change had been making constant inroads in the outlying and rural provinces and was completed by the conquest of the towns in the eleventh century. With the appearance of other Islamized nomadic tribes, natives of Asia—the Buyids, the Seljuks, and the Turkmen—the same slow, discontinuous cycles of unperceived change resumed in Anatolia and, later, in southeastern Europe. In Mesopotamia, after the conversion of the Mongols under Ghazan (1295–1304) and the devastations of Tamerlane (1400–1405), the Nestorian and Jacobite centers of Tagrit, Amid, Mardin, Arbil, Mosul, and Tur Abdin were destroyed.

Administered by courtiers, merchants, and prelates, the *dhimmi* populations perpetuated a culture condemned to marginalization and impoverishment, since—interwoven with this process of progressive stagnation and decline—there developed simultaneously a dynamic bearing another civilization. These *dhimmi* cultures shaped other conceptual molds, enabling Islam to build its greatness on foundations which the *dhimmi* elites had created before they themselves disappeared in contempt and oblivion. Consequently, these three centuries of symbiosis and golden age appear as the swan song of a brilliant moment in human history.

THE *DHIMMI* SYNDROME

Inequality and prejudice develop particular behavior patterns in every society, and *dhimmi* society was no exception to this general rule. As the survey of the psychological conditioning of groups belongs to the realm of psychosociology, we will only mention one syndrome specific to our subject.¹³

The *dhimmi* syndrome represents a collection of mental attitudes and behaviors linked to dhimmitude and common to the different groups which express them with greater or lesser intensity depending on circumstances.

The basic components of the *dhimmi* syndrome lie in the combined psychological effects of vulnerability and humiliation. Reduced in ex-

treme cases to a precarious survival, evaluated in monetary terms, the *dhimmi* perceives himself and accepts himself as a dehumanized being.

Dissymmetrical Relationships: Oppression-Gratitude

Obviously, all conqueror-conquered relationships are dissymmetrical. Sometimes they grow blurred and disappear through the fusion of the two groups. If they are fixed in religion, they endure. In the case of the *dhimmi*, this dissymmetry which affected all social relationships determined the same psychological conditioning that is found in other medieval societies. However, two factors are specific to dhimmitude. The protection tribute paid by the conquered subject is no ordinary tax. It reduces his human rights to a sum of money, whose payment is accompanied by humiliations. Thus, not only is his life valued in monetary terms but, as he is contemptible, the power which spares him is all the more magnanimous.

Another basic element of dehumanization follows from the conqueror's inalienable right over the life of the conquered. Understandable in the heat of battle, this right—now integrated into the legal status of the *dhimmi*—was perpetuated from generation to generation in peacetime. In the nineteenth century, Jacobite, Syriac, and Armenian villages in Little Armenia (Cilicia) still had to pay the protection charge to Kurdish and Turkish tribes, exactions that did not exclude arbitrary ransoms, nor compulsory *corvées*. In exchange for various services, these tribes protected monasteries and refrained from pillaging them.

It follows that the safety and fundamental rights of the human being are not inalienable rights, but a protection from a hostile environment constantly repurchased by money and submission. As a result, the *dhimmi's* consciousness—like that of the hostage—moves in a context of vulnerability which annuls the notion of rights and condemns him to exude gratitude for being tolerated. The *dhimma* is incompatible with the modern principles of inalienable and equal human rights.

Manageability of the Dhimmi

Several factors help to prepare a situation propitious to the manipulation of communities or individuals. Among these, one could mention vulnerability, ideological conditioning, corruption, loss of identity, or historical amnesia.

Vulnerability is integrated into dhimmitude, since the *dhimmi*, conquered by war and defenseless, is reduced to perpetually repurchasing his life. In addition, the right claimed by the Muslim authority to ratify the appointment of the spiritual leader of the *dhimmi* community en-

abled it to interfere in this choice to its own best interests, impose its own candidate, and deepen the schisms of a venal nature which were corrupting the institutions. Thus the morality and cultural level of the communities declined, and this domestic discredit increased the contempt of the outside environment.

Ideological conditioning grafts itself onto vulnerability. The janissaries provide the most perfect example of this situation. Young Christian children abducted during razzias, allocated within the quint of war booty or by the *devshirme*, were reduced to slavery and converted to Islam. Subjected to an intense military and religious education, they constituted the Muslim power's elite troops. Blind and fanatical tools of the sultan, they became the cruellest persecutors of Christianity, which was henceforth attacked by its own sons. The janissary incarnates the quintessence of dhimmitude, brought to its perfection.

The success of this collaboration was based on two factors: the extreme vulnerability of the child snatched from its family background and dependent for all its needs on its Muslim masters; and the total eradication of the past and family ties. The cruel character of the janissary or Mamluk developed from this depersonalization of the child's spirit and the destruction of his identity. Troops with neither a past nor family and compelled to compulsory celibacy, the janissaries embodied a sort of robotization of human material integrated into a war machine.

As for corruption, it permitted the purchase of the *dhimmi* leaders' collaboration at a time when their peoples, being still the majority, needed to be treated with circumspection. Understandably, the list of military strategies of the *jihad* includes "the purchase of hearts." It cannot be sufficiently stressed that corruption was the crucial factor in the decline of the conquered peoples. The temptation to enrich themselves by administering their community's fiscality lured their leaders into the system. The promise of a patriarchy to an ambitious dissident; the grant of a church or monastery belonging to a rival sect; the protection of churches in return for a denunciation or the rejection of the unionist policy of Byzantium or Rome: all these were methods of applying pressure, not to mention threats of reprisals.

A chronicle of the Jewish community of Fez (Morocco) in 1648 describes the incessant disputes between the notables in order to obtain the title of *nagid* (head of community) from the sultan. The contenders indulged in a real auction, drawing freely from the funds of a community, which they thus ruined. Consequently, "the community decided to abolish this position, but it had to reverse this decision since it was impossible to dispense with this office because of the oppressor."¹⁴ A similar situation cankered the Christian communities.

In recent times, the anti-Zionist *jihad* and the war in Lebanon evoked

يکچوي Janissaire.



Janissary (1720)

Costumes turcs

these historical and permanent components of dhimmitude, where the same mechanisms operate. The wars between the Christians in Lebanon have revealed the rivalries between leaders who, in their discord, were following the policy of *dhimmi* notables.

This fragmentation of Lebanese Christianity mirrors the divisions in Eastern Christianity as a whole. It follows the cracks which tore apart Churches, sects, and nations in the pre-Arab period. Ossified in dhimmitude, these fissures were perpetuated in the groups which crumbled in the course of centuries—particles drifting in the Islamic mass—as the complementary processes of the uprooting of the *dhimmi* peasantry, urbanization, and conversions accelerated. This division of the *dhimmi* groups into small units and the proliferation of dissensions increased their vulnerability, malleability, and collaboration.

THE EXCLUSION AND CONCEALMENT OF HISTORY

The realm of dhimmitude affects human groups collectively, extending beyond the framework of individual existence to embrace all the cultural manifestations of the group. The collective identity of groups is generally structured by a historical consciousness made up of reference data. This data rooted in geography and duration, enable groups to locate themselves in the universe and build their cohesion throughout centuries.

At a collective level, the *dhimmi* condition underlies the destruction of the group's culture and history. This situation results from the usurpation or appropriation of the *dhimmi* past by the conquering group, legitimate heir to the civilizations built on the lands it had conquered. The oblivion which surrounds the *dhimmi* past is not accidental; it reflects the abolition of *dhimmi* history. The annihilation of a community transfers its cultural heritage—civilization, arts, and sciences—to the dominating group. Cultural imperialism accompanies territorial imperialism; culture, monopolized by the authorities, becomes an additional instrument of domination and alienation. In fact, the *umma* claims a monopoly of culture: the *dhimmi*'s languages are banned, relegated to the liturgy; their monuments, testimony to their civilization's greatness are destroyed or Islamized.

In no area should the infidel triumph over the Muslim, as theological dogma has confirmed Muslim superiority from the early Islamic conquests. This self-complacency, which contributed to the withdrawal of the *dar al-Islam* within itself since it despised the entire culture of the *dar al-harb*, has also perpetuated a cultural intolerance toward the *dhimmi*s, who were branded with contempt, whatever their merits. The

irreplaceable skills and higher qualifications of certain *dhimmis*, being a source of humiliation to those around them, forced them to convert.

The Islamization of culture included the Islamization of geography, a phenomenon linked to every conquest. Cities often lost their original names: Amid in Armenia became Diyarbakir; Constantinople, Istanbul; Jerusalem, al-Quds; Hebron was Arabized to al-Khalil. There are endless examples throughout the *dar al-Islam*, and it is a curious fact that the Jewish and Christian chroniclers continue to refer to the original names, almost as if their national history was continuing *sotto voce* in its ancestral geographical framework, uninterrupted by the Islamization of their country.

The concealment of the *dhimmis'* history arises from the silence imposed on them and the ban on any criticism. In effect, the refusal of a *dhimmi* testimony against a Muslim determines behavior patterns and reveals the psychology of both groups.

The *dhimmi* group, stripped of its means of defense, is placed in a hostage situation at the mercy of unfounded accusations. This constant and degrading vulnerability engenders servility, flattery, and corruption. After emancipation, European consuls noted the *dhimmis'* fear to assert their rights. In fact, blackmail and assassination punished *dhimmi* "arrogance."

In the dominating group, this refusal of testimony by the suppression of speech—the distinctive sign of humanity—reflects a denial of rights. This mutilated speech, this rejected testimony, is transposed from the individual to the group and is perpetuated in time. History being also the testimony of a people and the foundation of its rights, the effacement of its past abolishes its rights. The official version of events then becomes a single voice epic, thereby perpetuating the mechanism of the obliteration and exclusion of the *dhimmi* nations. This process of obliteration—what Vidiadhar S. Naipaul calls "killing history"¹⁵—continues to function in our days.



Թուրք խուճանէն սպաննուած հարստակ հայեր Էնկիզիի կրասիպոտիան ԹՀՃ:

Armenians Shot in a Field. Ankara, Turkey, 1915

Photo: Armenian Museum, Jerusalem

10

Conclusion

Islamic civilization is so vast, rich, complex, and varied that it is absurd to restrict it to a simplified assessment. This chapter will be confined to an examination of certain arguments in the controversy on the *dhimmi* condition. From the start, it is necessary to recognize that dhimmitude confronts two opposing conceptions. One, set on a theological plane, invokes the incarnation of a divine will in the aims and strategy of *jihad*. *Jihad* and *dhimma*, emanations of the Creator's will, are invested with divine attributes: immutability, perfection, justice, infallibility; considered as perfect systems, they brook no criticism. The subjection of Christians and Jews to Islamic law, in accordance with the divine will, is achieved by the perfection of the *dhimma*. Any criticism of *jihad* and *dhimma*—that is to say of the temporal realm—becomes a sacrilege because of the unity of the temporal and the spiritual.

The other conception sets the *jihad* in the general context of common warfare, with which it can be compared according to criteria based on rational argument and not on faith. Resulting from a conquest which—according to this conception—is neither just nor holy, the *dhimma* represents a policy which in certain respects evokes or differs from other systems of government. Every aspect of this historical context can be examined, admired, or decried favorably or unfavorably, compared with other contexts of war and government, without reference to justifications of a theological nature. This is the rationalist critical attitude current in the historical disciplines in the West.

The discussion is not between these two conceptions which belong to different types, but rather within the rationalist conception whose principal controversial arguments will be grouped under diverse themes.

Generally, the facts are known. Muslim and non-Muslim chroniclers have amply reported and commented upon information, whose convergence confirms—within the limits of historical credibility—dates and facts relating to the conflicts and to the *dhimma*. The problems lies in defining the terms, in interpreting the facts, and on the value judgment

made regarding the *dhimma*. Were the conquered peoples who had been subjected to dhimmitude ethnoreligious groups or religious minorities devoid of national characteristics (language, history, and specific cultures)?

Is the *dhimma* a war treaty which the conqueror renews annually in return for the fulfillment of duties imposed on the conquered peoples or a status conferring exceptional privileges? Compared with others, is this an intolerant or an exceptionally tolerant system?

CONQUERED PEOPLES OR TOLERATED RELIGIOUS MINORITIES?

Does the expression “protected religious minorities” or “tolerated religious minorities” adequately describe the *dhimmi* peoples? In the first place, the terms “protected” or “tolerated” imply different meanings. Used separately they are insufficient, for the *dhimmis* were both protected and tolerated. Apart from these two words, the ambiguity lies in the terms “minority” and “religious.”

In the lands conquered by *jihad* (i.e., all the Muslim countries except Arabia), the Peoples of the Book formed majorities, among whom the Arabs of the first wave of Islamization and the Turks of the second wave were in the minority. Presumably the complex and little-known processes that transformed those majorities into minorities covered some three or four centuries for each wave of Islamization. By contracting it, the expression “religious minorities” reverses a chronological process that had spread over centuries, whose result—the minority condition—is taken as its starting point.

This interpolation, which omits the essential phase when irreversible changes occurred, conceals the political aspect of dhimmitude and reduces it exclusively to a religious minority status. In addition, the formula becomes inadequate for certain regions, such as the Balkans, where non-Muslims were in the majority until the nineteenth century; yet the circumstances of the conquest, as well as the legislation which governed the conquered, placed them in the category of *dhimmis*. Consequently, the “majority” or “minority” factor does not constitute the necessary determinant of dhimmitude but does represent a conjunctural aspect of it, insufficient to define this political category.

Today, it would seem absurd to describe the Rumanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Israeli nations as former “tolerated religious minorities.” Similarly, the common cliché “second-class citizens” has no

meaning, because the *dhimmis* were not citizens and the term "second class" is devoid of the *dhimma's* historical and juridical substrata.

POLITICAL CHARACTER OF DHIMMITUDE

The correlation between the law of the land and the *jihad* war determined the status of the indigenous populations' places of worship. This correlation induced perpetual discussions from Mesopotamia to Andalusia on the legality of churches and synagogues, whose status was debated by the jurisconsults according to the modalities of a conquest which had occurred centuries earlier. The question of knowing, for instance, whether Egypt or some specific town had been conquered by capitulation or by arms assumed crucial importance, for it determined definitively the *dhimmis'* rights. It is precisely this condition of being vanquished, perpetuated in dhimmitude, that motivates the numerous references to those charters of surrender—genuine or forged—dating from the conquests and stipulating the rights and guarantees that the opposing parties sought to defend or challenge. Piously preserved in the inner sanctums of monasteries, churches, and synagogues, these charters served as a pitiful protection to shield these last vestiges from destruction.

Born from the conquest, this legislation concerning the land was not abolished in the Ottoman Empire until the *tanzimat* period and the *Hatt-i Humayun* (18 February 1856) promulgated new rights for persons and property.

The *devshirme*, or levy of the quint on the Christian population of the Balkans, and later of Anatolia—including Greeks and Armenians—is another component of the politico-military context of dhimmitude. The *devshirme* perpetuated the right of conquest, which permitted the conquerors to levy the quint on human booty, whose descendants are thus considered as a perpetually captive population.

THE PROBLEM OF TOLERANCE

Islamic tolerance of the Christian and Jewish religions can be examined on two levels. The theological field finds expression in the Koranic doctrine, and the political one in the governing of the Peoples of the Book. Although these two fields are interdependent, particularly as reflected in the surat 9:29 that unites the religious injunction with the political, considerable differences nonetheless separate them. In fact, legislation concerning the Peoples of the Book developed over a few



Ichoglani or Pages (1720)

Costumes turcs

“These children are distributed as it pleases the Seigneur [Sultan], some to the Seraglio, others elsewhere, dependent on whether one hopes that one day they will be able to serve, on account of their physiognomy, in the army, or in other ways. But not all are put in the Seraglio [. . .]. For if all the children were put in the Seraglio, the Turk would need [place for] over three thousand, in view of the large number of children, all sons of Christians, and no others, who are brought each year and are scattered here and there, either for [work in] gardens, or to learn archery, and one day enter the Seigneur’s service, and bear the title of Janisary; to which they accede, having worked a long time, and slept for eighteen or twenty years on the bare ground, with only a little straw, like a dog and a horse.”

Thevet (1575), vol. 2, bk. 18, fol. 817–818

centuries after the death of the Prophet and was established on later interpretations of the Koran and *hadith*, and by the Islamization of pre-existing practices introduced into Islam by converts.

Only the political domain will be examined here, starting with the comment that the term "tolerance" is inappropriate because it is ambiguous.

Tolerance in the Political Context

The policy of the Islamic government toward the Peoples of the Book differed, depending on whether it was pursued in the Hijaz—the original land of Islam—or in the *dar al-harb*, the lands of war and booty. In the Hijaz, only Islam should prevail; the indigenous Peoples of the Book are exiled and pagans put to the sword or forced to convert.

In the conquered lands of war, the monotheist religions of the majority native populations are tolerated, but only in dhimmitude. This important distinction between Arab lands and the lands of war reflects on the political, social, religious, and fiscal planes.

Tolerance is assessed by the use of constraint that one group exercises over another. It lies in a relationship of inequality. The opinion which attributes an ethical value to this unequal relationship (it is tolerant) implicitly justifies force by discrediting the victim, whose perversity is precisely what enhances tolerance. Conversely, if the unequal relationship resulting from violence and war constitutes an injustice—as in all wars and invasions which have convulsed the world—the ethical concept of tolerance dissolves.

A value judgment on a political system must first define its criteria. Should one judge on the basis of dogmas, subject to a variety of interpretations, or on historical facts, formed by complex circumstantial and transient elements? By admitting the possibility of defining the criteria of tolerance, is one talking about relative tolerance in respect of a single, or of several, peoples?

Relative Tolerance or Absolute Tolerance?

The problem of the criteria of relative or absolute tolerance arises in the context of a multinational or multireligious empire. In the realm of dhimmitude, the question at issue relates to the nature and the causes of a selective tolerance in contrast with equal tolerance for all.

Hence, how to conciliate within the criteria of tolerance, on the one hand, the reception into the Ottoman Empire of the Jews driven from Spain and, on the other, the massacres, deportations, forced conversions,

enslavement, and the *devshirme* practiced by these same Ottomans against other populations? The same ambivalence appears in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Greek and Armenian higher civil servants wielded great economic power, while at the same time Greek and Slav populations, who had revolted against the *dhimma*, were being massacred. How can the same label of “Islamic tolerance” include the genocide of the Armenians?

The ambiguity lies in the contraction of an extremely complex historical system, reduced to one value judgment: tolerance. Yet dhimmitude embraces contradictory situations, where the best and the worst coexist, and periods of change determined by conjunctural transient causes in which geographical, economic, political, and religious factors overlap. The Jews were welcomed by the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid II because they formed an important labor force for economic development in depopulated fifteenth-century Anatolia. Two centuries later their star declined to the advantage of the Greeks and Armenians. In this vast historical fresco, the concept of tolerance vanishes and seems like a term invented by nineteenth-century Europeans for political motives: the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire or later, the policy of Arab appeasement.

Freed from the irrelevant trap of tolerance and from discussion about the degrees and subtleties of this tolerance—as specious as comparisons between the Orient and Europe—dhimmitude returns to its true political context. For it was precisely in this mold that it was conceived, rationalized, and fixed in dogmas, rules, and laws. A religious project inscribed in the basic religious texts and accomplished on earth by governmental and legal institutions, dhimmitude is the history of peoples whose transformation thus prepares the earthly achievement of this project. Its scope embraces geography (the importance of land relief), sociology (the clash and fusion of the nomadic and sedentary cultures), the particularisms of the different *dhimmi* peoples, their hostile or conciliatory reactions, and the interplay of politics and external influences. Set in this changing field of military, political, ideological, and economic mechanisms which govern human societies, the history of the *dhimmi* peoples—freed from a moralizing and ossifying judgment—enters the realm of history.

In his study of human geography at the beginning of the century, Jovan Cvijic uses numerous maps and sketches of the Balkan peninsula to examine the realm of dhimmitude—of the *dhimmis* whom he calls the *raya*—in terms of land relief, climate, and vegetation; in its sociological manifestations, its folklore, its culture, even its architecture and its ways of life. His first-hand investigations after the Turkish retreat and his

research among the village elders contribute to the knowledge of *raya* structures destined to disappear with modernization.

THE GLOBALIZING HISTORICAL TREND

The term “globalizing trend” refers to the opinion according to which “tolerated religious minorities” would have benefited from a privileged status which attests to Islamic religious tolerance. This thesis involves three overlapping levels of thought: the temporal level (political analysis); the theological level (Islam); and the value judgment (the assessment of tolerance).

The globalizing trend implicitly projects a static conception of history. During thirteen centuries and on three continents the *dhimmi* peoples are presented as having uniformly and indefinitely enjoyed a status of benevolent tolerance. Bursts of fanaticism and waves of persecution, when they are not obfuscated, are interpreted as exceptional situations, often attributable to the victims themselves or to foreign provocation—a momentary and accidental breach in a history, whose uniformity in reality merely reflects the negation of history. This puerile interpretation of *dhimmi* life—resembling idealized illustrations—endows Islam with an exceptional aura. This collective paradisiacal condition which, allegedly, would have encompassed thirteen centuries for millions of individuals, has never in fact been experienced by any people, at any period, anywhere in the world—because it is unfortunately incompatible with the human condition. “Happy people”—so it is said—do not have a history. Thus, like happy people, cohorts of *dhimmis* entering the holy beatitude of dhimmitude are fairy tale people with no history. This conception reinforces Muslim theologians in their view that Islamic law, the expression of the divine will, establishes the best possible regime to govern the Peoples of the Book.

The globalizing trend groups together several political tendencies. Its origins go back to the nineteenth century when it served as the basis for arguments of an apologetic propaganda in favor of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in order to protect its Christian provinces from Russian and Austrian designs. The dogma of Islamic tolerance and the *rayas'* happiness became the cornerstone of both European policy and its balance of power. The ethnic aspect of the *dhimmi* peoples was denied and scorned because it might be used to justify national claims manipulated by foreign imperialism. At the time, the hard and bloody march toward liberty of the Serbs, Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Armenians—all labeled together as “protected religious minorities”—aroused

indignation similar to the hostility shown toward other *dhimmi* groups today.

The globalizing trend linked up with the theses of the Turkish nationalists, whose main argument refuted the national character of the *rayas* and consequently challenged their claim to independence on their ancestral land. Defined exclusively as “religious minorities,” having benefited from a particularly privileged tolerant status, the *dhimmi*s would once again know the happy experience of dhimmitude which had prevailed in the past, provided they renounced their nationalist fabrications and accepted Ottomanism.

The idealized theme of Islamic tolerance—a political current, but also an outlet for religious prejudice—was used by the Latins against the Slavs and Greeks and by the Catholics against the Orthodox. The globalizing trend reflected nineteenth and twentieth century political and cultural tendencies. By discrediting the rights of *dhimmi* peoples on the basis of European political interests, it became a vehicle for racist prejudice against human groups, whose assumed inferiority barred them from national sovereignty and whose bondage was regarded as a privileged status. Dhimmitude thus constitutes the area where religious and national conflicts—inherent and indissociable components of its geopolitical structure and its history—converged and confronted one another.

The Jewish version of the globalizing interpretation illustrates the way in which dhimmitude was used to settle old scores with the Church by confronting it with the tolerance of its traditional enemy, Islam.¹ At a political level, the Zionists—anxious to humor the Turkish government in Palestine—extended the concept of a Spanish and Turkish “Judeo-Islamic Golden Age” to encompass thirteen centuries and three continents, irrespective of time or place. Certain Israeli trends transformed this pious lie into a sacred political axiom and a propaganda tool in their peace efforts with Arab states.

The outbreak of World War I completely discredited the principle of nationalities. The Armenians—victims of their forced alliance with Russia—were sacrificed by the Allies, whose least care was the enlargement of Soviet Armenia at the expense of Turkey, now the southern bastion against communism. The development of pan-Arabism, the emergence of the Arab and Muslim peoples into the international geopolitical context, their attainment of independence, and the formation of a hegemonic Islamic bloc have modernized and revitalized the globalizing trend through the flow of petrodollars, industry, and commerce.

Today, certain European political parties—not to mention the Islamist movements—use the clichés of the globalizing trend in order to criticize Europe for the Crusades and imperialism, whereas the centuries of

jihad, dhimmitude, and *devshirme*—generally labeled “Islamic tolerance”—elicit not the slightest disapproval from these moralists.

As the extreme complexity of the symbiotic relationships between Islamic civilization and that of Judeo-Christian dhimmitude does not deserve to be restricted to a puerile judgment of tolerance or intolerance, which will always remain subjective, any discussion on this subject would therefore seem futile, since both its simplistic intent and its methods are here rejected. The relevance of its most classic arguments, however, will nonetheless be discussed at an analytical level.

The Practice of Evasion or Amalgamation

Evasion consists of comparing, on an equal basis, two terms which are allegedly equal but are actually fundamentally unequal and even contradictory, avoiding precisely those elements or parameters which constitute the differences.

The practice of evasion is common to the Turcophile political apologist movement. Turkish propaganda strove to convince public opinion that the *rayas*' fate was even better than that of the Muslims. The argument was based on various assertions: traditional Islamic tolerance of “religious minorities”; the *rayas*' recourse to consular protection; their exemption from military service; the wealth of their notables and such other arguments.²

These comparisons place on an equal footing peoples who are in fundamentally opposite positions on the legal, national, and historical plane. All the matters in dispute in dhimmitude—and particularly the legal and fiscal inequality which made consular protection necessary—are evaded.³ In fact, although the Muslims were oppressed by the administration, they lived under an Islamic government, whose national culture was Turkish or Arabic. But the Greeks or Slavs—to mention only the European provinces—were in the position of peoples subject to foreign legislation. The reluctance of the Christians from the Balkans to enlist in the Ottoman army after the *tanzimat*—a reluctance which the European Turcophile trend glossed over—can be explained by the refusal of these people to collaborate in maintaining their bondage in their own country, a bondage which had brought centuries of suffering, branding their very flesh and spirit.⁴

The amalgamation also consists of refuting the whole context of dhimmitude and camouflaging it by the difficult conditions imposed on the Muslim populations by governmental tyranny, famines, and wars. No one would dream of denying this situation, but it is totally independent of the problem of the *dhimmis*, just as no serious historian would lump together the poverty and exploitation of the mujiks in Russia and the

anti-Jewish pogroms; the misery of the Spanish peasantry and the Inquisition; or the poverty of the French peasants and the massacre of St. Bartholomew. If the ills affecting the Muslims and the Peoples of the Book had really been equally shared, the early demographic proportions of the two groups would have been maintained throughout the Mediterranean basin in the form of a minority of Muslims within a Christian majority population and a substantial Jewish presence. As natural cataclysms do not select human beings according to their religion, they cannot be adduced to explain how the proportions were reversed and how the Peoples of the Book were reduced in most places to tiny minorities. One cannot deny human responsibility in a collection of selective factors—precisely those of dhimmitude—which impeded the development of these groups, thereby benefiting the growth of the *umma*.

This current reproaches Europe for its “bigotry” and its “medieval religious fanaticism,” revived by the press and by politicians who “protest” at the relatively low number of Christian deaths in the Ottoman Empire, whereas they say nothing about the large-scale massacres of Muslims in the Balkans and elsewhere.⁵ Indeed, this virulent denunciation of a biased Europe—indifferent to the misfortunes of the Muslims—fails to mention if an Islamic opinion even exists which condemns the imperialism of *jihad*, the oppression and cruelty of the *dhimma*, and recognizes the legitimacy of the *rayas*’ claims in their own country.

The Turcophile current which denounces Western imperialism—using a unilateral moralizing criticism but exonerates *jihad* imperialism—draws a contrast between the European states’ persecution, savagery, and oppression of their own Muslim subjects and the tolerance and “good treatment” of non-Muslims in the great Islamic empires, including that of the Ottomans.⁶ Devoid of any scientific substance, the history of these happy *dhimmis* is obviously nothing more than an instrument for anti-Western propaganda. These prejudices, propagated in the most scholarly texts, suggest that academics, however illustrious and erudite they may be, are not inevitably exempt from bias or clichés.

Practice and Theory: Laws and Customs

The classic argument of the apologetic school of thought maintains that the rules of *jihad* are entirely theoretical and were only rarely implemented, or in exceptional circumstances, and generally resulting from provocation by European fanaticism or by the *dhimmis* themselves. Yet all the historical sources contradict these interpretations. The Arab, Turkish, Armenian, Latin, Byzantine, and Slavonian chroniclers testify that the *jihad* was always waged according to the rules: razzias, pillage, arson, massacres, enslavement of the human booty. It might be argued

that the Byzantine and European wars were scarcely less cruel. Certainly they were not . . . but no one has ever disputed it.

Just from reading Muslim chroniclers prior to the Crusades—or the books by Jean-Paul Charnay on this subject—one realizes to what extent of irrationality this current has led astray the most competent historians. To endow the Arab conquest with a peaceful character, despite a multitude of documents which prove the contrary, cannot fail to astonish.⁷ To write that “Syria at the end of the eleventh century [. . . is] completely unconscious of any tradition of holy war,”⁸ amounts to concealing four centuries of *jihad* on all fronts or imagining that the process of Islamization before the eleventh century was propagated in a vacuum and in a totally unpopulated area. The *devshirme*, the abduction and enslavement of Christian children is described as a “novel process,”⁹ and the massive deportations conducted by the Ottomans as “population exchanges.”¹⁰

According to this same current, the *dhimma*'s disqualifications fell into disuse early on and were only imposed in exceptional circumstances. First, one notes the generalization implied by that assertion which would require that the historian possess precise historical data on all non-Muslim agglomerations in the conquered lands of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Such an inventory that would supposedly cover a time span of five to twelve centuries, depending on the region, would then allow the historian to determine precisely the periods when these rules were observed or relaxed. The impossibility of such an inventory reduces this assertion to pure conjecture.

On the other hand, in many places and at many periods until the nineteenth century, observers have described the wearing of discriminatory clothing, the rejection of *dhimmi* testimony, the prohibitions concerning places of worship and the riding of animals, as well as fiscal charges—particularly the protection charges levied by nomad chiefs—and the payment of the *jizya*, whose camouflage before the *tanzimat* laws as a tax related to exemption from military service represents a flagrant interpolation, totally at variance with the koranic surat 9:29 or with the opinion of the founders of the four schools of koranic law.


Not only was the *dhimma* imposed almost continuously, for one finds it being applied in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire—the most civilized in the Islamic world—and in Persia, the Maghreb, and Yemen in the early twentieth century, but other additional abuses, not written into the laws, became absorbed into custom, such as the *devshirme*, the degrading corvées (as hangmen or gravediggers), the abduction of Jewish orphans (Yemen), the compulsory removal of footwear (Morocco, Yemen), and other humiliations.

One cannot avoid mentioning the mental conditioning of the *dhimmi* who, aware of his vulnerability, fell into the stereotype which his environ-

Cosmographie Vniuerselle

icy representent la figure, pour vous faire cognoistre, que ceux qui tombent entre les mains de ces Tyrans, si Dieu n'a pitié d'eux, sont cruellement traictez, s'ils ne se veulent ranger du nombre des Circoncis. Il me fouiuit, qu'estant en Constantinople, vn grand Seigneur Comte, Allemant de nation, qui auoit esté deliuré de prison en la faueur de l'Ambassadeur du Roy de France: se voyât ce Seigneur innocent du faict dont

*Histoire
d'un Comte
d'Allemagne.*



The Punishment of Recaptured Christian Slaves. Balkans (1575)

“In addition, when some wretch among these fugitives is recaptured, he is tortured in a hundred ways: considering that besides the beatings they are given, they being hung up by their feet, and sometimes under their armpits, their wounds are also sprinkled with salt and other unbearable mixtures in order to give them greater agony. Many times, those who have been recaptured two or three times have such strict masters that they have no scruples about having them hanged, and most frequently empaled by the buttocks.”

Thevet (1575), vol. 1, bk. 8, fol. 265r.-v.

ment imposed on him. Consequently, another factor appears in addition to the legal constraints: the realization by the *dhimmi* of the realm of the permissible, summed up in the formula (still relevant): "to overstep one's rights." This consciousness, transmitted throughout the collective mentality of the Peoples of the Book, is displayed in a collection of behavior patterns. This psychological conditioning impregnates all aspects of life, permeates the individual from the cradle to the grave, influences his inner being, fashions his deportment, his behavior, external appearance, and activities. The diverse facets of dhimmitude and the process whereby legislation is identified with custom emerge from the various sources.

The recording in multiple sources of eye-witness accounts, concerning unvarying regulations affecting the Peoples of the Book, perpetuated over the centuries from one end of the *dar al-Islam* to the other (within the area studied here), proves sufficiently their entrenchment in customs. Even if the caliph sometimes disregarded these prejudices, pressure from theologians and popular fanaticism obliged him to conform to them. Generalizations cannot be made on the basis of individual cases of favoritism, for the problems of dhimmitude do not concern the special or individual case of one notable or the benevolent or tyrannical character of a Muslim leader, but it constitutes a fact of civilization, ideology, and custom. The periods of the *dhimma's* alleviation—the causes and modalities of which remain to be determined—were exceptional, and certainly not the reverse, as the apologetic tendency affirms in a lapidary manner and without any proof.

The Alibi of the deus ex machina

The apologetic trend attributes the periods of fanaticism to external causes, as if tolerance in the broad sense of peaceful coexistence in mutual esteem belonged to an ideal, closed, Muslim-*dhimmi* world, detached from the permanent turmoil of human conflicts. Crusades, Christendom's wars, Reconquista, Mongol invasions, European interference, colonialism, imperialism—and later, *dhimmi* nationalism—would thus be responsible for the dark periods of *dhimmi* history. Abandoning the role of observer for that of judge (assigning responsibility), the apologist neglects the realm of dhimmitude. Yet it is *precisely* this realm which encompasses and determines these factors. It explains the manipulation of the *dhimmis* by the imperialist powers, their collusion with the Crusaders or with European armies, and their nationalist revolts that provoked the corresponding reprisals by the *umma*, defending the *jihad's* gains. These interactions constitute, in fact, the specific terrain of dhimmitude—precisely that very crux where the destinies of groups clash and

are decided. Consequently, reflections on the relationships of adjustment to, or conflict between, the subjugated peoples and the dominant Islamic society would need to be supported by integrating *all* these components of dhimmitude.

In other words, whatever the external agents (the West, Russia, etc.), the reprisals within the *dar al-Islam* are determined by the *umma-dhimmi* relationship. Whether the European states or Russia profited from the misfortunes of the *dhimmi*s to expand, whether the *dhimmi*s allowed themselves to be manipulated in order to liberate themselves, these are no more than the inevitable consequences of dhimmitude. But the term "protected religious minorities" allows the obfuscation of this crucial factor, replacing it by a manipulative and imperialist Christian power. In comparison, it would be as if the European historical context of the Catholic Inquisition in Europe (the Islamization of Christian Anatolia and the Balkans, the development of the Protestant Reformation, and the wars of religion within Christianity) can serve as an excuse to avoid a detailed study of the Inquisition's principles and regulations.

All in all, the permanent structures of political systems are concealed by the transient situations which are grafted on to them and heighten tensions. Yet the two contexts—one determined by permanent institutions, the other resulting from circumstantial factors—cannot be amalgamated.

THE METHOD OF COMPARATIVE HISTORY

The history of the *dhimmi*s sometimes gives rise to confused comparisons between Christianity and Islam. The method of comparative history requires precision. One should define the areas of comparison, the segments of history (periodization) or specific categories (legal, political, and religious institutions), and consider the short or long term, the dogma or its implementation. Comparison implies taking account of various parameters, not only temporal and geographical (dates and places), but also historical (conjunctural).

Periodization—the comparison of segments of history from a delimited area—forbids generalizations of a longer duration and regarding other regions (e.g., Muslim Spain and Nazi Germany). Such generalizations would imply a static and uniform conception of history, whereas it is dynamic and multiform. Since societies are living organisms, institutions and customs evolve and change by interactions between permanent, fixed factors (laws) and conjunctural factors (events and political adjustments). It is therefore important to distinguish transitory situations arising out of circumstantial factors from permanent situ-

ations determined by rules fixed in a theologico-legal corpus. A general assessment of the condition of the Jews of Islam that would be based on their situation in tenth century Umayyad Spain, for instance, would be inconsistent with a very different reality in Yemen at the same period, or even in Andalusia one or two generations later. This extrapolation from sequences located within defined spacial and temporal parameters is a classic example of the globalizing trend.

It should be noted that a sociocultural symbiosis, alliances based on mutual interests (between the Turks and Byzantines), and close collaboration in the administration (Phanariots) and in the army (Christian militias serving the Ottomans) can exist simultaneously in the same or in other regions alongside the oppression of other social classes (e.g., peasantry and *dhimmi* urban artisans). The influence of the Phanariots and hospodars did not preclude the servile condition of the Greek people; it was even a consequence of it. The wealth of the Armenian notables in Constantinople did not prevent the oppression of their coreligionists in the Cilicia-Armenia region, nor, later, the fatality of the *dhimmi* destiny through the genocide of their nation.

When it comes to comparing the respective policies of Christendom and Islam toward Judaism, a distinction has to be made between the political and theological spheres and the evolution of ideas and institutions. One should consider the principle of the separation of religious and temporal power in Christianity—nonexistent under Islam—as well as the later secular principle of the equal rights for individuals and for peoples.

On a sociological level, one could point out that Christianity sprang from a Jewish environment and seemed at first to be a conflict between Jews. As it developed in a pagan environment, it assimilated Hellenistic elements but still retained the essentials of its Jewish roots. Not only do the two religions share a common spiritual base, but their geographical location puts them in the category of cultures whose institutions, values, civilization, and arts were built and developed through sedentarization. These common factors do not, of course, exclude situations of rejection, persecution, and intolerance.

Islam, on the other hand, does not place itself in a chronological continuity, but claims anteriority over Judaism and Christianity. The Prophet, through the Koran, restored the divine revelation given by his Hebrew and Christian predecessors, whose revealed Scriptures are allegedly falsifications. Here, it is not a question of the interpretation of a common text but a refutation of that text itself. In addition, Islam—which developed in a very different environment than the Mediterranean world—has incorporated the customs and values of the Arab Bedouins and of nomadism, particularly in its conception of *jihad*. However,

one should recognize the very extensive common ground that the three monotheistic religions share on the religious, ethical, and sociological planes, which is probably greater than their differences. For Islam, the status of the Jews is identical to that of the Christians on a dogmatic and political level, and this common condition is governed by the *jihad*, a concept without its equivalent in Christendom, thereby increasing the complexity of comparisons.

Any study of policies toward religious minorities in Christendom on the one hand, and the *dhimmi* peoples in Islam on the other, must consider the essential differences that distinguish these two groups. In particular, religious minorities in Christendom have never represented the remnants of national majorities. In fact, the expression “religious minorities” to describe the *dhimmi* peoples is an extrapolation from the European context.

The development in the last two or three decades of Muslim communities, now reckoned in millions—particularly in France—sometimes gives rise to strange comparisons. The French Arabist Bruno Etienne comments that “the Muslims in France [are] in a situation equivalent to that of the *dhimmis* in Arab-Muslim countries.”¹¹ If the Muslims in France were similar to the *dhimmis*, they would then have been the remnants of indigenous, formerly majority populations, reduced by persecutions and exile to a minority status. Yet the Muslims of France, as elsewhere in Europe, are voluntary, economic migrants. Deprived of certain rights reserved for nationals, and unfortunately exposed to widespread and xenophobic hostility, they came from numerous countries, including precisely those where the *dhimmis* were oppressed. Therefore, the comparison with the *dhimmis*, inspired by the designation “minority”—wrongfully used to describe the *dhimmis*—obscures totally different cultural and historical substrata.

THE CHOICE OF SOURCES AND THEIR CREDIBILITY

Whereas there are innumerable studies on Islamic civilization, those devoted to the *dhimmi* peoples are few. In fact, the *dhimmis* themselves had to await their liberation before writing their own history, as previously they could only express gratitude for having been tolerated, since all criticism of the *dhimma* was forbidden. To plead their case, they had to use foreign channels, which served their own self-interests. Consequently, *dhimmitude* became the field par excellence where political passions, religious prejudices and imperialist powers clashed.

For more than a century, the emancipation of the *dhimmis*, their wars of independence, followed by the emergence of sovereign states (Greece,

Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Israel), aroused impassioned discussion and bloody wars which changed the face of Europe and the Middle East. One, therefore has to acknowledge the bias of the sources relating to this domain—including and, especially, the Islamic ones—and the pseudo-objective arguments of Islamic scholars. In fact, this evidence expresses the opinions of contemporaries experiencing the social, political, and religious conflicts of their time, with their own prejudices.

Certain purists reject documents coming from Europeans and only trust Arabic and Turkish sources, as if they were not even more biased.¹² These sources speak through their ideological prism: the sanctity of the *jihad*, the justice of the *dhimma*, the perfection of Islamic law. An unvarying stream, it provokes no dispute nor interrogation; a serene certitude, an ideal discourse, in which the vanquished exist only to serve with gratitude the cause of Islam.

Dhimmi sources, on the other hand, present a violent cacophony, full of virulent mutual recriminations, a reflection of religious schism and sectarian fanaticism. The Jews would rejoice at the massacre of the Christians who persecuted them; the Christians would applaud the elimination of the Jews whom they hated; the Copts and Armenians would congratulate themselves on the enslavement of the Greeks; and the Greeks would find consolation for their humiliation in the abolition of the Serbian and Bulgarian Churches. One bishop would praise Islam for the destruction of a rival Church; another would collaborate in the oppression of a detested community. Such discordances emerge within one and the same community, depending on social status and participation in power—supplemented by the statements of renegades and defectors who would justify their conversion by indicting their former community.

Historians can thus, with no difficulty, draw on any *dhimmi* source to support the Islamic thesis of tolerance. The European sources contain just as many paradoxes and contradictions, depending on the political alliances between European and Muslim states, the enmity and religious prejudice between Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, Jacobites, and Nestorians, and between Ashkenazi or Sephardi Jews.

The emergence of the Balkan states—a relatively recent phenomenon—has stimulated Slavonic and Byzantine studies. Neglected sources, discredited by the charge of anti-Muslim bias and subject to modern criticism of late, have restored an obfuscated past. Greek and Slav historians are increasingly challenging the “tolerance” of Turkish rule, a thesis generally defended by many British, French, and American historians. The Serbian scholar Jovan Cvijic describes the Muslim yoke in the region

of Morava as a "lamentable martyrdom."¹³ Criticism is harsher from Armenian, Greek, and Bulgarian historians.

Thus two conflicting interpretations of facts and history clash: the interpretation by the people who experienced and suffered dhimmitude and that of historians, alien to this context and motivated in their selection of sources by various prejudices and interests. These opinions will probably always be irreconcilable, because historians will not obfuscate the ordeals endured by their own people with a detached indifference.

Thus the *devshirme* has been depicted as a benign institution in which the Christians allegedly collaborated gratefully, regarding it as a means to social advancement. According to Muslim authors, the thankful Christian populations flocked to offer their children who, due to the *devshirme*, had thus the honor of being converted to Islam.¹⁴

Yet other sources suggest the exact opposite. For instance, the populations of Galata, a suburb of Constantinople, surrendered to the Turkish armies in 1453 on condition that they be spared the blood tribute. Countless ballads and popular accounts express the grief of mothers whose children were snatched away, and the desertion of entire villages by peasants fleeing to hide their children in the woods. The cruelty of the "blood tribute" has left an indelible memory of horror in the minds of the Greek, Slav, and Armenian peoples, nourishing a vast popular literature. These documents, originating from the *dhimmi* peoples, refute the thesis of the Christian families' enthusiasm for the *devshirme*.

To settle the question decisively, one might ask if Muslim families would have found this practice altruistic or odious. If it proves to be reprehensible for one human group, but benign for another, it is because these latter, being *dhimmis*, are degraded and dehumanized in comparison with the first group and devoid of natural human feelings for their children. This dehumanizing image of *dhimmi* populations lessens the horror of the *devshirme* and disguises it as a benefaction.

Here sophistry comes into play, consisting of neutralizing or eliminating ethics in history within the framework of the relativity of values (historicism). Yet, if historicism is valid in the context of dhimmitude, it must also be valid for the whole of human history. The cruelty of enslavement, the fanaticism of medieval laws, all the barbarity that the modern conscience today condemns would lose all noxiousness if replaced in their relative contexts. But the historians who invoke historicism in order to protect the field of dhimmitude from moral judgment do not apply this process to other historical contexts. If the historicist interpretation is applied exclusively to dhimmitude, such a selection marks these *dhimmi* populations as special categories.

One could compare the *devshirme* system with some of the gross violations of human rights currently practiced in the Sudan. In his two re-

ports (1993 and 1994) submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur for the Sudan, Mr. Gáspár Bíró, stressed that children—mainly from ethnic or religious minorities—living in insecurity in conflict zones are exposed to abduction and sale. Coming mostly from Christian or animist families, these children—whom he estimates in the hundreds of thousands—are rounded-up every three months from the streets of Khartoum and major towns of northern Sudan, the victims of displaced families from the south and the Nuba Mountains area.

The Special Rapporteur's previous findings that these children are transported to special camps—the existence of which is not disclosed in many cases—and are subjected to religious conversion and ideological indoctrination were again confirmed (para. 26).

Upon arrival at the camp, their heads are shaved and their names changed into Arabic ones. "All inmates of these camps are officially called '*abna'a al-Sudan*' (children of the Sudan)—words which are written in bold letters in red ink on a shirt across their chests" (para. 29).

According to these reports, the children, selected by age and sex, are subjected to a military style, harsh regimentation with cruel punishment. Awful and unsanitary living conditions, added to malnutrition, cause many illnesses. The abducted children are from three or four to fourteen years old. Their education consists mostly of koranic and military training. Many are sent to the war front. Attempts to escape are severely punished.

"Abduction of children and the traffic of children take place routinely on a tribal basis in the conflict area" (para. 95). Children are released by their captors after the payment of ransom by relatives. "The mass abduction and traffic (including sale) seem to be an organized and politically-motivated activity on the level of non-regular armed forces (. . .) in the conflict zones in southern Kordofan and Bahr Al-Ghazal" (para. 97). Abducted children who are not deported to camps are sold as slaves to Arabs.¹⁵ Who today would qualify such practices as benign?

Although this study does not cover *jihad* practices in Black Africa, eyewitness accounts over the centuries and from several regions mirror events described in the previous pages. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, constant *jihad* in the Sudan is strikingly similar to accounts from the Jacobite, Armenian, and Greek chronicles of the early Middle Ages and of later periods. In 1896, Rudolf Slatin Pasha—held captive in Khartoum for ten years by the Mahdi's successor—published a detailed description of the razzias conducted by Khalifa Abdullah¹⁶ in his search for booty and slaves in those regions populated by Christians and animists.¹⁷

The African tribes in the provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal were obliged to deliver to the Muslim sultans of Darfur a regular tribute of slaves and ivory. Any delay became a pretext for razzias and the acquisition of considerable booty. In the 1870s, Rahama Zubeir Pasha, a notorious slave trader, considered "that Blacks who had no masters and were heathens, were, in accordance with the law of the Prophet, the fair spoil of the Muslims."¹⁸ According to Slatin, former governor of Darfur, villages which failed to make their submission were considered as *ghanima* (booty). The inhabitants of the southern mountainous regions, having refused to pay tribute, were treated as slaves. The men were slain, women and children enslaved, and many of the numerous deported populations died on their way to Omdurman (facing Khartoum), after having been totally dispossessed.

In 1889–90, the Shilluks and Dinka tribes (Fashoda region) were raided and large numbers were captured by the Khalifa's general.


The men he invariably put to the sword; but the women, young girls, and children were embarked on the steamers, and despatched to Omdurman. Here the Khalifa ordered the young boys to be taken charge of by his mulazemin [soldiers], by whom they were to be brought up, whilst most of the girls he kept for himself, or distributed amongst his followers and special adherents. The remainder were sent to the Beit el Mal,¹⁹ where they were publicly sold; but thousands of these poor creatures succumbed to fatigue, want and the change of climate.²⁰

Since the Mahdi and his successor were always surrounded by theologians, the traditional Islamic rules of *jihad* were strictly applied, as described by Slatin in his detailed accounts. Considering the distance between the Sudan and Ottoman Turkey, one is all the more astonished to read this observation a hundred years ago, which is so reminiscent of the *devshirme* system.

He [the Khalifa] is invariably accompanied by twelve or fifteen little boy-slaves as his personal attendants. Many of these are children of Abyssinian Christians seized by Abu Anga and Zeki Tummal.²¹ Their duty is to remain always near him, and act as his messengers to various parts of the town. They usher into his presence all visitors, and must be ready day and night to carry his orders. When they reach the age of seventeen or eighteen, they are drafted into the ranks of mulazemin, and their places taken by others.²²

EPILOGUE

Dhimmitude is a historical, political, social, and geographical fact. Its spatial area, though variable, is determined by very precise contours and



A Slave Dhow on the Nile. Sudan

Slatin (1896), p. 430

frontiers. It is a living historical phenomenon with periods of expansion and retraction. Numerous peoples have been affected and millions of individuals have experienced its constraints. It forms part of the general history of mankind. It is determined by specific characters which make of it a distinctive category. Its duration has varied from place to place, covering centuries or more than a millennium.

Dhimmitude is an evolving and not a static system, obliged by its own dynamic toward a constant development. Consequently, it cannot be confined in formulas such as “protected religious minority,” “system of Islamic tolerance,” or “second-class citizens.” Dhimmitude—via its agents, *jihad* and *shari'a*—has been a force determining human history. It motivated constant wars over a number of continents starting from its heartland of expansion in Arabia. It has provoked numerous rebellions and armed interventions by European states and by Russia; in the nineteenth century it dominated the policy of these states, who differed on its abolition or its maintenance in the Balkans.

Dhimmitude has engulfed in death many peoples and brilliant civilizations. It has molded and shattered countless generations and conditioned mentalities. Even today, it propels worldwide political and military forces. It is a field of investigation and comparison for multidisciplinary teams of experts. It requires a multidimensional approach, taking into account the interaction of multiple factors. It is not the sort of history where the good on one side can be distinguished from the bad on the other, for, in any human epic, everything intermingles and overlaps as time unfolds. Only pale reflections and faint echoes emerge from this tangle of centuries and multitudes. The present study neither confirms nor denies the principle of Islamic tolerance. It does not pretend to be a value judgment. It restricts itself to formulating themes for reflection and raising a few questions by way of conclusion.

Which are the populations targeted by dhimmitude? Why did it engulf entire peoples, and why did others succeed in freeing themselves from it? What are the forces which organize and impose it, century after century, wave upon wave, modeling themselves on an initial design, a long-term political plan? On the other hand, what are the pathogenic causes within the culture targeted which aid and work toward its self-destruction? Is it personal ambition, betrayal, internecine war, an unconscious death wish felt by materialistic and refined societies, powerless and incapable of fighting to survive? Dhimmitude—and this must be stressed—is as much the history of oppression as of collaboration. It would probably not have developed without this collaboration—through well-defined rules and aims—between a conquering militarist minority and highly civilized majority societies, who abandoned the defense of their heritage and their wealth to foreign armies. It involved the transfer

of possessions from rich peoples to poor peoples, but also the birth of civilizations on the ashes of the old. A quest to Islamize multitudes of peoples over vast territories, stretching from Russia to the Sudan, from the Maghreb to the Indus, could have failed—and history indeed often seems to hesitate. Its success owes as much to the passionate fearlessness of the soldiers of Islam and the shrewdness of its politicians, as it does to the venality, the betrayals, and the active cooperation of *dhimmi* leaders and ambitious renegades.

Whereas the *umma* united all its military, demographic, legal, and economic potential around a single goal, the *dhimmi* leaders—divided by religious sectarianism and economic pragmatism—were eager to accumulate wealth under Arab and Turkish domination. Actually, it would be easy to present this as a story of corruption, cowardice, blindness, and pusillanimity.

And yet *dhimmitude* reveals another reality. Here are peoples who, having integrated the Hellenistic heritage and biblical spirituality, spread the Judeo-Christian civilization as far as Europe and Russia. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, conquered by nomadic bands, taught their oppressors, with the patience of centuries, the subtle skills of governing empires, the need for law and order, the management of finances, the administration of town and countryside, the rules of taxation rather than those of pillage, the sciences, philosophy, literature and the arts, the organization and transmission of knowledge—in short, the rudiments and foundations of civilization.

They were the peasants who sowed, planted, and farmed; who ploughed, harvested, and worked in the fields; who cared for the orchards and the cattle; the beekeepers and vine growers; the farmers and laborers. In the towns they were the artisans who worked, hammered, wove, and fashioned objects; the glaziers, sailors, and merchants. They were also the town planners who conceived the towns, the architects who designed the mosques and the Islamic palaces, the masons who built them, and the people who maintained bridges and aqueducts. As artists they created, chiseled, and gave generously of their genius to “Islamic art”—a genius which had animated the architecture, sculpture, mosaics, and the infinite variety of the minor arts of a pre-Islamic Mediterranean civilization which we still admire today. As writers, scholars, poets, philosophers, and historians, they assiduously studied the knowledge handed down over the centuries. As translators and copyists, they transcribed this sum of knowledge in order that it might nourish their uncouth conquerors.

Decimated by *razzias* in the countryside, they sought refuge in the towns which they developed and embellished. Branded with opprobrium, the conquerors still chose to drag them from region to region

in order to revive ravaged lands and restore ruined towns. Once again they built, again they worked. Once again they were driven out, again pillaged and ransomed. And as they dwindled, drained of their blood and spirit, civilization itself disappeared, decadence stagnated, barbarism reigned over lands which, previously, when they had been theirs, were lands of civilization, of crops and of plenty.


The elites who fled to Europe took their cultural baggage with them, their scholarship and their knowledge of the classics of antiquity. Thenceforth, in the Christian lands of refuge—Spain, Provence, Sicily, Italy—cultural centers developed where Christians and Jews from Islamized lands taught to the young Europe the knowledge of the old pre-Islamic Orient, formerly translated into Arabic by their ancestors. Straddling the two shores of the Mediterranean, intermediaries between two civilizations, they ensured trade, exchanges, the circulation of commodities and ideas, and the transfer of technology, enriching themselves and others by their ingenuity. Then, in the nineteenth century, when Europe lifted the screed of opprobrium which stifled them, again they met the challenge of modernity. Railways, telegraph, printing, journalism, transport, industry, banking: everywhere they were the promoters, the leaven of civilization and evolution. Once again, tireless artisans of progress, builders of civilization, they created the infrastructure of modernity from Persia to the Maghreb. And once again driven out, despoiled, decimated, they fled to the Americas, to Europe, to Israel, where Armenians, Maronites, Syrians, Chaldeans, Copts, and Jews live from their own labor and not from international charity. Henceforth, from Turkey to Iran and the Arab countries, microminorities struggle along, the last remnants of multitudes of Christians and Jews who formerly populated those lands. Only cemeteries and ruins recall their past. Their historical, political, and cultural rights dissolve in the great oblivion of time and, in their usurped history, the profound sense of dhimmitude is revealed: obliteration in non-existence and nothingness.

And so this study would prefer to conclude with a tribute. Indeed, as the centuries shed their leaves, these rejects of history disclose the infinite variety of the human character. Servile, corrupt, cowardly, pusillanimous, and presumptuous, but also learned, industrious, and heroic; all aspects blended and intermingled; faces of blood and tears, faces of wisdom and enquiry, molded in a thousand-year-old human magma which the historian only approaches with respect and without judgment.

DOCUMENTS

I

Jihad



St. Mark the Evangelist (1455)

Painter: Minas of the Vaspuracan, Lake Van

Ms. 3815, Gulbenkian Collection,
St. Thoros Manuscript Library, Jerusalem

1. The Era of Conquests (Seventh to Eleventh Century)

Egypt, Palestine, Tripolitania (640–646)

The Capture of the Fayyum

Theodosius, the general, learning of the arrival of the Ishmaelites [Arabs], moved from place to place in order to observe the enemy. The Ishmaelites attacked, killed the commandant, massacred all his troops and immediately seized the town <of Behnesa?>. Whoever approached them was massacred; they spared neither old men, nor women, nor children. [p. 228–29]

After the Flight of the Greek Army near Nikiou

Then the Muslims arrived in Nikiou.¹ There was not one single soldier to resist them. They seized the town and slaughtered everyone they met in the street and in the churches—men, women and children, sparing nobody. Then they went to other places, pillaged and killed all the inhabitants they found. In the town of Sa they caught unawares Esqtaos and his men, of the tribe of Theodore the general, who were hidden in the vineyards, and they slew them. But let us now say no more, for it is impossible to describe the horrors the Muslims committed when they occupied the island of Nikiou, on Sunday, the eighteenth day of the month of Guenbot, in the fifteenth year of the lunar cycle, as well as the terrible scenes which took place in Cesarea in Palestine. [p. 243–44]

Amr oppressed Egypt. He sent its inhabitants to fight the inhabitants of the Pentapolis [Tripolitania] and, after gaining a victory, he did not allow them to stay there. He took considerable booty from this country and a large number of prisoners. Abulyanos [. . .], governor of the Pentapolis, with his troops and the leading citizens of the province withdrew to the town of Teycheira, which was heavily fortified, and shut themselves up there. The Muslims returned to their country with booty and captives.

The patriarch Cyrus felt deep grief at the calamities in Egypt, because

Amr, who was of barbarian origin, showed no mercy in his treatment of the Egyptians and did not fulfil the covenants which had been agreed with him. [pp. 254–55]

Amr's position became stronger from day to day. He levied the tax that had been stipulated; but he did not touch the property of the churches, preserved them from all pillage and protected them during the entire length of his government. After taking possession of Alexandria, he had the town's canal drained, following the example set by Theodore the evildoer. He raised the tax to as much as twenty-two batr of gold, with the result that the inhabitants, crushed down by the burden and in no position to pay it, went into hiding. [p. 261]

But it is impossible to describe the lamentable position of the inhabitants of this town, who came to the point of offering their children in exchange for the enormous sums that they had to pay each month, finding no one to help them because God had abandoned them and had delivered the Christians into the hands of their enemies. [pp. 262–63]

John of Nikiou

1. On the Nile, near Damanhur.


Iraq

Letter from Umar Ibn al-Khattab (633–643) to Sa'd b. abi Wakkas after the Conquest of Sawad (Iraq)

I have received thy letter in which thou statest that thy men have asked thee to divide among them whatever spoils Allah has assigned them. At the receipt of my letter, find out what possessions and horses the troops on "horses and camels" [Koran 59:6] have acquired and divide that among them, after taking away one-fifth. As for the land and camels, leave them in the hands of those men who work them, so that they may be included in the stipends [pensions] of the Moslems. If thou dividest them among those present nothing will be left for those who come after them. [p. 422]

Al-Husain from Abdullah ibn-Hazim:—The latter said, "I once asked Mujahid regarding the land of as-Sawad and he answered. "It can neither be bought nor sold. This is because it was taken by force and was not divided. It belongs to all the Moslems."

Al-Walid ibn-Salih from Sulaiman ibn-Yasar:—"Umar ibn-al-Khattab left as-Sawad for those who were still in men's loins and mothers' wombs [i.e., posterity], considering the inhabitants *dhimmis* from whom tax



Church of Qalb-Luzeh (6th century). Northern Syrian desert

Abandoned after the Arab conquest

de Vogüé, vol. 2 (1877), p. 123

[*jizya*] should be taken on their person, and *kharaj* on their land. They are therefore *dhimmis* and cannot be sold as slaves".[. . .]

Umar ibn-al-Khattab, desiring to divide as-Sawad among the Moslems, ordered that they [the inhabitants] be counted. Each Moslem had three peasants for his share. Umar took the advice of the Prophet's Companions, and Ali said, "Leave them that they may become a source of revenue and aid for the Moslems". [p. 423]

al-Baladhuri

Iraq, Syria, and Palestine

Umar Ibn al-Khattab Replies to the Muslim Soldiers who Demand the Sharing-out of the Conquered lands

But I thought that we had nothing more to conquer after the land of Kesra [Persia], whose riches, land, and people Allah has given us. I have divided the goods and chattels among those that conquered them after having subtracted a fifth, which under my supervision was used for the

purpose for which it was intended. I thought it necessary to reserve the land and its inhabitants, and levy from the latter the *kharaj* by virtue of their land, and the capitation [*jizya*] as a personal tax on every head, this poll tax constituting a *fay* in favor of the Muslims who have fought there, of their children and of their heirs. Do you think that these borders could remain without warriors to defend them? Do you think that these vast countries, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kufa, Basra, Misr [Egypt] do not have to be covered with troops who must be well paid? Where can one obtain their pay if the land is divided up, as well as its inhabitants? [pp. 40–41]

Umar's decision against the dividing up among the conquerors of the conquered territories, as soon as Allah had shown him the decisive passages of his Holy Book [the Koran] concerning this subject, constituted for him and his work a sign of divine protection and a blessing for all the Muslims. His resolution to levy the *kharaj*, so that the revenues could be shared among the Muslims was beneficial to all the Community [*umma*], for had it not been reserved to pay the wages and food of the warriors, the border provinces would never have been populated, the troops would have been deprived of the necessary means to carry on the holy war [*jihad*], and one would have been afraid that the infidels would return to their former possessions, since these would not have been protected by soldiers and mercenaries. Allah knows best where is the good! [p. 43]

Abu Yusuf

Armenia (642)

The ravaging army <of Arabs> left Assyria [upper Mesopotamia] and, by way of Dzor,¹ entered the Taron region, which it seized, as well as the districts of Bezhnunik and Agh'iovit²; then, turning toward the valley of Berkri via Ordoru and Kogovit,³ it spread out into Ararat. [p. 227]

There would have been no one among the Armenians able to sound the alarm in the [market] town of Dvin,⁴ had it not been for three chiefs who had come running up at the time to gather the scattered troops, Theodosius Vahevoni, Katchian Araveghian and Shapuh Amatuni.

They fled in haste towards Dvin. When they reached the bridge of [the] Medzamor,⁵ they destroyed it behind them and managed to impart the sad news of the enemies' approach to the inhabitants: they made all the people of the land, who had come for the wine harvest, go into the fortress. But Theodore <Reshtuni>,⁶ for his part, had gone to the town of Nakhidjevan.

When the enemy arrived at the bridge of [the] Medzamor, they could not go across; but as they had Vartig, prince of Mogk,⁷ known as Aghdznik, as their guide, they crossed the bridge, and invaded the whole region. After taking a considerable quantity of booty and captives, they camped at the edge of the forest of Khosrovakert.

On the fifth day [Thursday], they launched an attack on the town of Dvin, and it fell to them; for they had shrouded it in clouds of smoke and, by this means and by arrow shots, they drove back the men who were defending the ramparts. Then, having set up their ladders, they climbed on to the walls, hurled themselves into the square and opened the gates.

The enemy's army rushed in and butchered the inhabitants of the town by the sword. After gorging itself on booty, it returned to its encampments, outside the town.

After a few days' rest, the Ishmaelites [Arabs] went back whence they had come, dragging after them a host of captives, numbering thirty-five thousand.

Meanwhile, the prince of Armenia, Theodore, ruler of Reshtunik, had laid an ambush with a few men in the district of Kogovit, and pounced on them; but he was beaten and forced to flee. The infidels set off in pursuit of him and killed many of his men; after which they returned to Assyria. [p. 228]

Sepeos

1. Southwest of Lake Van. For these events, cf. Ghevond, *Histoire des guerres et des conquêtes des Arabes en Arménie* (Paris, 1856), 5.

2. West of Lake Van.

3. South of Mount Ararat.

4. Near modern Yerevan (Erevan).

5. Tributary of the Araxes.

6. Theodore Reshtuni, general-in-chief of Byzantine Armenia. Dismissed by Emperor Constans II (641–68), he went over to the Arab side and was recognized by Mu'awiya as head of Armenia and Georgia up to the region of the Karabagh in the east.

7. District of Greater Armenia.

Cyprus, the Greek Islands, and Anatolia (649–654)

Mu'awiya and his suite turned towards Constantia, the capital of the whole country. They found it entirely full of people. They established their rule over this town by a great massacre [. . .]. They collected gold from the whole island, riches and slaves, and they shared out the booty. The Egyptians took one part of it, they took another, and they went back [whence they had come].

But, as the Lord [Almighty] had set his eyes on the island, with a view

to laying it to waste, he shortly after urged on Abu l-A'war and his army, which went to Cyprus for a second time, because they had learned that its inhabitants had joined forces. When they arrived, the inhabitants were seized with terror. When the Taiyaye entered, they made the inhabitants come out from the caves and pillaged the whole island. They laid siege to the town of Pathos and reduced it by battle. When the inhabitants asked to negotiate, Abu l-A'war informed them that he would take gold, silver and riches and that he would do no harm to the inhabitants. They opened the town: the Taiyaye collected its riches and returned to Syria.

Then, Mu'awiya laid siege to the town of Arwad which is an island, but he was not able to take it. He sent word to Bishop Thomas that the inhabitants should foresake the town and go in peace. They did not agree; and Mu'awiya returned to Damascus. When the spring came, Mu'awiya returned to the siege of Arwad. Then all the people foresook it and Mu'awiya destroyed it so that it could no longer be inhabited.

Abu l-A'war and his army came down by sea and arrived at the island of Cos. Through the treachery of its bishop, he captured [the island]. He laid waste and pillaged all its riches, slaughtered the population and led the remnant into captivity, and destroyed its citadel. He moved into Crete and pillaged it.

They went to Rhodes, and devastated it in the year 965 [654] of the Greeks. [2:442]

The seven year truce that the Romans [Byzantines] had made with the Taiyaye expired in this period. The Taiyaye plundered all the lands of Asia, Bithynia and Pamphylia. There was a serious plague in the lands of Mesopotamia. The Taiyaye pillaged anew and laid waste [to lands] as far afield as Pontus and Galatia. [2:450]

Michael the Syrian

Cilicia and Cesarea of Cappadocia (650)

They [the Taiyaye] moved into Cilicia and took prisoners; they came to Euchaita [a town on the river Halys in Armenia] without the population becoming aware of it; they took the ports by surprise, and when Mu'awiya arrived he ordered all the inhabitants to be put to the sword; he placed guards so that no one escaped. After gathering up all the wealth of the town, they set to torturing the leaders to make them show them things [treasures] that had been hidden. The Taiyaye led everyone into slavery—men and women, boys and girls—and they committed much debauchery in that unfortunate town: they wickedly committed

immoralities inside churches. They returned to their country rejoicing. [2:431]

Mu'awiya, the Taiyaye general, divided his troops into two camps.—At the head of one he put Habib,¹ a nasty Syrian, whom he sent to Armenia in the month of Tesrin <October>.² When these troops arrived, they found the land filled with snow. Employing a ruse, they brought in oxen which they led before them to clear the road. In this way, they advanced without being impeded by the snow. The Armenians, who had not foreseen this, were attacked when they did not expect it. The Taiyaye embarked on devastation and pillage. They took captive the population, set fire to the villages and returned to their country joyfully.

The other army, which remained with Mu'awiya, advanced into the region of Cesarea of Cappadocia. Passing through Callisura, they found the villages full of men and animals and seized them. After collecting booty from the whole country, Mu'awiya attacked the town. He fought against it for ten days. Then, they totally devastated the whole province, left the town abandoned and withdrew. A few days later, they came back to Cesarea for a second time. They fought against it for many days. The inhabitants of Cesarea, seeing that a great wrath had fallen upon them and that they had no liberator, then agreed to negotiate for their lives. The leaders went out and consented to pay a tribute. When the sons of Hagar [Arabs] entered the town and saw the beauty of the buildings, churches and monasteries, and its great opulence, they regretted their promises to them. But as they could not go back on their pledges, they took everything they wanted and went away to the region of Amorium. When they saw the charms of the region, which was like paradise, they caused no damage, but turned towards the town. After surrounding it, realizing that it was impregnable, they suggested to its inhabitants that they negotiate with them and open the town to them. As the latter did not agree, Mu'awiya sent his troops to ravage the countryside: they plundered gold, silver, riches, like dust, and returned to their country. [2:441]

Michael the Syrian

1. Habib b. Maslama conquered the 4th Armenia, the whole region of Lake Van, Vaspurakan, Siunia, and Georgia.

2. The Arabs ravaged Armenia in the course of campaigns that were renewed annually.

Armenia (ca. 705)

The Extermination of the Armenian Nobles

At the time of the domination of the [Arabs] <Tadjics> after the death of the first [Prophet] Muhammad <Mahmed>, in the year 85 of



Church of the Holy Cross, Aght'amar (915–921). Lake Van, Turkey
Photo: Armenian Museum, Jerusalem

their era and in the reign of Abd al-Malik, son of Marwan, they lit a fire against us, inspired by Satan who breathed a spirit of wrath into them. Conniving together, with poisonous and deadly malice, they formed an atrocious plan, which added to the ills that they had already made us suffer¹; for they totally exterminated and slaughtered our troops and their generals, our leaders, our princes, the nobles, and those who were of the satrapal race.

They made haste to send messages to different places, bearing false news, intended—by means of insidious words and false promises—at persuading all the Armenian leaders to gather in one place. They distributed many gifts to them on behalf of the caliph, gave them dahekans [gold coins] in profusion and restituted the year's taxes to them. They used wiles to take away their weapons, as if they themselves wanted to place themselves under the protection of their swords. "You", they said to them, "You are not like us, firm in your oaths". Then, having gathered them all together, they placed them under good guard in two different places, some at Nakhidjevan, the rest in the market town of Chram.² The leader of these scoundrels, named Qasim,³ friend of Mahmed,⁴ was governor of Armenia by order of Abd al-Malik.

Having gathered the Armenian satraps in this way, they said: "Let no one set foot outside this great assembly". Then, having secretly taken away their weapons, they set watches and, running to the gates, they blocked them with rubble. Meanwhile, the Armenians intoned the canticle of the Holy Children in the furnace, and that of the angels extolling the King of the heavenly spirits with the shepherds. Having made an opening in the roof, the Arabs set fire to it and piled up larger quantities of combustible material than there ever was in the furnace of Babylon. Driven on by the fear of their tyrannical sovereign and by a host of demons who had entered their bodies, they were filled with rage and circled the building, flashing their swords. Fathers felt their entrails burn with paternal love; while a rain of fire fell from the ceiling, sticking to their children's clothes and setting them on fire, they ripped the tatters from them. Faced with the painful death of those to whom they had given life, they ignored the dangers for themselves; all died enveloped in flames.[. . .]

The executioners were now safe from their fears, they who, so many times and despite their numbers, had been beaten by a handful of brave and noble Armenian leaders. This was not all: the heads of our most distinguished warriors were cut off and hung on sticks. That was the last act of this tragedy.

Later, the infidels, those scoundrels, spread out in every direction and searched the houses of those they had tortured. They took away whatever

treasures were in the country; they also seized the houses of knights and their families; after which they led their prisoners away to Nakhidjevan.

They took those who were cast down by the reports of these cruelties and who wept for the fate of our homeland, to show them the wretched people attached to crosses; they wanted in this way not only to sow terror in the soul of our people, but to display their bravery to the eyes of the world.

This iniquitous mystery was carried out in the sixteenth year of the rule of Abd al-Malik, who laid waste to Armenia and crushed it with ills until the day of his death.⁵ Four times these devastations were renewed on his orders. After his death, and in the first year of the rule of Walid [. . .] at the time of the festival of Easter, they transported this multitude of captives to the capital town of Dvin. During the heat of summer, they kept them in prison; and, I do believe, more of them died than survived. When autumn came, they dragged them out from there and, having marked them on the neck, they sent them to Assyria, after counting and registering each one of them. In Damascus, the nobles were kept at the court, their children consigned to practising a trade, and the rest divided between different masters. As for those who succumbed on the road, I do not know if they received a burial or if they remained lying where they fell. [pp. 238–40].

Elegy on the Misfortunes of Armenia (703)
and the Martyrdom of Saint Vahan of Gogh'ten (736)
Dulaurier

1. In 695, the Arabs embarked on confiscations and massacres in Armenia. In about 700, the general uprising of Armenia provoked a campaign of repression.

2. On the Araxes.

3. Governor of Nakhidjevan and lieutenant of Mahmed.

4. General of Abd al-Malik and son of Marwan I.

5. Other chroniclers place these events under Walid I.

These Same Events Described by a Muslim Chronicler

During the insurrection of ibn-az-Zubair,¹ Armenia rose and its nobles with their followers threw off their allegiance. When Muhammad ibn-Marwan held under his brother Abd al-Malik the governorship of Armenia, he led the fight against them and won the victory, slaughtering and taking captives. Thus, he subdued the land. He promised those who survived higher stipends than the ordinary soldiers' pay. For that purpose they assembled in churches in the province of Khilat where he locked them in and put guards on the door, and then he frightened

them. In this campaign Umm [the mother of] Yazid ibn-Usaid was taken captive from as-Sisajan, she being the daughter of as-Sisajan's patriarchian. [p.322]

al-Baladhuri

1. Ibn al-Zubayr had proclaimed himself caliph at Mecca. He was killed in 692 by al-Hajjaj, general of Abd al-Malik, who thus became the only ruler of the empire. There are discrepancies in the dates. It seems that Abd al-Malik's general Muhammad b. Marwan had already conducted a campaign in Armenia in 692, but the massacre in the churches occurred in 705 during a second campaign. See Vardan, *La Domination Arabe*, 95–98.

Cappadocia

Under the Caliphs Sulayman and Umar II (715–720)

In the year 1028 <716–17>, Maslama crossed into the Roman [Byzantine] Empire.¹ Countless Arab troops assembled and began to invade the territory of the Romans. All [those from] the lands of Asia and Cappadocia took flight before them, as well as [those from] the whole coastal region.

They made their way to Mount Maurus² and Lebanon, as far as Melitene, and on the river Arzanius,³ and as far as the interior of Armenia. All this region was remarkable for the density of its population and the abundance of its vineyards, its cereals and its magnificent trees of every kind. Henceforth, it was laid waste and these lands are no longer inhabited. [p. 12]

In the year 1032 <720–21>, which was the first year of Umar,⁴ king of the Arabs, and the fourth of Leo [III, the Isaurian, 717–41], emperor of the Romans, Maslama left their territory, after having pillaged and devastated all that region which he transformed into an arid desert. [p. 14]

[Pseudo] Dionysius of Tell-Mahre

1. Maslama, son of the caliph Abd al-Malik and half-brother of the ruling caliph, Sulayman. In 715, the Muslims launched raids on Amorium, Cappadocia, and Pergamum. In 717–18, Maslama laid siege to Constantinople.

2. The Amanus, north of Antioch.

3. The author does not specify if this is the Arzan which flows into the Tigris or the eastern branch of the Euphrates, both in Armenia. For the topography of Christian Assyria, cf. Fiey, *Assyrie Chrétienne*, and idem, *Mossoul Chrétienne*.

4. Umar b. Abd al-Aziz (717–20). There is a discordance in the dates.

Spain and France (793–860)

In 177 <17 April 793>, Hisham, prince of Spain, sent a large army commanded by Abd al-Malik b. Abd al-Wahid b. Mugith into enemy

territory, and which made forays as far as Narbonne and Jaranda <Gerona>. This general first attacked Jaranda where there was an elite Frank garrison; he killed the bravest, destroyed the walls and towers of the town and almost managed to seize it. He then marched on to Narbonne, where he repeated the same actions, then, pushing forward, he trampled underfoot the land of the Cerdagne.¹ For several months he traversed this land in every direction, raping women, killing warriors, destroying fortresses, burning and pillaging everything, driving back the enemy who fled in disorder. He returned safe and sound, dragging behind him God alone knows how much booty. This is one of the most famous expeditions of the Muslims of Spain. [p. 144]

In 210 <23 April 825>, Abd ar-Rahman b. al-Hakam sent a strong troop of cavalry commanded by Ubayd Allah—known by the name of Ibn al-Balansi—into Frank territory. This officer led razzias in all directions, embarked on murder and pillage, and took prisoners. In Rebi I <June-July 825>, an encounter which took place against the troops of the infidels ended in the rout of the latter, who lost many people; our men won an important victory there. [p. 200]

In 223 <2 December 837>, Abd ar-Rahman b. al-Hakam, sovereign of Spain, sent an army against Alava; it camped near Hisn al-Gharat, which it besieged; it seized the booty that was found there, killed the inhabitants and withdrew, carrying off women and children as captives. [p. 211]

In 231 <6 September 845>, a Muslim army advanced into Galicia on the territory of the infidels, where it pillaged and massacred everyone. It advanced as far as the town of Leon, which it besieged with catapults. The terrified inhabitants fled, abandoning the town and what it contained, so that the Muslims plundered it as they pleased, then reduced what was left to ruins. But they withdrew without having been able to destroy the walls, because they were seventeen cubits wide, and they could do no more than open many breaches in them. [p. 222]

In 246 <27 March 860>, Muhammad b. Abd ar-Rahman advanced with many troops and a large military apparatus against the region of Pamplona. He reduced, ruined and ravaged this territory, where he pillaged and sowed death. [p. 236]

Ibn al-Athir, *Annales*

1. District of La Cerdana, region around Puigcerda, near Andorra.

Anatolia

The Taking of Amorium (838)

Thousands of men on both sides died during the three days of battle. Then the king was shown a cleft in the wall.¹ They concentrated all the

ballistas and all the battering rams against that place; when they had assailed that place for two days, they suddenly made a breach in the walls, and a burst of lamentation came from within and a shout <of joy> from without. The many fighters who had been killed were piled up over this breach so that it was filled in with corpses, and the besiegers were not able to enter. Abu Ishaq grew angry; gathering together his Moorish and Turkish slaves, he positioned them in front and his troops behind them: whoever turned his back was killed.

Then the Romans [Byzantines] asked to come and see him, and he consented. The bishop and three notables came forward; they asked him if they could evacuate the town and leave. The king, in his pride, hardened his heart and did not agree. As they returned, one of them, called Bodin, went back to the king and promised to betray the town to him by a ruse. The king accepted with pleasure and gave him ten thousand darics. The traitor gave them this signal: "When you see me standing on the wall, raising my hand and removing my cap from my head, you will know that I have sent the fighters away from the breach, draw near and enter". The bishop, seeing Bodin going back to the king, realized that he intended to betray the town.

When the inhabitants realized that Bodin was letting the Taiyaye enter the town, they took flight, some to the church, crying *Kyrie eleison*, some into houses, others into cisterns, still others into ditches; the women covered their children, like chickens, so as not to be separated from them, either by the sword or by slavery. The sword of the Taiyaye began the slaughter and heaped them up by piles; when their sword was drunk with blood, the order came to massacre no more, but to take the population captive and to lead it away.

Then they pillaged the town. When the king entered to see the town, he admired the beautiful structure of the temples and palaces. As news came which worried him, he set the town on fire and burned it down. There were so many women's convents and monasteries that over a thousand virgins were led into captivity, not counting those that had been slaughtered. They were given to the Moorish and Turkish slaves, so as to assuage their lust: glory to the incomprehensible judgements <of God!>. They burned all those who were hidden in houses or who had climbed up to the church galleries.

When the booty from the town was collected in one place, the king, seeing that the population was very numerous, gave the order to kill four thousand men. He also gave the order to take away the fabrics and the gold, silver and bronze objects and the rest of the yield from the pillage. They also began to take away the population: and there was a clamor of lamentation from the women, men and children, when children were separated and removed from the arms of their parents; they shouted and howled. When the king heard their cries of lamentation

and knew their cause, he was angry that they had begun to take the population away without his permission. In his anger, he got on his horse, and he struck and killed with his own hands three men whom he met leading slaves away. He immediately had the population assembled on the place where it was; on his orders, one part was given to the officers of the troop, and one part to the Turks, the king's slaves; and one part was sold to merchants. A family was sold as a whole; and parents were not separated from children. [3:98–100]

At this period [841], Theophilus [829–42], emperor of the Romans, sent gifts to Abu Ishaq, king of the Taiyaye, and asked for an exchange of Roman prisoners against the Taiyaye. Abu Ishaq accepted the gifts, sent back even larger ones, and said: "We Arabs cannot agree to compare Muslims with Romans, because God values them more highly than the latter. However, if you return the Taiyaye to me and ask for nothing in exchange, we can return twice as many and outdo you in everything". The envoys returned with fifty camel-loads of princely gifts. And peace between the kings was restored. [3:102]

Michael the Syrian

1. The caliph al-Mu'tasim (833–42), brother of al-Ma'mun (813–33).

Exchange of Prisoners (September 845)

And the Rhomaye [Byzantines] sent an ambassador to the Arabs on the subject of peace, and the exchange of prisoners. And when the ambassador of the Rhomaye came, Wathek [Wathiq] the king received him gladly, and he did not speak arrogant words like his father, who said, "We do not admit that the Christians are of equal value with the Arabs when <weighed in> the balance for exchange", but straightway he wished to exchange man for man. Now the ambassador of the Rhomaye was not at first pleased <with this view>, and he said, "All the Arab prisoners which we have are soldiers whom we have made prisoners during the wars, whilst as regards the Christian prisoners that are with you, the greatest number of them are soldiers which ye have captured in the villages, and old men, and old women, and very young boys, and girls. How can we possibly give soul for soul?" And when they had contended in this wise for days, finally the ambassador agreed to exchange one for one. And because the number of the Arab prisoners amounted to four thousand three hundred and sixty-two souls, and the number of the Christians was fewer, Wathek the king sent and collected from all his boundaries slaves, both male and female, which he bought



Church of St. Gregory, Ani (ca. 1000). Ararat, Turkey
Photo: Armenian Museum, Jerusalem

from their owners. And since even by this means the <full> number was not made up, he drove out from his palace the handmaidens which he had chosen from the Rhomaye, and sent them with his ambassadors. And the Arabs and the Rhomaye were gathered together on the river [Lamos, near the town] of Silawkia [Seleucia in Cilicia], which is on the frontier of Tarsos, and the liberation <of the prisoners> took place. [1 : 140–41]

Bar Hebraeus

Armenia

Under the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–861)

Provoked by the depredations of tax collectors and religious persecutions, the Armenian nobles rebelled and expelled the emirs of Taron and Vaspurakan. In order to subdue them, the caliph gathered an immense army under the orders of the emir Yusuf.

The following year [851] the monarch, with his counselors and all the grandees of Babylonia [Baghdad], decided and firmly resolved to strip all the Armenian princes of their domains in order, they said, to appropriate their heritage for themselves. It was first necessary to seize Ashot [Ardzruni] and his family, Bagarat [Bagratuni] and his family. They added, "For once these latter are removed, no one would be able to hold his position and stand up against them". At the same time, he assembled troops, formed battalions of horsemen, bold soldiers and captains; he entrusted them to a certain Yusuf, son of Abuseth, and charged him with the command of the country in place of his father, who had died on the road in the lands of Assyria [Iraq], when he was marching towards Armenia in order to punish it according to the agreed plan. "If you succeed", he told him, "in carrying out our plans against Armenia and its princes; if matters are brought to a successful conclusion just as I could wish; and if you are able to let me see the princes of Armenia in irons, particularly Ashot, prince of Vaspurakan, I will give you, you and your son, this land as an inheritance. Hasten, therefore, fly on his tracks, have no hesitation nor weakness nor delay nor tardiness in this matter which is yours."

The general left immediately, committed to the evil designs of his plan. He entered the canton of Aghbak, a province of Vaspurakan, via Atrpatakan, and camped at Adamakert,¹ the residence of the Ardzruni. From there he sent his messengers to pillage and gather up, with atrocious cruelty, the takings of his devastations. He summoned the prince

[Ashot] in amicable and peaceful terms, on the pretext of royal taxes; but the latter was advised not to present himself in person, by someone from the army of the Tadjics [Arabs], who disclosed to him the evil intentions formed against him. [pp. 102–3]

Ashot Takes Flight and Sends a Letter to Yusuf

In addition, Ashot's mother, sister of Sahak and Bagarat, prince of Taron, an intelligent woman both in word and deed, as pious as she was prudent, went to Yusuf with many gifts and begged him to establish peaceful good relations with her sons and with the whole land of Vaspurakan. Her gifts were accepted and her request fulfilled; in addition, the emir obtained for himself illustrious and respected hostages. As for Ashot's mother, he sent her away with great honors, and he, himself, quietly crossed Vaspurakan, without causing it great damage, with the hostages in his suite. Crossing the district of Bznunik, he went to Khlath because he wanted to wait for a favorable occasion to attack his quarry by trickery and deceit.

Once he had arrived at Khlath,² the emir entered and camped his troops in the citadel of the town. He sent messengers to Bagarat and an invitation to present himself without fear or delay. His handwritten letter stated that he entrusted him with the affairs of Armenia, so that he himself could return to the court on the pretext of the approach of winter and the bitterness of the winds from the north and the frosts, to which he was not acclimatized.

Bagarat, who had no suspicion of the perfidy of the monarch and his men, with the confidence which unreserved devotion gives, made his arrangements and preparations in accordance with the will of God. To obey the monarch's order, he followed the messengers, without suspecting either a trap or deceit; in this, he was mistaken. He was equipped with the Holy Testaments, divine scriptures, and took with him a host of servants and various members of the clergy. The emir seized him and all his Bagratide relations, loaded them with chains and, having sent them to Samara [near Baghdad], went in person to spend the winter in Mush, a town in the Taron, taking in his suite the hostages, either grantees of the house of Arzruni or notables and their dependants. As for the inhabitants, he took them captive in order to sell them in Assyria and in all the places where the Tadjics ruled. Half of them were destined for service in the towns, as water-carriers, woodcutters, subjected to the roughest work during the harsh winter. Those who escaped fled in all directions, their homeland being completely devastated, except for the heights and fortresses of Khouth, occupied by mountain-dwellers. [p. 104]

In order to avenge their prince, the mountain-dwellers assassinated Yusuf (852). The caliph recruited an army of two hundred thousand men from all the provinces of the empire, and placed it under the orders of the Turk Bugha.

At this time Bugha, having divided his troops into two bodies and crossed the land of Apahunik, came and entered the town of Khlath.³ He gave the order to enter Vaspurakan, to swamp the region, to carry off from there captives and booty, to empty the densely populated villages and market towns, to drag away all the rest [as] prisoners, women and children, and to load Ashot with irons and bring him to the monarch so that he could be punished for his past deeds and for his revolt against the Tadjics. Having entrusted one part of his troops to a commander called Jirak, he instructed him to move toward Reshtunik,⁴ and he himself entered the borders of Apahunik with the strongest body, like hunters of lions or of other such species surrounding a shallow ditch, in order to seize in his clutches the powerful Ashot, prince of the bold—while still watching out that he did not slip through their hands and that he did not cause them some terrible disaster by nocturnal attacks. Meanwhile, as the stronghold of Hoghts⁵ was massive, Jirak very quickly proceeded to the district of Reshtunik and poured his soldiers into the valley of Arhovank, on the borders of Mogk where was gathered the population of Reshtunik, which fell into the teeth of merciless dogs, that tore the men apart, feeding on their corpses: he had them put to the sword and flooded the land with their blood. One part was led into slavery; the dwellings, towns and fields were burned, depopulated of men and animals. Having taken the town of [Rhami] Noragiugh, in the district of Reshtunik, they led the people to the market place, cords around their necks, and put them to the sword. [p. 110]

Bugha succeeded in subduing Arab Armenia by a general massacre. The Armenian leaders, after having betrayed one another, were executed or sent with their families to the caliph who forced them to abjure their faith.

Thenceforth all the Armenian grandees began to separate to form different factions and to take refuge in the strongholds and citadels of Vaspurakan, each as fast as he could. The troops scattered, dispersed in the land, in order to fulfil the word [of God]. [. . .]

The general [Bugha], therefore, saw that everything had succeeded as he had wished; that, according to the intentions of the ungodly king, the wicked plans which they had envisaged for the principality of Vaspurakan had had a favorable outcome. All the valiant men having been eliminated, there was no longer any one in a position to stand up firmly and resist him. The bands of Tadjics and their clans, having followed the trail, began to disperse and spread out over the surface of the

land, with unrestrained boldness. They set about dividing up the lands, drawing lots for them among themselves and measuring boundaries with ropes, and settling down peacefully in the strongholds, as they were now absolutely reassured regarding the sides from whence came their anxieties. It was a painful distress for the country such as had never been and would not be seen again. Villages, fields and market towns turned into deserts, lost their charm and their attractiveness; likewise the various plants and trees covering the land lost their order and alignment. This is the evil, whose invasion the prophet Joel deplored [Joel 2: 25]. It seems that the grasshopper, large and small, that the caterpillar and the worm have borne down upon us altogether, that they have swooped down upon the fruit trees, overladen with noxious plants. So it was that the works and possessions of man were lost and annihilated, precisely as it is said in the book of the prophet Joel's vision.

Then, having given the order to sell the captives to whomsoever one wished, Bugha went to the town of Dvin, where his winter quarters were prepared, while waiting for the days of spring. He was overburdened with prisoners, and our land was desolated by his passage and his departure. [pp. 127–28]

When he [Bugha] entered the town with an innumerable quantity of prisoners and captives, he had them sold as slaves to foreign tribes, in order to remove them far from their fathers' houses and their inheritances. [p. 138]

Thomas Ardzruni

1. In the canton of Little Aghbak, on the Greater Zab river.
2. On Lake Van.
3. The Armenian text indicates that Bugha divided his troops *after* entering Khloth, not before. The translation into English has been made from Brosset's French translation of Ardzruni, with improvements when that text differed from the Armenian original.
4. South of Lake Van, in the province of Mogk.
5. In the district Aghdznik (Greater Armenia), north of the Tigris.

Sicily and Italy (835–851 and 884)

Another raid directed at Etna and the neighboring strongholds resulted in the burning of harvests, the slaughter of many men and pillage. Another raid was again organized in the same direction by Abu al-Aghlab in 221 <25 December 835>; the booty brought back was so extensive that slaves were sold for almost nothing. As for those who took part in this expedition, they returned safe and sound. In the same year, a fleet was sent against the <neighboring> islands; after having taken rich booty and conquered several towns and fortresses there, they returned safe and sound. [pp. 192–93]

In 234 <5 August 848>, the inhabitants of Ragusa made peace with the Muslims in exchange for surrendering the town and what it contained. The conquerors destroyed it after having taken away everything that could be transported.

In 235 <25 July 849>, a troop of Muslims marched against Castrogiovanni and returned safe and sound, after having subjected that town to pillage, murder and fire.

Redjeb 236 <January 851> saw the death of the Muslim emir of Sicily, Muhammad b. Abd Allah b. al-Aghlab, who had wielded power for nineteen years. He resided in Palermo, which he did not leave; he contented himself with sending out troops and columns from there, who served as his instruments of conquest and pillage. [pp. 217–18]

Also, in 271 [884?] a strong Muslim column was directed against Rametta; it wrought great ravages and returned with much booty and many prisoners. As it chanced that the emir of Sicily, al-Husayn b. Ahmad, had died at that time, he was replaced by Sawada b. Muhammad b. Khafadja Temimi. When the latter arrived on the island, he led a strong army against Catania and destroyed everything which was to be found in <the neighborhood>. He then went on to wage war against the inhabitants of Taormina, and ravaged the crops of the land. He was continuing his advance when a messenger from the Christian patrician came to beg for a truce and an exchange of prisoners. Sawada granted a three-months truce and redeemed three hundred Muslim prisoners, after which he returned to Palermo. [p. 261]

Ibn al-Athir, *Annales*

Mesopotamia

Causes of the Invasions by the Turks (Eleventh Century)

As the Arabs, that is to say the Taiyaye, grew weaker and as the Greeks [Byzantines] seized many countries, the Taiyaye had to call on the Turks to assist them. They marched with the Arabs as subjects and not as masters. However, as they acted bravely and gained victories wherever they went, they gradually became accustomed to triumphing. They loaded the riches of the region and carried them off to their land, and showed them to others, urging them to depart with them and go and live in an excellent region, filled with such goods. [3: 154]

Pillage of Melitene (Malatia) (1057)

At this same period, the dominion of the Turks began in some regions of Persia. Actually, a sultan called Tughril-Beg¹ occupied the throne of

the kingdom in the Khurasan, in the year 430 of the Arab empire. He sent troops who reached the regions of the Armenians, who were under the domination of the Romans [Byzantines]. They set about taking prisoners, pillaging, and burning in a barbarous manner. On several occasions they took prisoners and led them away without anyone coming out to meet them.²

They reached the stronghold of Melitene, to the number of three thousand, during the winter of the year 1369 [1057]; and as it did not have a wall, because Cyriacus³ had destroyed it when he had seized it from the Taiyaye, the inhabitants began to flee to the mountain, where they died of cold and hunger. The first day, the Turks began by slaughtering mercilessly; so that many hid themselves under the corpses of those <persons> killed. The Turks set up their camp outside the town on the flank of a hill; none of them spent the night outside of the camp and the candles of the churches remained lit throughout the night. [3:158]

The second day they set to torturing men so that they would show them hidden things [treasures]; and several died in torments; for example, the deacon Petrus, writer and schoolteacher. [. . .]

The Turks stayed at Melitene for ten days, laying waste and pillaging. Then they set fire to the wretched town, devastated the area within a day's march around and burned the whole land.

During this pillaging, the convent of Bar Gagai [in the area of Melitene] was seized and laid waste. After taking the population away, they departed; they strayed from the road and fell upon difficult mountains and rivers. While they were camping in a valley in the neighborhood of the mountain of the Sinisaya,⁴ heavy snow fell which hampered their progress. The Sinisaya having observed this, came down, occupied the roads and paths in front of them on all sides, and they died there of cold and hunger; those who survived were killed by the Sinisaya, none whatsoever escaping. The captive people from Melitene, all those who had escaped death, assisted in the massacre, and those who were hidden in the mountains likewise took part. [3:159]

The emperor [Michael VI Stratioticus, 1056–57], seeing that the Turks were moving up and had got as far as the sea of Pontus,⁵ taking captives, pillaging and burning, took pity on the Christian people and sent horses and chariots, and after they had loaded their possessions, took them across the sea. <The Turks> pillaged towns and villages in the whole region of Pontus. As they were empty of inhabitants, this benefited the Turks who found there a place to live. And while everyone blamed the emperor, we for our part say that this came not from him but from above. [3:160]

1. Tughril Beg (1038–63), founder of the dynasty of the Seljuks.
2. The Seljuk Turks ravaged Armenia from the beginning of the eleventh century. Here the author is referring to the campaigns of 1048–54.
3. The fortifications of Melitene had been destroyed in 934 by Joannes Kurkuas *domestikos*, and the Armenian leader, Mleh.
4. The inhabitants of Sasun.
5. The Black Sea.

Armenia

During the year 551¹ of the Armenian era, the Turks under the command of three of Sultan Tughril [Beg]'s generals, called Slar Khorasan, Mdjmdj [Medjmedj] and Isulv, [brought about a torrent of blood on the Christian nation and they] invaded the district of Baghin in the Fourth Armenia and sacked it. From there [like a venomous snake], they moved into the adjacent districts of Thelkhum and Arghni, where they took the Christians by surprise and exterminated them. The massacre began on the 4th of the month of Areg, a Saturday, at the eighth hour of the day.² [p. 296]

Matthew of Edessa

1. The date is wrong and could be 511 (1062).
2. There follows a vivid description of the massacre that is not translated by Dulaurier. The translation into English has been made from Dulaurier's French translation, with omissions reintegrated in square brackets.

The Taking of Ani by Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan (1064)

In 513 of the Armenian era [1064], at the time of the festival of the Virgin, on a Monday, the town of Ani was taken by the Sultan Alp Arslan [1063–73], who massacred its inhabitants, apart from the women and children whom he led into captivity. [p. 297]

Samuel of Ani

Syria and Palestine

As the Turks were ruling the lands of Syria and Palestine, they inflicted injuries on Christians who went to pray in Jerusalem, beat them, pillaged them, levied the poll tax at the gate of the town and also at Golgotha and the [Holy] Sepulchre; and in addition, every time they saw a caravan of Christians, particularly of those <who were coming> from Rome and the lands of Italy, they made every effort to cause their death in diverse ways. And when countless people had perished as a

result, the kings and counts were seized with [religious] zeal and left Rome; troops from all these countries joined them, and they came by sea to Constantinople.¹ [3:182]

Michael the Syrian

1. First Crusade (1096–99).



Sultan Sulayman at the Battle of Mohacs. Hungary (1526)

Miniature from Nakkas Osman (1588), in Sayyid Lockman, *Hüner-nama*
Ms. fol. 256v. Topkapi Saray Library, Istanbul

2. The Theory of *Jihad*

Jihad is a precept of Divine institution.¹ Its performance by certain individuals may dispense others from it. We Malikis [one of the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence] maintain that it is preferable not to begin hostilities with the enemy before having invited the latter to embrace the religion of Allah except where the enemy attacks first. They have the alternative of either converting to Islam or paying the poll tax <*jizya*>, short of which war will be declared against them. The *jizya* can only be accepted from them if they occupy a territory where our laws can be enforced. If they are out of our reach, the *jizya* cannot be accepted from them unless they come within our territory. Otherwise we will make war against them. [. . .]

It is incumbent upon us to fight the enemy without inquiring as to whether we shall be under the command of a pious or depraved leader.

There is no inconvenience to kill white non-Arabs who have been taken prisoner. But no one can be executed after having been granted the *aman* <protection>. The promises made to them must not be broken. Women and non-pubescents will not be executed. One will avoid killing monks and rabbis unless they have taken part in battle. Women also will be executed if they have participated in the fighting. The *aman* granted by the humblest Muslim must be recognized by others [Muslims]. A Women and a non-pubescent child can also grant the *aman* when they are aware of its significance. However, according to another opinion, it is only valid if confirmed by the *imam*.² The *imam* will retain a fifth of the booty captured by the Muslims in the course of warfare and he will share the remaining four fifths among the soldiers of the army. Preferably, the apportioning will take place on enemy ground. [p. 163]

Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani

1. See chapter 1, n.10.

2. Religious and political leader.

In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the <Muslim> mission and <the obligation to> convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. Therefore, caliphate and royal authority are united <in Islam>, so that the person in charge can devote the available strength to both of them <religion and politics> at the same time.

The other religious groups did not have a universal mission, and the holy war was not a religious duty to them, save only for purposes of defence. It has thus come about that the person in charge of religious affairs <in other religious groups> is not concerned with power politics at all. <Among them>, royal authority comes to those who have it, by accident and in some way that has nothing to do with religion. It comes to them as the necessary result of group feeling, which by its very nature seeks to obtain royal authority, as we have mentioned before, and not because they are under obligation to gain power over other nations, as is the case with Islam. They are merely required to establish their religion among their own <people>.

That is why the Israelites after Moses and Joshua remained unconcerned with royal authority for about four hundred years. Their only concern was to establish their religion. [I, 473]

Thereafter, there were dissensions among the Christians with regard to their religion and to Christology. They split into groups and sects, which secured the support of the various Christian rulers against each other. At different times there appeared different sects. Finally, these sects crystallized into three groups, which constitute the <Christian> sects. Others have no significance. These are the Melchites, the Jacobites, and the Nestorians. We do not think that we should blacken the pages of this book with discussion of their dogmas of unbelief. In general, they are well known. All of them are unbelief. This is clearly stated in the noble Qur'ân. <To> discuss or argue those things with them is not upto us. It is <for them to choose between> conversion to Islam, payment of the poll tax, or death. [I, 480]

Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*

Booty

The state's revenues, which have their origins in the Koran and Sunna, are three in number: booty <*ghanima*>, charity <*sadaqa*>, and the *fay*.

The booty consists of spoils taken from the infidels by force. Allah has established their statutes in the *sura*, *al-Anfal* [Koran 8: The Spoils], which he revealed at the time of the battle of Badr and to which he gave the precise name *al-Anfal*, because the booty represents an increase in the wealth of the Muslims. Allah said: "They will question thee concern-

ing the spoils. Say: "The spoils belong to God and the Messenger . . ." <Koran 8:1>.

In the two *Sahih*s [the two canonical collections of religious traditions], the Prophet said according to Jabir b. Abd Allah: "I have been endowed with five gifts, which no other Prophet has received before me. I have triumphed through terror for a period of a month. The earth has been made for me a mosque and purity; any individual from my community who is overtaken by prayertime can pray wherever he may be. I received permission to take booty, a privilege that was never accorded to any of my predecessors. I received the gift of intercession. The prophets who preceded me were sent only to their own peoples; I was sent to all mankind."

The Prophet said: "I was sent with the sword before the Day of Resurrection so that all men may serve only Allah, without associates. My resources have been put in the shadow of my spear. Those who opposed my orders have had degradation and humiliation as their lot. He who wishes to resemble these people must be considered as one of them". [p. 27-28]

The Fay

The *fay* is based on the following verses from the *sura*, *al-Hashr* [The Mustering], which Allah revealed at the time of the expedition against the Banu Nadir,¹ after the battle of Badr.

Allah said: "And whatever spoils of war God has given unto His Messenger from them, against that you pricked neither horse nor camel; but God gives authority to His Messengers over whomsoever He will. God is powerful over everything. Whatsoever spoils of war God has given to His Messenger from the people of the cities belongs to God, and his Messenger, and the near kinsman, orphans, the needy and the traveller [. . .]" [Koran 59:6]

These possessions received the name of *fay* since Allah had taken them away from the infidels in order to *restore* (*afa'a*, *radda*) them to the Muslims. In principle, Allah has created the things of this world only in order that they may contribute to serving Him, since He created man only in order to be ministered to. Consequently, the infidels forfeit their persons and their belongings which they do not use in Allah's service to the faithful believers who serve Allah and unto whom Allah restitutes what is theirs; thus is restored to a man the inheritance of which he was deprived, even if he had never before gained possession.

In this category the capitation tax <*jizya*> to be paid by Jews and Christians is to be included; the contributions imposed on certain enemy countries or the presents that they offer the sultan of the Muslims, such

as for example, the *palladium* <haml> made by certain Christian countries; the tithes <ushr> paid by the merchants of countries within the territory of war [*dar al-harb*]; the five percent tax levied on the protected peoples <ahl al-dhimma> who trade outside of their country of origin <this is indeed the rate employed by Umar b. al-Khattab>; the payments imposed on the people of the Book who violate their covenant of protection; the land tax <kharaj> that originally concerned only the People of the Book, but was applied later, in part, to certain Muslims.

Under the heading *fay* were also grouped all the possessions of the state that form the patrimony of the Muslims, like the possessions that have no particular owners: heirless goods, usurped goods, loans and deposits whose owners it is impossible to find, and, more generally, all personal and real estate that belongs to Muslims and that is in a similar situation. All property of this type constitutes the patrimony of the Muslims. [pp. 34–36]

Concerning the men “whose hearts are to be won over” [by gifts], they can be either infidels or Muslims. If they are infidels, it is hoped that by these gifts an advantage may be obtained: for example, to induce them to convert, or avoid some misfortune, on condition that it is impossible to act otherwise. If they are influential Muslims, it is hoped that some benefit will arise such as strengthening their conversion, forcing it on one of their fellows, enlisting their support in order to obtain the payment of the *sadaqa* from another group that has refused its payment, inflicting harm on an enemy or preventing him from harming Islam, providing always that this result cannot be achieved except at this cost.

These gifts, granted to the powerful and withheld from the lowly, resemble externally those which kings are wont to bestow. However, acts are what intention <niyya> makes of them: if these gifts are to serve the common interest of the Muslim religion and of Muslims, then they will be like those which the Prophet and the caliphs bestowed; if, however, they are motivated by ambition and corruption, then they will be like those granted by Pharaoh. [p. 51]

The two other revealed religions were enfeebled by their incapacity to fulfil themselves, or through the fear that their followers experienced in the face of necessary ordeals. Consequently, these religions appeared devoid of power and greatness to men, who then understood that they were incapable of ensuring their own happiness as well as that of others. These two erroneous paths are those of men who have embraced a faith without perfecting it with all that is necessary for its own existence; power, *jihad*, material resources—or that of men who have sought power, fortune, or war without having had as their goal the triumph of <their> religion. These two paths are those of men who have incurred divine anger, and those of men who have gone astray. One is that of the Chris-

tians who, in their error, have wandered astray; the other is that of the Jews, who have incurred the divine anger.

The straight path is only that of the prophets, saints <*siddiqin*>, martyrs, and the pious. It is the path of our Prophet Muhammad, his caliphs, companions, their followers, and our forebears who have shown us the way: the *Muhajir*, the *Ansar*, and the faithful of the second generation. Allah has reserved for them gardens where running water flows and where they will abide through all eternity. That is the supreme triumph. [p. 178]

Ibn Taymiya

1. One of the three principal Jewish tribes of Medina expelled by Muhammad in 625.

Prince,¹ you also demanded what are the rules applicable to those of the inhabitants of the countries of war² who convert in order to save their lives and their possessions. Their life is sacred, those belongings for whose preservation they converted remain their property, and likewise their lands, which thus become lands liable to tithes in the same way as in Medina, where the inhabitants converted <at the arrival> of the Prophet and whose land is liable to tithes. The same goes for Ta'if and Bahrayn, as well as for the Bedouin who converted in order to save their water-holes and their territory, which remained their land and which they continue to hold. [pp. 94–95]

Every polytheistic people with whom Islam has made peace on condition that they recognize its authority, are subjected to the division of spoils and pay the *kharaj* as a tributary [people]. The land they occupy is called land of *kharaj*: it shall be taxed according to the stipulations of the treaty, but in good faith and without overcharging.

All land over which the imam [sovereign] has become master by force may be apportioned—if he so decides, for he enjoys complete freedom in this respect—among those who have conquered it, whereupon it becomes tithe land; or, if he deems it preferable, it can be left in the hands of its inhabitants, as Umar Ibn al-Khattab did in the case of Sawad, whereupon it becomes land liable to *kharaj*, which cannot be retaken. The conquered have full possession of it, which they transfer by inheritance and by contract, and the *kharaj* that is liable on it must not exceed the capacity of its taxpayers. [p. 95]

Arab territory differs from non-Arab territory in that one fights Arabs only to oblige them to embrace Islam without making them pay the poll tax: nothing but their conversion is acceptable, and their land, if it

is left to them, is tithe land. If the imam does not leave it to them and decides on its division, it still remains tithe land. The decision in respect of non-Arabs is different because they are fought not only to convert them but also to oblige them to pay the poll tax, whereas only the first of these objectives applies to the Arabs since they must either convert or be put to death. We are not aware that either the Prophet or any of his companions, or any caliph since then accepted the payment of a poll tax by the idolatrous Arabs, who had only the choice between conversion or death. If they were conquered, their wives and children were reduced to slavery, which was done by the Prophet toward the Hawazin³ at the time of the Hunayn affair; subsequently, however, he gave them back their freedom. He only acted in this manner toward those who were idolaters.

The Arabs who possess Revealed Scriptures [Jews and Christians] are treated as non-Arabs and are allowed to pay the poll tax. Umar acted in this way with regard to the Banu Taghlib [Christians]⁴ whose alms tithe he doubled as replacement of the *kharaj*, and the Prophet acted in a like manner when he levied a dinar from every pubescent person in the Yemen—or its equivalent in clothes—which in our eyes is similar to <the procedure to be followed in the case of peoples> having Revealed Scriptures. He acted likewise in granting peace to the people of Najran [Christians] for a ransom.

In the case of non-Arabs: Jews or Christians, polytheists, idolaters, fire-worshippers, the poll tax is to be levied on the males. The Prophet made the mages of Hajar pay it; yet the mages are polytheists and do not possess a Revealed Scripture. We consider them to be non-Arabs and we do not marry the women of their race, neither do we eat the animals that they slaughter.

Umar Ibn al-Khattab levied on the non-Arab male polytheists of Iraq a poll tax divided into three categories: poor, wealthy, and middle-class.

In the case of Arab and non-Arab renegades, they are to be treated as Arab idolaters: they have the choice between conversion or death and they are not liable to the poll tax. [pp. 100–101]

The inhabitants of villages and the countryside, as well as the towns, their inhabitants and all that they contain, can be left on their land, their dwelling places, or houses, as the imam decides, and may continue to enjoy their property in return for the payment of the poll tax and the *kharaj* <or all may be shared out among the conquerors>. The only exception is the male Arab idolaters, who are not allowed to pay the poll tax and must choose between conversion or death. [. . .]

Thus the imam has the choice between two options, each of which is equally acceptable: either divide up as did the Prophet, or leave things as they were, as was the case elsewhere than at Khaybar. Umar Ibn al-

Khattab made no changes in the Sawad [Iraq]. Most of the countryside of Syria and Egypt was taken by force and treaties were required only when negotiating with the inhabitants of fortified places. Since the countryside had been occupied by the conquerors and taken by force, Uṃar relinquished it to the Muslim collectivity then existing, as well as to those who would come after them. He preferred to adopt this option, and similarly the imam is free to act as he pleases, providing the necessary precautions are taken <for the security> of the faithful and of religion [Islam]. [pp. 103–4]

Battle Procedures

It seems that the most satisfactory suggestion we have heard in this connection is that there is no objection to the use of any kind of arms against the polytheists, to destroy and burn their homes, cutting down their trees and date groves, and using catapults, without, however, deliberately attacking women, children or elderly people; that one can even pursue those that run away, finish off the wounded, kill prisoners who might prove dangerous to the Muslims, but this is only applicable to those on the chin of whom a razor has passed, for the others are children and are not to be executed.

As for the prisoners who are led before the imam, the latter has the choice, as he pleases, of executing them or making them pay a ransom, opting for the most advantageous choice for the Muslims and the wisest for Islam. The ransom imposed upon them is not to consist either of gold, silver, or wares, but is only an exchange for Muslim captives.

All that the victims bring back to the camp, or the possessions and goods of their victims, becomes a *fay*, which is to be divided into five parts. One share is to be given to those numbered in the Holy Book, and the four remaining shares are distributed among the soldiers who captured the spoils in the ratio of two portions to each horseman and one to each footsoldier. If a certain territory is conquered, the decision is left to the imam as to the best course to take in the interest of the Muslims: if he decides to leave it, as did Umar Ibn al-Khattab, who left the Sawad [Iraq] to the indigenous people—the local inhabitants—in exchange for the *kharaj*, then he can do so; and if he thinks that it should be left to the victors, he divides the land between them after having deducted a fifth. [pp. 301–2]

For my part I say that the decision concerning prisoners is in the hands of the imam: in accordance with whatever he feels to be more to the advantage of Islam and the Muslims, he can have them executed or he can exchange them for Muslim prisoners. [pp. 302–3]

Whenever the Muslims besiege an enemy stronghold, establish a treaty

with the besieged who agree to surrender on certain conditions that will be decided by a delegate, and this man decides that their soldiers are to be executed and their women and children taken prisoners, this decision is lawful. This was the decision of Sa'ad b. Mu'adh in connection with the Banu Qurayza.⁵ [p. 310]

The decision made by the chosen arbitrator, if it does not specify the killing of the enemy fighters and the enslavement of their women and children, but establishes a poll tax, would also be lawful; if it stipulated that the vanquished were to be invited to embrace Islam, it would also be valid and they would therefore become Muslims and freemen. [p. 311]

It is up to the imam to decide what treatment is to be meted out to them and he will choose that which is preferable for the religion and for Islam. If he esteems that the execution of the fighting men and the enslavement of their women and children is better for Islam and its followers, then he will act thus, emulating the example of Sa'ad b. Mu'adh. If, on the contrary, he feels that it would be more advantageous to impose the *kharaḡ* upon them and that this is preferable in order to increase the *faḡ*, which enhances the resources of the Muslims against them and the other polytheists, then he is to adopt this measure toward them. Is it not correct that Allah has said in his book: <“Fight those> . . . until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled” <Koran 9:29>, and that the Prophet invited the polytheists to embrace Islam, or, if they refused, to pay the poll tax, and that Umar Ibn al-Khattab, after having subdued the inhabitants of Sawad, did not spill their blood but made of them tributaries? [p. 312]

If they offer to surrender and accept the mediation of a Muslim of their choice together with one of their number, this is to be refused, for it is unacceptable that a believer collaborate with an infidel to arrive at a decision on religious matters. If by error, the ruler's representative accepts and a verdict is proposed by both men, the imam is not to declare it binding unless it stipulates that the enemies will be tributaries or be converted to Islam. If this condition is adopted by them, then they are reproachless and if they acknowledge that they are tributaries, then they shall be accepted as such, without there being need of a verdict. [pp. 314–15]

Abu Yusuf

1. The author, a jurist, is addressing his advice to the caliph Harun al-Rashid (786–809).
2. Countries of the *dar al-harb*, conquered by *jihād*.
3. A confederation of North Arabian tribes, which were routed by Muhammed at the battle of Hunayn in 630.
4. A tribe of Christian Arabs of the Wa'il branch, established in Arabia.
5. One of the three principal Jewish tribes of Medina.

II

The Peasantry's Condition



The Northern Church at Shivta (4th century). Negev desert, Israel
Abandoned after the Arab conquest

1. Actual Life

Mesopotamia-Iraq (ca. 767–773)

Depopulation

[Al-Mansur] set up another governor to brand and mark men on their necks as slaves.¹ “And which”, says the prophet, “[had not worshipped the beast, neither the image,] neither had received his mark upon their foreheads [. . .]” [Rev. 20:4]. But here they no longer bear it only on their foreheads, but on both hands, on their breast and even on their back. [p. 104]

This governor therefore came, and his arrival made the region to tremble with greater fear than any of those who had come before him. In fact, he had orders to mark the inhabitants with a sign on their hands which would not fade and would never leave its place for the whole lifetime of the man <who had received it>.

When he entered towns, all the men were seized with terror and took flight before him. Shops were shut; there was no more buying or selling in the markets; no coming or going in the streets. Those who wished to enter <the town> were stopped by fear of evil; those who wanted to leave it, were likewise stopped because the gates of the town were closed and no one was allowed to leave.

When he had acted thus for a week, <seeing that> no one came to the town from the country, the administrators of the poll tax sent to the man who had replaced Abbas² in collecting this tax, and informed him: “The people are fleeing before the brander, and if this latter does not leave here, it will be impossible to levy the tax”.

On hearing these things, he sent a letter to the brander who went away. The men enjoyed a little respite on this side, because he died on the road. [p. 105]

On Exile

He also set up another governor to bring back each of those <who had fled> to his country, to his father’s house. He [this governor], in his turn, set up other governors whom he sent to the towns. He did not

send one for each town, but he sent the governor of any one town to another, with the result that the governors of all the towns of Mesopotamia sometimes found themselves gathered together in the same place, in connection with the exile.

Thenceforth, there was no more safety anywhere; but everywhere pillage, malice, injustice, godlessness, every wicked act, calumnies, injustice, the vengeance of men, one against another—not only by foreigners, but by members of the same family. Brother laid traps against his brother, and this one betrayed that one.

He set up a Persian [official from Baghdad] at Marda [Mardin] to bring the fugitives back there and collect the tribute. The population had taken flight from there more than from any other place, and the whole region was occupied by Arabs, because the Syrians [Christians] had fled before them.

This man was called Khalil Ibn Zadan. He made the Arabs suffer many ills. He had no equal for his hatred of the Arabs, either before or after him. He sent a few emirs to all the towns. If it was learned that a man or his father or his grandfather had been in Marda, even forty or fifty years before, he was snatched from his house, from his village, from his country, and taken back to that town. With this man a gift was no longer accepted, persuasion was in vain: very few escaped. In this way, he gathered such a multitude in this region that there was not one place, not one village, not one house which was not full and did not overflow with inhabitants. He made the Arabs move from region to region and took all that they had. He filled their lands and their houses with Syrians, and made the latter sow their corn. He seized those among them who were rich and mercilessly used every sort of torment and torture on them. He made one of them come forward, had a razor put to [cut] his hair and beard, made him a crown of paste, placed it on his head and exposed him to the sun. He then threw oil on his head in such a way that it gradually flowed over his eyes, and his head was thus gripped by sharp pains. Then he pressed his thighs, his fingers and his arms into shackles and put iron knobs on his eyes. He thus employed torments on them without pity and caused a large number of men to die as a result. The others fled and moved from place to place. [pp. 105–6]

We will also make known the ills which overwhelmed the Arabs, for no one escaped the calamity which took place at that period because of our many sins. [p. 128]

Verily, here the wicked were punished by the wicked [. . .] These Arabs penetrated into the midst of those unfortunate peasants like worms into wood, and took their lands, their houses, their seed and their livestock, so that they came to the point of taking them [the peasants]



The Prophet Habakkuk
 Syriac Bible (6th/8th century)

Ms. Syr. 341, fol. 180, BN

themselves, as well as their children, as slaves; in all that they possessed, these peasants worked for them like slaves. [. . .]

On all sides, one heard nothing talked of but blows and cruel torture and sometimes, moreover, the Arabs caused the death of the peasants who lived on their lands for they taxed them and forced them to pay [the taxes] with them, until they had ruined them and had seized all that they possessed. They fled from their dwellings. As this was the beginning of the calamity and the start of the devastation and there were still adequate resources, they were not reduced completely to perish; but nor did these depraved governors eat their fill either. [p. 130]

When the district chiefs and governors entered a village, they seized the prefect of the place and made him give up everything he had levied.

They broke open the sack and took what they wanted from it saying: "This is the emir's share". They beat honorable men and the hoary-headed elders without mercy. Thenceforth, all that was heard on every side was a cry of lament.

He [the governor] also helped all the governors charged with seeking out fugitives, for he was party to their brigandage. He sent them to the furthestmost frontiers and instructed them <to collect> a triple or quadruple capitation fee. He made every effort to make the people of God [the Jacobites] suffer all manner of cruel evils.

The grandees of the town themselves favored him because he promised them great things. Everywhere, he demanded tribute for himself and not for the royal treasury.

The evils on the region multiplied: exile; extortionists who claimed what was owing by a man who had been dead for twenty years, and took the same tax several times without mercy; many other ills, <such as> excessive taxes and others which it is impossible to list because of their great number. [p. 134]

On Poll Tax (Jizya)

When they knew that he [a peasant] could give nothing because he possessed nothing, these governors who were unjust judges, said to him: "Come out on to the public square, watch out for someone whom you know possesses something and say: 'I left my property with this man', or again: 'He is my debtor'". And that unfortunate man, oppressed from right and left, from the front and from behind, from above and from below, was driven by fear of God not to give false testimony against this man, and he was prevented from refraining from so doing by the torture that these godless judges inflicted on him. And then he took God as his witness that he was forced to do these things and that it was not of his own will that he was led to bear false testimony against people whom he had never seen or whom he did not know. [. . .] They had been abandoned because their leaders went from malicious act to malicious act and hastened from one injustice to another. They despoiled and pillaged the poor who were in their midst like lambs fallen among wolves; they subjected them to all forms of evil and sold their property which was barely enough to pay the poll tax, not to mention the other calamities which they had to suffer: <on the part> of those who were seeking out the exiled, of those who took away livestock, <from the officials of> the tithes, the *sufi*,³ and the *ta'dil*.⁴ [pp. 135–36]

On Torture

First, they made pieces of wood four fingers wide and flat on both sides. Then, they stretched a man out with his face against the ground,

and one of them stood on his head, another on his feet, while a third beat his thighs mercilessly like on a hide. [. . .]

Secondly, they brought two sticks bound with chains at one end, and applied them to the thighs of an individual, one above and the other below. Then, a robust man positioned himself at the other end, until the thighs were broken. And thus was accomplished <that word>: "Thou puttest my feet also in the stocks" <Job 13:27>.

Thirdly, they hung them up by their arms until their limbs were dislocated, and even the women by their breasts, until they were torn off.

Fourthly, they stripped them of their clothing, loaded them with stones and immersed them in snow and ice in this condition. They also poured cold water over them until they became inert and fell on their faces to the ground.

Fifthly, they took five pieces of wood. They split them all at one end, put someone's fingers into this split and squeezed the other end until the two sections came together and the fingers were broken. They also took two planks which they bound together at one end and placed one under the loins, the other on the stomach. Then a man stood on the other end until the ribs were broken and the entrails on the point of coming out.

They made fetters for the arms and for every limb. They sharpened reeds and forced them under the fingernails. They made a type of pellet which they put in the eye socket until the eyes were about to be gouged out. They made them stand in snow and water bare-footed and without clothing until they turned white as death. They whirled thick sticks and beat them without pity while they were stretched out on the ground. For them, whips were of no use, and prison unnecessary. [. . .]⁵

They did not wait until they had completed one torture before they moved on to another.[. . .] They wanted to accumulate every type of torment on their bodies at the same time. They threw them naked into the snow; they gathered large stones which they placed under their backs until their guts cracked and their ribs and spine were broken. They heated the bath until it burned like fire. They filled it with smoke and shut them there naked; then they brought cats which they threw in their midst and, as these cats were burning, they hurled themselves on them and ripped them with their claws. They confined them in dark rooms into which no ray of light penetrated. [. . .]

They crushed the poor people with all these torments and all these tortures, at the time of the tax.

Would the gods and goddesses not have gloried in this bitter persecution, had this calamity not been universal, including—mixed altogether—Christians and pagans, Jews and Samaritans, worshippers of fire and of sun, Magians, and Muslims, Sabeans and Manicheans? Yet

the matter had nothing to do with faith, and affected the man who worships to the East no more than he who worships to the West. The name of <the worship> of the South [Islam] disappeared with that of <the worship> of the North [Christianity]. If the Christians had been the sole object of this persecution, I might with justice have been able to glorify the martyrs of our time above all previous martyrs: for rapid death by the sword is kinder than prolonged torments which do not cease. [. . .] A cup of bitterness and a diet of anger lay in store for all men equally; for great and small, for rich and poor, as the prophet says [Jer. 25:15]: The rich man continually ate bitterness because they unjustly took what he possessed and because his bones were broken by blows; the poor man because they demanded from him what he did not possess, what he could not borrow and because no one gave him work, neither in the field nor the vineyard. [. . .]

Let no one, my brethren, think that I exaggerate here, but let it be known that all the calamus⁶ and all the paper in the world would not be enough to write down the ills which have crushed men in our time. Let no one blame us for having diminished them, for we are incapable of thinking of everything, and these calamities did not only occur in one town. [pp. 142–44]

They practiced iniquity without shame. The earth was troubled and turned topsy-turvy, and men went from village to village, from one place to the next. [. . .] No one, neither bishop, nor priest, nor judge, was exempt from sin, or calumny, or pillage, or denunciation, or abuse, or curses, or hatred, or gossip, or brigandage, or adultery, or the violation of graves. All the seeds of the devil were now sown in every man. Each one strove to do evil in accordance with his rank and power. [p. 166]

These things have not come down to us by hearsay, but we see them before our eyes. [. . .]

If someone owned something and wanted to flee, he was imprisoned as if bound, until he was stripped of everything and left with nothing. As soon as he was robbed of everything, he was able to flee, but as long as he had something he could not. If he took flight, the journey itself despoiled him. If it so happened that he deposited something in the ground, even the place betrayed him: "Here is the property of such a person: come, let us take it". If he disclosed his repository to someone, this person became his despoiler and took his property himself instead of robbers and brigands. [p. 167]

The Christians dragged out all the iron or wooden utensils <?> from their houses and sold them; they tore out their doors and sold them, awaiting a better time; lastly, they even ripped out the beams from their houses and sold them. Then they abandoned the ruins of their dwellings

and went away stripped clean, wandering from village to village, from one place to another. [p. 168]

We have to say not only that “meat offering and the drink offering is cut off from the house of the Lord” <Joel, 1:9>, but that the churches’ liturgical <?> books have been torn out and sold, that the remainder have been burned in the fire, that their sacred vessels have been destroyed. The vineyards have been laid waste; the grape harvest mourns <Isaiah 24:7>. The fields have brought forth thorns and brambles; the fig trees have withered; the olive trees were destroyed; the pomegranate trees, date palms, the apple trees and all the trees have died. That is why joy has disappeared from among men; the workers have taken flight and their houses have become the dwellings of wild beasts.

When collecting the poll tax and many others, they [the governors’ assistants] demanded several times the amount. They sold everything the men possessed and they took <the value> of it. Not only did they exact the tax which was due in a place, but the same tax several times. There was neither beginning, nor middle, nor end <to their extortions>. They fell upon the country and hurled themselves upon it, saying: “The share of such a village is so much; so many <dinars> still remain <to be paid>”. And they went on to tax it again. When they obtained the sum by violence, they began to exact it again. No one dared to speak out, because everyone was afraid of being taxed further by the judge. They seized notables and put pressure on them mercilessly: to the point that it caused their death and destroyed many of them.

The peasants themselves helped the wrong-doers. They attacked men, took away and sold everything they possessed. They said, untruthfully: “You have a vine in our country, or a garden, a wood, a field of olive trees”, or: “You are responsible for someone”, or: “You are subject to the poll tax in our land, and see, for so many years you have not paid the tribute. Pay now that we are hard-pressed”.

For such or like motives, the peasants seized poor men and plundered them. The judge himself taught them to act thus; he assisted them and did not ask them to account for what they did. They fell on a passerby, seized him, brought up false testimony against him <which said>: “This man is liable for our tribute”. He stated on oath: “I have never seen these men, nor have they seen me”. They said: “He is liable for our tribute”.⁷ And there were false witnesses among them whom they produced against him. Thus they sold his livestock, his property and all he possessed. They moved around the towns like dogs which sniff the ground for traces of their masters, animals or flocks. They informed themselves of those who had some stores: either of wheat, or iron or any other commodity, and they seized it. One should have seen them moving round the towns, in gangs, watching out for a man and saying:

“Such a man is one of ours”.⁸ The man who escaped from one was seized by others, who took him to still others. If it so happened that he had hidden something, either in the ground or with someone, the place itself shouted it out, like a pregnant woman seized with birth pains. It is in like circumstances that men spent the holy days of Lent. [pp. 169–70]

Exodus of the Peasants

Razin⁹ went on to Arzun¹⁰ and Maipherkat,¹¹ and when he saw the brigandage of the governors of the town, he condemned them to great torments and violent torture; to the point where they were gnawed by vermin and died. He broke their hands and feet in the stocks, and he took away everything they had pillaged.

God delivered them up to the evils of this cruel villain, and all the impious acts they had committed fell on their own heads. It was said that they seized beardless youths in the streets and defiled them. Scribes and ungodly money-changers, who were Christians, had young girls taken and led away and they defiled them, both daughters of the people and daughters of notables. [. . .] I have noted down some of these things in order that when the leaders see them, they [will] confront their conscience with God, that they do not act as they please and contrary to honesty; and also that they should know that there is a law, even for those who make the law, and that they understand that the prince who behaves in such a lawless manner immediately and rapidly loses the title of prince, in which lies his glory and, in exchange, receives the title of tyrant, which is full of madness; which is the beginning of dementia. [. . .]

There was great affliction in the lands of the South [lower Iraq, Syria], because of the drought which we mentioned above. All the southern and eastern region was roused by the cruelty and persecution of Musa Ibn Musab. Their inhabitants invaded Mesopotamia. Villages and towns, houses and fields were full of them; to the point where it was not possible to move around or settle anywhere because of them. This increased the tribulations which weighed on the poor and the workers of Mesopotamia, because no one gave them wages, no one employed a single one of them. If someone offered to work solely for the cost of his food, there was to be found as many as were wanted among them, who agreed to work, even if they were not given enough bread. The whole day, without cease, they moved around houses, men and women, children and the old; when they noticed a door open somewhere, thirty or forty of them at a time hurled themselves at it. In the beginning everyone gave them alms. But when this host of poor people, of these strangers, of these starvelings, increased excessively, one stopped giving; for the inhabitants

feared to go in want themselves and to become more miserable than they, and moreover the governor, through fraud and theft, had taken all the wheat from the landowners and had it sold. [. . .] The inhabitants of the various regions of Mesopotamia joined together and entered the towns, fleeing the famine. All their property was sold and no one wanted to lend to them. They ate meat and dairy produce throughout Lent. Because of the low price of livestock, they were given as much meat as they wanted everywhere. In certain places this famine became worse for the native inhabitants because of the multitude of strangers, to the point where they attacked the corpses of the dead.

The strangers who had abandoned their land because of the famine, in order not to die there, were preceded, accompanied and pursued by sword and plague wherever they came and went. [pp. 175–77]

When the ills increased because of the governor, dearth, famine, plague, and the various diseases which swooped down on men, these men abandoned their houses and went to settle in the mountains and valleys. There they died like flies from hunger, plague, and cold and they were eaten by birds and beasts without anyone to bury them.

This plague weighed heavily on the lower regions and desolated the whole of this region. With the result that courts [habitations] where there had been forty or fifty people were left without a single inhabitant. In Mosul, more than a thousand coffins were taken out of the town daily. In the region of Nisibin, several villages, which had become sizeable, were totally ruined. All the great [notables] of the region died. Above all, this plague caused the death of the priests of towns and countryside. [. . .] Fields, villages, the great courts of the towns were left deserted. [p. 186]

[Pseudo] Dionysius of Tell-Mahre

1. Al-Mansur, brother of the caliph al-Saffah (750–54), was governor of Mesopotamia, Mosul, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. According to Ghevond (eighth century), he forced all *dhimmis* to wear a lead seal on their necks (p. 124).

2. Al-Abbas, former governor of the Jazira, was replaced by Musa b. Musab.

3. A tax imposed on currency destined for the troops.

4. A harvest tax calculated in proportion to the number of taxpayers.

5. The tortures are confirmed by the Armenian historians. Cf. Ghevond: "Gallows, presses and scaffolds were erected everywhere; one saw everywhere only terrible, endless tortures" (p. 131). The lower class of the population had been "exposed to different sorts of tortures: some suffered flagellation for having been unable to pay exorbitant contributions, others were hung up on the gallows or crushed under the presses; others were stripped of their clothing and thrown into lakes in the depths of an extremely harsh winter; and the soldiers who were disposed on the bank prevented them from reaching land, and forced them to die wretchedly" (p. 132). Many sought refuge in caves; others committed suicide.

6. A reed used for writing.

7. Levied on the community.

8. Member of the same community.
9. The person responsible for controlling the governors, who cruelly tormented all the inhabitants, according to this author.
10. Former capital of Arzanenus, in Kurdistan, north of the Tigris.
11. Former Martyropolis, south of Armenia.

Egypt

Journey of the Jacobite Patriarch Dionysius of Tell-Mahre to Egypt (826 or 827)

Yaqdan¹ had a Chalcedonian [Greek Orthodox] scribe [secretary] at Edessa who was called Walid. He detested the Christians [Jacobites]. When they complained of him [Walid] to Yaqdan, he honored him even more because of the evils that he taught him to inflict on the Christians. The Edessenians [Jacobites from Edessa] could not tolerate him and went down into Egypt to the emir Abdallah [b.Tahir], in order to complain about these two men. When Walid saw that his downfall was close at hand, he saw to it that Yaqdan demolished their churches. He wrote to the leader of Callinicum² to arouse his anger against the Edessenians and against Theodosius³, their metropolitan. This leader, who was also an enemy of the Christians, presented the <letters> to the emir Muhammad [brother of Abdallah b.Tahir]. This latter, who was a young man, allowed himself to be taken in by the words of the judge. He [the emir Muhammad, governor of Callinicum] ordered that every new building be destroyed, and the Church of the Forty Martyrs was destroyed, as well as the *diaconicon* and the sacristy of the Great Church, the small north atrium of the baptistry, the basilica and the rest of the buildings of Theodosius³. They also destroyed the monastery [convent] of the Chalcedonian women and the church, and they built a mosque in the tetrapylon situated in front of the Old Church, the place called Beit Sabta. [3:61]³

Seeing these things, the Taiyaye of Harran, were encouraged to demolish the church and molest Christians.

When we received this news at Nisibin, we took a few bishops and set off without delay for Egypt, to the emir Abdallah [b.Tahir]. We and the bishops boarded a boat at Joppa [Jaffa] [. . .] After two days [of storms], we were thrown into the port of the town of Tanisis [Tanis]. When the inhabitants learned who we were, over thirty thousand of them came out to meet us. [3:62]⁴

We were delayed in the towns which are on the banks of the river, because they did not allow us <to depart> until we had celebrated and made them partake of the Mysteries.

The Egyptians placed high value on receiving them from the hands of the patriarch. As a result of our delay, Theodosi<us>⁵ went before us and spoke to the emir about us and about the storm at sea. When we arrived at the Persian camp [the armies of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun] and when I came into his presence, he reprimanded me for having journeyed by sea, "being elderly", he said, "and cloaked in such dignity"; for I was much respected by him. He said: "Who obliged you to come to Egypt; you could have let me know what you wished by letter, all the more so as your brother [Theodosius], who was principally concerned, came." I answered: "This metropolitan, O prince, <has come> on his own account and because of what Edessa has suffered [the persecution of the Christians]; <but as that> is spreading in all the countries, it is I who am the most afflicted and the most oppressed, when our churches are destroyed and when our laws are abolished". And as the time of our visit to him was at night because he was engaged all day in battles,⁶ we spoke to him for a long time of useful things and I introduced to him the embassy [delegation] from the Jazira and from the West⁷ and [presented] their recriminations against his prefects.

I told him the lamentable story of Tanisis, a town in Egypt. Although it had a large population and churches, we had never seen poverty such as that of its inhabitants. When we asked whence <it came>, they answered: "Our town is surrounded by water, and we have neither harvest nor other resources; we cannot keep flocks; the water we drink comes from afar and we buy it for four zuz a pitcher; our work consists of the flax that our women spin and that we weave; the price that we receive per day from the clothes merchants is half a zuz a day. And although our work is not enough to put bread into our mouths, when we are taxed for the tribute, each of us is obliged to give five dinars; we are beaten and thrown into prison and forced to give our sons and daughters as a pledge, in order to work like slaves, for two years per dinar; and if it is a daughter or a wife, and if it so happen that she give birth while among them, they make us swear that we will not trouble them on this subject. It also happens that before the moment comes for the freeing of someone's wife, a new tribute is imposed. And they asked me, O emir, to inform you of their situation so that you may have pity on them." Then the emir ordered that, according to the law of the Jazira, they give tribute of forty-eight zuz for the most affluent, twenty-four for the middle [rank] and twelve for the poor, when the poll tax would be levied on them.

He wrote an edict for us so that everything that had been destroyed at Edessa should be rebuilt, and so that no one should ever destroy any part of a church. [3:62–64]

Second Journey to Egypt by Dionysius of Tell-Mahre (832)

In the month of Sebat <February>, the king [al-Ma'mun] entered Egypt, and the patriarch Mar Dionysius entered it with him, for the second time, as he himself wrote, saying:

When we came to the town of Farama [Pelusium], the first in Egypt, the king had me summoned by Fadhl, director of royal affairs. When I entered, he held out his hand to me according to custom and said: "You have learned, O patriarch, of the revolt of the Egyptian Christians that are called Biamaye [in lower Egypt]. The first devastations that they suffered were not enough for them. And if it was not that I am merciful and that I do not contemplate massacre, I would not send them a man such as you. But take the bishops who are with you and the Egyptian bishops and go and find them; negotiate with them on condition that they surrender the rebels and that they come with the army where I will decide and I will make them live there; if not, I will have them put to death by the sword." When I had talked to him for a long time about submission and about leaving them in their country, he answered: "No! Either they leave or they are put to death". And he immediately ordered that the patriarch of Egypt accompany me. We went by water, and eight days afterwards the patriarch Joseph came to find us in order to join us.

We immediately went down to the Basrut, which is the district of the Biamaye. We found them assembled and protected on an island surrounded by water, reeds and rushes on all sides. Then their leaders came out to us. When we reprimanded them for the revolt and for the massacres they had committed, they placed the blame on those who ruled them. When they learned that they had to leave their land, they were dismayed and begged us to send to the king to ask if they could go to him and tell him all their sufferings. They said that Abu'l-Wazir condemned them to excessive tribute; that he imprisoned them in the [words missing] and that when their wives came to pass them food, his servants seized them and raped them; that he had killed a large number of them, and intended to do away with all of them, so that they could not complain to the king about him. It was he who had urged [General] Apsin to go into their villages in order to make them come to this [army] camp, and in order to kill the men.

Now, it so happened that the soldiers met a woman and seized her in order to rape her. When she cried out and shouted, those who were on the island heard her voice, hastened out and joined the fray, killing and being killed; and for this reason, the peace was broken and ceased completely. [3:76-78]

When we reached General Apsin and informed him that the rebels were adamant, he answered: "The peace is broken. Go and tell the king

that no peace is possible". And they started war. They set fire to villages, vines, gardens, and churches in the whole district. The Biamaye, for their part, pierced the Persians by throwing javelins or spears from amidst the water. They brought along their neighbors, rousing them against them [the Persians], and began to kill and be killed.

When we reached the king, I told him everything, and informed him of the injustice <committed in respect> of the Egyptians and the wickedness of Abu'l-Wazir, who had prevented peace, and that the people of the land were complaining of him and of two others. [3:79]

King Ma'mun went down to the Biamaye; he brought the devastation among them to an end; he summoned their leaders and ordered them to leave this region. They [the leaders] revealed to him the harshness of the prefects <set up> over them, and [explained] that, if they left their land, they would not have the means to live, since they drew their livelihood from papyrus and catching fish. Then they accepted his orders; they left by ships for Antioch, and from there they were sent to Baghdad. They numbered three thousand. The majority of them died on the way. Those who had been taken during the war were given as slaves to the Taiyaye, to the number of some five hundred. They exported them to Damascus and sold them there. A thing that had never been seen in the empire of the Taiyaye: they sold those who were subjected to the yoke of the poll tax.⁸ But, with the help of God, we exhorted the faithful and they were all redeemed and released. They did not go back to their land, because there was a great famine there, and many withdrew to Syria in order to have their fill of bread.

The king ordered the prefects not to use the Egyptians harshly, on pain of death. He remitted half the tax for all of Egypt.

When the king had left Egypt, disasters multiplied on the Egyptians. The Persians entered the villages, chained together those who resisted in tens or twenties, and sent them to Fustat [near Cairo], without finding out whether they were guilty or innocent. Many died without having committed an offence. Some of those who were led away in chains to be slaughtered asked the man who was escorting them to accept a gift and to release them. As they had been given to him counted, he said: "Wait until we meet others on the way, and I will chain them up in your place". They met three men: a priest and two Taiyaye, one of whom was imam of a mosque; they were taken in the place of those who were released on payment of a gift. And as the oppressed were not permitted to speak, they were slaughtered. Thus, the roads were filled with men unjustly killed. Sword and captivity, famine and plague prevailed in the land of Egypt at this period.

[When al-Ma'mun died (833), he was succeeded by al-Mu'tasim.] He sent his troops to fight the Zotaye,⁹ who lived among the lakes into which the



Coptic Fabric (7th–8th century). Egypt

cat. no. 139, Israel Museum

Euphrates and the Tigris flowed [lower Iraq]; for these people were continually in revolt and tormented the king. They beat, pillaged and slaughtered the merchants who came to Baghdad from Basra, India and China. But the troops could do nothing against them, because they fought from their boats. Then the king sent the Egyptians whom he had taken prisoner in Egypt, who were accustomed to water and swam like fish in water; without being seen, they suddenly struck the Zotaye with spears and pierced them. Thus, the Zotaye were vanquished by the [defeated] Biamaye; they were seized, with their women and children at the same time, and they wasted away and succumbed in prison in Baghdad. When the king saw the Egyptians' brilliant feats of arms in the battle against the Zotaye, he appreciated them, and took some of them into his service, to work in the gardens and parks, and others to weave the flaxen garments, in the manner of Egyptian embroidered work; he allowed all the others to return to their country. When they reached the

sea, they took their places on boats to go back down to Egypt; but <divine> justice did not permit them to go and live there; a storm arose and they were all drowned in the sea. [3:82–84]

Under the Caliph Harun al-Wathiq (842–847)

At Cyrrhus [north of Aleppo], another prefect was going from village to village when he met a camel-driver whose camels were urinating on the road; he said to him: “Why do you let these camels piss on the road on which Muslims travel, to make them slide and fall?”. He had him thrown into prison with his camels, until he gave him <a gift>. Another day, he saw a man who had fallen from his ass, and who had broken his head. Learning from him that his ass had taken fright and had thrown him to the ground; he ordered the ass to be killed, on the grounds that it was fearful and the murderer of his master. When this poor man saw the prefect’s sentence, he gave him two dinars and saved <his ass>. When one man complained about another, he imprisoned both of them until both were thereby ruined. And in this way, men were prevented from bringing a complaint; and of necessity they observed the commandment which says “Recompense to no man evil for evil”. <Rom. 12:17>

They prevented the harvest of the grapes in its season, until they had levied one dinar per thousand plants; likewise at the presses, they prevented pressing until they had been given the money that they wanted; then they confined the wine to barrels until they had levied <a tax> on buyers and sellers.

They likewise levied <taxes> on the roads and at the gates of towns; and also at the start of the harvest, and on millstones, and when they pruned, and picked the olives.

Ahmad Bar Abu Da’ud promulgated all these evil laws.

We remember what was done by the people of his tribe, the Iyadayites [of the tribe of Iyad of Iraq]. The mind is astounded, the tongue trembles at the memory of the impiety of the Iyadayites. In fact, they were so boastful at this period that no one could withstand them, nor prevent them doing whatever they wished. [. . .] Should an Iyadayite covet a village: he burdened it with taxes until its owners were forced to sell it and then he bought it himself for almost nothing.

Ahmad seized a number of villages in this way. The men were persecuted by the Iyadayites and by the prefects. The Taiyaye themselves were persecuted. [3:106–7]


1. We have found no further details about this person.
2. Callinicum, ancient name of Raqqa, in northern Mesopotamia on the Euphrates, a town developed under the early Abbasids.
3. House of the Sabbath, probably an ancient synagogue.
4. The majority of the population of Egypt at this period was still Christian.
5. Theodosius, bishop of Edessa and brother of Dionysius, the patriarch.
6. Abdallah b. Tahir had been sent by the caliph to expel the Arabs of Spain from Alexandria.
7. Jazira: the region north of the Euphrates; "the West" refers to Egypt.
8. This observation by the Patriarch Dionysius indicates a seeming unawareness of the rule condemning to slavery, deportation, or death any rebel *dhimmi*; and slavery for *dhimmis* unable to pay the *jizya*. His account depicts the good relations between the patriarch and the caliph and his generals, and the simultaneous persecution of his flock.
9. Zotaye or Zanj: black slaves from Africa who farmed the domains of the Arabs in lower Iraq. They revolted in the early ninth century.

2. Jurists' Opinions

In order to collect the poll tax, one must not beat the taxpayers, nor expose them to the sun nor resort to other such methods, or inflict upon them repulsive physical torments. They must be shown gentleness, or imprisoned in order to extract payment from them for what they owe, and they are not to be released until they have paid in full. The *wali* [governor of a province] is not allowed to exempt any Christian, Jew, Magian [Zoroastrian], Sabean,¹ or Samaritan from paying the tax, and no one can obtain a partial reduction. It is illegal for one to be exempted and another not, because their lives and possessions are spared only on account of the payment of the poll tax, which serves in lieu of the *kharaj* related to their possessions. [p. 189]

Concerning the Costume and Appearance of the Tributaries

Furthermore, you must set a seal upon their necks when the poll tax is collected and until all have been passed in review, though these seals may later be broken at their request, as did Uthman b. Hunayf. You have succeeded in ordering that none of them should have the freedom to resemble a Muslim by his dress, his mount, or his appearance; that all should wear a belt <*zunnar*> at the waist similar to a coarse string, which each must knot in the middle; that their bonnets be quilted; that their saddles carry, instead of a pommel, a piece of wood like a pomegranate; that their footwear be furnished with double straps. That they avoid coming face to face with Muslims; that their womenfolk do not ride on padded saddles; that they do not build new synagogues or churches within the town and restrict themselves to using, as places of worship, those which existed at the time of the treaty that transformed them into tributaries, and which were left to them without having been demolished; the same applies to the funeral pyres [of the Zoroastrians]. It is tolerated for them to live in the main towns, to buy and sell in Muslim markets, but selling neither wine nor pigs, and without displaying crosses in the main towns; but their headgear should be long and coarse. Consequently, command your representatives to oblige the tributaries to respect these requirements in their appearance, as Umar



Two Abbasid Poll Tax Leaden Disks (854/900)

Hirschberg, *Research* (1969–70), pl. 1 & 2, p. 7

Ibn al-Khattab had done, as he said: “in order to distinguish them from the Muslims at a glance”.

I have it from Abd ar-Rahman b. Thabit b. Thawban, in the name of his father, that Umar b. Abd al-Aziz [717–20] wrote the following to one of his governors: “After the preliminaries [greetings]; do not allow any cross to be exhibited without smashing and destroying it; no Jew or Christian may be allowed to ride upon a saddle, but must use a pack-saddle, and let none of their womenfolk use a padded saddle, but only a pack-saddle; formal decrees must be issued in this respect and the public prevented from disobeying them. No Christian may wear a *qaba*, nor a fine cloth nor a turban! It has been reported to me that several Christians under your jurisdiction have relapsed into the custom of wearing turbans, no longer wear belts at the waist, and let their hair grow freely without cutting it. Upon my life! If this happens in your entourage, it is on account of your weakness, your incompetence, and

the flatteries that you heed, and these people know, in resuming their former customs, what kind of person you are. Keep a watch on all I have forbidden and do not contradict those who have done it. Peace". [pp. 195–96]

Abu Yusuf

1. A Judeo-Christian sect widespread in lower Mesopotamia. In the Middle Ages, the Sabians living in the Harran in upper Mesopotamia claimed membership of this sect in order to take advantage of the protected status of the Peoples of the Book.

Poll Tax and Land Tax

The poll tax and the *kharaj* are two levies that Allah has imposed upon the polytheists for the benefit of the believers and that have three aspects in common and three that differ, apart from the more complicated applications of the rules. The three points in common are as follows: (a) both taxes are imposed upon the polytheists in order to emphasize their inferior condition and their humiliation; (b) they increase the *fay* and the proceeds are reserved for those entitled to the *fay*; (c) the payment becomes due at the end of the year and is not payable before this date. The three points by which they differ are the following: (a) the poll tax is stipulated in a [koranic] text, whereas the *kharaj* was devised by personal estimation <*ijtihad*>¹; (b) the lowest rate of the first is established by the [koranic] Law, the highest being calculated by personal estimations, whereas both rates of the second are based on personal estimation; (c) the former is payable as long as the individual remains an infidel, and disappears subsequent to his conversion; whereas the second is payable whether he has remained an infidel or converted to Islam.

The *jizya*, or poll tax, which is to be levied on the head of each subject, is derived from the verb *jaza* <retribution or remuneration>, either because it is a remuneration due by reason of their unbelief, for it is exacted from them with contempt, or because it amounts to a remuneration because we granted them quarter, for it is exacted from them with mildness. The origin of this impost is the divine text: "Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden—such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book—until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled" <Koran 9:29>. [pp. 299–300]

The words *out of hand* may mean either despite their state of riches and opulence, or that they are convinced that we have the strength and

power necessary to exact it from them. As for the words *and have been humbled*, they either signify that they are to be despised and humiliated or that they must be governed by Islamic prescriptions.

Every authority must impose the poll tax on the followers of the revealed religions who come under our protection, so that they may thereby dwell in Islamic territory, and the payment that they make confers upon them the following two rights: to be left unmolested and to be protected, so that, by virtue of the former, they have security, and by virtue of the latter, they find the shelter of our arm. [. . .]

Like the others, the Arabs are subjected to the poll tax <whenever it is applicable>. However Abu Hanifa [ca. 767]² stipulated: "I do not require it of the Arabs in order that they should not be a target of humiliation". Neither the renegade, nor the materialist, nor the idolator is subjected to it; nonetheless, Abu Hanifa did subject the latter to it when he is a non-Arab, but not in the case of an Arab.

The followers of the revealed books are the Jews and the Christians, whose sacred writings are respectively the Torah and the Gospels. [pp. 301–2]

Whoever converts from a Jewish to a Christian sect is not free to do so. According to the more correct of the two opinions he is obliged to become a Muslim. [p. 302]

When peace has been made with them [the infidels] on condition that hospitality be shown by them to passing Muslims, this obligation is to be limited to three days and cannot be increased. It was in this manner that Umar dealt with the Christians of Syria by imposing upon them the obligation to lodge in their homes any traveling Muslims, while providing them with normal food, but without requiring them to slaughter a sheep or a hen; as well as the obligation to provide shelter for their animals but without supplying fodder for them; moreover, only the inhabitants of the countryside, excluding the towns, were subjected to this obligation. [pp. 304–5]

Two clauses appear in the poll tax contract, one of which is obligatory and the other recommended. The first entails six articles: (a) they must neither attack, nor deform the Holy Book; (b) nor accuse the Prophet of falsehood nor quote him with contempt; (c) nor speak of the Muslim faith in order to denigrate or question it; (d) nor approach a Muslim woman with a view to having illegal relations, or marriage; (e) nor entice a Muslim from his faith, nor harm him or his belongings; (f) nor aid enemies or lodge any of their spies. These are those duties to which they must strictly conform and which they must observe without it being necessary to stipulate them. If this is done, it is merely in order that they should be made aware of them, to confirm the solemnity of the obligation that is incumbent upon them and in order to emphasize that,

henceforth, engaging in one of these acts will result in the nullification of the treaty that has been conceded to them.

The second clause, which is only recommended, also consists of six points: (a) changing their outward attire by the wearing of a distinctive sign <*ghūyar*>, and a special belt <*zunmar*>; (b) prohibiting the construction of buildings higher than those of the Muslims; they should be only of equal height, or lower; (c) prohibiting them from causing offence to Muslims by the ringing of their bells <*nakus*>, the reading of their books, and their pretensions concerning *Uzayr*³ and the Messiah; (d) prohibiting them from drinking wine in public, or displaying either crosses or pigs; (e) the obligation for them to conduct their funerals in secret, without a demonstrative display of mourning and lamentation; (f) prohibiting them from riding horses, be they thoroughbreds or crossbreeds, though leaving them the use of mules and donkeys. These six prescriptions are not necessarily to be included in the vassalage agreement, unless they were expressly stipulated, in which case they are strictly obligatory. Despite their having been stipulated, any offence does not result in the nullification of the pact, but the infidels are forcibly obliged to respect them and are punished for having violated them. They are not punishable if nothing was expressly stated in this respect. [pp. 305–6]

When allies and their tributaries unite in order to combat the Muslims, they immediately fall into the category of enemies and each of these combatants can be put to death. For those who did not take up arms, it must be decided whether or not they gave their approbation to the hostilities.

The refusal of tributaries to pay the poll tax constitutes a violation of the treaty that was conceded to them. According to Abu Hanifa, this refusal is not tantamount to a violation unless, in addition to this, they rejoin the “territory of war” [*dar al-harb*]. This tax is levied by force, in the same manner as other debts.

They are not allowed to erect new synagogues or churches in the territory of Islam and any built are to be demolished without compensation. They can restore ancient synagogues and churches that have fallen into ruin.

The violation of their covenant by the tributaries permits us to put them to death, pillage their belongings and enslave their women, but only when they combat us. Otherwise one expels them from Muslim territory, in respecting them until they reach their place of safety in the nearest polytheistic country. If they do not leave of their own will, then they are to be expelled by force. [pp. 308–9]

1. A juridical term meaning a personal effort at interpretation of a dogma or of a law.
2. Abu Hanifa. See Appendix A.
3. According to the Muslims, the Jews regarded this personage [Ezra ?], named in the Koran 9:30, as the Son of God.

“Humiliation and derision are to be the lot of those that disobey my word”. The *dhimmis* are the most disobedient of His command and contrary to His word; consequently it befits them to be humiliated by distinguishing them from the comportment of the Muslims whom Allah has exalted through their obedience to Him [Allah] and His Prophet above those that have disobeyed Him. These He has humiliated, belittled, and rendered abominable so that the sign of contempt is manifest upon them, so that they can be distinguished by their appearance. That a distinctive sign [*ghiyar*] must be imposed upon them is clear from the Prophet’s statement: “Whoso of you makes them [Jews and Christians] his friends is one of them” [Koran 5:56]. [. . .] It is obligatory to force the infidel to remain similar to his people so that the Muslims can detect him. For has not the Prophet said: “The rider shall greet the pedestrian, the pedestrian he who is seated, and the individual the assembly [. . .] whereas it is forbidden to greet a Jew or Christian first. If one of them greets us [Muslims], then we reply, ‘and upon you,’.¹ If that is the custom of Islam, then it is necessary to impose upon the *dhimmis* a special garb so that they can be recognized and Islamic custom be properly observed and a Muslim may know who has greeted him. Is he a Muslim who deserves to be greeted in peace or is he a *dhimmi* who is not deserving? [. . .] Moreover the distinctive dress serves other purposes. He [the Muslim] will thereby know that he is not to go to meet him, he is not to seat him among Muslim company, he is not to kiss his hand, he is not to stand up for him, he is not to address him with the terms *brother* or *master*, he is not to wish him success or honor as is customary toward a Muslim, he is not to give him Muslim charity, he is not to call him as a witness, either for accusation or defence, he is not to sell him a Muslim slave, and he is not to give him religious or legal books concerning Islam. [p. 81]

“The turban is the crown of the Arabs [*‘arab*]. [. . .] Turbans are not the attire of the children of Israel, but that of the Arabs. Abu Qasim said, “It is forbidden for a *dhimmi* to don a turban, for he must have no honor in the land of Islam and therefore it is not his attire”. [p. 84]

It is strictly forbidden to address a *dhimmi* as “sir” or “master”, as it is stated in the *hadith*: “Do not call the unfaithful ‘sir’, for if he is your ‘sir’ then you have angered your Lord”. As for calling them, “Glory of the State”, “Pillar of the State”,² and so on, this is not allowed. If any one of

them bears these titles, then a Muslim must not call him by them. If he be a Christian let him address him: "You, there, Christian", "You, there, O cross"; and if he be a Jew, let him address him with the words, "You, there, Jew". [p. 115]

The *dhimmi* is bound to honor the Muslims in their assemblies, showing them respect and deference. He should not beguile them, nor must he enter their presence without their permission. He must not perform disrespectful or discourteous deeds in their presence. He must greet them as he would his fellows. He must not uncover his legs nor raise his voice in their presence. [p. 118]

The neglect or substitution of these laws of Umar by others, even though accepted by the religious authorities, constitute a negligence on the part of him to whom Allah has commended the truth, and a victory for the enemies of Allah. For, in allowing them to manifest their irreligion and to emerge from the status of inferiority, the religion of Allah, His Prophet, His Book, and the Muslims are thereby defamed [. . .] and the demonstrations that we have adduced confirm that *jihad* is obligatory until the word of Allah reigns supreme, and until all are of the religion of Allah [Islam], until the religion of Allah triumphs over all religions and until they pay the poll tax while in a state of inferiority. [pp. 236–37]

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya

1. This formula means: "May your curses be on your own head."
2. Honorific titles given to distinguished officials.

Malik b. Anas [d. 795]¹ said that it is not right for a Muslim to teach the Arabic script or anything else to a Christian. Furthermore, he should not place his child in foreign [non-Muslim] schools in order to learn an alphabet [language] other than the Arabic [language]. [. . .]

When a *dhimmi* sneezes, one should no longer say, "may Allah bless you!" but, "may Allah lead you to the right path!" or, "may he improve your situation".

If a *dhimmi* has had a criminal relationship with a consenting Muslim woman, opinions are divided as to whether or not the pact [of protection] is thereby annulled. If, on the contrary, he took her by force, as far as I am aware there is no disagreement and as far as that individual is concerned, his pact is ended. In this manner the pact of most of the *dhimmis* of Egypt has been annulled, for they insulted the Muslims and maintained, in one way or another, criminal relationships with Muslim women. For the rest, Allah is all-knowing.²

If the *dhimmi* refuses to pay the *jizya*, then his pact [*dhimma*] is broken and all of his possessions may be seized.

If he insults the Prophet, he is to be put to death. But it may be asked whether he can escape death by converting to Islam. Although there are two opinions on this subject, it would seem that whenever a *dhimmi* is condemned to death for violation of the pact, he can escape capital punishment by converting to Islam.

If he purchases a Muslim slave or a Koran he shall be punished.

Malik was asked the following question concerning the books that contain the Pentateuch and the Gospel: "Do you think that it is permissible to sell these books to the Jews and Christians?"—"Listen to me", he replied, "first, can one be sure that these texts are really the Pentateuch and the Gospel? Notwithstanding, I do not think that we should sell them, nor receive payment for them".

Other *ulama* are of the opinion that, since Islam has abrogated all previous religions, it is not permissible to sell these books to men who believe in their precepts and who do not recognize the Koran, which has replaced them, even if they were the true Pentateuch and Gospel; but this also is not acceptable, for there is no means of knowing what was the authentic text, since Allah himself has said: "They have changed the Pentateuch and the Gospel". [JA 18:510–12]

CHURCHES—It is related, according to the tradition, that the Prophet made this declaration: "No churches are to be built in Muslim lands, and those that will have fallen into ruin shall not be repaired". Another *hadith* is also quoted in his name: "No churches under Islam".

Umar Ibn al-Khattab <may Allah bless him!> commanded that every church that did not exist before the rise of Islam was to be demolished and he forbade the building of new ones. He also commanded that no cross was to be visible outside a church, otherwise it could be broken over the head of him who carried it.

Urwat b. Naj gave orders to destroy all the churches of San'a [Yemen]. This is the law of the *ulama* of Islam.

Umar b. Abd al-Aziz went even further than this and gave orders to leave neither churches nor chapels standing anywhere, be they ancient or new. It is customary, says Hasan al-Basri,³ to destroy the old and the new churches in any country.

Umar b. Abd al-Aziz also issued decrees prohibiting Christians to raise their voices while chanting in their churches, for these are the most distasteful hymns to the Most High. Moreover, he prohibited them from repairing those parts of their places of worship which fell into ruin. Concerning this latter point, there are two opinions. If they resurface them on the outside, says al-Istakhari,⁴ then they must be prevented

from doing so, but if they merely restore the inside, the portion that is on their side, then this can be tolerated. However, Allah is all-knowing.

CAPITATION—The *ulama* are of different opinions with regard to the *jizya*. According to some, it is determined and established in accordance with the sum fixed by Umar Ibn al-Khattab, and it is not permissible to increase or decrease it. Others, however, hold that it is fixed in accordance with the zeal of the imam, who is the most competent judge in the matter. Finally, a third opinion holds that while one cannot decrease the rate established by the imam, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, it can be increased. [. . .]

The *jizya* established by Umar was forty-eight dirhams for the rich, twenty-four for the middle class, and twelve for the poor, but it is proper for the imam to show his zeal for the faith by increasing the sum of the *jizya*; and more so, in the times in which we live, it would be fairer to impose an annual levy of a thousand dinars on certain *dhimmi*s, who, moreover, would not be incapable of paying such a sum, considering the riches that they have gotten out of the Muslims. Furthermore, once the imam has been informed of the treacheries that they have committed in order to accumulate these fortunes, he must dispossess them immediately; if he is not entirely convinced of their perfidy, he must share it with them, taking half of what they own, in the case, evidently, where they possessed a fortune before having entered the public administration <*wilaya*>; but, if they were poor and needy at this time, then the imam is obliged to take all of their possessions. Moreover, this is how Umar Ibn al-Khattab⁵ acted toward the Egyptian notaries, by relying on the supposition that these individuals had become rich through their public office; and yet it was impossible to prove their guilt.

Praise be to Allah the Most High, the only God. May blessings and peace be bestowed upon Muhammad, his family and his companions.
[JA 18:513–15]

Ibn an-Naqqash

1. Malik b. Anas. See Appendix A.

2. This statement implies that, as a result of this annulment of the pact (*dhimma*), most of the *dhimmi* population of Egypt had dwindled—whether by slaughter, exile, or forced conversion to Islam is not indicated. As no details are provided, it seems to be merely an observation, while the reference to “Allah is all-knowing” throws doubt on the accusation against the *dhimmi*s.


3. Al-Hasan b. Abi l-Hasan al-Basri (642–728), a famous personage in the first century of Islam, renowned for his piety and asceticism.

4. Abu Sa'id al-Hasan b. Ahmad al-Istakhari (898–940), a Shafi'i jurist, resident of Baghdad. Author of works on Islamic jurisprudence.

5. In the time of Umar Ibn al-Khattab, Egypt had just been conquered.

III

Sedition, Nomadism, and Dhimmitude



The Battle of the Rival Clans. Iran

Illustration from the *Khamseh* of Nizami (1442)

Ms. add. 25800 fol. 121v. BL

Iraq-Mesopotamia (Early Ninth Century)

When Tahir [b. al-Husayn]¹ learned at Callinicum, that Ibrahim² was reigning, he won the support of the rebels, some by gifts, others by giving them authority over the lands. At Harran, he settled Ibrahim, the Qurayshite [of the tribe of Quraysh], who gave the pagans permission to make public sacrifices. In Edessa, he settled Abd al-Ala, who crushed the Edessenians with taxes. When he coveted one of their villages, he multiplied the charges on that village until they were forced to sell it and he took it for next to nothing. He took it into his head to drive the Edessenians from the town and to settle the people of his tribe, the Sulaymanites, there. A large crowd having gathered as a result of this and having gone to find him in order to complain of what they had to suffer on account of those who lodged in their houses, in the town and in the villages, he answered them: "What have you Christians got to complain of! Since the time of the Romans [Byzantines], you devoured this land, and our ancestors wandered in the arid desert, grazing camels or sheep in the cold or the heat, which withered or burned; and now that we have taken this land from the Romans by our swords, why do you make difficulties about surrendering it to us and being strangers there? Get up and leave my presence; bear your lot. Pay the tribute and remain at peace." And the Edessenians went away in sorrow. [. . .]

When the rebels saw that Tahir was leaving them in peace, they thought that he was afraid, and they then carried out greater pillage, not only of Christians but even of Taiyaye. Then the Taiyaye rose up against the depredators and drove them out. Nasr and Abbas [leaders of the rebels] joined together and marched against Uthman [ruler in Syria] at Hira. The latter gathered a large number <of men> and they were not able to attack him. Then Uthman went to Tahir to urge him to make war on the rebels or to give him an army with which he would go out to meet them. But Tahir kept him in suspense and informed Nasr and Abbas of his [Uthman's] intentions. Tahir delayed bringing peace to these regions for fear of receiving the order to leave for Egypt. When Uthman understood the matter, he wrote to al-Ma'mun about Tahir, saying that he had become an accomplice of the rebels. His messenger was seized. When Uthman knew that his letters had been seized, and that his enmity towards Tahir and also toward Nasr and Abbas had become evident, he himself gathered rebels and began to steal and pillage. [3:35-36]

The Troubles Continue

Then [in 821] the rebels became more powerful. Nasr purchased the market town of Beit Balas [Balis],³ gathered his army and went down towards the river which is near Callinicum and which is called Hani.⁴ Isa came out with the peasants. Nasr killed all of them and seized the villages, pillaged them and took prisoners there. When al-Ma'mun learned of this he was disturbed. He sent Sabib, a valiant soldier, with seven thousand picked men, to meet Nasr. Nasr, learning of this, was seized with fear and sent ambassadors and letters to king Ma'mun. He gave proof of his allegiance and the king answered: "If it is sincerely so, come and tread my carpet and I will honor you". But he sent his excuses to the king. Then Sabib prepared for battle. Nasr divided his army into three corps and did not allow the Persians [the caliphal army] to bring in provisions. When they were enfeebled by hunger, they joined battle. Many men succumbed on both sides. The Taiyaye turned tail and the Persians set to pillaging the peasants, eating, drinking, rejoicing and mocking those who were inside the walls. While the Persians were in transports of arrogance, Nasr came back against them and the Persians, seized with terror, were cut to pieces. Sabib, seeing that they could do nothing against the Arabs, wanted to go to Antioch and bring back the gold taken from Egypt in Harun's day.⁵ They advanced in secret during the night; but Nasr had knowledge of it and got there before them; after having killed about three thousand of them, he shouted to them from the rear: "Throw down your arms and go away wherever you want". These unfortunate men threw down their arms, and then they took all of them. After that, they set about pursuing Sabib and overtook him. Seeing this, the Persians were gripped by fear. Nasr shouted out, saying: "I will give a horse and a thousand dinars to anyone who comes over to my side". Several people having passed over, Sabib took flight with a small number <of men> and went to Baghdad in the shame that he deserved, because he did not prevent his troops mistreating the unfortunates. Nasr and his Arab troops seized Persians, and also killed the turncoats who had changed sides and those who had thrown down their arms.

When Nasr came back from the war against Sabib, he heard talk of the Yemenites who were in Mabbug,⁶ and who had invaded and pillaged the villages situated on the river Sugra; the Taiyaye call this river Sajur. They hid in an ambush and when each man went out to work, Nasr and his troop fell on them and set to killing the women and everyone they met. As many fellahs and poor people went up to the monastery of Borim, Nasr set fire to it and some of them were burnt: others threw themselves down and were dashed to pieces as they fell: their heads were

cut off by the sword. A host of poor people died in this way. After they had cut off all the heads, they brought them to Sarug [near Edessa]. [...]

At this period,⁷ the emir Ibrahim of Harran, taking the air on his large cupola, saw new houses and he questioned the cup-bearers who were with him: "Whom do these new white houses belong to?". The men, who were pagans,⁸ said to him: "These are the churches of the Christians who built them in your time; and because of this, many Muslims are shocked because of you, because you allowed them to build what was not built in the time of the Romans; and they say that you received a gift." He immediately flew into a rage and ordered the destruction of the new churches; and before sundown he had the sanctuary of our Catholic church at Harran destroyed, and that of the Mother of God, which was at Qubbe,⁹ and part of the temple of Mar Georgius, and other temples among those of the Chalcedonians, Jews and Nestorians. Then all the faiths began to entreat God to have pity on them, and in the night, God changed the emir's state of mind: he showed repentance; in the morning, he summoned the Christians and told them to rebuild what had been destroyed. And in a few days, they rebuilt everything that had been destroyed. [3:46–48]

In the same year [835], the Muslims of Harran stirred up war against the Christians. An edict appeared: and on the Sunday morning of the Resurrection, they destroyed the temple of Mar Georgius of Qubbe and <that> of Mar Ahudemme on the pretext that they were newly built. Thus, that curse which says: "I [The Lord] will turn your feasts into mourning etc." [Amos 8:10] was fulfilled upon the people of Harran. [3:86]

At this period, the son of Abu Ishaq [al-Mu'tasim], king of the Taiyaye, a young man called Abu Daoud, was the enemy of the Christians. He arranged for his father to forbid the cross to be seen outside churches, to play the semantra, raise voices in prayer or at burials, on the road, and to allow wine to be seen in any town or on the roads. Thenceforth, the men became the victims of prefects, who hardened or lightened this edict as much as they wished and in proportion to what they received. [...]

Whereas public affairs, that is to say empires, went badly in these years, our Church was left in peace because the faithful and all the people were overwhelmed by the problems of the tax and tributes of the governors, amid the wars and struggles of the kings.

But whereas the faithful were enjoying tranquility because there were no troubles and dissensions among the leaders of the Church, the demon provoked persecution at Sarug, through the intermediary of a pagan [Muslim] who was seized with satanic zeal. He went to and fro

discovering those who had returned to Christianity after having apostasized, in order to force them to become Muslims again. Several were seized and suffered torture courageously. [3:96–97]

At this period [ca. 841], the tribe of the Rabi'aye,¹⁰ made up of murderers and brigands, had as their leader a man called Malik, of their own race. He dragged off and incarcerated in the town of Balad [on the Tigris, near Mosul] most of the thieves that were among them. After a time, they broke their bonds and took flight. Seeing this, the people of Balad seized three of them and put them to death. The families of those who had been killed, to the number of five hundred, came together, ravaged the land of the Arabaye, and set fire to the villages. When the sons of Hasan, the leader of the Rabi'aye, heard this news, they went out to pillage because their villages had been taken by the king [the caliph al-Mu'tasim] in compensation for a debt of three million zuz which their father, Hasan, still owed on the levy of the poll tax. They laid waste the region of Nisibin, Siggarr, the Tur Abdin¹¹ and Qardu.¹² Then the king sent help to Malik, who left in pursuit of the rebels: the mountains and valleys were filled with the corpses of the Rabi'aye. [3:106–7]

Later, in the year 1153 [842], there was in Palestine a man named Tamim, called Abu Harb,¹³ who proclaimed himself king. Thirty thousand starving and destitute [men] joined him. His face was covered with a veil. He appeared to be zealous for the law of the Prophet, and concerned for the oppressed: he did not impose tribute of more than four zuz. Many rejoiced. But he did not persevere with these rules and began to pillage and kill. He went up to Jerusalem: the Taiyaye, the Christians and Jews took flight. He made his way into mosques and churches and, after having pillaged everything, he wanted to burn down the Church of the Resurrection and the others. The patriarch sent him much gold. Raja [b. Ayyub] was sent against him with eight thousand men.

When they reached Callinicum, news came that Abu Ishaq [al-Mu'tasim] was dead. The majority <of men> prepared for pillage; but God had pity [on them], and the news arrived that Harun¹⁴ was reigning; the rebels were contained and the disturbance ceased. Meanwhile, Bar Baihas, from Damascus, assembled five thousand men and began to pillage and slaughter. Raja caught up with him and killed four thousand of his men, and the rest dispersed. [3:103]

Michael the Syrian

1. Officer in the caliph al-Ma'mun's army.
2. Ibrahim, son of al-Mahdi, reigned at Baghdad (817–19), while the two sons of Harun al-Rashid, al-Amin (809–13) and al-Ma'mun (813–33) quarrelled over his empire.
3. Village on the banks of the Euphrates in the province of Aleppo.
4. Eastern part of the Euphrates.

5. The caliph Harun al-Rashid (785–809).
6. Mambij, former Hierapolis in Syria.
7. Under the caliphate of al-Ma'mun.
8. Pagans, in this context of the Chronicler, mean Muslims.
9. Near Edessa.
10. A nomad tribe originating from Bahrain.
11. Jabal al-Tur, plateau along the Tigris, near Diyarbakir.
12. Former Beit Zabday, in the region called Jazira ibn Umar.
13. For details on Abu Harb Tamim, called al-Mubarqa' (the veiled), see Moshe Gil, *A History of Palestine. 634–1099* (Cambridge, 1992), 295.
14. Caliph Harun al-Wathiq (842–47).

Abbasid and Fatimid Empires

After Wathek, Mutawakkil his brother <ruled> fourteen years and nine months, he began to reign in the year two hundred and thirty-one of the Arabs <A.D. 845>.¹ This Khalifah was a hater of the Christians, and he afflicted them <by ordering> them to bind *pukire* <i.e., bandlets> of wool round their heads; and none of them was to appear outside <his house> without a belt and girdle. And if any man among them had a slave, he was to sew two strips of cloth of different colors on his tunic from the front and from behind. And the new churches were to be pulled down. And if they should happen to have a spacious church, even though it was ancient, one part of it was to be made into a Masjid <Mosque>. And they were not to lift up crosses during their feasts of Hosanna. In a similar manner he laid these same commands, and many others which were like unto them, upon the Jews also. [1:141]

And in the year three hundred and ninety-two of the Arabs <A.D. 1001> the Arabs rose in a tumult against the Christians in Baghdad, and they looted their houses. And they also put forth their hands against the churches to destroy them. And having set on fire that church of the Jacobites which is by the side of the place where flour was ground, it fell down on a very large number of Arabs, men, and women, and children, and it suffocated them and burned to death those who set it on fire; and the onlookers became terror stricken. [1:183]

And at this time Hakim [996–1021], the Khalifah of Egypt <read Baghdad>² commanded and the Temple of the Resurrection which is in Jerusalem was dug up from its roots <or, foundations>, and all its furniture was looted. And he laid waste also thousands of churches which were in his dominions. And he commanded the heralds to proclaim, "Every Christian who entereth the Faith of the Arabs shall be honoured, and he who entereth not shall be disgraced, and he shall hang on his neck a cross from above <upside down?>. And the Jews shall place on their necks the figure of a calf's head, since they made <a calf> in the wilderness and worshipped it. And they shall not wear



Highest Rate Poll Tax Receipt. With Description of Jewish Owner
Vilayet of Salonica, 1755/6
Hirshberg, *Research* (1969–70), pl. C

rings on the fingers of the right hand, neither shall they ride on horses, but on mules and asses, with common saddles and stirrups of wood. And the man who will not accept this humiliation, let him take everything that he hath and go to the country of the Rhomaye.”

And when this Edict went forth very many people departed, but a few denied the Faith of the Christians. And those who neither departed nor denied their Faith hung crosses of gold and of silver on their necks, and they made for themselves saddles of rich coloured stuffs. When Hakim heard this he was wroth, and he commanded, saying, “Every Christian who does not hang on his neck a cross of wood weighing four *litres* [*sic*], according to the measure of Baghdad, shall be killed. And also the Jew who does not hang on his neck a plaque <?> with the figure of the claw of chicken <on it>, which weighs six pounds, shall be killed. And when they go into the baths they shall tie little bells on their necks, so that they may be distinguished from the Arabs.” [1:184]

Bar Hebraeus

1. Al-Mutawakkil actually reigned from 847 to 861.
2. “Baghdad” as in the original translated English text. Al-Hakim was the Fatimid caliph of Egypt and Syria.

Baghdad (1100)

A description by Obadyah the Norman proselyte (Johannes), born in Oppido, southern Italy, a priest converted to Judaism (1102).

The servant installed Obadyah, the Proselyte, in a house used by the Jews for prayers, and food was brought to him. Afterwards, Isaac, the head of the Academy, arranged that Johannes [Obadyah] should join the orphaned boys in order to be taught the law of Moses and the words of the prophets in the divine characters and the tongue of the Hebrews.

Before these events [in 1091], the Caliph of Baghdad, of the name of al-Muqtadi [1075–94], had given power to his vizier, Abu Shuja, to introduce a change of policy in regard to the Jews of Baghdad and he had tried several times to destroy them. But the God of Israel had thwarted his intention <and> on this occasion also He hid them from his wrath. He <Abu Shuja> imposed that each male Jew should wear a yellow badge on his headgear. This was one distinctive sign on the head and the other was on the neck—a piece of lead of the weight <size?> of a silver dinar <?> hanging round the neck of every Jew and inscribed with the word *dhimmi* to signify that the Jew had to pay poll-tax. Jews also had to wear girdles round their waists. Abu Shuja further

imposed two signs upon Jewish women. They had to wear a black and a red shoe, and each woman had to have a small brass bell on her neck or shoe, which would tinkle and thus announce the separation of Jewish from Gentile [Muslim] women. He assigned cruel Muslim men to spy upon Jewish women, in order to oppress them with all kinds of curses, humiliation and spite. The Gentile population used to mock at the Jews, and the mob and their children used to beat up the Jews in all the streets of Baghdad.

The law of the poll-tax, collected yearly by the Caliph's official from the Jews, was as follows: Every Jew belonging to the wealthy class had to pay four and a half dinars in gold; a Jew of the middle class two and a half; and a Jew of the poorest a dinar and a half. When a Jew died, who had not paid up the poll-tax to the full and was in debt for a small or large amount, the Gentiles did not permit burial until the debt of the poll-tax was paid. If the deceased left nothing of value, the Gentiles demanded that other Jews should, with their own money, meet the debt owed by the deceased in poll-tax; otherwise <they threatened>, they would burn the body. [p. 37]

Obadyah

North Africa and Andalusia

The *Qadi*, Ahmad b. Talib [ninth century], compelled the *dhimmi*s to wear upon their shoulder a patch of white cloth <*riqa*> that bore the image of an ape <for the Jews> and a pig <for the Christians>, and to nail onto their doors a board bearing the sign of a monkey [Koran 5:65]. [p. 142]

al-Maliki

In Tunisia, the discontented masses rallied to Abu Yazid, the Berber Kharijite, against the Shi'ite governors. Abu Yazid entered Qairuan in 944.

The Berbers broke into the town, where they gave vent to slaughter and excesses; <only> a few inhabitants offered any resistance at the outer edges of the town. Abu Yazid then sent a corps of troops to Qairuan, commanded by one of his men, Ayyub Zawili who consigned it to pillage and massacre and committed monstrosities when he came there at the end of *Safar*.¹ [pp. 328–29]

Abu Yazid stayed in Maysur's² tents for two months and eight days,

sending out columns in all directions, which brought back booty. One of them was led against Susa, which was taken by the sword: men were slaughtered, the women enslaved and the town burned. The invaders split the women's genital parts and disembowled them, so that soon there was no longer one cultivated field or one roof left standing in Ifriqiyya; the inhabitants, bare-footed and without clothing, took refuge in Qairuan, and those who did not become slaves died of hunger and thirst. [p. 330]

[Abu Yazid] advanced towards Mahdiya and established his camp fifteen miles from there. He launched columns in the direction of that town, which pillaged and slaughtered everyone, so that the whole population took refuge within it. [p. 331]

Ibn al-Athir, *Annales*

1. *Safar*: second month of the Muslim year.
2. General defeated by Abu Yazid.

Seville (ca. 1100)

A Muslim must not act as masseur to a Jew or Christian; he must not clear their rubbish nor clean their latrines. In fact, the Jew and the Christian are more suited for such work, which are degrading tasks. A Muslim must not act <as a guide or stableman> for an animal owned by a Jew or Christian; he must not act as their donkey-driver or hold the stirrups for them. If it be noticed that a Muslim contravenes these prohibitions, he shall be rebuked. [p. 108]

A Jew must not slaughter an animal for a Muslim. The Jews may be authorized to open their own special butcher shops. [p. 110]

It is forbidden to sell a coat that once belonged to a leper, to a Jew or Christian, unless the buyer is informed of its origin; likewise if this garment once belonged to a debauched person. [p. 112]

No tax-officer or policeman, Jew or Christian may be allowed to wear the dress of an aristocrat, nor of a jurist, nor of a wealthy individual; on the contrary they must be detested and avoided. It is forbidden to accost them with the greeting "Peace upon you!" <*as-salam alayka!*>. In effect, "Satan has gained the mastery over them, and caused them to forget God's Remembrance. Those are Satan's party; why, Satan's party, surely they are the losers!" <Koran 58:20>. A distinctive sign must be imposed upon them in order that they may be recognized and this will be for them a form of disgrace. [p. 114]

The sound of bells must be prohibited in Muslim territories and reserved only for the lands of the infidels. [p. 123]

It is forbidden to sell to Jews and Christians scientific books unless they treat of their particular law; actually they translate scientific books and attribute them to their coreligionists and to their bishops, whereas they are really the work of Muslims! It would be preferable not to let Jewish or Christian physicians establish themselves, so as to heal Muslims. Since they are incapable of noble sentiments toward Muslims, let them treat their fellow infidels; knowing their feelings, how is it possible to entrust the lives of Muslims to them? [p. 128]

Ibn Abdun

Under the Almohades (1130–1269)

Towards the end of his reign, Abu Yusuf¹ ordered the Jewish inhabitants of the Maghreb to make themselves conspicuous among the rest of the population by assuming a special attire consisting of dark blue garments, the sleeves of which were so wide as to reach to their feet and—instead of a turban—a cap, which hung over the ears and whose form was so ugly as to be easily mistaken for a pack-saddle. This apparel became the costume of all the Jews of the Maghreb and remained obligatory until the end of the prince's reign and the beginning of that of his son Abu Abd Allah [1224–27]. The latter made a concession only after appeals of all kinds had been made by the Jews, who had entreated all those whom they thought might be helpful to intercede on their behalf. Abu Abd Allah obliged them to wear yellow garments and turbans, the very costume they still wear in the present year 621 [1224]. Abu Yusuf's misgivings as to the sincerity of their conversion to Islam prompted him to take this measure and impose upon them a specific dress. "If I were sure", said he, "that they had really become Muslims, I would let them assimilate through marriage and other means; but if I was sure that they had remained infidels, I would have the men killed, enslave their children and would confiscate their belongings for the benefit of the believers". [pp. 264–65]

al-Marrakushi

1. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (1184–98), Almohad ruler of Spain and North Africa.

Mesopotamia-Iraq (Twelfth to Thirteenth Century)

In that year [1148], the emir Qara [Ar]slan, ruler of Hesna of Ziad [Harput], seeing that the Turks were invading on all sides and seizing

the lands of the Franks,¹ which the Lord had abandoned, because they themselves had abandoned Him, sent his troops to seize Babula, on the banks of the Euphrates. The inhabitants of the land of Gargar² were gripped with fear and took flight to seek safety in the mountain of Mar Bar Sauma [near Melitene]. The whole area around the convent³ was filled with men and women with their children and baggage. Many monks, zealous for the faith, grumbled and complained; however, as there were in the convent monks and serfs who were relatives of these refugees, they were not able to drive them out. That is why, when the Turks invaded the land of Gargar and saw the villages deserted and learned that the inhabitants were in the mountain of Mar Bar Sauma, they turned their steps towards the mountain. On Sunday 15 of Ab <August>, the Turks <laid ambushes> on three sides, and in the morning they suddenly rushed in and seized flocks and oxen. Three men were killed on the serfs' side and two on the Turks' side. Then the Turks sent word that: "We honor this saint; we give him offerings, and we have not come to ill-treat this convent. We have come because of those people who have come here from the land of Gargar; if you now surrender them to us, we will give you back everything we have taken; we will not send the people whom we have taken prisoners into captivity, but safely back to their villages". Then the people of the convent formed two parties; one said: "These people must be surrendered"; the other shouted: "We will not surrender them"; and they were on the point of resorting to battle and the sword, if one of the God-fearing old men had not calmed them by his wisdom. He took with him a few people from both parties, went out to seek the Turks and said to them: "If truly as you say, you do not want to lead these people into slavery, let a few of the notables among you come with us; we will go to Hesna of Ziad, to the emir, and there this pact will be confirmed". Then the Turks made it apparent that they were using a ruse to lead the people into slavery. And when this was found out, all the inhabitants of the convent were unanimous in shouting: "We will not surrender a single person, even if all of us have to die!" Then, the Turks burned down everything that was outside: houses and presses, and also the fence round the vineyards. They took sheep, oxen and prisoners, and went away. The monks <went> to Hesna of Ziad. Thanks to the intervention of a few loyal notables of the place, they were presented to the emir and, thanks to the help of the prayers of the saint, God inspired the heart of the emir Qara Arslan with generosity⁴; he returned everything: men, oxen and sheep. This was a great joy to everyone in all these land, and praise of God and the saint filled every mouths. [3:290–91]

At this period [1152], an Armenian priest called Joseph, a native of the land of Hazanit [Hanzith], built a church in the village of Bargahis,

and decorated it. He made it a resplendent white on the outside. One day when the emir Qara Arslan had gone out to divert himself, as kings are wont to do, he saw this glittering church and was annoyed by it. Some Turks who detested this priest stirred up the emir's anger; apart from the many accusations they made against him, they added, with diabolical inspiration: "Wherever a new church is built, the prince of the place dies". Then on his orders, this church was mercilessly razed to its foundations, and that slandered priest was shut up in prison. The Christians living in Hesna of Ziad⁵ joined together to intercede on his behalf; but at the very moment, before they could go into his presence, the emir ordered that he be crucified, on the day of the festival of the Cross, in the month of Elul <14 September>.

From that moment and for this reason, an edict appeared forbidding the building of new churches or the restoration of old in all the lands of Mesopotamia. This caused great sorrow to all Christians until the period following the death of that emir. From the time of his son, Christians from all states joined together, offered him a great deal of gold and obtained permission to restore any old church in need of repair. A similar edict brought great consolation to Christians in every place. [3: 307-8]

In the year 1482 [1169], in the month of Ab <August>, the [Zangid] atabeg Qutb ad-Din, prince of Mosul and all Assyria died.

Then his brother, Nur ad-Din of Aleppo [1146-1174], assembled his troops, and went down without delay. He seized Nisibin without a battle; and the jurisconsults rejoiced because he held them in high esteem. He diligently observed [the injunctions] on not drinking wine and not letting the times for prayer pass. The Muslims called him "prophet". That is because he was harsh on the Christians and good to the Taiyaye. He ordered the destruction of all new constructions existing within churches and convents; and they began to demolish a large wall which had been built in the church of Mar James of Nisibin, which the Nestorians had occupied since the time of the heretic Bar Sauma. They pillaged the treasure which was there and about a thousand books. They did the same in many places.

He established as "guardian of the laws" one of his intimate friends, an enemy of the Christians, a jurisconsult called Bar Azrun and he sent [him] on a tour to destroy meticulously any new construction said to have been done within the churches in the time of his father and brother, "so that God have mercy on them!". This scoundrel left as he had been instructed. Wherever he was given gifts as bribes, he swore that the building was old; but where this veil was not placed over his eyes, he demolished and destroyed, until Nur ad-Din heard of the matter and dismissed him. [3: 339-40]

He [Nur ad-Din] multiplied the tributes of the Christians, he raised the poll tax, introduced the law that they had to be girdled with a belt and not let the hair grow on their head, in order that they would be recognized and held up to ridicule by the Taiyaye. He likewise decreed that Jews had to wear a piece of red fabric on their shoulders to make them recognizable. [3:342]

From the year 1496 [1185–86] the devastation carried out by the Turkoman people began, and for eight years they massacred and were massacred in Armenia, Assyria, Mesopotamia, Syria and Cappadocia.

The reason for the start of this devastation, occurred in this way:

The great people of the Turkomans, who live in tents, come down to spend the winter in the desert situated to the south of Syria where snow does not fall, where it does not freeze and where pasturage is to be found. In spring they return to the northern region where they find pasturage for their cattle. During their descent and ascent the roads are filled with their throngs of livestock. The Kurds, accustomed to pillage, stole their sheep, goats, camels, oxen everywhere and sometimes even killed their men. Then, the Turkomans began to gather together at the time of their journey to watch over their convoys. But in the land of Sabaktan on the borders of Mardin, they encountered some two hundred Kurds who were lying in ambush in order to steal. The Turkomans seized all of them and slaughtered them. Then there was open hostility between them. The Kurds gathered together to the number of some ten thousand and the Turkomans assembled a greater number. They joined battle and some ten thousand men on both sides were killed.

Then their hatred and anger grew. The Kurds assembled in the region of Nisibin, of Tur Abdin, to the number of some thirty thousand. The Turkomans gathered in the region of Habora [of the river Khabur]. When battle was joined, the Kurds were conquered and their dead fell from the banks of the river Habora up to Nisibin itself.

After that, there were two battles between the Turkomans and Kurds in the region of Mosul. The war continued and the Kurds were beaten in many places: they took flight before the Turkomans, and escaped to the mountains close to the frontiers of Cilicia, to place their children and baggage in safety on the borders of the Armenians. The Turkomans came to attack them there and caused them all, men, women and children, to die by the sword; they took their riches, and the race of the Kurds disappeared from all Syria and Mesopotamia. As the Turkomans went to and fro in bands on the plains and in the mountains, wherever they found Kurds, they slaughtered them without mercy or cause.

During the early years, they did not ill-treat Christians. But the Turkomans soon started to slaughter Christians as well for two reasons; first, because when the Kurds fled, they hid their possessions in the villages

of the Christians, and this was known to the Turkomans; secondly, because the Turkomans ill-treated all the peoples in Greater Armenia when they were carried away by the enthusiasm of pillage and slaughter, the princes not preventing them from so doing. After having killed the Kurds, they took the Armenians captive; they led twenty-six thousand men away and sold them as slaves; they burned the villages and they set fire to the great convent of Garabed, after having killed all the monks who were there and having pillaged its books and everything it contained.

At the same period, they took with brute force the fortress of Tell 'Arab which is in the land of Sabaktan,⁶ and they enslaved and sold the whole population.

At the same period, they killed a hundred and seventy men at Tell Besmeh⁷; and likewise in many other places <?>. Then, the princes, seeing their lands ravaged and their villages depopulated, began to wage war on the Turkomans each in their own region. In all Cappadocia and in the land of Melitene there were battles and massacres.

At the same period, the Turkomans invaded the land of Claudia⁸ and the prince resisted them in battle; some two hundred young people from the village <of Amrun> and the rest of the country were killed in battle.

Words cannot describe all the massacres which took place during these eight years; because from a small spark, was born that great fire which consumed myriads of peoples. Later, the storm died down. [3:400–402]

Michael the Syrian

1. After the loss of Edessa, the massacre of its inhabitants (1144–1146) and the failure of the second Crusade (1147–49).

2. Region in upper Mesopotamia, in the bend of the Euphrates.

3. The word "convent" and "monastery" are used indiscriminately.

4. Probably with a gift of money.

5. Modern Harput.

6. On the borders of Mardin.

7. West of Mardin, on the road from Edessa.

8. Region of the Upper Euphrates.

After the defeat of the Mongols by the Mamluks in Syria (December 1260–61), Malik Salih, governor of Mosul during the Mongol conquest, joined with the Egyptians. When he was denounced, he took flight. Some of his slaves, who had fled with him, returned to Mosul.

And when these men <who had come back> went into Mawsil, they started a great persecution of the Christians, and they looted their

houses and killed everyone who did not become a Muslim. And many elders and deacons, and gentlefolk, and common folk denied their Faith, <all> except a few of the house of Suwayad, that is Wadhkoki, and Nafis the goldsmith. And as for the country outside Nineveh,¹ immediately Malik Salih fled, the Kurds came down, and they made a great slaughter among the Christians, and they took the nunnery of the Sisters which is in Beth Kudida, and they killed therein many of the people who from all over the country were hidden therein. And those accursed men also went up to the Monastery of Mar Mattai,² and thousands of horsemen and men on foot assembled there, and they made war on the monks for a period of four months. And they set scaling ladders in position, and they wanted to ascend the wall, but the monks prevailed and burnt their scaling ladders. Then the Kurds hewed a mass of stone from the mountain which is above the monastery and rolled it <down> upon it. And that great mass of stone split in two, and one part made a breach in the wall, and it remained fast in the breach like a gem in a ring which cannot be moved. And the other part made a hole in the wall and passed through it, and the Kurds rushed to enter in thereby. And the monks, and the natives of the country who were refugees there, resisted fiercely, and they fought with stones and arrows and did not let them come in; and they built up immediately the breach with stones and lime. And during these fights one of the eyes of Abu Nasr the archimandrite was knocked out, and a few men were struck by arrows, but they became well again. And the monks being weary of the fighting, they demanded peace of the Kurds, and they undertook to give them all the hangings, and curtains, and equipment of the church, and also to collect gold, and silver, and chains <jewellery>. Now because they heard a report of the coming of the Tatars [the Mongols], the Kurds inclined swiftly towards peace; and they took a very large amount of property from the monastery, the total value of which amounted to one thousand gold *dinars*, and departed.

And at that time certain people from the village of Beth Sahraye, and others of the natives of Nineveh, who had been shut up in the Monastery of Habhshushyatha, removed themselves from that place, and they went and crossed the river Zabha [upper Zab] to go to Arbil. And Kutlu Bag, the Amir, met them, and giving them as a reason that they were coming from the side of the enemy, he killed them all, men and women alike. [1:441]

Bar Hebraeus

1. Opposite Mosul, on the eastern banks of the Tigris. For the incident, see Fiey, *Mossoul chrétienne*, 47.

2. The monastery of Mar Mattai on the Jabal Maklub, a mountain near Nineveh, was a Jacobite spiritual center.

Obligations of the Dhimmis, According to Abu Abdallah b. Yahya Ibn Fadlan: Letter to the Caliph Nasir al-Din Allah (1180–1225)

Umar Ibn al-Khattab wrote to the governors of the provinces instructing them to oblige the *dhimmis* to shave their hair, to wear lead and iron seals around their necks, not to sit astride their saddles, to wear at the waist special belts that differentiated them from the Muslims.

And so it was at the time of the caliphs, but the last to have rigorously imposed these obligations was the Caliph al-Muqtadir bi-Amrallah [908–32], who forced them to observe the laws that had been current in the time of al-Mutawakkil.

He ordered them to hang bells about their necks and to put wooden effigies on their doors in order to distinguish them from Muslim houses. Their homes were not to be of the same height as those of Muslims. He obliged the Jews to wear a badge and a yellow turban, whereas Jewish women were to wear yellow veils and different colored shoes, one white and the other black. They also had to wear iron necklaces around their necks when they entered the bath-houses. As for the Christians, they had to wear black or grey garments, a special belt around the waist, and a cross on their breast. They were not allowed to have a horse as a mount, but only a mule, or an ass without a pack or a saddle, which they were not allowed to ride astride, but on one side only. Although all this has been abandoned, no increase of tax has been enacted, whereas in most [Muslim] countries they are still forced to wear [distinctive] badges and are admitted to none but the most humiliating employments. Thus, for example, in Bukhara and Samarkand the *dhimmis* clean out the lavatories and sewers and carry away the rubbish and refuse. In the province of Aleppo, which is the closest to us, they are still bound to wear the badge. What is more, according to Islamic law, when the poll tax [*jizya*] is to be paid, the person who delivers the sum must be standing and he who receives it must be seated. The former places it in the other's hand so that the Muslim receives it in the palm of his hand, the Muslim's hand being above and that of the *dhimmi* below. The latter then stretches forth his beard and the Muslim strikes him on the cheek with the words: "Pay the dues of Allah, O enemy of Allah, O infidel". But today, it even happens that some of them no longer come in person before the officials, but send their messengers in their stead.

As for the Sabeans, who are outright idolators, who live in the province of al-Wasit [Iraq], they are not *dhimmis*, although they were so in the past. When the Caliph al-Qahir Billah [932–34] inquired of Abu Sa'ad al-Istakhari the Shafi'i concerning their status, he declared their blood licit and refused their poll tax. When they had wind of this, they bribed him with 50,000 dinars and he left them alone. Consequently,

today they do not even pay the poll tax and nought is demanded of them even though they be under Muslim domination.

May the will of the sultan be done!


Ibn al-Fuwati

In the days of the Sultan al-Malik as-Salih Najm al-Din Ayyub [1240–49], a Moslem went into the Suq al-Tujjar in Cairo. He had with him a title-deed to some money owing to him by a soldier. The document was all finished, and needed only the necessary signatures of the witnesses. The man came across two Christians. They were clothed in bodices and in garments that had wide sleeves, just as Moslems of the noble class are dressed. The Moslem really thought that they were nobles. He spread the document out before them and they signed it—their very act being a jeer at the Moslems. This fact was brought to the attention of the Sultan al-Malik al-Salih; and he gave orders that those Christians should receive a beating, that they should be forced to wear girdles and to put on the distinctive mark that they were not Moslems; that they should be prevented from making themselves look like Moslems, and that they should take the proper low and humble station to which Allah had degraded them. [pp. 439–40]

Ghazi b. al-Wasiti

Religious Celebrations

And in the days of the <Lenten> Fast [1271] the Ishmaelites [Assasins] rushed out upon Ala Ad-Din, the Master of the Diwan, when he was riding in Baghdad, and they stabbed him with knives, but did not injure him <fatally>. And they were seized, and their members were cut off. And the Arabs spread the report that they were Christians, and that they had been sent by the Catholicus. And the holy men, and the monks, and the chief men who were in Baghdad were seized and shut up in prison; and Kutlu Bag, the Amir of Arbil, seized and shut up the Catholicus and his holy men in prison. And they were in great tribulation during the whole of the Fast, until God helped <them>, and a *Pukdana* came from the Camp, and they were released. And from that time the Catholicus went and dwelt in the city of Eshnu, in Adhorbijan. [1:449]



Map in Bar Hebraeus: *The Candelabrum of the Sanctuaries* (1406)

Philosophical work, composed in 1267 or 1274, concerned with theological doctrines and the natural sciences

Ms. Syriac no. 210, Ancien fonds, no. 121, fol. 38, BN

And in those days [1274] when the Christians of the city of Arbil wished to celebrate the Festival of Hosannas <Palm Sunday>, and knowing that the Arabs were making ready to obstruct them, they sent and summoned to their help certain Tatars who were Christians and who were near them. And when they came they placed crosses on the heads of their spears, and the Metropolitan of the Nestorians, together with all his people, sallied forth with those Tatars riding in front of them. And when they approached the front of the fortress, the companies of Arabs grouped themselves together, and they were carrying stones and they stoned the Tatars and the Christians, and their companies were scattered and each of the Christians fled to one side; and after this they remained for some days without daring to go forth. And this also afflicted the Christians in every place. [1:451]

Anarchy and Banditry

And on the first day of the week, on the twenty-ninth day of the month of Tammuz <July> [1285], a Syrian horde of mounted robbers, Kurds, Turks, and desert Arabs, about six hundred strong, burst upon the

country of Arbil, and they looted and killed many men who were Christians from the village of Amkabad [Ainkawa, near Arbil], and from Surhagan and other villages. And Baha Ad-Din, the Kurd, sallied out from Arbil to meet them in battle, and he was broken before them and fled and went into the city. And those accursed robbers carried off great spoil, women and maidens, and many cattle, and departed. And in those days other marauding bands came to the country of Tur Abdin,¹ and they made a great slaughter in the village of Keshlath, and in Beth Man'im and the villages thereof, and in Sbirina, and they carried away very much spoil from the country of Beth Rishe and departed.

And in the year fifteen hundred and ninety-seven <of the Greeks—A.D. 1286>,² on the seventeenth day of the month of Haziran <June>, about four thousand mounted robbers and brigands, Kurds, Turkmans, and Arabs, gathered together, and some men say that three hundred chosen horsemen from the Egyptian slaves [Mamluks] were joined to them. And they directed their gaze on the country of Mawsil. And having spoiled the villages which were on their road, they burst upon the city at dawn on the second day <of the week>, on the twenty-second day of the third month of the Arabs, of the year six hundred and eighty-five <A.D. 1285>.³ Then king [sultan] Mas'ud and the other horsemen who were found in the city mounted and rode out [of the town] to engage them in battle. And when they saw how great was their number, and that they themselves had no force equal to theirs, they turned back and went into the city. And they crossed the Tigris and went and ascended to the Monastery of Mar Mattai, and they remained there for a few days. Then when the accursed marauders had entered the city, the Arabs who were natives thereof met them with abundant supplies of food and cool waters. And they rejoiced in them with a great joy, and they exulted, pretending that they were prepared to do harm to and spoil and kill the Christians only.

And those Christians who were in the neighborhood of the church of the Tagritanaye <Tagritanians> took their wives, and their sons, and their daughters, together with all their cattle, and they went and took refuge in the mansion of the uncle of the Prophet, who was called Nakib Al-Alawahin [. . .] that peradventure the marauders might pay respect to that building, and that there they might be saved from the slaughter and spoliation of the city.

Then the remainder of the Christians who had no place whereto to flee, and could not take refuge in the mansion of the Nakiba, remained terrified, and trembling, and weeping and wailing over themselves, and over their evil fate, though in reality it was through those who had gone there <i.e. to the mansion of the Nakiba> that the evil fate came. As soon as ever the marauders had gone in they began asking about the

Christians. Then the Arabs who were natives of the city cried out with one mouth <or, voice>, "Behold all the Christians are in the mansion of the Nakiba". Then they all became strong, and all the marauders went there. And they placed ladders in position and went up them and captured the mansion, and they looted and robbed the whole of the people who were therein. And one of the Christians who were there was wounded by an arrow and died. And they put to the torture not only the Christians but the Arabs also, and they made a mock of their women, and sons, and daughters in the mosques before their eyes.

And when they had made an end there they went to the quarter of the Jews, and they looted their houses and plundered all their community. And as for the Christians who had remained in their houses, and had not gone elsewhere, no man injured them, and they did not even see the marauders with their eyes. But certain Christian merchants, and many Arabs, who were coming to the city, and had alighted at the inns <*khans*> which were outside the city, where none of the marauders came, because of their fear, suffered the loss of a large quantity of their goods. And they brought their loads into the city and deposited them in the market-place of the bazaars, and inasmuch as all the food and provisions of the citizens was there, they thought that they would never be neglected by <those who kept> guard over such a place as this. Therefore they struggled and wrestled with each other that they might bring in their treasures. And the natives of the city also were carrying possessions out from their houses, and were bringing gold, and silver, and bales of cloth, and apparel of various kinds to that place. And so after <all these things> had been gathered together, the marauders came, and they smashed the gates of the market-place easily, and they went in and took everything which they found there.

Now many young men from among the natives of the city were standing by the gate of the market-place, and when the marauders, who were heavily laden with plunder, were going out, they snatched it from them and fled. And others took their horses which they had left at the gate of the market-place and fled. And thus during the whole of that day, from morning until evening, they went round about through the bazaars of the city and carried off horses, and mules, and asses, and oxen, without number. And they took prisoners the slaves and handmaidens, nearly five hundred souls, and the greater number of them were Arabs and Jews; there were a few Christians, but only those who were found from the mansion of the Nakiba. [1:475-77]

And in this year also [A.D. 1289] about two thousand horsemen of the robber bands of Syria gathered together, and they came and crossed the frontier of Sinjar⁴ and Beth Arbaye, and they neither plundered nor looted until they arrived in the neighborhood of Pishabhur, a village on

the banks of the river Tigris, where they halted there for the night. And they rose up during the night and crossed the river, and they directed their gaze on Wastaw, a large village of the Nestorians, and they burst upon it at the early dawn of the first day of the week, on the fourteenth day of the month of Ab <August>. Now the villagers thinking that they were merely a few marauders sallied out to engage them. And when they saw how many they were, they went back into the village, and some of them took refuge in the church and were saved, and some of them scattered themselves about in the gardens and vineyards. And those accursed men spread themselves over the seven hamlets which were round about it and then they wrought great destruction. And they killed nearly five hundred men, and they took prisoners nearly one thousand persons, women, and sons, and daughters, and they took treasures, and sheep and cattle without number. And they went back the same day by the way they had come, and they travelled quietly and without fear until they arrived at the river Habura, over which was a fragile <or, narrow> bridge, and there they were impeded by the weight of the loot and the great number of the prisoners which they with difficulty were carrying away. And thus news <of them> reached the Amir of the Mongols who was in Mawsil, and the Mongols without delay made themselves ready and stood up and mounted their horses and pursued them. And they went on and found them, and the greater number of them had crossed the bridge, and were journeying on laden with loot. And those who had not yet crossed the bridge the Mongols killed. And they recovered of the spoils three hundred prisoners, women, and sons, and daughters, and they brought them and handed them over to their owners [parents].

And moreover, in this summer the marauders of Syria, about two thousand mounted men, sallied out and went to the countries of Melitene and of Hesna. And Kharbanda, the captain of the host who was there, heard <of it>, and he collected his troops and they made ready and went and engaged them in battle, and they [Kharbanda and his men] were broken before them. And a large number of those who were with him were killed, and certain of his friends, and his kinsfolk, and the sons of his brothers, an unknown number of persons, were made prisoners. And only he and the forty persons who had fled escaped, and they came and went into the new mansion which he had built in the country of Hesna [Harput], in the place which is called in the Aramean language "Hesona". And whilst sitting, and grieving and pondering how they could save those of them who had been made prisoners in the war, they all agreed that the war which had taken place in this country had happened because of the Christians and that it was therefore right to take the money from them and to buy <i.e. ransom> those who had been made prisoners because of them. Then they began to assess every

city and country for a certain amount of gold according to the ability of the place <to pay>. [1:483–84]

Destitution of the Jewish Vizier, Sa'd ad-Dawla (1292)

And behold, from this time <onwards> [A.D. 1290] the King of Kings [Arghon, 1284–91] recognized, and it was proved to him fully, the falseness and impudence of the Arabs, and that everything they did they did with deceit <or, treachery>, and the accepting of persons <i.e. hypocrisy>. And straightway he commanded that Sa'd ad-Dawlah, the Jew, who was governor in Baghdad, should be the chief of the scribes, that is to say, Sahib Diwan, in all the dominion of his kingdom; and that governors should never, never appoint the Arab to be a scribe, but only the Christian and the Jew. And thus the hatred and ill-will of the Arabs <towards the Christians> grew stronger. Now since that Jew was governor, the administration of the revenue and taxation of the city was committed to him. And the King of Kings sent his brother <to be> governor of Baghdad in his place. And he sent his other brother, together with Taj ad-din, the son of Mukhatas, the Director-General, to Mawsil, and to Mardin, and all Diar Bakr. [1:484–85]

And in the month of Tammuz <July> of this year a certain monk, who was an Armenian and a just man, one of those who used to go round about through the countries admonishing <the people> and proclaiming repentance, and reformation, and the confession of sins, arrived at the Citadel of Zaid [Zaydan?], and he remained there about a month of days. And his discourses pleased the Christians who were there very very much, and some young men were attracted by him, and they began to assemble about him in the night-time, and they ate, and drank, and conversed about the histories of the holy men and the crowning of the martyrs. And when the power of his utterances became reported to the Arabs, certain of them were smitten with envy, and they went on the night of Friday and took a dead dog and hung it up over the door of the Great Mosque. And when the day broke and the Arabs gathered together to pray, they saw that dead dog, and they burned with wrath. And they all with one mouth said, "This deed is the work of the Armenian monk and of those who gather together about him". And they drew their swords and daggers, and they went and seized the wretched monk, and a few of the natives of the city who were with him. For when the people had knowledge of the trick <of the dog>, they fled and all of them hid themselves from before the wrath of <the Arabs>. Then those wicked men took the monk and departed to the Monastery of Ba'uth, and they went into the cells of the monks and carried away all their possessions. And they killed that poor monk there

together with two or three natives of the city, and they returned to the city. And they also entered the houses of the believing Christians, and they looted everything which they found in their houses, and they inflicted beatings and tortures on many honourable men. And the city remained for about a month of days without buying and without selling <i.e. trade was paralysed>. [1:487–88]

The behaviour of the Arabs hath <long> been made manifest in the world, and up to the present day no Jew hath ever been raised to a position of exalted honour among them; and except as a tanner, or a dyer, or a tailor <the Arab> doth not appear among the Jews. But truly the honourable ones and the fortunate among them <exalt> the art of healing and the art of the scribe; but in situations in which others will not demean themselves to work, they will work. And at this time when the Mongols were ruling over these western countries, they did not honour every one who was worthy of honour, and they did not make those who had descended from the loins of kings to rule over the cities and villages which were in subjection to them. With the Mongols there is neither slave nor free man; neither believer nor pagan; neither Christian nor Jew; but they regard all men as belonging to one and the same stock. [. . .]

Therefore this Jew triumphed in every way, and attained the greatest glory and honour possible in the time of Arghon, the King of Kings, and he alone brought all political matters to a successful issue, and much else besides. To the nobles of the Camp he paid no heed, and he reduced the taking and giving of their hands, and he treated with contempt the principal Amirs and the directors of general affairs. The man who could confer a favour <or, benefit>, or who could do harm, was never seen at the Gate of the Kingdom, unless perchance <he was> a Jew. And through this state of affairs many of the Jews who were on the fringes of the world gathered together to him, and they all with one mouth said, "Verily, by means of this man the Lord hath raised on high the horn of redemption <or, deliverance>, and the hope of glory for the sons of the Hebrews in their last days".

Therefore, when they were boasting proudly of their exaltation, and occupied with their power, suddenly Arghon, the King of Kings, perceived <i.e. was attacked by> paralysis, and he was grievously afflicted with the disease for a month of days. And the wretched Jew was perplexed by his illness, and with great care he endeavoured in every way possible to heal him. Then the Amirs and the nobles of the Camp who despised the Jew utterly, having lost all hope of <saving> the life of Arghon, <behaved> as if the Jew himself, through the evil of his machinations, was the cause of the sickness of Arghon. And they began to roar at the wretched man like lions, until Arghon ended his life on the

fourth day of the week, at the end of the Latter Kanon <January> of the year <A.D. 1291>. Then God stirred up His wrath against the Jews who were in every place. This Sa'd al-Dawlah, the Sahib Diwan, they killed there. And with great care <the Amirs and nobles> sent ambassadors into all the countries which were under the dominion of the Mongols, and they seized his brethren and his kinsfolk, and they bound them with chains, and they plundered their stores of food, and they took their sons, and their daughters, and their slaves, and their handmaidens, and their flocks and herds, and all their possessions. And he who was killed by them was killed, and those who were left <alive> returned to their original stations. The man who yesterday was an officer, and could bind and set free, and was arrayed in royal apparel, was to-day swathed in sackcloth, and had dirty discoloured hands as if he was a dyer and not a scribe, and a beggar going round from door to door and not an officer. The trials and wrath which were stirred up against the Jews at this time neither tongue can utter nor the pen write down.

Then in Babil <Baghdad>, when <the report of> the murder of this Jew was heard, the Arabs armed themselves and went to the quarter of the Jews, because the Jews were all living together in one quarter in Babil. And when they wanted to go in and plunder them, the Jews rose up against them in great strength, and they fought against the Arabs, and killed and were killed; and they did not leave alive <any Jews> to rule over them. "Now", said they, "when this Jew became great and exalted, he commanded that a palace should be built for him in Tabriz, and he buried many pots filled with gold and silver in the walls thereof." Now this <fact> only became known at that moment, for it was only when <the Mongols> were torturing them <i.e. the Jews>, they showed them the places where the pots were, and so they dug <in the walls> and brought them out. Now the whole period during which the Jew was Director and Governor was two years, more or less. And he was killed and his name <i.e. fame> perished, and because of him the Jews throughout the [Muslim] world were hated and ill-treated. [1:490-91]

After the Conversion of the Mongols to Islam (1295)

And he [Nawruz]⁵ issued a command that the churches, and the houses of images, and the synagogues of the Jews should be destroyed, and that the priests <of the images> [Buddhists] and the chief priests should be treated with ignominy, and that tribute and taxes should be imposed upon them. And no Christian was to be seen <in the streets> unless he had a girdle round his loins, and no Jew was to be seen <in the streets> unless he had a mark on his head.

And in those days [October 1296], the foreign peoples⁶ stretched out

و شمشیر دست کشادند تا عاقبت حق بر باطل غلبه کرد و اکثر شیعه شرک را در شرک هلاک کرد



و اهل ضلال گزیده ضلال غنبت شدند و اولیای سلطان منصور و اودا شیطان
مقهور گشت فوله تعالی و در یرواحیه در کافله از فرود آمدند
بیمه کار جبروت آن روز شب کشیدیم اینجا نزول کردند روز دیگر در هنگام آمدن شعر

Battle of Bolnisi (1227). Georgia. Battle between Georgians and troops of the Khwarazm-Shah Jalal ad-Din en route to Tiflis

Ms. *Tarikh-i Jahangusha'i* of Juvaini. Cop. persane Shiraz (1437), supplé. persan 206 fol. 67. BN

their hands to Tabriz, and they destroyed all the churches which were there, and there was great sorrow among the Christians in all the world. The persecutions, and disgrace, and mockings, and ignominy which the Christians suffered at this time, especially in Baghdad, words cannot describe. Behold, according to what people say, "No Christian dared to appear in the streets <or, market>, but the women went out and came in and bought and sold, because they could not be distinguished from the Arab women, and could not be identified as Christians, though those who were recognized as Christians were disgraced, and slapped, and beaten and mocked. And behold, all the Christians who were in these regions were tortured with punishment of this kind; I would not say abandoned by God. And whilst they were being driven hither and thither, and were being worn out by tempestuous storms, the enemies of righteousness were jeering at them, and saying to them, "Where is your God? Let us see if you have a helper or one who can redeem and deliver <you>." Now this persecution had not dominion over our people alone, but also over the Jews, and it was twice as fierce, many times over, on the priests who were worshippers of idols [Buddhists]. And this after the honour to which they had been promoted by the Mongol kings, and which was so great that one-half of the money which was gathered together in the treasury of the kingdom had been given to them, and it had been expended <?> on the work of images of gold and silver. And a very large number of the pagan priests, because of the way in which they were persecuted, became Muslims.

And subsequently there went forth a command from the King of Kings [Ghazan] and the Yarlike <i.e. Edicts> were written to all the countries, and Mongol messengers were sent to every country and town to destroy the churches and to loot the monasteries. And wheresoever the messengers went and found Christians who rose up before them to render them service, and to give them gifts, they were less severe and were more lenient. For they were far more anxious to collect money than to destroy the churches, according to what happened in the city of Arbela. For when the officers arrived there they remained twenty days, and they expected that some one of the Christians would approach <them> and undertake <to bring> a certain amount of gold, and would manifest towards them open-handedness in return for sparing the churches which were there so that they might not be damaged; but no man approached <them>. And the Metropolitan himself who was there could not support the weight <i.e. burden> of his churches, and no other man took upon himself the care of the churches, but every man looked carefully after the management of his own individual house. Therefore there was given straightway an opportunity to the pagans, and they laid <their> hands on the three splendid churches which were

there, and they destroyed them utterly, down to the very foundations. [...]

Now when <the Ninevites>⁷ heard of the calamity which had taken place there, they were terrified and were exceedingly afraid. And when the nobles and the officers <of the Mongols> passed over into the region of Mawsil, certain men who loved works <connected with> the holy churches, and who made themselves responsible for the troubles <which assailed them>, approached them, and undertook <to give> much gold. And because they did not possess any of the mammon of the world, they laid <their> hands on the equipment and furnishing of the churches, and they did not leave untaken a cross, or an eikin [icon?], or a censer, or a Book of the Gospels which was mounted <or, inlaid> with gold. And when this was not sufficient, they made the believers who were in the towns and villages subscribe a certain amount of money. And they collected nearly fifteen thousand *dinars*, and they weighed them <i.e. paid> against the destruction of the churches, and the tribute of the Christians. And by the help of God not one church was damaged. [1:506–8]

Bar Hebraeus

1. Between Mardin and Mosul in the Jazira, a Jacobite center.
2. A note, in the translation and by the editor, indicates that Bar Hebraeus died at that date and that the chronicle was continued by someone else.
3. Note the difference between the Greek and Arabic dates.
4. On the river Tharthar.
5. A Muslim officer who persuaded his master the Il-Khan Ghazan (1295–1304) to convert to Islam, and initiated a wave of persecutions against Buddhists, Christians, and Jews.
6. This term “foreign peoples” to designate the Muslims is also found in Greek, Armenian, and Syriac authors. The reason is that Islam at this period was perceived as a religion brought by foreign, generally nomadic, populations.
7. Inhabitants of Nineveh, opposite Mosul.

Egypt

The 7th of Jumada 822 <1 June 1419>, the sultan of Egypt <Malik Mu'ayyad Abu Nasr>¹ summoned the Christian patriarch to appear before him in the presence of the *qadis* and doctors of the Law. While remaining standing, he received reproaches and blows and was berated by the sultan on account of the humiliations to which the Muslims had been subjected by the prince of the Abyssinians; he was even threatened with death. Next, the chief of the Cairo police, Shaykh Sadr ad-Din Ahmad b. al-Ajami, was summoned and reprimanded on account of the contempt of the Christians toward the laws relating to their [specific]

costume and their outward attire. After a long discussion between the doctors of the Law and the sultan on this subject, it was decided that none of these infidels would be employed in government offices, nor by the emirs; neither would they escape the measures taken to maintain them in a state of humiliation. Thereupon the sultan summoned al-Akram Fada'il, the Christian, the vizier's secretary, who had been imprisoned for several days; he was beaten, stripped of his clothes, and ignominiously paraded through the streets of Cairo in the company of the chief of police, who proclaimed: "This is the reward for Christians employed in government offices!" After all this, he was thrown back into prison.

So thoroughly did the sultan carry out these measures, that nowhere in Egypt was a Christian to be found employed in the administration. These infidels, as well as the Jews, were obliged to remain at home, decrease the volume of their turbans, and shorten their sleeves. All were prevented from riding on donkeys, with the result that when the [common] people saw a mounted Christian, they attacked him and confiscated his donkey and all that he had. Consequently, none are to be found mounted on horseback, except outside of Cairo. The Christians made every effort to recover employment and offered great sums of money for this purpose; however, despite the support they had from the Coptic scribes, the sultan did not comply with their requests and refused to retract the prohibitions that he had decreed.

Whereupon I reflected: in view of this deed, Allah will perhaps pardon all the sins of al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad! For, in acting thus, he effectively contributed greatly to Islam, since the employment of Christians in official functions is one of the greatest evils, which results in the exalting of their religion, since most Muslims need to frequent these officials in the course of their business. For every time they have some business that is dependent on an office run by such officials, they are obliged to behave humiliatingly and politely to them, be they Christians, Jews, or Samaritans. [pp. 115–16]

Thus the edict issued by this prince is tantamount to a second conquest of Egypt; in this manner was Islam exalted and infidelity humiliated, and nothing is more praiseworthy in the eyes of Allah. [p. 117]

Ibn Taghribirdi

1. al-Malik Sayf ad-Din, Mamluk sultan of Egypt, from the Burji dynasty (1412–21).

Morocco

[al-Maghili, d. 1504] showed an unbending stubbornness in upholding good and prohibiting evil. He thought that the Jews <may Allah

curse them> no longer enjoyed the status of a protected minority <*dhimma*>; this status was now abolished on account of their association with the Muslim ruling class. Such participation in governing is contrary to the degradation and scorn that accompany the payment of the *jizya*. It is enough that an individual <or a group> of them violate the status for it to be invalidated for all of them. <Our doctor> [al-Maghili] declared lawful the shedding of Jewish blood and the plundering of their belongings and he maintained that their repression was a more urgent duty than that of all other infidels. He wrote a book on the subject, consisting of several chapters <?> that incurred the disagreement of most of the jurists of his time, including shaykh Ibn Zakri and other <eminent personalities>. A great discussion ensued. The work arrived in Fez, the capital, where the jurists examined it at great length. Some expressed their disdain, while others reacted equitably <*faminhum man anifa waminhum man ansafa*>. [pp. 806–7]

Ibn Askar

Collection of the Poll Tax (Jizya)

On the day of payment they shall be assembled in a public place like the *suq*. They should be standing there waiting in the lowest and dirtiest place. The acting officials representing the Law shall be placed above them and shall adopt a threatening attitude so that it seems to them, as well as to the others, that our object is to degrade them by pretending to take their possessions. They will realize that we are doing them a favor <again> in accepting from them the *jizya* and letting them <thus> go free. Then they shall be dragged one by one <to the official responsible> for the exacting of payment. When paying, the *dhimmi* will receive a blow and will be thrust aside so that he will think that he has escaped the sword through this <insult>. This is the way that the friends of the Lord [Allah], of the first and last generations will act toward their infidel enemies, for might belongs to Allah, to His Prophet, and to the believers. [p. 811]

al-Maghili

On an appointed day the *dhimmi*—Christian or Jew—must present himself in person, and not through the intermediary of an agent <*wakil*>, before the emir responsible for the collection of the *jizya*. The latter must be seated on a chair raised in the form of a throne; the

dhimmi will come forward bearing the *jizya* held in the middle of the palm of his hand, whence the emir will take it in such a way that his hand is above and the *dhimmi's* hand underneath. Following this, the emir will strike the *dhimmi* on the neck with his fist; a man will stand near the emir to chase away the *dhimmi* in haste; then a second [*dhimmi*] and a third will come forward to suffer the same treatment as well as all those to follow. All [Muslims] will be admitted to enjoy this spectacle. None [of the *dhimmis*] will be allowed to delegate a third party to pay the *jizya* in his stead, for they must suffer this degradation personally; for perchance they will eventually come to believe in Allah and his Prophet and be consequently delivered from this distasteful yoke. [JA 19 (1852), 107–8]

al-Adawi

Persia (Seventeenth to Eighteenth Century)

Deportation¹ of the Population of Armenia by Shah Abbas I (1604)

[Shah-Abbas] summoned his officers into his presence and chose the leaders and administrators of the population from among them, one commandant per district. Emir Guna-Khan was especially put in charge of the town of Erevan, of the land of Ararat and of the small districts in the vicinity. They had for instructions, wherever their power could reach, to hunt down and take away everything—down to the last living dog—either Christians or subjected Muslims; for those who resisted and rebelled against the royal order—the sword, death and captivity.

Having received this cruel and deadly order from the monarch, the generals departed, each with his division, and went to the districts of Armenia that had been assigned to them. It was like a flame spread by the wind among reeds. Immediately, in all haste and without drawing breath, the inhabitants of the provinces, forced to leave their dwellings and exiled from their homeland, were driven forward like herds of light and heavy cattle, violently dragged and forced back into the province of Ararat, where they filled the vast plain from one end to the other. [. . .] The Persian troops entrusted with the operation, gathered the population together no matter where, in villages or towns, and consigned houses and buildings to the flames; they burned and destroyed the stores of forage, piles of corn, barley and other useful things; they pillaged, they cleared out everything, so that the Osmanli [Ottoman] troops



Armenian Bible. Painter: Khatchadur. New Julfa (1620)

Ms. no. 428, p. 443a, Gulbenkian Collection,
St. Thoros Manuscript Library, Jerusalem

should be destitute and die, and that the deportees, seeing this, would lose the hope and thought of return.

While the Persian soldiers, charged with escorting these masses, were dragging them towards the plain of Etchmiadzin, Shah Abbas was in Aghdja-Ghala [Yervandashat], and the Osmanli sardar [commander], Dshqal-Oghli, arrived with his troops at Kars. Knowing that he was not able to keep up the campaign against the Osmanlis, whose numerical superiority discouraged him, Shah Abbas turned towards Nakhidjevan and, with all his men, set out to follow in the tracks of the hordes going to Persia. The Osmanlis, for their part, set out hot on the heels of the Persians. There were therefore, three great and endless assemblies: that of the populations; of the Persians; and of the Osmanlis. As a result, it came to pass that when the populations began to move off, Shah Abbas and the Persians swooped down on their former camp and, when they left the place, it was occupied by Dshqal-Oghli, with the Osmanli troops. They followed one after another, putting their feet in the same tracks, until the people and the Persians had reached the village of Julfa and the Osmanlis Nakh-ovan [Nakhidjevan]. From then on, the Persians did not allow the people to halt not even for an hour: they hustled them, hurried them, caused some of them to die from blows with sticks, cut the ears or noses off others, cut off heads and stuck them on posts. It was in this way that Iohandjan, brother of the Catholicos Arakel, and another man had their heads cut off and stuck onto a pole by the side of the river Araxes. The purpose of these tortures and even worse inflicted on the population, was to force them by excessive terror to make haste and cross the river. The cunning Persian nation tormented the people in this way, out of fear of the Osmanlis advancing behind them: they saw the people's camp, crowded to overflowing—with their own men, also very numerous—and they understood that many days would be required to make the crossing. They were afraid that the Osmanlis would take advantage of this delay and hurl themselves upon them unawares and inflict a disaster upon them, or that they would take the population away from them and lead them back, which would later cause them considerable harm. That is why they harassed the people and hurried them to cross. But there were not enough boats and chests for such a throng. Many boats had been brought along from various places and a number of chests constructed on the spot, but the people and the Persians formed such a large body that nothing sufficed. The Persian warriors, charged with escorting the deportees surrounded them and watched that no one fled, dealt blows with sticks, broke everything, drove the people into the water, overflowing its [deep] banks, so that the sufferings and dangers for the people were appalling.

The wretched multitude saw the vast river, that sea that was going to

swallow them; at their backs, the murderous sword of the Persians, leaving no hope of flight. A concert of heart-breaking lamentations, floods of tears, forming another Araxes, cries, groans, sobs, howls of grief, invectives, harrowing wailing; pleas and shrieks mingled: neither pity nor means of salvation appeared from any quarter.

Here, our people would have needed Moses of ancient times and his disciple Joshua to extricate Israel from the hands of another Pharaoh, to calm the waves and the swell of a great, wide river; but they did not have them, because the multitude of our crimes had closed the righteous God's gates of mercy.

The cruel Persian soldiers, escorting the crowd, filled the river with them, and themselves amid the waters, caused redoubled cries and lamentations, torn from their breasts by the danger. Some clung to the planks of the boats or even the chests, others seized the tails of horses, oxen and buffalo, still others swam across. Those who did not know how to swim, the weak, old men and women, children, young girls and boys covered the surface of the water which swept them along like autumnal wisps of straws; the river disappeared under men borne along by the current; some succeeded in crossing, many drowned there and met their death.

Some Persian horsemen, who had sturdy mounts, or were endowed with strength themselves, went among the Christians, observed the girls and boys, and if one of them pleased them—woman, boy or girl—deceived their master [their father or relative] by saying to him: "Give, I will take them across to the other side"; having crossed, instead of setting them down on the ground, they took them away to suit their fancy. Others carried them swimming, others took them away, killed the master, and led them off; others went off, throwing the children on the road and abandoning them; the masters escaped themselves, leaving the sick, because of the intolerable dangers and fatigues to which they were exposed. In a word, I say that our nation was prey to such misery and intolerable dismay and torment that I am incapable of recounting the details of the mortal hardship which broke the Armenian nation, crushed by such calamities [. . .] At last it came about that the whole throng crossed the river, and pell-mell with them, the Persian army. Emir-Guna, their leader until then, was ordered by Shah Abbas to join his army, leaving Khalifalu Elias-Sultan, to guide the throng, with orders to lead these people on forced marches, to distance them from the Osmanlis and to deposit them on Persian soil. As for the shah, he marched straight to Tauriz [Tabriz] with his troops, following the royal route or *dshadeh*, but the throng did not follow the road going straight to the town, for fear that, marching behind the king, they would be separated from him and taken away by the Ottomans. He had therefore

instructed Elias-Sultan to lead them by roundabout routes, through places which were difficult to approach, where the Osmanlis could not follow them. Elias made the multitude march and guided them through valleys where the Araxes followed its course, through mountain gorges, rough both to enter and to descend, as well as through small valleys and narrow places. They did not cross mountain gorges or move from one rough spot to another without pain and suffering [. . .].

The Hunt for Fugitives

When this matter was ended, the khan and his troops marched against other refugees from the same district of Garhni-Zur: those they succeeded in halting, they despoiled, slaughtered and took with them. By coming and going, they reached the large valley called Kurhudara. Although there were several caves and fortified places in this valley where Christians were hiding, they neglected them in favor of the famous cave of Iakhsh-Khan where a thousand Christians, men and women, had gathered, attracted by its strong position, and who carefully watched over its approaches. The Persian soldiers had attacked them in vain for a long time, but they obtained no results from down below because it was a very high position. Their diabolical imagination presented them with another method. A detachment of two hundred men left the valley and scaled the rocks, where stones formed tiers up to the peak. Having fastened themselves together by long ropes, they went down, one after the other, from one level to the next, and in this way reached the level of the summits where the cave was. There, they clothed four of their men with iron breast-plates, covering them from head to toe, to which four or five swords were attached. Each man had a bared sword in his hand and four or five ropes around his body, so that if one were cut the other would hold him. They suspended these people from a dizzy height until they had reached the cave. When they arrived at the center of the hideout, they began to strike men and women mercilessly with their swords, like wolves who had entered an enclosure tearing sheep to shreds. At the sight of the Persian swords, bent on slaughtering them, the wretched Christians set up a great cry of grief; there were sobs, lamentations, tears, and groans torn from them by mortal horror; they moved about, became restless, jostled each other in disarray, went to and fro from side to side like the waves of a stormy sea, seeking safety where there was no way out. Hearing the cries and understanding what had happened, the people who guarded the paths leading to the cave abandoned their posts out of concern for their comrades and went within to help them. When they saw the guards arrive outside, the Persians went altogether into the cave and fell on the Christians with their swords.

From the entrance up to the furthest corner of the hideout, it was like mown grass, all were slaughtered and hurled down below. Men, old women and those who did not please them were killed and the floor of the cave ran with Christian blood which reddened all the stones. The child was torn from its mother's breast and thrown below. A few women, young men and young girls, who escaped the carnage, seeing themselves given into the hands of these fierce, inhuman beasts who would lead them into captivity, torture them and sully their purity, preferred death to a short and fleeting life full of crime and suffering. Many of them covered their heads with veils or with their gowns and threw themselves from the top of the cave into the abyss, and thus met their death. However, there was a dense forest in the valley. Some of those who threw themselves from the cave were caught in the branches of the trees which bore their weight; the branches went through their stomachs and came out of the backs of some of them; they reached the hearts and tore the shoulders of others, and their death was all the more cruel and painful. Lastly, those who remained were pillaged and robbed, and the rich booty shared out among the Persian soldiers, who seized them and took them to the main camp.

Thus the deportation to Persia did not extend to one or two districts but to a large number, from Nakhidjevan to Eghegadzor, on the frontier of Gegham, and to Lore on Hamzatshimar and Aparan; to Charap-Khan and Chiracavan; to Zarishat and to part of the villages of Kars [near Ani]; the whole Gaghzvan valley, to all the territory of Alashkert, to the village of Macon and to the land of Aghbak; to Salamast and Khoy, to Urmi, to all the foreigners and transitory people, who had remained in Tauriz and in its villages; to the entire plain of Ararat and the town of Yerevan; to the lands of Kerkh-Bulaqh and Dzaghcnots-Dzor, to Garni-Dzor and Urtza-Dzor, and earlier to the districts of Karin, Basen, Khnus and Manazkert, Artzke, Ardjesh, Berkri, and Van, where the inhabitants had been dragged to Yerevan in captivity and taken further afield.

All these districts of the beautiful land of Armenia, with their dependencies, where the population had been taken away forceably to Persia by order of the shah, were sacked and depopulated.

Many depopulated villages and sizable market towns can still be seen today on their rich and fertile soil, their fields and gardens. [pp. 287–95]

After having ruined the region of Ararat, the Jelalis moved on to Ghegharkunik and pillaged its villages (1605).

In addition, they seized women and children and took them away with them into captivity in order to force their masters to redeem them with



The Romance of Alexander (1536)

Painter: Krikonis of Aght'amar

Ms. no. 473, fol. 17, Gulbenkian Collection,
St. Thoros Manuscript Library, Jerusalem

gold and silver. After having done everything to their hearts' content, they made the captive women and children march, loaded the beasts of burden and the oxen, using the guards who had fallen into their hands, then they took the many flocks of sheep, the provisions and the herds of horses on the road with them. As this expedition was taking place in winter—and the cold season that year was harsh, the snow heavy—they had not marched for two days when the exhausted animals fell by the way and they divided the loads of those who failed and distributed them among the captive women and children. In this way, they crossed the mountain and arrived in the village of Karbi. How much suffering was

endured by the wretched people employed in this task! Some of them lost hands, feet and ears from the frost and it cut into their flesh; for others, the icy breezes took their breath away and they fell by the road and expired. These died as it were on the journey; the survivors were taken to Karbi, some sold for silver, others reserved as slaves to serve the Jelalis, who rested until the spring. [pp. 309–10]

1. The transfer of populations was always carried out on a very large scale, both by the Arabs at the time of their conquest and by the Seljuks, Ottomans, and Safavides. Here are given some testimonies, which indicate how these traumas were experienced. For examples from the deportations of the Byzantines by the Turks, see Vryonis Jnr., *The Decline*; for the Jewish communities of the Ottoman empire, see Joseph Hacker, "The Sürgün System and Jewish Society in the Ottoman Empire during the 15th–17th Centuries," in *Zion* 55 (1990): 27–82 (Hebrew).

Conversion of the Jews of Persia (1657–1661) under Shah Abbas II

After having removed the Armenian nation from the heart of Isfahan, they planned to eliminate the Jews from there as well. In the time of Shah Abbas II, in the Armenian year 1106 <Wednesday, 8 October> = 1657, a Friday, eve of the Sabbath, toward evening, the same *ehitim al-dawla* [minister] Mehmed-Bek, who had expelled the Armenians from the heart of Isfahan, wanted to do the same thing to the Jews; he therefore chose soldiers and sent them against the Hebrews or Jhuds [Yehuds]: "All you Jews must leave the town center [Isfahan] and settle outside on one of the outskirts. As you are non-Muslim and an impure race, quit the town and live outside, as the monarch commands".¹

"Since such is the monarch's order concerning us", said the Jews, in tones of supplication, "his order is on our heads and we will execute it completely; we only ask you to give us a few days' grace so that we can leave with our sons and daughters, with our possessions and belongings. Moreover, you see that today it grows late, that we have many sick and invalids, old men and young children, who cannot leave by night: therefore, we ask you for three days' grace."

However, the soldiers who had already arrived did not allow them to wait until the morrow and insisted that they leave with the utmost haste, that same evening, such being the order of the *ehitim al-dawla*, which did not permit them to wait till morning, and enjoined them to make them [the Jews] clear out forthwith, they and their families; because if a single one of them remained the next day, the stick, prison and torture would punish the unsubmissive who remained in contempt of the order of the *ehitim al-dawla*.

The minister [*ehitim al-dawla*] acted in this way towards the Jews in order to force them to commit the crime of violating the Sabbath, which they observe by doing nothing.

The soldiers of the *ehitim al-dawla*, come to drive them out by blows and ill treatment, made them leave their dwellings by sword and stick, by shoving them about brutally, scattering their belongings and breaking down their doors. As for the Jews, crying out, uttering lamentations, weeping and bewailing, each holding his son or daughter by the hand, dragging their beds and clothing along the ground, they left at a late hour, going from door to door across streets and squares, without any Muhammadan taking pity on them.

Having left the town and having arrived at the district of Djughha and Gaurabad, they were still not able to halt there because several soldiers came over and, claiming to have an order from the *ehitim al-dawla*, gave orders to the people of Djughha and Gaurabad not to give them asylum, and they all rested in the open air. As they were not under cover, and as there were many poor of both sexes among them, the cold of autumn and early winter caused great suffering. [Among them were many women nursing their babies, some of whom were pregnant and had heavy feet. There were young girls and handsome boys toward whom was turned the passion of impure, lustful and adulterous men from the Persian nation, who said ugly, dirty and vicious things, causing them great shame.]² Also other Muhammadans who crossed their path treated them with disdain and disgust, beat them and heaped many insults on these wretched people.

After this, the *ehitim al-dawla*, seeing that there was no way of leading them to become Muslims willingly, resolved to use violence to this end. He enjoined every Muslim and especially soldiers, wherever they found a Jew to seize him and bring him to his door. As a result, as soon as a Muslim caught a Jew they acted in this way. The minister first spoke to the Jew in a sweet tone: "Come along, good people, leave your vain religion, acknowledge the God who created the heavens and the earth and let us become brethren".

The Jews answered: "We know the God, creator of the heavens and the earth, we serve him, but we do not wish for brotherhood with you and we will not avow your religion. Ours is true, given by God, through the intermediary of the prophet Moses, whom you yourself recognize".

"By embracing our religion", the *ehitim al-dawla* replied, "you will be our well-beloved brethren; in addition we will heap upon you rich gifts and distinguished honors". [. . .]

Having consulted together, the Jews presented the *ehitim al-dawla* with a petition, in order to have a place to live: "As", they said, "in expelling the Armenians from the centre of the town, you assigned them a place to live elsewhere, do the same for us, in any place on the outskirts of the town, where little by little we will build ourselves houses: this will be our permanent dwelling after having vacated the town".

However, the *ehtim al-dawla*, after consultation with the other Persian lords, designated a certain place, far from the town, called Gozaldaba, near Muthallath-Imam, an entirely unsuitable place and without resources, first because it was far from the town, then because water was so scarce there that if one wished to bring it from afar, it would not get there because of the distance. If a well was dug, water did not spring from that hilly and stony soil, which had been chosen precisely to make the Jews who would be living there suffer and to reduce them to the last extremities. They were, therefore, not able to go there and remained isolated outside.

After this, the *ehtim al-dawla* resolved progressively to increase the sufferings of the Jews. From time immemorial there had been a place on the outskirts of the town, far from any inhabited dwelling, a place surrounded by a high wall with a door to the interior in which there was not a single building, only the wall forming the enclosure.

He ordered that one Persian soldier should be attached to each couple of Jews in order to torment them; that all the Jews who could be found should be seized and led into the enclosure in chains, that water be sprinkled over the whole surface of the ground and that they be made to sit there without clothing. As it was the time of the cold autumn season <in 1658>, the water was not only cool but icy. The Jews sat there [and the Persian soldiers were beating them] for three days and three nights, and the Jews stayed there on empty stomachs and without food, for no one gave them anything, and their compatriots who remained outside having brought bread which they threw over the walls into the enclosure, the soldiers took it away and ate it themselves. After this, the *ehtim al-dawla* had them taken from there and thrown into prison.

He [the *ehtim al-dawla*] then asked this question to the *sadr*, the head of the Persian religion: "What should be done if these people do not consent to embrace our faith? Convert them by force or not?". "Our law", replied the *sadr*, "does not permit conversion by violence". "What should be done then?" repeated the minister. "That is nothing to do with me", said the *sadr*. "It is your business".

Having made the Jews come into his presence again, the *ehtim al-dawla* urged them to submit and to embrace the faith of Muhammad: "Everyone who does so", he added, "will receive two tumans from me, will be freed from torments and will sit in peace in his house; he who first acknowledges our faith will have authority as leader." [. . .]

[One of them, Ovadia, renounced Judaism and advised the Persians.] Through his advice, the Hakham [rabbi], called Sa'id, was hastily sought and when he was found he was brought to the *ehtim al-dawla* who said to him: "Yield to my advice, carry out the royal order; come and embrace

the Muslim faith and I will heap gifts and benefits upon you". Instead of consenting, the Hakham replied with a refusal; the nobles spoke in vain, he held firm and asked only to return to his house. The nobles having dismissed him, the renegade Ovadia, who was there at the time, urged them to retain him and to keep him near them, which they decided to do. The next day he was called back to the divan [council room] and he was again urged to embrace the Muslim faith; but this time again he refused. The same manoeuver was repeated on the third day with the same result. At last, on the following day, after many words and promises, the Hakham's sentence was pronounced. "If he does not embrace the Muslim faith, his stomach will be split open and he will be paraded through the town attached to a camel; his property and his family would be consigned to pillage". The sentence given, a camel was brought, on which he was seated, the executioners came and bared his stomach, then they beat him with a naked sword, saying that either he apostasized or his stomach would be split open. Fear of death as well as affection for those close to him having led him to weaken, he was made to pronounce his belief in the Muslim faith, and he was incorporated into the religion of Muhammad, which was cause of untold joy to the Persians.

After having converted the Hakham to their religion, they made Jews come to the divan, one or two together, and said to them: "What reason have you for persisting in your resistance, when the Hakham has made his profession [of faith]?" As these people held firm, the nobles had them escorted back to prison by soldiers. They were taken out, led away and taken back several times, and on the way the soldiers, slaves and servants of the nobles present there, insulted them, abused them, beat them, slapped their faces, threw them to the ground and dragged them along, then brought them into the presence of the *ehitim al-dawla* and the nobles, and strove to tear out from them acceptance of the Muslim faith. If Jews, willingly or unwillingly, pronounced it from fear of death, the Persians immediately clothed the renegades in new robes, gave them two tumans from the royal treasury and allowed them to return home. Those who resisted were kept in prison; then they were brought back to the tribunal two or three times, even more often, and were urged to apostasize. By these actions, all the prisoners were led to the religion of Muhammad; in the space of a month, three hundred and fifty men became Muslims.

Ever since then, half the Jews having adopted the religion of the Persians, their nation lost what the Persians gained by their ascendancy over them: they were not even allowed to exist any longer, for every day they were dragged by force before the *ehitim al-dawla* and there they were forced to become Muslims.

The Persians put so much determination into their violence, aimed at conversion, that all the Jews living in Isfahan, and they were not many, about three hundred families, adopted the religion of Muhammed.

As a last measure, a Muslim mollah was forced on them, entrusted with teaching them the law of Muhammad, with escorting them assiduously to the place of prayer, with making them pray in Persian, with teaching the children Persian letters and history; the Jews were also forced to give their daughters to the Muhammadans, to marry Muslim women themselves, not to slaughter animals according to their ancient ritual, to buy their meat from the shops of Muslim butchers; in a word, they were subjected to a mass of Persian customs.

However, there were Jews who did not attend the Persian mosque and avoided all closer relationship with them; who, instead of buying the meat from the butcher's shop, secretly slaughtered sheep at home, or even did not buy meat for days on end. If they went to the Persian butcher's shop to buy meat from time to time for fear of traitors, they ostentatiously and boldly carried it to their home for all to see and, instead of eating it themselves, gave it to the dogs and made them eat it. The Jews indulged in many other similar practices, proving that they did not want to renounce Judaism. [. . .]

The Jews therefore, did not practice the precepts of Islam at their local gatherings, but those of Judaism. "Every year we put aside the annual taxes we owe to the royal exchequer and capitalize them in our treasury", they said, "in order to be able to hand them over at the first levy and protect ourselves. As for the two tumans that were paid for our apostasy, we keep them and we draw an annual interest on them, in order to acquit ourselves with the Persians and meet all their requirements". This is then the situation between Persians and Jews upto the moment of our writing this, in our year 1109 <1660> [. . .] As for the future, God knows it.

It should also be known that at the period when the Jews were brought, willingly or unwillingly, to the faith of Muhammad, the *ehitim al-dawla* obtained from the monarch a decree for all heads of provinces under Persian rule, to make all Jews and communities in villages and towns wherever they were to renounce Judaism. If they submitted with good grace, so much the better; recalcitrants had to be brought by force and torture to embrace the law of Muhammad. As soon as the royal decree was received in a place, it was as if fire raged among reeds. The Jews were assembled and forced to carry out this supreme edict. Not all of them submitted; a few escaped by means of bribes, by flight, or thanks to their shrewdness; those who remained, caught off their guard, went along, willy-nilly, with the Muslim religion; assumed at least the appear-

ances of it in the eyes of the Persians, without the reality, and practised the laws of Judaism in secret.

Jews residing in Persian towns had no option but to appear to comply with the laws of the land. This was the case at Kashan, Qum, Ardavel, Taurez [Tabriz], Qazbin, Lar, Shiraz, Banderi-i-Qum. Those who saved themselves by bribes, flight or shrewd means, stayed at Gulpekian, Khunsar, Bandar, Shushtar, Hamadan, Yezd, in the Kirman, Khurasan, at Dumavand, Astarbad, in the Gilan and in the villages of Phahrabad.

As for those who remained in the town of Phahrabad itself, they openly resisted the royal decree and did not conform with the faith of Muhammad. Having learned that the Jews of Isfahan had adopted it, their governor, prince Mirza-Satgh, undertook to compel the Jews of the aforesaid village to adopt it too. Before receiving the royal decree, the Jews, worried by his violent actions, had told him directly: "You do not have the sovereign's order on this matter, why are you tormenting us?". These words slightly lessened his arrogance, but a sharp resentment remained in his heart and he waited patiently until he had received the rescript. After that, he summoned the Jews and said to them: "What have you got to say? Here is the sovereign's decree, submit yourselves to carry it out and become Muslims".

As for the Jews they persisted in their opposition without weakening: "We do not recognize the law of Muhammad", they said. "We will not renounce the faith of our fathers; do with us what you please".

The prince employed various types of torture in order to compel them: some were hung from a post and the breath beaten out of them; others were suffocated in the water of the lake, taken out and beaten. In addition, he sent soldiers to ransack their houses, sully their women, things which these people carried out with frenzy against boys and girls. The Jews of this country were rich and wealthy; many of them owning shops [dukans] in the market, where they traded in fine fabrics and silverware; the prince of the Muslims had ordered that their rich shops be plundered, which was soon done.

More than one hundred of the Jewish men were arrested, their necks laden with a long and heavy iron chain which they bore one behind the other—as there was only one chain—and they were dragged daily to the prince's door to be judged; then they were led back to prison.

The matter having lasted for three or four months, even the prince became sick and tired of his orders for torture and spontaneously took this decision: "Since you refuse to renounce Judaism, place a sign on yourselves which will make everyone know that you are Jews". These people eagerly accepted such a sign. [. . .] [And the prince, as an insult to them, ordered that from the neck of each Jewish male should be hung on a single string, copper pieces of iron and copper, handles of

water-drinking jugs and spouts. With this distinctive sign, Jews had to walk about in the streets, squares, markets and all other places. Any Jew who failed to bear this sign was subject to blows, prison and fines. Accepting this order, Jews willingly put on their necks what the prince wished (the string of objects) and so went everywhere.]

The Jews still had to suffer so many torments and snubs that the Persians themselves became bored with it and stopped altogether persecuting them. Delivered in this way from the hands of the Persians, they persevered up to this day in the faith of their fathers.³ [. . .] To God, who knows the future, glory for eternity! Amen. [1:489–96]

Arakel of Tauriz


1. From remote antiquity one of the districts of Isfahan was populated with Jews and was called Yahudiyah.

2. These five lines in the Armenian text were omitted by Brosset in the French translation, as were another eight lines, toward the end of this description, also included in square brackets.

3. In 1661, an edict authorized the Jews to profess their religion openly on payment of the *jizya* and the wearing of a distinctive patch on their clothes. For a Jewish account of these same events in English, see Hizkiya's elegy (*Arnes mi-Hizkiya*), in Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, doc. 98, pp. 359–61; for a more complete version of this text in Hebrew, cf. Bat Ye'or, *Ha-Dimmim* (Hebrew, enlarged edition). Foreword by Moshe Sharon. Translated by Aharon Amir. (Jerusalem, 1986), 295–303 (text by Amnon Netzer).

Deportation of Armenians from Ararat (1735)

After the departure of the khan [Nadir Shah],¹ I remained at Tiflis for three days. In fact, the fearsome sovereign had ordered that three hundred families be taken out from that town, as he had already commanded for Ararat, and be made to move into the Khorasan. The khan of Erevan, the *kalanthar*² and the *melik*³ already had orders to register these three hundred families, to tear them, willy-nilly, from their dwellings and make them emigrate. A like number of families from Tiflis were also registered. The people assembled in a church and, as several had learned of the departure and arrest of their people, they hurried to the place where I was lodged. There arose a clamor, wails, cries rising toward heaven; there were tears, groans, lamentations; they writhed on the ground, begged me to ask the khan to free them, not to take them to a foreign land. Grieved by the sight of the pain of my people, the men as much as the women; and with a heavy heart, burning, shedding tears of blood, I set to knocking on the doors of the great, entreating, pleading, begging that they be saved from such a misfortune. Thanks be to God, certain arguments softened the heart of the khan, who granted them a pardon, in return for three thousand tumans and three



**Tamerlane Takes the Fortress of Tiflis (1386). Georgian Prisoners Led
 Away on the Sultan's Orders**
 Ms. *Rawzat al-Safa*, from Mir Khwand, 6th part, cop. persane
 dating from 1603, supplé. persan 151b. fol. 59v. BN

thousand loads of corn, which they collected altogether and were thus redeemed. As for the three hundred families of Ararat, although it cost me much bitter anguish and fatigue, nothing could be done. He ordered two buffalo per house to be supplied at the exchequer's expense, in order to transport what they wanted; each of those who remained had to give three oxen, three cows, three litras of copper objects, three carpets, three lheps <?> of flour and wheat and one tuman of silver, in aid of each refugee's house. [2:278-79]

Abraham of Crete

1. Nadir Khan defeated the Turks at Bagravan in 1735, taking Tiflis. He was proclaimed Shah of Persia (1736-47) under the nominal reign of the infant Abbas III, the last of the Safavids.

2. A high officer, below the khan, but above the melik.

3. A high-ranking officer in Iran and eastern Armenia (fourteenth-eighteenth centuries), responsible for tax collecting in a town.

Palestine

Jews and Christians in Jerusalem (1700)

We [Jews] were obliged to give a large sum of money to the Muslim authorities in Jerusalem in order to be allowed to build a new synagogue. Although the old synagogue was small and we only wanted to enlarge it very slightly, it was forbidden under Islamic law to modify the least part [. . .]. In addition to the expenses in bribes destined to win the favor of the Muslims, each male was obliged to pay an annual poll tax of two pieces of gold to the sultan. The rich man was not obliged to give more, but the poor man could not give less. Every year, generally during the festival of Passover, an official from Constantinople would arrive in Jerusalem. He who did not have the means to pay the tax was thrown into prison and the Jewish community was obliged to redeem him. The official remained in Jerusalem for about two months and consequently, during that period, the poor people would hide wherever they could, but if they were ever caught, they would be redeemed by community funds.¹ The official sent his soldiers throughout the streets to control the papers of the passersby, for a certificate was provided to those who had already paid the tax. If anyone was found without his certificate, he had to present himself before the official with the required sum, otherwise he was imprisoned until such time as he could be redeemed. [fols. 3a-b]

The Christians are also obliged to pay the poll tax [. . .] The Muslims, however, are not permitted to exact payment of the tax on the Sabbath


or Holy Days, and consequently we could walk in the streets unmolested on those days. However, during the week, the paupers dared not show themselves outside. Likewise, the soldiers are not allowed to carry out their controls to collect the tax from door to door, and all the less so in prayer houses. But in their wickedness, the soldiers would go to the synagogues, waiting by the doors, requesting the certificate of payment from the congregants who emerged [. . .]. No Jew or Christian is allowed to ride a horse, but a donkey is permitted, for [in the eyes of Muslims] Christians and Jews are inferior beings. [fol. 7b]

The Muslims do not allow entry to the Temple area to any member of another faith, unless he converts to their religion—for they claim that no member of another religion is sufficiently pure to enter this holy spot. They never weary of claiming that, although God had originally chosen the people of Israel, He had since abandoned them on account of their iniquity in order to choose the Muslims. [fols. 8b–9a]

In the Land of Israel, no member of any other religion besides Islam may wear the green color, even if it is a thread [of cotton] like that with which we decorate our prayer shawls. If a Muslim perceives it, that could bring trouble. Similarly, it is not permitted to wear a green or white turban. On the Sabbath, however, we wear white turbans, on the crown of which we place a piece of cloth of another color as a distinguishing mark. [fols. 13a–b]

The Christians are not allowed to wear a turban, but they wear a hat instead, as is customary in Poland. Moreover, the Muslim law requires that each religious denomination wear its specific garment so that each people may be distinguished from another. This distinction also applies to footwear. Indeed, the Jews wear shoes of a dark blue color, whereas Christians wear red shoes. No one can use green, for this color is worn solely by Muslims.² The latter are very hostile toward Jews and inflict upon them vexations in the streets of the city. It is rare, however, for the Turkish or even the Arab notables to harm the Jews when passing them [in the street], but the common folk persecute the Jews, for we are forbidden to defend ourselves against the Turks or the Arabs. If an Arab strikes a Jew, he [the Jew] must appease him but must not rebuke him, for fear that he may be struck even harder, which they [the Arabs] do without the slightest scruple. This is the way the Oriental Jews react, for they are accustomed to this treatment, whereas the European Jews, who are not yet accustomed to being assaulted by the Arabs, insult them in return. [. . .]

Even the Christians are subjected to these vexations. If a Jew offends a Muslim, the latter strikes him a brutal blow with his shoe in order to demean him, without anyone's being able to prevent him from doing it. The Christians fall victim to the same treatment and they suffer as much



The Western (Wailing) Wall of the Temple Mount. Jerusalem (1870)
Photo: Palestine Exploration Fund, London

as the Jews, except that the former are very rich by reason of the subsidies that they receive from abroad, and they use this money to bribe the Arabs. As for the Jews, they do not possess much money with which to oil the palms of the Muslims, and consequently they are subject to much greater suffering. [folio 13b]

Gedaliah of Siemiatyc

1. These procedures, the captivity and redemption of the tributaries, have already been mentioned in abundance by the pseudo-Dionysius of Tell-Mahre, Michael the Syrian, the Jewish geniza documents published by Shlomo Dov Goitein, Armenian and foreign authors, d'Arvieux, Tavernier, and so on. They can be regarded as permanent components of dhimmitude.

2. In 1730, in order to avoid reprisals, the French consul tore down a curtain made of green fabric in his dwelling because that color is reserved solely for the sharifs, that is to say the descendants of the Prophet; see Charles-Roux, p. 54.

Egypt

Coptic Pilgrimage from Egypt to Jerusalem in 1756

The Coptic Christians wanted to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Their leader, who was then Nurauz, a writer from Ridwan Katkhoda, imparted this plan to Sheikh Abdallah al-Shabrawi and offered him a gift of a thousand dinars. The sheikh then handed him a *fatwa* which allowed those who enjoyed the protection of the Muslims to have complete freedom in their religion and their pilgrimages. When they had this *fatwa* in their hands, the Copts proceeded to make immense preparations and set out to leave. Their retinue was impressive and ostentatious; they carried with them immense loads of baggage, gilded wooden chests; their women and children were carried in litters and they did not forget to take musical instruments with them. While awaiting the time of departure, they set up a camp at Qubbat al-Azab and they hired Bedouin to escort them on the journey. They gave them sums of money, robes of honor, clothing and gratuities.

The news of this pilgrimage soon spread in the town and this deed was found reprehensible. [2:114–15]

[*A notable reproached Sheikh al-Shabrawi for it.*] “The deed you have authorized them to undertake will become a custom; next year they will make themselves a carpet and in future the Christians’ pilgrimage will be spoken of in the same way as one talks of the Muslims’ pilgrimage. Sheikh Abdallah, listen well to what I will tell you: you will carry the responsibility of this decision until the Day of the Resurrection.”

Sheikh Abdallah then rose, filled with wrath. He left the house of Sidi al-Bakri and authorized the people to fall on the Copts who were mak-

ing the pilgrimage and pillage them. The throng, swelled by a party of students from the mosque of Al-Azhar, then went to the Copts' camp, which it pillaged; it ill-treated the pilgrims and spared them neither blows from sticks, nor from stones. It also pillaged the nearby church, situated at Demirdashi. The Christians were very badly ill-treated on the occasion of this pilgrimage and they were not able to take vengeance for the insults that they were made to suffer. The enormous costs they had borne were lost. [2:115–16]

al-Djabarti

Opinion of an Eighteenth-Century Egyptian Jurist

As Badr¹ says in *al-Durar al-Nafa'is*, quoting from Abu Ubayd²: The foundation of Muslim cities varies according to local conditions. Thus, for example, in Madina, Taif, Yaman, peace treaties were negotiated; uninhabited area[s] demarcated and settled by Muslims, such as Cairo, Kufa, Basra, Baghdad, Wasit; any village that was taken by force and that the caliph did not see fit to return to those from whom it had been taken. These are Muslim cities in which the protected people may not display any of their religious symbols, for example, erect churches, bring out wine or pork, or sound the clapper. No new synagogue, church, monk's cell, prayer assembly of theirs is allowed in these cities, by the consensus of the doctors [theologians]. It has been mentioned above that our city, Cairo, is an Islamic town, started after the conquest of Egypt, under the reign of the Fatimids. Therefore, no church, synagogue, and the rest, may be erected in it. Among those who affirmed this was the mufti of Islam, the erudite Hanafi, Shaykh Qasim b. Qutlubugha³ disciple of Ibn al-Humam.⁴ The books of the school are unanimous in the prohibition of the erection of *dhimmi*-owned churches and the like in any Islamic territory. How then can it be permitted in this Islamic settlement, in a city over which unbelief has never had a hand, not since the city's inception? The Prophet, peace and blessing upon him, said: No emasculation and no church in Islam. The word "emasculation", *khisa*, follows the pattern *fi'al*, as the verbal noun of *khsy*, "to emasculate". The relation between "emasculation" and "church" is that the erection of a church in Muslim territory denotes the elimination of manliness in the people of the territory, just as emasculation, in reality, is the elimination of virility in an animal, though the sense of the word in our context is withdrawal from women by attachment to churches. The connection is evident. By "no church" the Prophet meant no construction thereof, a prohibition, that is, that no church be built in Islamic territory because

the erection of a new church in Islamic territory signifies the elimination of virility in the people of that territory, which is not permissible, even as the elimination of man's virility by castration is not. [pp. 20–21]

Even though some data may be understood from the above, know that just as the *dhimmis* are prohibited from building churches, other things also are prohibited to them. They must not assist an unbeliever against a Muslim, Arab, or non-Arab; or indicate to the enemy the weak points of the Muslims, such as the Muslims' unpreparedness for battle. The *dhimmis* must not imitate the Muslims in garb, wear military attire, abuse or strike a Muslim, raise the cross in an Islamic assemblage; let pigs get out of their homes into Muslim courtyards; display banners on their own holidays; bear arms on their holidays, or carry them at all, or keep them in their homes. Should they do anything of the sort, they must be punished, and the arms seized. Neither Jew nor Christian should ride a horse, with or without saddle. They may ride asses with a packsaddle. They must not wear the *qaba* <full-sleeved garment>, silk garments, turbans, but may wear quilted *qalansuwa* [conical bonnet] headgear. If they pass by a Muslim assembly, they must dismount, and they may ride only in an emergency such as sickness or leaving for the country, and their path is to be made narrow. They must not imitate the garb of the men of learning and honor, or wear luxurious garb, silk, or, say, fine cloth. They must be distinguished from ourselves in attire, as the local custom of each area may have it, but without adornment, so that it indicates their humiliation, submission, and abasement. Their shoelaces must not be like ours. Where closed shoes are worn, not laced footwear, their shoes should be coarse, of unpleasant (unadorned) color. The Companions [of the Prophet] agreed upon these points in order to demonstrate the abasement of the infidel and to protect the weak believer's faith. For if he sees them humbled, he will not be inclined toward their belief, which is not true if he sees them in power, pride, or luxury garb, as all this urges him to esteem them and incline toward them, in view of his own distress and poverty. Yet esteem for the unbeliever is unbelief.

In *al-Ashbah wa-l-naza'ir*,⁵ it says:

Deference for the unbeliever is unbelief. He who greets a *dhimmi* with deference is guilty of unbelief. He, who says to a Magian,⁶ in deference, "O, Master" is guilty of unbelief. That is so because they are the enemies of our beloved, the Lord of the Messengers; and he who honors the enemy of his beloved has humiliated his beloved. That is why it is not permissible to install infidels as officials. To let them gain sway over a Muslim by empowering them to beat, imprison, or oppress him in order to exact money turns the infidel into [a] tax collector from a Muslim, all on behalf of a chieftain or dignitary who, for the sake of worldly affairs and in disregard of punishment in the hereafter, fears not the consequences of endowing unbelievers with power over believers. If the infidel

has behaved this way, he has violated the covenant [*dhimma*] with the Muslims as mentioned above, and is subject to death.

Kamal b. al-Humam [d. 1457] says: "The *dhimmi* infidel who raises himself above the Muslims so as to become overbearing may be slain by the caliph".

It is prohibited to assign them a seat of honor in a session attended by Muslims, to show friendship for them, to extend greetings to them.

If you greeted one whom you considered a Muslim, only to learn he was a *dhimmi*, withdraw your word, pretending "he answered my salutations". If one of them salutes he is answered with "same to you" only.⁷ If you correspond with one, you say: "Salutation to him who follows right guidance". But avoid congratulating, consoling, or visiting them, unless you expect the person visited to convert to Islam. If you do expect so, visit him and proffer Islam to him.

Infidels are prohibited from raising a structure higher than that of a Muslim neighbor, even if the Muslim's structure is very low and the Muslim is reconciled to the infidel's high building. They are forbidden to buy a Koran, or a book of Islamic law or of prophetic tradition, or to take one as a pledge. Neither case would be correct. One should not rise in their honor to start saluting them, as mentioned above. If a Muslim accompanies the greeted infidel, direct the salutation at him, and do not indulge in "How are you, how have you been, how do you feel?" One may say "May God honor and guide you", meaning toward Islam. One may say "May God give you long life, much wealth and progeny", because it implies the payment of many poll taxes.

Just as Muslims must be clearly different from infidels in life, so their graves must be clearly distinguished from those of the infidels, and must be remote from them. [pp.55–57]

al-Damanhuri

1. Badr ad-Din Muhammad al-Qarafi (1533–1601), author of the work of jurisprudence, *ad-Durar an-Nafa'is*.

2. Al-Qasim Abu Ubayd (d. 838), a scholar who lived in Iraq.

3. Qasim b. Qutlubugha (1399–1474), eminent Egyptian of the Hanafi school.

4. Kamal ad-Din Muhammad Ibn al-Humam (d. 1457), an Egyptian jurist.

5. The title of several volumes on "the systematic structure of positive law". The work referred to is perhaps that by Ibn Nujaym (d. 1562), a Hanafi author of books of this kind.

6. Zoroastrian.

7. See p. 327, n. 1.

Turkey

Letters from British Ambassadors to Constantinople (1662–1785)

Pera at Constple, Aprill 25th 1662

[. . .] This present Vizier¹ degenerates nothing from the tyranie, & severitie of his father,² but rather exceeds him in a naturall abhorrencia of Christians & their religion. For those Churches, that were 2 yeares past burnt down in Galata & Const:ple the ground was purchased at a deare rate from the Grand Sig:r by the Greekes, Armenians, & Romanists; but not wth licence to build in the forme of Churches; or therein use any more rites, or services of religion. But these religions being too forward in their zeale, not only reedifyed them in the fashion of Churches, but resorted theither publickly to their divine service; wch the vizier hath made use of, as a wellcome opportunitie to demolish, & levell their Churches wth the ground, wch hee doth wth much passion, & malice, & comitted those who had the chiefe hand in the building to a severe imprisonment, excepting only my chiefe Druggerman, or interpreter who yet escapes free from any molestation by that security hee enioyes under my protection.³

SP 97–17 [pp. 272b–73]

Winchilsea to the Foreign Office, London

1. Fazil Ahmed Köprülü Pasha (1661–76), grand vizier to Sultan Muhammad IV.

2. Mehmed Köprülü (1656–61).

3. The head of the carpenters and masons, accused of having allowed the workers to build churches, was strangled by order of the vizier. (SP 97–17, pp. 274–75, Winchilsea, Pera-Constantinople, 20 May 1662).

Constantinople, 3d Febr'y 1758

[. . .] The order against Christians & Jews Dress, except in modest Cloaths, browns blacks & c:a & as to caps & boots is most rigorously executed in a Manner unknown before, which alarms much all those who are not Mahometans, & makes them apprehend the utmost Rigour; it seems however but natural, when it is considered, that it comes from a self-denying religious Prince [Sultan Mustafa III].

SP 97–40 (n.p.)

Porter to Pitt, London

Constantinople, 3d of June 1758

This time of Ramazan is mostly taken up by day in sleep, by Night in eating, so that we have few occurrences of any importance, except what the Grand Seignor [Sultan Mustafa III] himself affords us he is determin'd to keep to his laws, and to have them executed, that concerning



Sulak Bashi. Captain of the Guards

Le Hay (1715), pl. 16

dress has been often repeated, and with uncommon solemnity, yet as in the former Reigns, after some weeks it was seldom attended to, but gradually transgress'd, these people whose ruling Passion is directed that way, thought it was forgot, and betook themselves to their old course, a Jew on his Sabbath was the first victim, the Grand Seignor going the rounds incognito, met him, and not having the Executioner with him, without sending him [the Jew] to the Vizir, had him executed, and his throat cut that moment, the day after an Armenian follow'd, he was sent to the Vizir, who attempted to save him, and condemn'd him to the Galleys, but the Capigilar Cheaia [head of the guards] came to the Porte at night, attended with the executioner, to know what was become of the delinquent, that first Minister had him brought directly from the Galleys and his head struck off, that he might inform his Master he had anticipated his Orders. A general terror has struck all the people, and greatly embarras'd the Ministers of the Porte, the very Draggoman's or Interpreters are afraid to walk the streets, tho' excepted in the command, the Vizir has order'd all his own people, tho' protected by Berrat [official certificate], to conform to the vigour of the law. [. . .]

SP 97-40 (n.p.)

Porter to Pitt, London

Constantinople, 17th Sepr. 1770

[. . .] The Bostangi Bashi [guardian in chief of the Sultan Mustafa III] is changed, and the new one immediately issued Orders, that no Greeks, Armenians, or Jews should be seen out of their houses at half an hour after Sunset; for that if he found any one in the streets, after the hour, he would hang him without Distinction. It is imagined that the reason for this order is, that the Turks go disguised in their [non-Muslim] Dress. [. . .]

SP 97-46 [pp. 216-216b]

Murray to Weymouth

Constantinople, 10th January 1785

[. . .] The Grand Visir [of Sultan Abd al-Hamid I] has been induced to take a very harsh, and impolitical step with the Greek inhabitants of this Capital, who, in the grand Conflagration in the month of August last, had, by astonishing exertion, and at a vast expense, saved from the

۱۷۵۸. yehoudi, ou, Juif.



A Jew (1720)

Costumes turcs

بادانجی. *Badanadji, ou Arménien qui blanchit les murailles.*



Badanadji: An Armenian Who Whitewashes Walls (1720)

Costumes turcs

Flames two of their Churches situated in the City. These, my Lord, though nighly ruined, had, with great trouble, been secretly repaired, and the work, with great cost, entirely completed, when some mischievous Turks in that neighbourhood, complained of this industry as an infraction of the Law, by which Christian Churches in the City of Constantinople are neither to be demolished, nor repaired, but permitted to exist for the purposes intended, so long as it shall please God to preserve them. In this moment, the Visir did not think proper to oppose the Fanaticism of the Mob, and at break of the day on the 8th instant, some Turk Workmen were employed to take down all the new Repairs made in these two Buildings.

FO 261-1 (n.p.)

Ainslie to Carmarthen, London

Morocco (Nineteenth century)

Letter from the Sultan of Morocco, Mulay Abd ar-Rahman (1822-1859), to the French Consulate at Tangiers (1841)

The Jews of Our fortunate Country have received guarantees from which they benefit in exchange for their carrying out the conditions imposed by our religious Law on those people who enjoyed its protection: these conditions have been and still are observed by Our coreligionists. If the Jews respect these conditions, Our Law prohibits the spilling of their blood and enjoins the protection of their belongings, but if they break so much as a single condition, [then] Our blessed Law permits their blood to be spilt and their belongings to be taken. Our glorious faith only allows them the marks of lowliness and degradation, thus the sole fact that a Jew raises his voice against a Muslim constitutes a violation of the conditions of protection. If in your country they are your equals in all matters, if they are assimilated to you, this is all well and good in your country, but not in Ours. Your status with Us is different from theirs: you are considered as [having the status of] "reconciled", whereas they are the "protected".

Consequently, if one of them ventures into Our fortunate Empire in order to engage in commerce, he must conform to the same obligations as the "protected [peoples]" in Our midst and adopt the same external signs [of discrimination]. He who does not desire to observe these obligations would be wiser to stay in his own country, for we have no need of his commerce, if the latter is to be conducted in circumstances contrary to Our blessed Law. [. . .]

Ended the 20th of the holy month of dhu l-Hijja, of the year 1257 <1841>. [pp. 14–16]

Eugène Fumey

They [the Jews] were first permitted the usage of this kerchief in Morocco [Marrakesh] and Meknez, as a means of covering their ears. They really wanted to elude the customary insult of Moorish children, who delighted in knocking off their bonnets, which were a sign of servitude. They are not allowed to fasten the kerchief with a double knot below the chin; this knot must be a simple one and the kerchief removed in the presence of Muslim dignitaries [. . .] They are obliged always to wear the black or dark blue cloak (*ya'lak*); it is only as a concession that they wear the white *slam*, a small coat, useful against the hot sun. The coat's hood, made of blue cloth, must not fold over the head, lest the Jew be mistaken from afar for a Moor; for the Moor sometimes wears a hood of the same color, except with a different rim.

Moreover, the black bonnet must always be visible. Furthermore, the coat must have a little opening on the right, and the hood must fall over the left shoulder in order to trouble the movement of the arm as another sign of servitude. [pp. 27–28]

Abbé Léon Goddard

Afghanistan

Expulsion of the Jews from Mashhad (1839) and from Herat (1857–1859)


In the year 1839, in the wake of a false libel, the Muslims rose up against our forefathers on Thursday the 13th of Nissan [March–April] and threatened to kill and annihilate all the Jews [of Mashhad] and plunder their belongings unless they converted to Islam. Thirty-one Jews were murdered and had it not been for the mercy of Heaven, we would all have perished. [. . .] Some time afterward those who wished to remain faithful to the word of God departed from the city of Mashhad and journeyed to Herat [north-west of Afghanistan], and from 1840 onward they dwelled there in peace and tranquillity for fifteen years.[. . .] However, in the year 1856, on account of our numerous sins, the army of Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar [1848–96] attacked and besieged

the city of Herat for nine months. At the end of the month of Tishri [October], 1857, the city fell through trickery, without a fight. Thenceforth, [the assailants] started to humiliate us with accusations and threaten us, saying you have perpetrated this and therefore we will punish you with that. They calumniated us with lies before our king and his princes and persuaded him to banish us from the city and to send us into exile in the city of Mashhad. Thus on the 15th of Sebat [January–February], 1858, the assailants fell upon us with mortal blows, saying “Get out of your houses by the order of the king”. They threw out everybody, men, women, and children from their homes, without sparing the old or the infants, without mercy or compassion.¹ The whole city echoed with the wailing of the poor and the orphans. We had no time even to gather our belongings and prepare provisions, for within three days all the Jews had been expelled from the city and assembled at a place called Musalla. On the 19th of Sebat they marched us away, and for nearly 30 days we walked by the way, surrounded by Muslim soldiers. It was cold; snow and hail fell from the heavens and several people perished on the road on account of the extreme cold, lack of food, and other innumerable misfortunes. We reached the city of Mashhad in the month of Adar [February–March]. We were not allowed into the city but were parked in animal pens in the fort known as Bab Qudrat, which was no more than a prison, the narrowness of which added to our shame and humiliation. Because of the great suffering a few of our brethren converted to Islam. It could have been said of us “The sword without and terror within [. . .]” [Deut. 32:25], for our captors beat us daily most savagely and exacted from us payment for the hire of the camels that had brought us [. . .] and moreover we were plagued with disease and pestilence and several people died. Other misfortunes befell us which it would be wearisome to recount, as it is said: “Captivity is worse than the sword of death” [TB *Baba Bathra*, 8b]. We remained there for two whole years until such time as our sins had been forgiven in heaven and the king decided to allow us to return to our homes. In Kislev [November–December] 1859 we set forth from Mashhad and arrived in Herat on Monday the 13th of Tebet [December–January], and each man returned to his household. [pp. 12–13]

Mattatya Garji

1. For another description of these events, see N. de Khanikoff, “Méched, la Ville Sainte, et son territoire. Extraits d'un voyage dans le Khorassan (1858).” In *Le Tour du Monde* (Paris, 1861), 2d quarter, 280–82.

IV
The Era of
Emancipation



Druzes at Dayr al-Qamar. Lebanon (1859)

Engraving: C. Maurand; E. Grandsire's drawing, after E. A. Spoll

Spoll (1861), p. 9

Ottoman Empire

Reports by British Diplomats (1850–1876)

Consul Hugh H. Rose to Sir Stratford Canning

Beyrout, October 31, 1850

Mr. Consul Werry has already reported to your Excellency the deplorable events at Aleppo,¹ and a mass of statements which I have received on the same subject, place in still darker relief those occurrences. I shall state a few facts which will prove, that, only for the unpardonable misconduct of the Turkish Civil and Military Authorities, the revolt might easily have been put down.

There are two Mussulman parties at Aleppo, the Moderate and the Fanatical, which latter includes the “Ayans” or Notables. The first treat the Christians well, and many of them, during the late troubles, guarded the houses of the Europeans, and even defended with arms the Christians against their Mussulman enemies.

There is a garrison of 1,400 men, cavalry and infantry with three guns at Aleppo. With this force and the Moderate Party, the two Pashas might easily, as will be shown, have crushed an Aleppo mob, and wild Bedouins armed only with bad matchlocks. But the two Pashas at Aleppo, instead of acting with the resolution of men, or the sense of duty, of responsible authorities, abandoned the City, and its stronghold, the Castle, full of warlike stores, where they only left 30 native Artillery men of doubtful fidelity, and retired to the Barracks where they remained the whole night in pretended consultation with the “Ayans”, whose fanaticism and bad example had, mainly, caused the outrage on their Christian neighbours.

Having allowed the Insurgents full scope to commit, during the night, every sort of atrocity in the Christian Quarter, Kerim Pasha, in the morning makes what he calls “a military demonstration”, that is, he marches his troops and guns, the band playing, round the Quarter where the rioters, in broad day, were burning and pillaging the Churches, murdering the Clergy and laity, and violating Christian women *in the very presence of their nearest and dearest relatives*.² The Insurgents well understood the nature of this pusillanimous parade, for Mr. Werry reports “that, during it and after it, the horrors in ‘Guedidah’ were continued”.

Eventually, after 24 hours uninterrupted outrage, a few troops were sent with Abdalla[h] Bey, a Civilian and some orderly Mussulmans, into the Christian Quarter, and [they] reestablished order there. This fact proves how easy it would have been, as I have stated, for the authorities to have restored order.[. . .]

The events at Aleppo have caused amongst all classes of all nationalities a sensation such as I never witnessed here before. The population of Aleppo is the wealthiest, best conducted community in Syria. That such a body of people, in time of profound peace, living under the protection of an organized Government, of two Pashas, and a garrison of regular troops of all arms should find themselves, without the slightest provocation on their part or a moment's warning, the victims of atrocities which are rarely practised on a town taken by storm, is a consideration which has, I regret to say, produced a feeling most unfavorable to the responsible Government. The Christians of Syria, even those under the protection of regular troops and Authorities, tremble lest the fate of their coreligionist of Aleppo should be their own. The fears of those where there are no regular troops and Government are of course more intense.

The only means of restoring confidence in Syria, and of preventing a recurrence of events as hurtful to the Porte's political interests as to those of humanity, is that the Porte should, for the future, grant equal justice, before the laws, to Christians and Mussulmans, view the catastrophe of Aleppo in all its painful gravity, and punish the authors of it with unshrinking justice and severity; that is, punishment of the two Pashas of Aleppo; capital punishment, or banishment for life of the perpetrators of murder, and violation; and indemnity for the sufferers by the confiscation of the properties of those inhabitants, who have, directly or indirectly, been concerned in depriving their unoffending fellow townsmen of all that men hold dear.

But if the Porte adopts, or is misled by the short sighted views of its Agents in Syria, who already endeavour to find unworthy excuses for the culprits, and causes of blame for the sufferers, to cloak the cruel fanaticism which caused, and the irresolution of treachery of the Pashas which literally encouraged the commission of Aleppo, and Maloula³ atrocities, then, I have the honor to say, that the Porte will never regain the confidence of its Christian subjects in Syria, who will unceasingly seek for foreign protection and sigh for foreign rule; nor will the Porte be able to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of Aleppo, nor keep in subjection its Mussulman subjects who will be confirmed in the unfortunate impression which they now have, that, notwithstanding all ostensible declarations, the Porte, in reality, looks on its Christian subjects with mistrust, if not aversion, and on its Mussulman subjects as the only

faithful guardians of its rule; and further, that if left to itself, the Porte never would punish, with substantial justice, any oppression which Mussulmans might exercise on their Christian countrymen. And here, however delicate the subject, I cannot, from a sense of duty, fail to report a cause, which, only one of many, confirms such dangerous impressions. I allude to the present, which the Sultan, when dispensing favors, this summer, during his Royal progress, made to Bedr Khan Bey, actually under punishment for having committed one of the most unprovoked and sanguinary massacres of Christians on record. It is impossible that the provincial Pasha, the fanatical Ayans of a Country town, an Aleppo mob, or wild Bedouins, can view such an act but as a mark of Royal favour to a Mussulman, who had done to Christians all the wrong that fanatical inhumanity could do. And however willing I am to do justice to the good intentions of the present Turkish Ministers, yet I must state that there is one general complaint among Syrian Christians, those of the Lebanon excepted, and unfortunately only too true an one, that Mussulmans and their laws oppress them, and that it is almost useless to ask for justice either from the Turkish Authorities, or Tribunals of justice.

I have frequently had the honor in my despatches, and lately in my military report, to foretell two evils which have mainly brought about the disaster at Aleppo. I mean the lawless and menacing state of the Arab tribes on the desert Line from Aleppo to the Dead Sea, and the inability of the troops to keep in subjection those tribes.

Mr. Calvert's report, No. 29, to Her Majesty's Embassy gives a further proof of the inability of the Turkish troops to enforce the Pasha's order on the Desert Line. [. . .]

FO 78/836 (No. 47)

Rose to Canning, Constantinople

1. A riot had broken out in Aleppo, caused by conscription, the levy of a tax (*ferde*), and the new rights accorded to Christians.

2. Underlined in the text.

3. The houses of Christians in Ma'lula were plundered, the clergy killed, and their women raped by the regular troops (FO 78/836, No. 48, Rose to Canning, Constantinople, 31 October, 1850).

Consul James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury

Jerusalem, 8 November, 1858

In continuing to report concerning the apprehensions of Christians from revival of fanaticism on the part of the Mahometans, I have the

honour to state that daily accounts are given me of insults in the streets offered to Christians and Jews, accompanied by acts of violence.

The latter, though generally petty cases, are of frequent occurrence, and the sufferers are afraid, if natives, to report them to Turkish authorities, inasmuch as, notwithstanding the hattı-humayoon [18 February 1856], as far as I have learned, there is no case yet known of a Christian's evidence being accepted in a court of justice, or in a civil tribunal (Medjlis) against a Moslem. There have been some instances of Moslems being punished for offending Christians, but only in a summary method, without the formality of a trial or the Christian's evidence being placed on record. Of such justice we may read instances in the "Arabian Night's Entertainments", as existing previous to the hattı-humayoon.

But even in matters of important personages the same evils occur. Only a few days ago his Beatitude the Greek patriarch was returning through the streets from the Cadi's Court of Judgment (having perhaps paid a visit to the new Cadi), preceded by his cavasses and dragoman, but had to pass through a gauntlet of curses hurled at his religion, his prayers, his fathers, &c.

This in Jerusalem, where Christian Consuls have flags flying, including the Russian: but can this state of things be expected to last long?

The occurrence is rather one of indicating the tone of public mind, than one to be dealt with by punishment of offenders, which could scarcely be done. But it could not have happened in the time of Kiamil Pasha, though he was a patron of Latin interest.

The present Pasha piques himself upon not believing too readily the complaints of Christians, and he has recently, in an unguarded moment, avowed to my dragoman that his mission here, especially over and above common work, is not to depress Christianity so much as to abate or bring down European influence.

I beg leave to express my opinion on this point, that among the few patriotic Turks, such a desire may, under certain limitations of feeling rather than of action, be excusable, but unfortunately these persons think they have to arrive at their object only by crippling of progress among their own people. Public works are not only not undertaken, but are by authority hindered. The feeblest commencement of a public-opinion is stifled, and because Europeans are Christians, and Europeans are to be checked, the independence of the Turkish Empire is made to consist in the independence of Mahommetanism. [pp. 500–501]

Consul James Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury

Jerusalem, 8 November 1858

I have the honour to enclose copy of my despatch of the 27th ultimo to Mr. Moore, Her Majesty's Consul-General, and to report that, whereas many villages in the district of Nablous have a few Christian families located in each, such families were subjected in every direction to plunder and insults at the approach of Tahir, the Military Pasha, shortly before his arrival.

But the two villages of Zebabdeh and Likfair (where all the inhabitants are Christian, and in the former of which is a humble chapel) were utterly sacked, men and women stripped even to their shirts and turned adrift. This was done by the people of Tubaz and Kabatieh, always a violent people, and no redress or punishment has yet been given by the military force. I need not say that none is afforded by the civil authority, himself a factious leader.

But on the arrival of Tahir Pasha in the city, and demanding a house to serve for a barrack, instead of encamping in tents at this beautiful season, the house of the Christian priest (Greek) was taken in his absence and his stores of grain and oil for household use during the winter were taken, not to be consumed by the soldiers (for that would entitle the owner to a claim on the Government) but were mixed into one heap, wheat, barley, lentils, and oil, by the Moslems of the city, and thrown into the street.

I feel myself more and more to be warranted in attributing the riots of Nablous, in 1856, to an anti-Christian feeling.

At this present period it may be that the Military Pasha has not been informed of what was done in the process of appropriating the priest's house to his use. But why does he not know it when I do? Simply because I am a Christian, and they fear to tell him who is not one, and who is himself afraid to coerce the inhabitants.

In conclusion, I have the honour to quote the perpetual expression of Christians in Palestine, that their lot is become far worse since the termination of the Russian War than it was before that period, extending back to 1831. [p. 501]

PP 1860 [2734] 69 (No. 68)
Finn to Malmesbury, London

Consul James H. Skene to Sir Henry Bulwer

Aleppo, 31st March, 1859

The Christian subjects of the sultan at Aleppo still live in a state of terror. It is difficult to explain this otherwise than as a reflex of the panic

they received nine years ago, for I cannot see that their condition is in any way worse than that of the Christian population in other Turkish cities where no such dread exists.

But events like those of 1850 are not easily forgotten. Houses were plundered, men of distinction amongst them were murdered, and women violated. It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that the eye witnesses of such horrors should conceal their wealth and prevent their families from appearing in the streets beyond the limits of the Christian quarter. Before the Egyptian occupation in 1832 they had grounds of complaint which cannot now be adduced. They were not allowed to ride in the town, not even to walk in the gardens. Rich merchants were fain to dress in the humblest garb to escape notice; when they failed in this they were often forced to sweep the streets or act as porters in order to give proofs of their patience and obedience; and they were never addressed by a Mussulman without expressions of contempt. The Egyptians treated them differently, and nothing of the kind has been outwardly renewed by the Mussulman population since the cessation of their occupation [1840]. In heart, however, I believe in little or no change. The Christians say that none has taken place excepting most superficially, and they constantly talk of pillage and massacre as imminent on every occasion when fanaticism is roused by Mahometan festivals.

The *Bedelieh Askerieh* or Tax in lieu of military service is one of the grievances of the Christians who admit that the principle is just but find fault with the mode of its application. They say, for instance, that they should not be called upon to pay the tax when the conscription is not in activity,—that if the Turks give men, it is fair to take money from the Christians,—but that, by levying the tax without enlisting recruits, the Government relieves the mussulman population at the expense of the Christians, whom it professed to favour by abolishing the *Kharadj* [poll tax],—and that the distribution of the tax is unequal in as much as it has been collected in some towns and not in others. The *Kharadj* of Aleppo amounted to 100,000 Piastres per annum while the sum of 240,000 Piastres is claimed for the *Bedelieh* payable by 15,000 Christians and 4,000 Jews, in lieu of 48 soldiers at 5,000 each. This falls heavily on them, and it appears the more onerous because the change was represented as a boon which the Sultan granted to his Christian subjects when yielding to pressure from abroad in their behalf. The *Verghi*, or personal tax, is taken unequally from the different classes of the population of Edlib, a town of this Pashalik, 25 Piastres from the Mahometans and 40 Piastres from the Christians, who complain bitterly of this injustice. Their Bishops have brought the matter before the Governor, who, strange to say, admitted that the division was unfair by consenting to

reduce the amount paid by the Christians, but took upon himself to fix an arbitrary ratio which diminished the disproportion without removing it altogether. He offered to receive as a favour the quota of 38 Piastres, which favour the Christians declined to accept. The other assessments furnish no subject of dissatisfaction. [. . .]


In another part of this Consular District there seems to have been little change from the old times of rapine and bloodshed in Turkey. I allude to the Ansaireh mountains, stretching from the valley of the Orontes to Mount Lebanon. On a late occasion a member of the Medjlis of Tripoli, passing through a Christian village in pursuit of the revolted Ansaireh, set fire to it, and, when the inhabitants conveyed their moveable property of value into their Church which they hoped would be respected, it was broken open and plundered. This case, with many others equally abominable, of simultaneous occurrence, was laid before Her Majesty's Consul General for Syria, the perpetrators of the outrages being under the jurisdiction of the Pasha of Beyrouth, and will thus have already come under Your Excellency's notice.

FO 78/1452 (No. 11, extract)
Skene to Bulwer, Constantinople

Report of Cyril Graham on the Massacres of the Christians in the Districts of Hasbeya and Rasheya, Lebanon (June, 1860)

On the 6th and 7th August such bad Accounts were given me by certain natives of Hasbeya and Rasheya of the condition of the Christians in that district, that I determined upon visiting without delay both those Towns, so recently the scene of horrible massacres [10–11 June]. On the 8th I had an interview with His Excellency Fuad Pasha and announced to Him my intention, at the same time asking authority for removing, if necessary, the Christians from that country, or for making the best possible arrangements for their safety. The Pasha seemed delighted with my proposal for he said he was extremely anxious to obtain accurate information of what was going on in that quarter, and hitherto he had been able to obtain no authentic accounts whatever. He immediately ordered me an escort, promised to be guided by my reports, in his future measures for the security of the country about Hermon, and placed at my disposal the sum of twenty thousand piastres for distribution among the unfortunate Christians of the country I was about to visit.

I left Damascus that same evening, Wednesday August 8th, and reached Rasheya the next morning. On arriving there I went to the house of the Druze Chief Khazâi el Ariân, and immediately began my enquiries as to the number of Christians at that moment in the place,



Christian Refugees after the Hasbeya and Rasheya Massacres (1860)

The Courtyard of American Missionary Isaac Bird, Dayr al-Qamar, Lebanon.

Engraving: L. Dumont; Gustave Doré's painting, from a photograph by Cyril Graham

and as to the condition in which they were. I soon found that they were indeed in a miserable state; they had nothing to eat except what they owed to the bounty of the Druzes, and that was little enough! The population amounted to 1,100 souls whereof only 76 were men, all the remaining males having been killed, and some few having fled to Damascus and Beyrout. In order to distribute the funds committed to my case, I had all the women and children mustered, and then separated in divisions according to the quarters of the Town they occupied, each division again was shut up in a house and then one by one the women and children were admitted through the door at which I stood and placed in their hands money, so that I had an opportunity of ascertaining almost to an accuracy the number of the population at that moment in Rasheya. The Druzes however soon became very jealous of this and came in numbers to ask what I was doing in their town and what my object was in coming. [. . .]

That night I started for Hasbeya, and passing through Kfeir and Mimis, two villages in which almost all the Christian houses had been burned and some 110 Christians killed, I reached the other large town belonging to the district of Hermon,—Hasbeya. Here I repeated my enquiries, numbered the women and children, distributed money, and received visits from the principal inhabitants. The whole number of Christians at that moment was 1,430, there having been only three months ago, no less than 3,200[;] some few are in Beyrout and Damascus but I fear that fully 1,300 were slaughtered. Here the Christians were in the same state of suffering as those whom I found at Rasheya, and in both places they were hourly in terror of a massacre, so excited had the Druzes again become. I visited the Serai, which was full of the Corpses of the Christians, none had been buried and strange to say the bodies were well preserved, having been parched by the burning Syrian sun. The sight was dreadful, bodies lying in every attitude on the paved court of the Palace, the stones naturally white being stained a deep brown; but the upper rooms presented even a more horrible spectacle; in almost all of them, the bodies were piled one upon another to the height [*sic*] of 5 or 6 feet, and lay just as they had fallen; to add to the horror of this frightful scene the poor women followed me in, and began to howl and mourn over their dead; they led me from corpse to corpse, telling me how they had seen their brothers, fathers, husbands, sons, slaughtered before their eyes, and calling me to witness and to avenge their wrongs. The Druzes who accompanied me made their jokes on the bodies, and one fellow showed me a pair of pistols set in silver, one of which had been broken in dashing the brains out of the Christians' heads. He lamented over his pistol and said "Oh that it should have been spoiled against their cursed hard skulls." Here again the Druzes were more bold

and insolent than I had ever seen them anywhere before. I have travelled over all their country and even visited them in their strongholds in the Haurân, and have never met with anything but courtesy; now however they speak with great insolence, boast of the number of Christians they have killed, and assert that they will cut to pieces any force which shall be brought against them. The Emir Saad ed Dîn who had been most obnoxious to the Druzes had his head cut off during the massacre, and his body thrown out under the walls of the Castle. It is said that the Druzes on first entering the Serai began to cut the Christians to pieces, but some of them remarked, "If we do this we shall spoil their clothes" let us strip them and then kill them. So accordingly after that, they stripped them and slaughtered them in cold blood. I made enquiries about the gun, which the commander of the troops had with him in the Serai at Hasbeya, how often it had been fired &c. The Christians told me it had been fired twenty-seven times, but all the balls had struck the houses of the Christian quarter, this was certainly the case; and on asking the Druzes, they said "Yes it is true Osmân Bey intended to fire upon us but he did not elevate his gun enough, so that it destroyed the Christians instead of us." Osman Bey had the doors of the Serai opened and in rushed the Druzes and commenced their slaughter.

In the evening the Druzes here again threatened my life, on which one of my escort had some words with them, two Druzes thereupon fell upon him, and there would have been bloodshed, had not some others interfered. I then returned through some of the other burned villages, where a few Christians were still struggling for their existence, coming back to Rasheya, where I visited the Serai in which a second scene like that at Hasbeya presented itself, I again mounted and rode down to Damascus where I arrived early on the morning of the 12th.


The result of my journey and of my enquiries was, that I ascertained the Christians to be in a state of great danger. No man dare go out of the towns. Each week several persons were maltreated and even killed. The Druzes threatened to exterminate them altogether should any attempt be made to remove them to Beyrout.[. . .]

FO. 78/1520, Extracts from "Report of Cyril Graham Esq. on the Conditions of the Christians in the districts of Hasbeya and Rasheya", encl. in Brant (Damascus) to Russell (London), 13 August 1860, no. 13.

Consul James Brant to Sir Henry Bulwer

Damascus, 25th July, 1860

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that by last evening's Beyrout post we learned the departure of the Seraskier¹ with two battal-



Christians Fleeing to Beirut after the Damascus Massacres (1860)

Engraving: L. Dumont; from a painting; after a sketch by L. R., a French officer
in the expeditionary force

ions on Sunday the 22nd. Inst [July]: and the promised departure of His Excellency Fuad Pasha with two other battalions; thus the arrival of necessary succours is deferred from day to day and in the same degree the restoration of confidence.² The Jews who had taken refuge in Turkish houses were beginning to return to their own, but they are persecuted by people demanding money under threats of violence. It is reported that many Druzes are walking about the Town today which occasions apprehension, and shows weakness in the Government. We learned by the post that a strong message had been sent through the French Ambassador to the Porte, that seeing the inability of the Sultans Government to protect its Christian subjects, France would consult with her allies as to the means of preventing the massacres which have been disgracing Syria. If an armed intervention were resolved on without protection to the Christians being in some way secured, no one would escape, for before foreign aid could reach those in the interior, they would to the last soul be murdered, unless it were those who embraced Islamism. The Porte therefore should be urged to send adequate forces, and active and energetic employés to restore order for the time, but if it could not be permanently ensured, then the momentary security should be availed of to withdraw the Christians to the coast before foreign troops were sent into the interior. I would beg Your Excellency to consider what is to be done with regard to the men and boys who have become Mussulmans under threats of death, and what with regard to the women who have been taken by Moslems as wives and concubines and made to conform to Islamism.

I have come to an end of my pecuniary resources, and know not how to obtain supplies; nobody in the actual state of insecurity will cash private bills, nor have I funds to draw upon if they would. I have managed to give sustenance to those under my roof; many have departed, but I still have about 30, and I know not when I shall be able to get them off my hands, for many are widows and orphans, and have neither houses to go to, nor friends to help them, and all are without resources of any kind, for providing food, clothing or lodging.

FO 78/1520 (No. 28)

Brant to Bulwer, Constantinople

1. Commander in chief of the army.

2. Opposition to the emancipation of the Christians provoked murders in Palestine and the massacre of thousands of Christians in Damascus in July 1860.

Consul James Brant to Lord John Russell

Damascus, 28th July, 1860

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of my despatches Nos. 25, 26, 27 and 28 addressed to His Excellency Sir Henry S. Bulwer, up to the 25th Instant, which will furnish the details of what has been passing here.¹ [. . .]

The Wallee does not appear to have sufficient energy, or confidence in his strength, to act with vigour, and this encourages the endeavours of the ill-disposed to try to get up an excitement by ridiculous rumours. One for example was spread yesterday that seventy Christians had leagued to burn the Great Mosque; to any person who would use his reason, the utter absurdity of such attempt, by people half dead with terror must be apparent, but the lower classes of Moslems were or pretended to be excited by it, and numbers of Christians panic-stricken rushed to the Castle from the Quarter of the Meidan, where they had enjoyed safety and protection during the outbreak. The Castle contains upwards of 12,000. The space is crowded to excess, the shelter of the Tents and buildings insufficient, and the exposure to the sun and heat by day, and to the chill of the night air produces ophthalmia and fever among this half-starved, half-clothed, panic-stricken crowd, depressed in spirits by the loss of property and relatives. The stench alone is sufficient to produce an epidemic. The food supplied by the Authorities though enough to avert starvation is insufficient to preserve health and the allowance is continually diminishing. Some clothing has been furnished but quite inadequate to the necessity. The French Consulate has been supplying both food and clothing to a considerable extent; still the sufferings are very great, and when they are likely to end, or even to be diminished does not appear clear, it is impossible that they can be endured much longer without the most fatal consequence, both to the sufferers and to the population generally.

FO 78/1520 (No. 10)

Brant to Russell, London

1. Consul Brant's dispatch of 25 July to Sir Henry Bulwer, and several other reports on the massacre of the Christians in Lebanon and Syria (June–July 1860) were published in Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, documents 44–50, pp. 259–278.

Consul James Brant to Sir Henry Bulwer

Damascus, 9th August, 1860

[. . .] Property of great bulk has been restored, but I fear of small value. About 750 persons, accused of murder and robbing or of robbing

alone, are under arrest, some have been proved guilty of murder. Only one as yet has been executed, and in the Christian Quarter the very same day a Christian was massacred, and the report was spread about the City that the inhabitants were determined to murder a Christian for every Mussulman executed. This report has renewed a panic and increased the desire of the Christians to quit the City, many of whom were beginning to think that they might be able to remain.

The Criminal Commission cannot get any witnesses to swear to a man being a murderer, many will testify that people will be guilty of plundering, but as to murder, one might almost believe that none had been committed, and although it is certain that above 5,000 persons have been massacred in broad daylight or by the light of blazing houses, yet nobody will testify to having witnessed a murder committed, or will recognise a single man guilty of such a crime. If the ordinary forms of Turkish law cannot reach such criminals, extraordinary proceedings must be resorted to, and people proved guilty of plundering must be treated as having at the same time committed murder. Atrocities such as have been committed cannot go unpunished by such subterfuges as are attempted to turn aside the sword of justice. If other means cannot be devised a Hat-i-Sheriff should be published condemning to death every one guilty of arson or robbery in the late outbreak at Damascus, giving to the Court power to recommend to a less penalty than death such persons in whose favor strong extenuating circumstances can be adduced.

FO 78/1520 (No. 31, extract)
Brant to Bulwer, Constantinople

Consul James Brant to Sir Henry Bulwer

Damascus, 16th August 1860

[*After some criminals were arrested.*] I anticipate that Fuad Pasha will immediately commence executing some of the Criminals condemned, and I have no doubt his doing so will strike terror into the population. The Mussulmans will not yet believe that any executions can result from the murder of infidels; when that is made clear to their minds, many will change their tone and conduct and make revelations which they at present withhold.

FO 78/1520 (No. 34, extract)
Brant to Bulwer, Constantinople

Papers Relating to the Condition of Christians in Turkey (1860)

On 11 June 1860 the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Bulwer, sent a memorandum to various consuls containing twenty-five questions relating to the conditions of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, requesting their replies. This investigation was based on Turkey's pledge (Treaty of Constantinople, 12 March 1854) to promote the equality of all its subjects in exchange for Anglo-French military aid in the Crimean War. Some extracts from these answers are reprinted below.

Consul Charles J. Calvert to Sir Henry Bulwer

Salonica [Monastir], July 20, 1860


[. . .] It is, unfortunately, an historical fact that during several centuries the Christians have been sorely oppressed. As their moral degradation has through this long period of oppression become hereditary, so their elevation to a higher standard of social and political worth will only be attained progressively through successive generations after the removal of the oppression. As yet, there has scarcely been one generation since the first step has been taken towards it.

Nevertheless, the condition of the Christians is, in this province¹ at least, by no means so intolerable as it has been depicted by the Russian Government; and although I must admit that it is not, on the whole, as satisfactory as I could wish it to be, it cannot be disputed that the Christians are far better off now than they were some years ago. The greater part of the floating capital, and almost all the trade, of the country is in their hands, whilst, on the other hand, the Turks have been decimated by the conscription, and Mussulman artificers and tradesmen return after their period of military service to find their places occupied by Christians.

In the meantime the Christians have been distracted by too many conflicting external influences. Young Greece, in the south, disseminating the seeds of its scarcely gathered liberty, and Russia, in the north, working through the sympathies of a common creed,—neither the one nor the other have taught the Christians how they might improve themselves by reforming the abuses of their own Church, which it is clearly not the office of the Turkish Government to do. [. . .]

Reviewing my answers to your Excellency's question, and what I have written above, I beg leave respectfully to state it as my humble opinion that direct foreign interference in the affairs of the various races, at least in the way in which it has been exercised hitherto, is most prejudicial to

کیلو روم *Kaila roum, ou, Laisan grec .*



Greek Peasant (1720)

Costumes turcs

the general interests of the population. It ought at once to be put a stop to by every practicable means. More good would be done by employing the gentle influence of unobtrusive and disinterested advice at the head than by exciting the susceptibilities of both rulers and subjects in the mode that has been practised.

It is difficult to conceive a more offensive course for one independent State in time of peace, than that the one should receive and take formal notice of complaints proffered against the other by a portion of its own subjects. The initiative in a course of this kind has recently been taken by Russia towards Turkey; and although the highly-coloured statements of the former Power will very probably be successfully refuted, the bare fact of Russia having openly provoked an inquiry into the condition of the Christians in Turkey will establish a permanent claim on her part to their gratitude that cannot but sensibly affect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The deplorable events that have occurred in Syria, and the display of Mahometan fanaticism, accompanied, as it always is, with atrocities, ought to make us more than ever cautious how we curb the spirit of the conquering race in Turkey. The Turks, too, have their secret societies; and the discovery of one conspiracy, with the punishment of the leaders, is no security against the formation of other conspiracies against the Government, and against the Christians, who are considered to have been too much favoured by the Government already.

The lives of the Europeans who are thinly scattered over the country are assuredly not safe so long as the elements of strife are fermenting on both sides. The lives of the foreign Agents, too, are exposed to even greater danger, because the Government itself seems to be incapable of suppressing an outbreak against Christians; whilst, were the case reversed, a foreign Agent suspected of having upheld the authority of the Porte would in all probability be sacrificed to the popular vengeance of the Christians. [pp. 9–11]

FO 424/21 (No. 7, Inclosure 1 in No. 2, extracts)
Calvert to Bulwer

1. This report concerns the province of Salonica, including Thessaly.

Answers to Queries: Consul Charles J. Calvert to Sir Henry Bulwer (July 20, 1860)

[Query 12. When cases of oppression against the Christians take place, is this generally owing to the acts of the Government or the fanaticism of the population?]

12. They are attributable chiefly to the innate hatred which the Mussulmans bear towards the Christians; and, if the officials of the Porte

ever act against the Christians, they (particularly the subordinate authorities in the districts) are generally instigated by some influential Mussulman landed proprietor sitting in the Medjlis. Otherwise the Mussulman and Christian population live peaceably towards each other, not from motives of affection or sympathy, but, because of their mutual dislike, they avoid each other as much as possible. The Mussulman always considers himself the Christian's superior, and whenever he acts with kindness towards the Christian it is with a species of condescension and forbearance which converts a right into a favour.

[Query 15. Are Christians admitted into the Medjlis or Local Councils? Are these Councils generally more in favour of progress and good government than the officials of the Porte, or more unfavourable?]

15. Christians are admitted into the local Councils, but they are so few in number compared with the Mussulman members as to be completely overawed, and therefore practically useless. They blindly affix their seals to the "mazbattas" [reports or decisions] which are written in Turkish,—a language they can rarely read; and even were they to understand what was written, they would scarcely venture to refuse to confirm it, although they might inwardly dissent from the purport of the document. [p. 14]

FO 424/21 (No. 26, Inclosure 2 in No. 2, extract)
Calvert to Bulwer

Consul J. A. Longworth to Sir Henry Bulwer

Belgrade, 14 July, 1860

[. . .] At Widdin,¹ however, a petition had been presented to him [Grand Vizier Kiprisli Mehmed Pasha] subscribed with 300 signatures, and containing vague charges against the local authorities. This document he did not hesitate to characterize as spurious. [p. 24]

1st. With reference to the refusal of the local authorities to allow the Christians to put up a church-bell, it may be remarked that this use of bells in the East has always been considered as tantamount to a recognition of Christianity being the established worship of the place. In some towns, therefore, inhabited almost exclusively by Christians, this concession has been made by the Government. But at Widdin, where more than three-fourths of the inhabitants are Turks, it would have involved an insult to their prejudices and a dangerous experiment on their forbearance. At a former period the Christians would not have dreamt of putting forward such a pretension; and it must be admitted that in all

other respects there is no restriction on religious ceremonies, and not even on public processions. [p. 25]

3rd. It is represented that the Christians admitted as members into the Medjlis, or Municipal Council, were allowed no voice in its proceedings, and had, in fact, been silenced by the Pasha. This charge was fully investigated by the Grand Vizier, and proved to be unsupported by a shadow even of evidence. It was, moreover, denied most positively by the Bishop, who has himself a seat in the Medjlis. If the petitioners had been satisfied with affirming that the Christian members exercised little influence or authority in the Medjlis, the complaint would have been more plausible; though as regards Widdin, I am told it would, even when thus qualified, have been inapplicable. My own experience, however, leads me to infer that in many places, and I should say the majority of them, it were vain to look for independence of character in the Christian members of these Councils, not more from the domineering spirit of the Turks than their own disposition, which is crouching and corrupt; corruption and falsehood, indeed, are the chronic infirmities, though in a different degree, of a change for the better. The Government may, by its Edicts and Hatti-humayouns, hasten and advance such a reform; but I question very much whether more evil than good will not arise from proclaiming a social equality which is, in the present state of things and relations of society, morally impossible.

Equality before the law is that which must be first established; the only sort of equality, in fact, which can, under existing circumstances, be realized. And in connection with this, we come to the complaint in the petition—the only tangible point in it—relative to the rejection of Christian evidence in the Ottoman tribunals. In this respect, it cannot be denied there is room for amendment, not only at Widdin, but in every province of the Empire. A futile regulation has been enacted by which such evidence is admitted in an inferior Police Court, but excluded from the higher or Municipal Council, while the sentence passed in that where [Christian] witnesses are heard has to be confirmed in the other where they are not. All this has the appearance of evasion—one of those half-measures which give satisfaction to nobody. Nor is this all: a distinction is drawn in the Hatti-humayoun itself between civil and criminal suits, Christian evidence being held to be admissible in the latter, but not in the former. The plea upon which it is defended is, however, specious enough; it is urged that the property of the Turks, particularly in districts where they are in a great relative minority, would be exposed to confiscation if, in the existing demoralized state of society, Christian testimony were taken in cases of this kind. But it may, on the other hand, be rejoined that much of this demoralization, as regards the indifference shown to perjury, both by Turks and Christians, may be traced to the

lax and vicious principle acted upon in the Mussulman Courts, where, as the only means of securing justice to Christians, Mussulman false witnesses are permitted to give evidence on their behalf. The abolition of this practice would do more than anything else to purify these tribunals; but this can only be effectually accomplished by the admission of Christian evidence, instead of Mussulman perjury, as a matter of legal necessity. The "ulema," or the law authorities of Turkey, will have eventually either to do this, or to renounce the adjudication, together with the emoluments arising therefrom, of all Civil suits. Were the alternative resolutely put to them by the Porte, there can be little doubt what their decision would be. In the meanwhile, this is unquestionably the chief obstacle to any amelioration in the matter. [p. 26]

His Highness, moreover, agreed in the opinion I expressed that this [the forcible abduction of Christian girls by Mahometans] and the question of Christian evidence are the two main points to which, as sources of bitter feeling and discussion, the attention of the Porte should now be directed. As to eradicating, by any summary process, mere religious antipathies, which were mutual between the Turks and Christians, the only difference being that the Turks, as masters, had been under greater temptation to display them, the task was, he said, hopeless; all that could be done was to deal with their effects in the shape of overt acts. It was, at the same time, a great mistake to suppose that the oppression complained of had been systematic or uniform. The contrary, indeed, was the case. The result of the Ottoman conquest had been to establish the supremacy of one people over another, while the Government had, from the democratic tendencies of Islamism, been much more popular in its essence than was generally imagined. It was a fact, which did honour to the Turks, that living in juxtaposition with conquered races, they had discovered a degree of toleration and forbearance to which, considering they were uncontrolled, history could not furnish a parallel. Their hand, it is true, had been heavier on the Christians in some parts of the Empire than it had been in others, and this when a rude, popular authority was exercised, was to have been expected as the natural consequence of different circumstances in different provinces. In Bulgaria and on the Danube, where the Turks garrisoned the fortresses and occupied, in force, the considerable towns, the pressure on the Rayahs might have been greater in their immediate neighbourhood; but they were comparatively unmolested in the distant villages of the plains and the Balkans. In Albania the instincts of race are stronger than the prejudices of religion; and it was remarkable that though Christians of a race, in their estimation, inferior, such as the Bulgarians, who live among them, are treated with harshness and contumely, Christians of Albanian

blood are allowed to wear their arms, and are independent almost as themselves. The province in which Christians have had most reason to complain was Bosnia: the question is, there, one of noble and serf, of a privileged and unprivileged class, precisely analogous to that which now occupies the Russian Government, which, familiar as it must be with its difficulties, should be more indulgent to a neighbouring State engaged in the task of solving them like itself. Turkey had, in fact, made greater progress in it; but in Bosnia the question of privilege was complicated by religious considerations, the nobles having, at a former period, embraced Mahometanism to preserve their estates, which were thus conditionally assured to them. Each of the other provinces had passed through its peculiar ordeal, and a separate inquiry into the past and present condition of each would tend entirely to disprove the charge of systematic oppression. It was, in truth, the absence of anything like system or uniformity that rendered it difficult for the Porte to adopt any general régime for the amelioration of the condition of the Christians.

I give the above remarks as the substance rather of my conversation with the Grand Vizier² than a distinct recapitulation of what was said on either side, which, as our views were almost identical, is the less necessary. [pp. 27–28]

FO 424/21 (No. 26, Inclosure in No. 3, extract)
Longworth to Bulwer

1. On the Danube, to the north of Rumelia.
2. This official Turkish opinion is contradicted by the systematic rules for *dhimmis* and their obligatory enforcement throughout the *dar al-Islam*.

Vice-Consul S. Mayers to Sir Henry Bulwer

Rustchuk,¹ July 15, 1860

[. . .] The Israelites of Widdin have also benefited by the Grand Vizier's [Kiprisli Mehmed Pasha] visit and obtained the permission of erecting a synagogue which the authorities denied them up to this day. [p. 32]

FO 424/21 (No. 37, Inclosure 3, in No. 4, extract)
Mayers to Bulwer

1. On the Danube, in Wallachia.

*Consul James Finn to Lord John Russell**Answers to Queries*

Jerusalem, July 19, 1860

[7. *Is Christian evidence admitted in Courts of Justice; and if not, point out the cases where it has been refused?*]

7. In the Mehkemeh or Cadi's Court, non-Mussulman evidence is always refused. In the various Medjlises some subterfuge is always sought for declining to receive non-Mussulman evidence against a Mussulman, or recording it under the technical name of witness. These Courts and the Pasha will rather condemn at once a Mussulman in favour of a Christian, without recording testimony, than accept non-Moslem evidence. Evidence of Christian against Christian or Jew, or *vice-versâ*, *i.e.*, non-Moslem against non-Moslem, is always received.

[8. *Is the Christian population, on the whole, better off, more considered, and better treated, than it was five, ten, fifteen, twenty years ago?*]

8. [. . .] The condition of the Christians was lowest and inconceivably degraded previous to the Egyptian occupation [1831–40].

The condition of the Christians during the Egyptian period was one of greater liberty and comfort than at present.

There was a reaction in favour of the Mussulmans after the expulsion of the Egyptian, though until 1853 this was much modified by the advancing influence of Consulates and of Europeans generally.

During the Russian war [Crimean War] the condition of Christians was improved, and many instances have been brought to my notice of insolent Christian behaviour towards Mussulmans, the former having Consulates to lean upon.¹

Since the war, another reaction has taken place which is, in most respects, anti-Christian, and, on the part of the Governors, anti-European.

[9. *Are there any inequalities dependent on religion now, and if so, what are those inequalities?*]

9. No offices of trust are confided to Christians, either in local government or in military service, or even in police. They are essentially the governed class, and the Mussulmans the governors. [. . .]

[11. *Do Christians find any difficulty in constructing churches, or in following their religious observances?*]

11. Difficulty is always made till an order is obtained from Constantinople for building new churches; and such orders, when obtained, have been hitherto couched in such vague terms as to give rise to needless vexations and long delays. The disposition is here rather towards hindrance than otherwise.

I have not heard of Christians asking for steeples. Bells are of common use in towns where Christians are numerous; in others they are not permitted, on account of the fanatical feeling in the majority of inhabitants. Their use, however, only dates from the last few years, except in the Lebanon, where they have been long in use.

[12. *When cases of oppression against the Christians take place, is this generally owing to the acts of the Government, or the fanaticism of the population?*]

12. Oppression against Christians usually begins with the fanatic populace, but it is neither repressed nor punished by the Government; a remarkable instance of which is presented in our Nablous case of April 1856. There was another case in Gaza in 1856. But Sureya Pasha showed a disposition to depress Christians on his first arrival; for instance, in imprisonment of the Coptic priest and deacon in the common prison. The popular fanaticism never breaks out until the fanatical tendency of the Governor is visible. [p. 34]

FO 424/21 (No. 21, Inclosure in No. 5, July 17, 1860, extracts)
Finn to Russell, London

1. During the Crimean War, Britain, France, and Turkey were Allies against Russia. After the war, Europe pressured the sultan to implement the emancipation of the *rayas*.

Consul J. E. Blunt to Sir Henry Bulwer

Answers to Queries

Pristina, July 14, 1860

[. . .] For a long time the province [of Uscup]¹ has been a prey to brigandage: this evil originating from a mountain population unsubdued, and eminently warlike and mercenary, has more sway in the plains. But it may be said that its development has been rather arrested than promoted; Christian churches and monasteries, towns and inhabitants, are not now pillaged, massacred, and burnt by Albanian hordes as used to be done ten years ago.

On the whole the Undersigned can say, without fear of contradiction, that the province of Uscup is in that happy state of transition from bad to good, perhaps slow in its operation, but on that account not the less sure in its effects. [. . .]

1. They [the Christian peasants] are not allowed to carry arms. This, considering the want of a good police, exposes them the more to attacks from brigands. [p. 43]

7. Christian evidence in law-suits between a Mussulman and a non-Mussulman is not admitted in the Local Courts.

In such cases in which the parties are not Mussulman, Christian evidence is admitted.

About seventeen months ago a Turkish soidier murdered a Mahometan, an old man, who was working in his field. The only persons, two in number, who witnessed the deed are Christians. The Medjlis of Uscup would not take their evidence, although the Undersigned urged the Kaimakam to accept it.

About the same time a Zaptieh tried by force to convert a Bulgarian girl to Islamism. As she declared before the Medjlis of Camanova² that she would not abjure her religion, he killed her in the very precincts of the Mudir's house. This tragedy created great sensation in the province. The Medjlises of Camanova and Prisrend³ would not accept Christian evidence, and every effort was made to save the Zaptieh; but on the case being referred to Constantinople, an order reached the authorities to "take evidence of all persons who witnessed the murder". This was done, and Kiani Pasha, who at the time took charge of the province, where he has done much good, immediately had the Zaptieh beheaded.

Six months ago a Bulgarian in the district of Camanova was attacked, without provocation on his part, by two Albanians. They wounded him severely; on the case being referred to Prisrend, the Medjlis refused to take cognizance of it, as the only evidence produced was Christian.

[8. *Is the Christian population, on the whole, better off, more considered, and better treated, than it was five, ten, fifteen, twenty years ago?*]

8. Decidedly it is: while everywhere there are signs that the Turks, more especially the higher classes, are losing ground in population, agriculture, and trade, the opposite is the case with the Christians.

In nearly all the towns, streets—entire quarters—have passed into the hands of the Christians.

"Djeremeh" fine, the very worst feature of Eastern oppression, and which was much practised twenty and fifteen years ago, has been removed by the Tanzimat.

Ten years ago torture was very frequently adopted by the authorities,

but is no longer resorted to. Churches were not allowed to be built; and one can judge of the measure of Turkish toleration practised at that time by having had to creep under doors scarcely four feet high. It was an offence to smoke and ride before a Turk; to cross his path, or not stand up before him, was equally wrong. [. . .]

[9. *Are there any inequalities dependent on religion now, and if so, what are these inequalities?*]

9. Christian evidence, as stated in reply to question No. 7, is not respected by the Medjlises.

The uncivil conduct and contemptuous conduct of the Mudirs and members of Medjlises towards the Christians, appears to be viewed by the latter as arising from the difference of religion.

The degrading terms of “kiaffir” [infidel] and “giaour” [pagan], addressed to them by their authorities, offends their feelings and excites their hatred. [p. 44]

[15. *Are Christians admitted into the Medjlis or Local Councils? Are these Councils generally more in favour of progress and good government than the officials of the Porte, or more unfavourable?*]

15. Christians are admitted, but generally as a mere matter of form. They are not allowed to take a prominent part in public affairs, and are treated disrespectfully. On the whole, these Councils are far more opposed to reform and good government than the officials of the Porte. [. . .]

19. [*In the case of conversion of females, is this generally the effect of religious enthusiasm on the one side or the other, or does it proceed from worldly causes? And, if the latter, state those causes.*]

19. On the part of the Turks, from both, but not so with the Christians; with them it is more under the influence of worldly causes.

The Turks employ Christians, principally females, as servants; and the number of these has increased since the importation of Arab slaves has been arrested. When these servants first enter the service of the Turks, they are very young, often mere children, and are chiefly recruited from the indigent classes. The fact is, the parents, who cannot afford to support the young and useless members of their family, dispose of them when they can for a sum of money, paid to them in advance, at the rate of twenty, thirty, or forty piastres per annum for a period of three, five, or seven years. The arrangements once concluded, the Turk

takes charge of the girl; and as the parents will not or cannot look after her, she is brought up, as regards manners and religion, like the other members of the family to which she is apprenticed.

It very frequently happens that, at the expiration of service-term, the master does not want to give her up; and tries by every means in his power—now by promises of matrimony and gifts, and then by threats—to draw her from her religion. If she feels that she can better her condition by abjuring a religion of which she knows little, and has been taught to care less, she succumbs under such pressure. It is then that the matter is taken up by the Christian community; a hue-and-cry is raised by the clergy and primates against the Turks, and every effort is made to save her; and they generally succeed through the same process of persuasion used by the opposite party. [pp. 45–46]

FO 424/21 (No. 470, Inclosure in No. 7, extracts)
Blunt to Bulwer

1. Uskup: Skopje, in the actual "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."
2. Kumanovo, near Skopje.
3. Prizren, near Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Consul James H. Skene to Sir Henry Bulwer

Aleppo, 4 August, 1860

Answers to queries

1. [. . .] Vast plains of the most fertile land lie waste on account of the incursions of the Bedouins, who drive the agricultural population westward, in order to secure pasture for their increasing flocks of sheep and herds of camels. I have seen twenty-five villages plundered by a single incursion of Sheik Mohammed Dukhy with 2,000 Beni Sachar horsemen. I have visited a fertile district which possessed 100 villages twenty years ago, and found only a few lingering Fellahs, destined soon to follow their kindred to the hills ranging along the seaboard. I have explored towns in the Desert, with well-paved streets, houses still roofed, and their stone doors swinging on the hinges, ready to be occupied, and yet quite untenanted; thousands of acres of fine arable land spreading around them, with tracks of watercourses for irrigation, now yielding but a scanty pasture to the sheep and camels of the Bedouin. This overlapping of the Desert on the cultivated plains commenced eighty years ago, when the Anezi tribes migrated from central Arabia in search of

more extended pasturage, and overran Syria. It has now reached the sea on two points, near Acre [Palestine], and between Latakia and Tripoli.

The Arab, however, does not always carry off the whole stock of the villager, but is frequently satisfied by a conciliatory offering in money and grain. [p. 58]

14. [. . .] Thus a very great evil is the insecurity of life and property arising from the state of insubordination of the nomadic tribes; the Turkish authorities could do much to remedy this. [p .61]

FO 424/21 (No. 47, Inclosure in No. 9, extract)
Skene to Bulwer

Acting Consul James Zohrab to Sir Henry Bulwer

Bosna Serai [Sarajevo], July 22, 1860

I have the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's circular of the 11th June, transmitting a list of questions connected with the condition and administration of the provinces within my Consular jurisdiction.

To these questions I beg to hand the following replies, according to the series of questions:—


1st. A glance at the map of European Turkey will show the importance of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Turkey, both on account of their extent and their geographical position.

Occupying a space of more than 800 square miles, of which a large portion is arable land, bounded on three sides by independent or almost independent States, it is of vital importance that the elements of resistance be found in the provinces, and that the lands be occupied by a contented and loyal people. [. . .]

The Mussulmans, like the Christians, belong to the Slave [*sic*] race.

From 1463 to 1850 the Bosniak Mussulmans enjoyed all the privileges of feudalism. Sincerely attached to their religion they respected the Sultan as its head, but as their temporal Sovereign they bore him no affection, and they looked and still look upon the Turks as a separate people.

This statement seems to be contradicted by the fact that the Bosniaks have frequently fought under the banners of the Sultans. Their aid was, however, always conditional, that is, they lent their aid on condition that none of their privileges should be invaded, and that they should continue to govern Bosnia through their own Chiefs. The Porte submitted to these conditions till 1850, when, finding herself sufficiently powerful to assert her authority over these provinces, she sent an army, under Omer Pasha, who subdued the country and introduced reforms.



Turks and Bosniac Pandours (Soldiers). Bosnia
Engraving: Bertrand; Théodore Valerio's drawing (1869)
Georges Perrot (1870), p. 281

Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina may be said to have been but tributary States of the Porte for nearly three centuries.

Omer Pasha exiled the heads of the chief families, who, under the mere nominal superintendence of a Pasha named by the Porte, arbitrarily governed the Sandjaks, and about 100 other individuals implicated in the effort made to resist the Government. He abolished the corvée and the Spahi privileges, and enrolled about 2,000 Bosniaks into the regular army. The Porte did not, however, dare to proceed further; the conscription was abandoned, and the reformed laws were only put partially and occasionally in force. The Mussulmans, keen to detect, at once perceived this weakness, and they have not failed to take advantage of it.

Irritated at the banishment of their Chiefs, irritated at having been subdued by a people they considered inferior to themselves, the Bosniaks long for independence, and if they could overcome their antipathy to the Christians, I have no doubt they would join them to expel the Turks.

The hatred of the Christians towards the Bosniak Mussulmans is intense. During a period of nearly 300 years they were subjected to much oppression and cruelty. For them no other law but the caprice of their masters existed.

In the belief that the direct administration of the Porte would materially ameliorate their position, they were induced, in 1850, to lend a hearty assistance to Omer Pasha, and to their aid must be attributed the rapid success of the Turkish arms. Their hopes were disappointed. That they were benefited by the change there can be no doubt, but the extent did not nearly come up to their expectation. They saw, with delight, the extinction of the Spahi privileges and of the corvée, but the imposition of new and heavy taxes, the gross peculation of the employés sent from Constantinople, and the demands of the army, filled them with disappointment and dismay, and, with these causes for complaint, their previous servile condition was almost forgotten. Their hopes had been raised high to be cruelly disappointed; their pecuniary position was aggravated, while their social position was but slightly improved.

A humiliation they experienced at this time at the hands of Omer Pasha disappointed them greatly, and impressed them with the hopelessness of expecting real benefits from the Turks; they were disarmed, while the Mussulmans who had opposed the Government were permitted to retain their arms.

Oppression cannot now be carried on as openly as formerly, but it must not be supposed that, because the Government employés do not generally appear as the oppressors, the Christians are well treated and protected. A certain impunity, for which the Government must be rendered responsible, is allowed to the Mussulmans. This impunity, while it

does not extend to permitting the Christians to be treated as they formerly were treated, is so far unbearable and unjust in that it permits the Mussulmans to despoil them with heavy exactions. False imprisonments are of daily occurrence. A Christian has but a small chance of exculpating himself when his opponent is a Mussulman.

Christian evidence, as a rule, is still refused.

Christians are now permitted to possess real property, but the obstacles which they meet with when they attempt to acquire it are so many and vexatious that very few have as yet dared to brave them.

Such being, generally speaking, the course pursued by the Government towards the Christians in the capital of the province where the Consular Agents of the different Powers reside and can exercise some degree of control, it may easily be guessed to what extent the Christians, in the remoter districts, suffer who are governed by Mudirs generally fanatical and unacquainted with the law. [. . .]

2. The population of the two Provinces (Bosnia and the Herzegovina) is estimated at 1,200,000, as follows:—Mussulmans, 490,000; Catholics, 160,000; Greeks [Serb Orthodox], &c., 550,000.

3. The Mussulmans are almost all proprietors; the Christians are engaged in trade and in agriculture.

4. Christians are permitted by law to possess landed property, but the difficulties opposed to their acquiring are so great that few have as yet dared to face them. As far as the mere purchase goes, no difficulties are made—a Christian can buy and take possession; it is when he has got his land into order, or when the Mussulman who has sold has overcome the pecuniary difficulties which compelled him to sell, that the Christian feels the helplessness of his position and the insincerity of the Government. Steps are then taken by the original proprietor, or some relative of his, to reclaim the land from the Christian, generally on one of the following pleas: that the original owner not being sole proprietor had no right to sell; that the ground being “*meraah*,” or grazing ground, could not be sold; that the deeds of transfer being defective the sale had not been legally made. Under one or other of these pleas the Christian is in nineteen cases out of twenty dispossessed, and he may then deem himself fortunate if he gets back the price he gave. Few, a very few, have been able to obtain justice; but I must say that the majority of these owe their good fortune not to the justice of their cause, but to the influence of some powerful Mussulman.

Those who possess lands hold them on equal conditions with the Turks.

5. Christians can exercise trades in towns on equal terms with Mussulmans.

6. The Christian peasants in the Christian villages are generally miser-

ably off, working land which does not belong to them; they are but the labourers of the proprietors, who, with rare exceptions, appropriate the lion's share of the harvest. The Mussulman peasants generally work their own land, and having only Government taxes to pay are well to do; but those Mussulmans who labour on the lands of others are as badly off as the Christians.

7. Christian evidence in the Medjlises is occasionally received, but as a rule it is refused, either directly or indirectly, by reference to the Mehkemeh. Knowing this the Christians generally come forward prepared with Mussulman witnesses. The cases in which Christian evidence has been refused are numerous, but it would take time to collect them.

8. The Christian population is socially better off now than it was twenty or ten years ago. The protective laws, though indifferently administered, are still extended over them. Their financial position is worse; twenty years ago, it is true, they had no laws beyond the caprice of their landlords; but their landlords, well aware that to ruin them would be to ruin themselves, allowed them to enjoy a greater share of the fruits of their labour than they can hope to enjoy now after paying their landlords, their taxes, and their priests. [. . .]

11. To construct a church a firman must first be obtained from Constantinople granting the authority; beyond unnecessary delay in transmitting this, I have not heard of the Government opposing their erection. The Christians are occasionally, but rarely, disturbed in their religious ceremonies.

12. Cases of oppression are frequently the result of Mussulman fanaticism, but for these the Government must be held responsible, for if offenders were punished, oppression would of necessity become rare; but while impunity is allowed, and the Agents of the Porte are themselves frequently oppressors, the Government must be considered the primary cause.

13. There are no native Protestants in these Provinces.

14. The grievances of which the Christians complain must be attributed to the Turkish authorities.

15. A Greek and a Catholic Christian are admitted into each Medjlis to represent Christian interests. Their presence is not of the slightest utility; indeed it is prejudicial to the Christians, as by it they appear to approve acts of injustice against the Christians.

The Medjlises are invariably opposed to progress and good government.

16. An entire remodelling of the Medjlises I consider most urgent. As at present constituted they represent neither the interests of the Provinces, nor the declared views of the Government. The members are selected from among the richest persons of the town in which the

Medjlis sits; they are invariably fanatical, narrow-minded, and opposed to progress, possessing no qualifications for their position; they are selected merely on account of the local interest they may possess. [. . .]

Nearly two-thirds of the population is Christian. It is therefore absurd to suppose that if ten or twelve Mussulmans are required to represent the interests of the minority, two Christian members are sufficient to represent the interests of the majority. I should therefore propose that each Sandjak nominates two members, one Christian and one Mussulman; and, in the same manner, each Mudirlik of sufficient importance should elect two members to form the Medjlises of the sandjaks. [. . .]

17. [. . .] A Criminal Court was established in Mostar in 1857. It was composed of a President sent from Constantinople and a Council of six,—two Greeks, two Catholics, and two Mussulmans.

This tribunal existed for two years. During this period only one or two cases were disposed of, though the prisons were full of persons awaiting trial. This ill-success must be attributed to the inexperience of the President, who was a very young man.

18. Conversion of males to the Mussulman religion is rare. I have not, during my residence in this country, heard of one case of compulsory conversion.

19. The conversion of females is common, but compulsion is not frequently used to effect this; and, when attempted, I must in justice say the Government generally interferes. A case in point occurred only a few days ago. A Turk carried off a young Catholic girl, and endeavoured to compel her to abjure her faith prior to his marrying her. The girl was recovered by the authorities and restored to her home; and Osman Pasha assures me that the Turk will be punished.

In nearly every Mussulman house in these provinces one or two Christian girls are to be found holding the position of servants. They are taken when very young, grow up in the family, by whom they are kindly treated, and they frequently end by voluntarily changing their faith and marrying into the family. [. . .] [pp. 64–69]

FO 424/21 (No. 41, Inclosure 1 in No. 10, extract)
Zohrab to Bulwer

Acting Consul James Zohrab to Sir Henry Bulwer

Bosna Serai, July 22, 1860

[. . .] The Hatti-humayoun, I can safely say, practically remains a dead letter. To what extent the Edict of Gulhané has been enforced, I cannot exactly say, as I have not by me a copy of it by which to judge. [. . .]

FO 424/21 (No. 41, Inclosure 2 in No. 10, extract)
Zohrab to Bulwer

Correspondence Respecting Disturbances in Herzegovina and Montenegro in 1861–1862

In spring 1861, the sultan announced in a proclamation reforms in Herzegovina, promising among other things freedom to build churches, the use of bells and the opportunity for Christians to acquire landed property: Cf. FO 424/26 (No. 320, Inclosures 1, 2, 3, in No. 167, Aali Pasha to the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, 30 April and 1 May 1861).

Consul William R. Holmes to Sir Henry Bulwer

Bosna-Serai, May 21, 1861

[. . .] With regard to the concessions of the Proclamation, I would remark that the most important, if not all of them, have been long since nominally accorded here, and, I believe, in the Herzegovina, but never carried out in fact, as the insurgents are well aware. For instance, the promise of permission to build churches as other Christian subjects of the Porte seems delusive, when it is known here that one of the Christian communities—the Orthodox Greeks—have collected money to build a church, but are prevented from doing so on the frivolous pretext of its being near a mosque, the said mosque being more than 150 yards from the site proposed for the church, and hardly visible from it. The admirable arrangement between the farmers and proprietors of land, made some time ago with the deputation who proceeded from Bosnia to Constantinople for that purpose, is well known to have remained a dead letter. Every possible obstacle is still thrown in the way of the purchase of land by Christians, and very often after they have succeeded in purchasing and improving land, it is no secret that on one unjust pretext or another it has been taken from them. [p. 111]

FO 424/26 (No. 71, in No. 177, extract)
Holmes to Bulwer

Correspondence Concerning Cases of Alleged Religious Persecution in Turkey (1873–1875)

Sir Henry Elliot to Earl Granville

Therapia, October 10, 1873

I delayed answering your Lordship's despatch No.208 of the 1st September in reference to the Christians of Gradiska and of Bosnia in

general, till I should have received a statement of the circumstances, which was being drawn up by the Porte, and of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy. [. . .]

Almost all Her Majesty's Consuls concurred in reporting that the nominal equality of Mussulmans and Christians before the law, which had never thoroughly existed in practice, was now in most provinces more illusory than it had been a few years ago, and it was necessary for the [Ottoman] Government to show that it was determined to enforce it. [pp. 6-7]

FO 424/34 (No. 361, in No. 6, extract)
Elliot to Granville, London

Vice-Consul William K. Green to Sir Henry Elliot

Damascus, November 19, 1874

I have the honour to report that, the day before yesterday, some Christians came to me in considerable alarm and informed me that in the most crowded part of the bazaar a Derwish was shouting at the top of his voice the following words:—"The measure has now been filled to the brim; it needs to be cleaned until it is cleansed;" and that the Derwish was, at the same time, making signs with his hands, indicating in this country of the cutting of throats.

My informants told me that the Moslems understood the Derwish to be preaching against the Christians, and as this belief was confirmed to me by Mohammedans, I thought it proper to call upon the Acting Governor-General, Essad Pasha being absent at Tripoli, with reference to the riots at that place, and to urge him to have the Derwish arrested. The Naib Effendi thanked me for my action in the matter and promised to have my suggestion carried out.

Yesterday I was again visited by native Christians who came to relate to me the alarming accounts that had been received by them of a riot at Horus on the 9th instant, when three bodies of Mohammedans invaded the Christian quarter from separate directions and so frightened its inhabitants that they sought refuge in the churches and the buildings attached to them. The Moslems appear to have been excited by an endeavour of the Christians to obtain justice from the authorities for the murder of the guard of their quarter, who was shot down a few nights before, when opposing the escape of some thieves who had broken into a Christian house.

I also made a representation to the Naib Effendi on this subject, and he informed me that he had already directed the Lieutenant-General

of the district to proceed at once in person to Horus from Hamah to institute an investigation into the cause of the disturbance and to punish the rioters. [pp. 122–23]

FO 424/34 (No. 25, Political. Inclosure in No. 188)
Green to Elliot, Therapia

Part I. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in The Herzegovina (July to December 1875)

Vice-Consul J. H. Dupuis to Sir Henry Elliot

Adrianople [Edirne], November 20, 1875

[. . .] Previous to Bairam it was believed by the Bulgarians that the Turks were planning a general massacre of the Christians, but happily nothing came of it. My informant adds that he inclines to think that the apprehensions were not altogether groundless, that the Turks were thoroughly armed, and that even Turkish prisoners in Philipopoli were secretly provided with deadly weapons. In conclusion, he informs me, that no attempts at insurrection will be made soon, as the Christians feel themselves powerless, but the Government needs to institute very great reforms without delay, or a more serious attempt will be made at the first favourable opportunity.

I beg leave also to acquaint your Excellency that private intelligence reaches me from Philipopoli that the reforms promised by the Imperial Government cannot be carried out, because the ruling classes and the Turks generally are of opinion that these reforms will operate to their disadvantage; that the Central Government doubtless is sincere in its desire to ameliorate the condition of the Rayahs, but the dominant race in the different vilayets and towns think that improving the condition of Christians means nothing less than their own destruction and ruin. Under these circumstances it is believed that reforms cannot be adopted, and that matters will eventually be allowed to pass back into the old channels. It is, however, said that if the public press were free, the Government would be in a better position to learn the real state of the country. The present distracted state of affairs will necessitate great changes in all the administrative departments of the Empire, and unless this be done, and greater liberty accorded to the press, no benefits can possibly accrue to the country. [pp. 338–39]

FO 424/39 (No. 773. Inclosure, in No. 523, extract)
Dupuis to Elliot, Therapia

Part II. Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in The Herzegovina (January to March 1876)

Acting Consul Edward B. Freeman to the Earl of Derby

Bosna Serai, December 30, 1876 [1875]

I have the honour to report to your Lordship that assemblies of the chief Mussulmans of this town have lately been held in some of the mosques and at the private houses of influential persons. [. . .]

It would appear that the Bosnian Mussulmans have prepared a petition to the Sultan, making grave complaints against the Government officials of the province. I am not aware that they implicate any of the authorities in particular, or bring any special accusations against them, but they state that they have indirectly been the cause of the present insurrection by maladministration, and by stirring up the mutual hatred and jealousy of Christians and Turks. They represent to His Majesty that formerly they lived as brothers with the Rayah population and would seem to imply that the present unsatisfactory relations have only been engendered since the introduction of the [reforms of the] "Tanzimat" by the Serdar Ekrem Omer Pasha some five-and-twenty years ago, and they ask permission to be allowed to make their own terms with the insurgents. In fact, their aim appears to be to restore the feudal system that existed formerly in these provinces, and to reduce the Christian peasants to their ancient state of serfdom; in their ignorance, believing that it can be done, and that it would restore tranquillity to the country. It is also stated that they have protected [themselves] against the nomination of a Christian to the newly-created Mutessariflik of Gatzko.¹

There is no doubt that the position of the Christians, especially of the townspeople, has immeasurably improved during the last quarter of a century; but I do not think that the agricultural population is materially much better off than it was thirty years ago, when the native "Beys" and "Spahis" were all powerful. Every proprietor was then supreme master of the peasants located on his lands, and, in a rude way, afforded them protection. Cases of ill-usage were doubtless not uncommon, but as the peasant could look to no one for redress for his grievances, it was his interest to endeavour to content and conciliate his master. Of late years, however, he has been taught to look to the Ottoman Government and its employés for protection, and under a just administration he would have found his position greatly ameliorated; but as the motive power of the whole system of Government has been bribery, corruption, and religious fanaticism, a most uneven justice has been meted out in all cases between rich and poor, between Mussulman and Christian, and the complaints of the latter have not only, as a rule, brought down upon

him the chastisement of his Government, but they have also been the cause of his incurring the hatred of his master and oppressor.

No doubt the Ottoman officials have much to answer for, but it may also be said in their defence that they are so tied down in all their actions by the local Medglisses that the Governor of a Province or a district, possessed of the best intentions, is almost powerless to do good or to administer justice. Anything like Municipal Government I believe to be quite impossible in the present ignorant and fanatical state of the population, both Christian and Mussulman. [p. 34]

FO 424/40 (No. 24. Political, No. 56, extract)
Freeman to Derby, London

1. In Herzegovina.

Memorandum by Consul-General and Judge Sir P. Francis on the New Judicial Reforms contemplated in the Sultan's recent Iradé of 20th October and the Firman of 12th December 1875 to the Earl of Derby

Constantinople, January 5, 1876

[. . .] The Porte hitherto has not appointed independent judges. Indeed, the modern perversion of the Oriental idea of justice is a concession to a suitor through grace and favour, and not the declaration of a right, on principles of law, and in pursuance of equity. The latest appointments to the judgeship, ever since the promulgation of the Firman, do not inspire one with confidence as to the genuine desire of the Government for an independent and incorruptible judicial body. [p. 78]

[. . .] It appears that one object—a very respectable one in itself—of the new Firman is to admit the evidence of Christians or non-Moslems before the Tribunals of the country. This has been done indirectly, and not by enacting that Christian witnesses shall henceforth be heard before the Sheriat [*i.e.*, the religious Courts], but by ordaining that suits between Moslem and non-Moslem shall be transferred to the “Nizanie” Tribunals, where there shall be no religious objection to Christian evidence being received.

Unfortunately, however, the Naïbs [judges under the religious law] are to be nominated as residents of all the local Courts of Appeal, and it is a question whether to Christian evidence thus admitted much weight will be attached by Presidents, who, with their conscientious belief in the Koran and their religious education, will undoubtedly regard the evidence of Christians as valueless henceforth as heretofore.

It is true that the Firman observes with great verbal emphasis that the scrupulous observance of the law is a protection against arbitrary acts, and shall consequently be the object of the constant attention of the Tribunals; but hitherto such vague phrases in Hatts and Firmans have had no value.

The whole wording of the clauses under consideration are so vague, wide, loose, and periphrastic that they admit of any interpretation which hereafter the Government may choose to adopt

In the provinces, and perhaps even in the metropolis, it is proposed, if I read the Firman right, to introduce the most foolish, mischievous, and in Turkey utterly impossible system of popular election of Judges and Members of Tribunals.

Universal suffrage and, I believe, vote by ballot, have seriously been proposed for a country where elections are unknown, and the habit of thus expressing an opinion upon public subjects is utterly alien to the habits of the people.

Even if Judges could be so elected, they would certainly be badly elected, and the proposition looks like a mockery suggested to the authors of the Firman by extraneous advice which has been adopted in pure ignorance.

Any acquaintance, however slight, with the people, their institutions, and the Government, would be enough to show that those who made such a proposition can have no good or practical intention; for it amounts to introducing the worst features of an ultra-democratic Government into one of the most arbitrary and autocratic of Empires. [pp. 78–79]

FO 424/40 (No. 27, Inclosure, in no. 136, extract)
Francis to Derby, London

Vice-Consul Charles A. Brophy to Sir P. Francis

Bourgas,¹ April 9, 1876

I HAVE the honour to submit to you some remarks upon the execution or non-execution, in this province [Bosnia], of the Imperial Iradé [Decree], dated December 12, 1875. [. . .]

1. After a pretty wide experience of Christian agas [notables] in the province, I am convinced that they are nothing but machines for signing any document presented to them by the Judge or the Governors.

2. "All cases arising between non-Mussulmans, or between them and Mussulmans, are to be decided by Civil Law, to the exclusion of [that of] the Sheri"²; this most important provision, upon which hinges the

acceptance or rejection of Christian evidence, is in the province either absolutely disregarded or resolutely defied; the Judges say openly "we are Sherah Memourlari, officers placed here to judge according to the Sheri; it is the only law we can recognize, and it is the only law we shall administer."

I have known many instances, since the publication of the Iradé, in which stolen cattle having been recovered, and Christians being ready to prove the ownership, their evidence has been refused, and Mussulman witnesses demanded, even if the village from which the cattle have been stolen is exclusively rayah the Judge will still insist upon the production of Mussulman witnesses, and if the plaintiff does not choose to lose his property, he is obliged to suborn a couple of Turks or Mussulman gipsies.

No point in the whole of the Iradé will meet with such opposition as this substitution in certain cases of the civil for the sacred law, and I doubt whether the members of the Ulema will, in practice, ever thoroughly concede it, they consider this innovation as a fundamental alteration in a system which according to their views is unalterable as long as Islamism exists, and as being a virtual negation of their religion.


The aversion on the part of the naïbs and cadis to the application of the civil law has been much more strongly marked since the publication of this Iradé than before, although the same orders were long ago received, but as they have now been more formally and authoritatively promulgated, the action of the Ulema seems to take the shape of a definite protest, none the less strong that it shows itself merely in passive resistance. [pp. 410–11]

FO 424/40 (No. 49. Consular. Inclosure in No. 806, extract)
Brophy to Francis, Constantinople

1. Port on the Black Sea in present-day Bulgaria.
2. The *shari'a*, koranic law.

***Jihad* and Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Sudan**

A few years ago quantities of slaves were sent from Abyssinia by Abu Anga and from Fashoda by Zeki Tummal,¹ as well as from Darfur and the Nuba mountains by Osman Wad Adam,² and were generally sold by public auction for the benefit of the Beit el-Mal,³ or the Khalifa's⁴ private treasury. The transport of slaves is carried on with the same execrable and heartless cruelty which characterises their capture. Of the thousands of Abyssinian Christians seized by Abu Anga, the majority were women



In the Slave Market. Omdurman, Sudan

Slatin (1896), p. 558

and children; and under the cruel lash of the whip they were forced to march on foot the whole distance from Abyssinia to Omdurman [facing Khartoum]; wrenched from their families, provided with scarcely enough food to keep body and soul together, barefooted, and almost naked, they were driven through the country like herds of cattle. The greater number of them perished on the road; and those who arrived in Omdurman were in so pitiable a condition that purchasers could scarcely be found for them, whilst numbers were given away for nothing by the Khalifa. After the defeat of the Shilluks, Zeki Tummal packed thousands of these wretched creatures into the small barges used for the transport of his troops, and despatched them to Omdurman. Hundreds died from suffocation and overcrowding on the journey; and, on the arrival of the remnant, the Khalifa appropriated most of the young men as recruits for his body-guard, whilst the women and young girls were sold by public auction, which lasted several days. Hungry, and in many cases naked, these unfortunate creatures lay huddled together in front of the Beit el Mal. For food, they were given an utterly inadequate quantity of uncooked dhurra [corn]. Hundreds fell ill; and for these poor wretches it was also impossible to find purchasers. Wearily they dragged their emaciated bodies to the river bank, where they died; and as nobody would take the trouble to bury them, the corpses were pushed into the river and swept away.

But a worse fate than this befell the slaves who had the misfortune to be sent from Darfur along the broad stretches of waterless desert which lie between that province and Omdurman. These miserable creatures were mercilessly driven forward day and night; and it would be impossible for me to describe here the execrable measures adopted by these brutal slave-drivers to force on their prey to their destination. When the poor wretches could go no further, their ears were cut off as a proof to the owner that his property had died on the road. Some of my friends told me that on one occasion they had found an unfortunate woman whose ears had been cut off, but who was still alive. Taking pity on her, they brought her to El Fasher, where she eventually recovered, whilst her ears had been duly exposed in Omdurman as proof of her death.

Latterly, no large caravans of slaves have arrived in Omdurman, because the majority of the slave-producing districts, such as Darfur, have become depopulated, or, in some cases, the tribes, such as the Tama, Massalit, etc., have thrown off allegiance to the Khalifa. Consignments, however, still come from Reggaf; but, owing to the long and tedious journey, numbers of them perish on the way. As the supplies from Gallabat, Kordofan, and Darfur have considerably diminished, the Khalifa now allows the Emirs to sell slaves to the itinerant Gellabas⁵; and the latter are obliged to sign a paper giving a descriptive return of their

purchase, and the amount paid. They are permitted to re-sell on the same conditions.

There is of course a daily sale of slaves in Omdurman; but the purchase of male slaves is forbidden, as they are looked upon as the Khalifa's monopoly, and are generally turned into soldiers. Any one wishing to dispose of a male slave must send him to the Beit el Mal, where a purely nominal price is paid for him; and he is then, if likely to make a good soldier, recruited for the mulazemin, but if unsuitable, he is sent off to work as a labourer in his master's fields. The sale of women and girls is permissible everywhere, with the proviso that a paper must be signed by two witnesses of the sale, one of whom, if possible, should be a Kadi, certifying that the slave sold is the actual property of the vendor. This system was brought into force because slaves frequently ran away from their masters, were caught and sold by other persons as their own property, and thus theft of slaves was a very common practice in Omdurman. They were frequently enticed into other people's houses, or secretly induced to leave the fields, then thrown into chains and carried off to distant parts of the country, where they were sold at very low rates. In accordance with the Mohammedan Law, slaves cannot be witnesses; and, being well aware of their inferior position, these stolen creatures, as long as they are kindly treated, are not dissatisfied with their lot.

In Omdurman itself, in an open space a short distance to the southeast of the Beit el Mal, stands a house roughly built of mud-bricks, which is known as the Suk er Rekik (slave-market). Under the pretext that I wanted to buy or exchange slaves, I several times received the Khalifa's permission to visit it, and found ample opportunity for closely observing the conduct of the business.

The Slave-Market at Omdurman

Here professional slave-dealers assemble to offer their wares for sale. Round the walls of the house numbers of women and girls stand or sit. They vary from the decrepit and aged half-clad slaves of the working-class, to the gaily-decked Surya (concubine); and as the trade is looked upon as a perfectly natural and lawful business, those put up for sale are carefully examined from head to foot, without the least restriction, just as if they were animals. The mouth is opened to see if the teeth are in good condition. The upper part of the body and the back are laid bare; and the arms carefully looked at. They are then told to take a few steps backward or forward in order that their movements and gait may be examined. A series of questions are put to them to test their knowledge of Arabic. In fact, they have to submit to any examination the intending purchaser may wish to make. Suryas, of course, vary consider-

ably in price; but the whole matter is treated by the slaves without the smallest concern. [pp. 554–57]

Rudolf C. Slatin

1. Officers of the Khalifa's army.
2. The Khalifa's cousin.
3. *Bayt al-Mal*, the state treasury, made up of tithes, taxes on all booty, and confiscated property, as well as fines.
4. Abdullah al-Ta'ashi (Khalifat al-Mahdi) was proclaimed successor to the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad) by the latter before his death in 1885.
5. Petty itinerant traders, dealing mainly in slaves.

The Armenian Question

The Massacres of 1894–1896

[. . .] The acceptance of a program of reforms was the signal for new massacres in Asia. According to the most trustworthy documents, the minimum number of victims during the last three months of 1895 was thirty thousand, and even this figure does not take into account the massacres which took place outside localities where consuls lived. The most moderate assessment for the years 1894, 1895 and 1896, is two hundred and fifty thousand murdered. In the majority of cases, if not all, collusion between the Turkish authorities and the soldiers has been established with certainty. Did we witness here a sudden outburst, a fierce bout of fanaticism? On the contrary, everything indicates that a methodical plan for the extermination of the Armenians was made and carried out in cold blood. History has not recorded a similar crime since the sixteenth century. Every area inhabited by Armenians was steeped in blood: massacres, tortures, unspeakable brutalities, profanation of churches, forced conversions to Islam, this is what we have seen here for three months. At Diyarbakir, the massacre lasted for three days, starting every morning at a signal given from the top of the minarets; there were wretches who, having been mutilated, were made to eat their own flesh; for others, seated and chained, their children were placed on their laps and cut into slices: there were three thousand dead; in the vicinity, a hundred and twenty villages were burned by order of the government. Erzerum was also the scene of nameless cruelties; the massacres began at the governor's palace and claimed three thousand victims. The soldiers amused themselves by flaying Armenians, whom they hung up like sheep in a butcher's shop; others were coated with petrol and burned; children were not spared. The high imperial commissioner, Shakir Pasha, prevented nothing <18 October>. At Mush, Bitlis, Van, Harput, Sivas, Cesarea [Kayseri, Anatolia], Malatia, etc., the same hor-

rors occurred followed naturally by extreme misery, which in its turn claimed victim after victim. [. . .]

Not only none of the murderers of 1895 was punished, but an extraordinary court was constituted to judge Armenians accused of conspiracy; a large number, including priests, were sentenced to capital punishment or imprisonment. At the same time, the sultan, seeing conspiracy everywhere, allowed, or took, severe measures against the Young Turks and the *softas* [theologians]; several of them had their throats cut or were drowned; many disappeared mysteriously.

Last August [1895], the Armenians formed a plot to seize several important points in Constantinople; they only succeeded in occupying the Ottoman bank, from where they only escaped with their lives thanks to the intervention of the [European] embassies. A general massacre immediately stained the capital with blood <26 August>. [. . .] It is no exaggeration to estimate the number of victims at six thousand, several of whom were killed in cold blood after arrest. At Has-Keui, a central district of Constantinople inhabited by Armenians, twenty men remained from five hundred. Women were driven mad by fear and horror. The roads streamed with blood; hundreds of corpses were thrown into the Bosphorus. Muslims and even the imam of the mosque of Eyub protected and saved Christians! It is currently said in Constantinople: "The Master allowed Armenians to be killed".¹[. . .]

At the time of the Congress of Berlin (1878), the Armenians handed over secretly to the representatives of the Powers, a memorandum summarizing their aspirations and grievances. It said:

"Leaving aside everything which constitutes and protects political equality, a Muslim authority would not be able to acknowledge and practice two things, without belying its religion: freedom of conscience and equitable justice, those two essential functions of any government. Freedom of conscience in Turkey means no more than the freedom of the Christian to become Muslim. A Muslim authority will never tolerate, and has never tolerated, conversion to Christianity by a Muslim, not even by a Christian who had at some time become a Muslim. It is not possible to cite a single example of such a conversion which has been tolerated. The principle of freedom of conscience is only applicable to the different Christian Churches in their relations with one another. The same applies to equitable justice. Except by the laws which are an integral part of it, the religion exerts no influence on the administration of justice when it concerns Christians between themselves; but the Muslim who wrongs a Christian will always be privileged in the face of justice, which only acknowledges, and will only acknowledge, the testimony of Muslims". [pp. 981–83]

“Les affaires arméniennes”, *Revue encyclopédique* (Paris, 1896)

1. See Victor Bérard, *Revue de Paris* (15 December 1896); and the British government *Blue Book*. Documentation in MAE.DD. Vol. 6 (Arménie-Macédoine-Turquie), *Affaires Arméniennes: Projet de Réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman. 1893–1897*, and *Affaires Arméniennes (Supplément). 1895–1896* (Paris, 1897).

Two Eye-Witness Accounts of the Armenians during World War I Palestine, 1915

[. . .] It has been more than proved (of their own admission!) that it was the Germans who “organized” the control and “correction” of the Armenians. Yet, these messengers from hell, who claim to be superior to others in many things, also describe themselves as “better Christians” than all the others (do relish William’s prose . . .).¹ Now, the Turks have promised that only 500,000 of the 2,500,000 Armenians living in the empire will be left at the end of the war. As far as these promises are concerned, have faith in the Turks. They are on the way to keeping their word.

On our roads [in Palestine], one sees long files of young and old men engaged in forced labour: from time to time, someone sick enough is borne on the shoulders of a helpful comrade in misfortune; sometimes, someone lying on the road whose sufferings will soon have ceased.

Even better: these wretches are pursued along the [railway] line of the Hedjaz: old men, old women, children. Sometimes they are allowed to camp down. No bread, no clothing, not a [piece of] cloth on their heads [as protection] against sun or cold, not a tool with which to work. Yet these wretches sometimes have the courage to ask: Will we stop here at last? The reply is invariably: “It is not known!” and the worst torture is added to all the rest: the torture of uncertainty. In many places, it is *forbidden* to give alms to this hapless people.

Even better: do you know what was done with the young girls and young women? ! Yes, as soon as you read my question, you, who know Islam, have guessed. However, this will not stop me telling you: THEY HAVE BEEN SOLD! Yes, yes: sold, every girl from the age of seven or eight upwards. They are not expensive. Although it is difficult to feed even the animals in this starving country, there were found among the “faithful”, bidders ready to pay from five to a hundred francs for a piece of white flesh. Do not console yourself with the idea that I am reporting gossip! Vain consolation! Things seen, witnessed, proven, official! Very small girls torn from their mothers, young brides taken from their husbands, young girls “kaffirs” [infidels] become the slaves of the debauchery of the “faithful”! The children of a race of martyrs, a race which is

claimed to be physically beautiful, and which is undeniably of an acute superiority of intelligence. [. . .]

As for me, I no longer have teeth to gnash, who's turn is it now?! For I came into *my* country, on the holiest ground, on the road from Jerusalem, and I asked myself if we were in 1915 or in the days of Titus and Nebuchadnezzar. For I, a Jew, I forgot that I was Jewish—it is very difficult to forget this “privilege”!—and I asked myself if I had the right to weep solely for the grief of my nation and if Jeremiah [8:21] did not shed his tears of blood for the Armenians too?!

And, lastly, since the Christians—some of whom sometimes claim a monopoly of works of Love, of Charity and of Solidarity—are silent, there is need once again for a son of the Old Race who disregards the Pain, overcomes the Torture, or denies the Death which for twenty centuries is offered to us more often than is our share; it would need a drop of blood from the Patriarchs and of Moses, of the Maccabees from arid Judea, of Jesus, the dreamer by the side of the blue lake of sweet Galilee, and of Bar Kochba; it would need a drop of the blood that had escaped from the slaughter, to rise up and say: Look! You who refuse to open your eyes. Listen! You whose ears refuse to hear! What have you done with the secrets of Love and Charity entrusted to you?! To what purpose has served the spilled streams of our blood?! What are you doing in Life with your lofty words?!

And while a night's journey from here thousands and thousands of Englishmen, Canadians and Australians—all volunteers who *have come to fight*—remain inactive, a few Arab dogs and Turkish hyenas are wallowing in a charnel-house which they create and maintain. And to know that whips would suffice to drive out all this cowardliness. Alas! the torture of being powerless and disarmed.

The valiant soldiers who would arouse a Halleluya of liberation and joy do not come . . . But tomorrow an official will come and teach us that the “Hasan” mosque of Jaffa is sacred and infinitely respectable because . . . a bandit built it with stones from stolen houses, and that some Muslim wearing an immaculately white “Lafeh” [gown] is worthy of respect and honor because he keeps well imprisoned in his harem two Armenians, bought “on the cheap”, or, to use the words of the Holy Bible, “for a pair of shoes”.

Forgive this tone, lieutenant! The roots of my past are in this country, my dreams for the future too; [. . .] I have my whole heart here and it is bleeding and wailing, forgive me.

And while the accursed Germans flood the world with their printed lies, their treachery built into professions of faith [. . .], why are you silent?! Silent scorn and mistrust are fine, but did not Ecclesiastes say: “A time to keep silence, and a time to speak.” [. . .] Especially, as honest

people, should one not speak out, and is it a young, rebellious Jew who once again must do it?! [. . .]

Extract from a report in French "PRO ARMENIA" (Athlit, 22 November 1915) by Absalom Feinberg² to Lt.C. Z.Wooley, British naval officer in Port Said, Egypt.

1. William II, German Emperor
2. Absalom Feinberg (1889–1917). Born at Gadera (Palestine). Agronomist and co-founder with Aharon Aaronsohn of *Nili*, the Palestinian Jewish intelligence service, which worked with British intelligence during World War I. He was assassinated by Bedouins near Gaza while traveling to Egypt in January 1917. A palm tree grew from the date seeds in his pocket. In 1967, after the Six Day War, his remains were discovered under the tree indicated by a Bedouin and buried in Israel on Mount Herzl.

Iraq, 1915–1917

Letters in French from D. Sasson, headmaster of the Alliance Israélite Universelle boys' school at Mosul, to the president of the AIU in Paris

Constantinople, 3 April, 1919

[. . .] As I am reflecting in order to coordinate my ideas and describe to you with some precision the situation of Mosul during this war, I am overwhelmed by a feeling of sickness and embarrassment; for I find that the pen is too imperfect an instrument to convey truthfully all the horrors that I have seen, all the images which today fill my mind.

When I remember again, only a few months afterwards, the painful scenes which we have witnessed; when I think of that crowd of gaunt, fleshless spectres, their faces white as corpses, filing through the streets and over countryside in search of a carcass or a few herbs to cheat their hunger; when I think of others, with limbs and cheeks bloated with air, who came to ask for alms, collapsing from exhaustion on my doorstep, I come to the point of doubting myself. Was it a nightmare? What pen, what words could ever describe the distress, the agony of Mosul in 1918? What words could render the evil sight of those children's heads severed from their bodies and paraded in the streets to summon weeping mothers to recognize their stolen children, stolen in the street by ferocious starvelings, for whom this was the last resort? However improbable this may appear, it is—unless I am still dreaming—something I have seen, a reality experienced. [p. 1]

D. Sasson, report No. 4 (extract)
Archives, AIU, Iraq, I.C.2.

Constantinople, April 30, 1919

[. . .] 1915 saw the massacre of the Armenians; 1916 saw—O divine vengeance—the explosion of a dreadful epidemic. The fetid decomposition of Armenian corpses which were found abandoned in the open fields; those that were foolishly thrown into the nutritive waters of the Tigris emitted vengeful germs of inexorable diseases which, alas, mowed down an entirely innocent population. There was typhoid fever, malaria, yellow fever, cholera. The uninterrupted exodus of deportees and emigrants brought with it exanthematic typhus, the most terrible of calamities, which decimated the population and which unfortunately claimed an immense and harsh tribute from our coreligionists. Oh! what a sad Passover it was that year! It found our quarter in mourning and almost every family weeping at the grave of a deceased or at the bedside of someone agonizing. [pp. 2–3]

D. Sasson, report No. 5 (extract)
Archives AIU, Iraq I.C.2.

Constantinople, July 20, 1919

[. . .] At last, in 1917, after the fall of Baghdad, a few young Christians appealed to me for the organization of a collection on behalf of the wretched Armenians deported to our town. This hapless mass, that had miraculously escaped the executioners' knives and the fatigues of a forced march of several months, swarmed in our streets, a prey to the pangs of hunger and condemned to the horrors of the most abominable persecution. Some of them—women and children of good family, with a refined education—had a few savings in local banks; but a cruel order had forbidden all these financial establishments to make payments to the deportees from the funds which they held for them. It seemed as if the government, not having been able to exterminate all of them by fire and sword, wanted to eliminate them by hunger and disease.

For months on end we watched, impotent and distressed, the arrival of these interminable convoys of women and children, emaciated, exhausted, yellow and pitiable, reminiscent of the most atrocious persecutions in the period of the Inquisition. They arrived with the hope of at last settling somewhere, happy nonetheless to have escaped death thus far. Their fathers, husbands, brothers, sons—in fact all the males of their families—had been massacred, slaughtered before their eyes with an abominable refinement of cruelty. And, on the road to exile, all those women and children, who were not able to follow the convoy, fell pierced by the bayonets of the savage horde charged with escorting them. Able-



Slaughtered Armenians in a Ditch (1915). Harput region, Turkey
Photo: Armenian Museum, Jerusalem

bodied young girls were dragged off and subjected to the most horrible and despicable acts. Never was barbarity practised with so much cruelty on women and children.

The survivors in rags, emaciated, more dead than alive, dragged themselves pitiably through our streets. To see them stream past, it was impossible to say precisely whether these ghosts were naked or clad, if these figures were those of animals or human beings.

The number of these deportees in our town alone rose to more than eight thousand, but it is said that a similar number were not able to follow the convoy and were killed on the road. And, actually, the roads round about were strewn with corpses; the Tigris washed up swollen unrecognizable corpses on its banks every day. Horror of horrors, it was forbidden to be affected or to show pity. This was one more sentence of death, slow and painful, still more cruel than the massacres by sword and fire to which their male compatriots, or their travelling companions, had succumbed. And the authorities did not think that the presence of this wretched throng, in these horrible conditions, could constitute a danger for the town. Did they want to kill two birds with one stone: abolish the Armenian race and reduce the number of Arabs by debauchery and epidemics?

The wife of a merchant from Harput, a tall woman, blond and about forty years old, had seen her husband, her uncle and her sixteen-year-old son shot before her eyes. She herself was condemned to leave behind her property and possessions and to take the road of exile with her two children, aged three and eight. However, before she set out on the journey, the wretched woman burned her face and cut her lower lip and the tip of her nose. On the road, her elder daughter was thrown into the water, being unable to follow the convoy.

After many attempts, this woman was taken in by a Chaldean family of Mosul, who had had business connections with her husband before the war. This woman spoke French. I learned that she had thus disfigured herself so as not to be forced to serve as an instrument of pleasure for her executioners. "I could have killed myself", she told me one day, "but my two little daughters were still alive and I did not want to abandon them; and then", she added, "I am anxious to see the end of this war, I want to know if God exists".

A few days later, a visit by the minister of war, Enver Pasha, was announced. In order to prevent any awkward incident, any violent act arising from despair, the deportees were assembled and divided into two camps: one was penned into a closed area and the other forced to leave for Dayr al-Zur. This hapless woman left with the last group. I later learned that she had died on the road. Poor woman! Her bruised heart had not had the joy of seeing that God exists and that his justice,



Armenian Lady from Constantinople (19th century)

“Engraving: C. Maurand; from A. Proust’s drawing

Le Tour du Monde, 2nd sem., 1863, p. 159

which she had entreated and which she wanted to see, had finally been revealed.

Be that as it may, we tried to organize a small subscription on behalf of these poor wretches. But the police having got wind of the matter were hot on our heels and arrested me, among a number of others, making a thorough search of my house. As they found nothing suspicious—and after many applications by some prominent friends—I was released after being held for ten hours, with formal recommendations not to concern myself any longer with such matters. [pp. 5–7]

D. Sasson, report No. 10 (extract)
Archives, AIU, Iraq I.C.2.

Appendix A: Muslim Historians and Theologians

ABU HANIFA (d. 767). An-Nu'man b. Thabit b. Zuta abu Hanifa. Theologian and juriconsult, founder of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, he died in Baghdad.

ABU YUSUF, Ya'qub (731–98). A renowned jurist of the Hanafi school of law. Author of a basic treatise on public finance.

AL-ADAWI, Ahmad ad-Dardir (eighteenth century). Egyptian theologian of the Maliki school of jurisprudence. Author of a *fatwa* against the *dhimmis*.

AL-BALADHURI (d. 892). Eminent Persian historian who lived at the caliphs' court from 847 to 892. Author of *Book of Conquests*.

AL-BUKHARI (d. 869). Born in Bukhara, he died in Samarkand. Author of the most important of the six compilations of traditions (*hadith*), being the acts and sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.

AL-DAMANHURI, Ahmad b. Abd al-Mun'im (1690–1778). Born in Damanhur, Gharbiya (Egypt). Theologian and head of the koranic university of al-Azhar.

AL-JABARTI, Abd al-Rahman (1754–ca. 1825). Egyptian historian, born in Cairo, his ancestors were from Jabart in Abyssinia. Among other works, he wrote a Chronicle covering the years 1688–1821, which constitutes one of the most important works concerning Arab countries under Turkish rule.

EVLYA CELEBI (1611–84). Born in Istanbul. Turkish author of the *Seyahatname (Travel Book)*, in which he describes various provinces in the Ottoman Empire of his time.

GHAZI b. AL-WASITI (active in 1292). Native of the town of Wasit on the Tigris (Iraq). Author of a treatise on the *dhimmis*.

IBN ABDUN, Muhammad b. Ahmad (d. 1134). Andalusian author of an authoritative legal treatise on Seville.

IBN ABI ZAYD AL-QAYRAWANI (922–96). Head of the North African Maliki school at Qairuan. Author of several legal works and of a compendium which ensured the triumph of the Maliki school of jurisprudence.

IBN ASKAR (1529–78). Born in Chechuan (Morocco). Author of a hagiographic dictionary.

IBN AL-ATHIR (1160–1233). Born in Jazirat Ibn Umar on the Tigris (Iraq), lived in Mesopotamia and Palestine. Author of historical works on the Zangid dynasty of Mosul (*al-Bahir*) and of a vast corpus of Chronicles (*al-Kamil fi't-tarikh*).

IBN BATTUTA (1304–ca. 1368). Born and died in Tangiers. Author of accounts describing places visited in the course of several lengthy travels throughout the Islamic world, including India and China.

IBN AL-FUWATI (1244–1323). Born in Baghdad, historian and librarian in Maragha and Baghdad. Author of several historical works and bibliographies.

IBN HANBAL (d. 855). Theologian and jurisconsult, editor of a corpus of traditions and founder of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence.

IBN HISHAM (d. 813). Born and died in Egypt. Grammarian and genealogist, famous for his later recension of Ibn Ishaq's biography of Muhammad.

IBN ISHAQ (d. 761). Author of the most famous biography of Muhammad.

IBN KHALDUN (1332–1406). Born in Tunis, died in Cairo. Jurist, *qadi* (Maliki), renowned philosopher, historian and sociologist. Author of a *History of the Berbers* and a *Universal History*, preceded by an *Introduction to History* (*al-Muqaddima*).

IBN MISKAWAYH (936–1030). Born at Ray, Persia. Philosopher and historian who lived at the court of the Buyid Adud-ad-Dawla in Iraq.

IBN AN-NAQQASH (d. 1362). Egyptian preacher. Author of an important *fatwa* on the *dhimmis*.

IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA (d. 1351). Theologian, follower of Ibn Taymiya.

IBN TAGHRIBIRDI, Abu l-Mahasin (d. 1469). Historian of the Mamluks.

IBN TAYMIYA, Taqi al-Din Ahmad (1263–1328). Syrian theologian and jurisconsult of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence under the Mamluks; active in Damascus, where he died. He left a considerable body of jurisprudence. His doctrine inspired the Wahabi movement in eighteenth-century Arabia.

AL-MAGHILI (d. 1504). North African theologian, his writings on the *dhimmis* were widely circulated in Moroccan religious circles during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

MALIK b. ANAS (710–95). Theologian and jurisconsult from Medina, founder of the Maliki school of jurisprudence. Author of *al-Muwatta*, the oldest extant treatise of Islamic law, as practiced in the Hijaz.

AL-MALIKI, Abu Bakr Abd Allah (eleventh century). Tunisian historian. Author of a famous chronicle, *Riyad an-Nufus*.

AL-MAQRIZI [MAKRIZI] (1364–1442). Renowned historian, born in Cairo. Author of several works, particularly on the Mamluk sultans of Egypt.

AL-MARRAKUSHI [Merrakechi], Abd al-Wahid (d. 1224). North African historian of the Almohads.

AL-MAWARDI [MAWERDI] (d. 1058). Famous Shafi'i jurist of Baghdad. Author of an important law treatise, *Al-ahkam as-Sultaniyya*, and a treatise on morality.

MUSLIM (d. 874). Disciple of al-Bukhari and compiler of one of the most important corpus of traditions (*hadith*), being the acts and sayings (*al-Sahih*) attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.

AL-SHAFI'I (d. 820). Born in Gaza. Theologian and jurisconsult, disciple of Malik, founder of the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence.

AL-SHAYBANI (d. 805). Jurist of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, disciple of Abu Yusuf. Author of several authoritative works, particularly an important work on *jihad*: *The Islamic Law of Nations*.

AL-TABARI (838–923). Born in Tabaristan, died in Baghdad. Historian, theologian and jurisconsult. Author of a monumental commentary on the Koran and a universal history, *Annals*, and *Kitab al-Jihad* (Book of the Holy War).

Appendix B: Non-Muslim Historians and Authors

ABRAHAM (III) OF CRETE (d. 1737). Armenian spiritual leader in Thekirtagh (Rodosto, on the Black Sea), invested on 24 November 1734.

ARAKEL OF TAURIZ (Tabriz) (ca. 1600–ca. 1670). Armenian author who, at the request of the Catholicos Philippos, wrote a *Book of Histories* on the deportation of the Armenians in Persia. He continued his work in Isfahan from 1661 to 1662 at the request of the Catholicos Jacob of Julfa. His book is a valuable source of first-hand information on the condition of the Armenians and the patriarchs at that period.

BAR HEBRAEUS (ABUL-FARAJ) (1226–86). Born in Melitene (Malatia in Upper Mesopotamia) of a Jewish father, hence his name. Jacobite Bishop of Gubbos, Labakin, and Aleppo; Maphrian of the East, he died in Maraga. Author of *The Chronography* and other important historical and theological works.

DIONYSIUS OF TELL-MAHRE (d. 845). Patriarch of the Jacobites, his *Chronicle* has disappeared but extracts from it were preserved in Michael the Syrian's twelfth century *Chronicle*. The *Chronicle* wrongly attributed to him was completed in ca. 775, before his time. (See under pseudo-Dionysius of Tell-Mahre.)

GARJI [GEORGI], Mattatya (1845–1918). Born in Herat, Afghanistan; scholar and head of the Jewish community. He emigrated to Palestine in 1908 and died there.

GEDALIAH OF SIEMIATYCE (d. 1716). A Polish Jew who arrived in Jerusalem with a group of Jewish immigrants on 14 October 1700. Author of *Sha'alu Shelom Yerushalayim (Pray for the Peace of Jerusalem)*, which describes, *inter alia*, the fiscal extortion and oppression suffered by the Jews and Christians in Palestine, and the conditions of life there.

GHEVOND. Armenian historian of the second half of the eighth century. Author of *History of the Wars and Conquests of the Arabs in Armenia*.

JOHN OF NIKIOU (seventh century). Coptic bishop. Author of an important account of the Arab conquest of Egypt, of which only an Ethiopian translation remains.

MATTHEW OF EDESSA (d. after 1136). Armenian author of *Chronological Tables*.

MICHAEL THE SYRIAN. Jacobite patriarch of Antioch from 1166 to 1199. Author of a famous *Chronicle*, which reproduces earlier sources, before describing contemporary events.

OBADYAH THE PROSELYTE (Johannes). Born in Oppido (Lucano, southern Italy), son of a Norman aristocrat. A priest, he converted to Judaism in about 1102 and lived in Constantinople, Baghdad, Aleppo, and Egypt.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS OF TELL-MAHRE (eighth century). Anonymous author of a *Chronicle*, wrongly attributed to the ninth century patriarch of the same name. It provides a valuable description of the peasant condition in Mesopotamia from personal experience.

SAMUEL OF ANI. Armenian author of a *Chronicle* from the second half of the twelfth century.

SAWIRUS (SEVERUS) b. AL-MUQAFFA. Coptic bishop of Ashmunein (Egypt) from 955 to 987. Author of a *History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria*. After his death, it was continued from 886 to 1046 by Michael, bishop of Tinnis; then up to the thirteenth century by other ecclesiastics.

SEPEOS (SEBEOS). Armenian bishop, active in the third quarter of the seventh century. Author of a *History of Heraclius*, from the end of the fifth century to 661, he describes the events of his time.

THOMAS ARDZRUNI (d. early tenth century). Armenian historian and author of *History of the Ardzrunis*, in which he describes contemporary events. It was continued by others from 907 to 1226.

VARDAN (thirteenth century). Armenian historian. Author of a *Universal History*.

Appendix C: British Ministers, Ambassadors, and Diplomats

AINSLIE, Sir Robert. Ambassador at Constantinople (1776–91).

BRANT, James. Vice-Consul, Trebizond (1831–36); Consul, Erzerum (1836–55) and Damascus (1855–60).

BULWER, Sir Henfy Lytton. 1st Baron Dalling and Bulwer (1801–72). Secretary of Embassy, Constantinople (1837–39). Ambassador, Constantinople (1858–65).

CAMPBELL, Colonel Patrick (1779–1857). Agent, then Consul-General, Egypt (1833–41).

CANNING, Sir Stratford. 1st Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (1786–1880). Constantinople (1808–12). Ambassador, Constantinople (1825–29, 1831–32, 1842–58).

CARMARTHEN. See OSBORNE.

DERBY, Lord. See STANLEY.

ELLIOT, Sir Henry George. Ambassador, Constantinople (1867–77).

FINCH, Heneage. 2nd Earl of Winchilsea. Ambassador, Constantinople (1660–69).

FINN, James. Consul, Jerusalem (1845–62).

FRANCIS, Sir P. Consul-General and Judge, Supreme Consular Court of Great Britain at Constantinople (1876).

FREEMAN, Edward Bothamley. Chancellor, Diyarbakir Consulate (1858–60). Acting Consul at intervals, Bosna-Serai (1863–76). Consul, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878–91) stationed at Bosna-Serai, and Consul-General at Bosna-Serai (1891–1905).

GRANVILLE, George Leveson-Gower. 2nd Earl Granville (1815–91). Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1840–41). Foreign Secretary (1851–52, 1870–74, 1880–85).

GREEN, Sir William Kirby Mackenzie (1836–91). Vice-Consul, Tetuan and Consul, Tangiers (1859–69), Tunis (1869), Damascus (1871), Beirut (1873), Scutari (1876). Consul-General, Montenegro and Scutari (1879). Minister to Morocco and Consul-General, Tangiers (1886).

HOLMES, Sir William Richard. Consul, Diyarbakir (1852–60). Consul, Bosnia (1860–77), he participated in the Constantinople Conference (December 1876 to January 1877).

MALMESBURY, James, Howard Harris. 3rd Earl (1807–89). Foreign Secretary (1852, 1858–59). Lord Privy Seal.

MURRAY, John. Ambassador, Constantinople (1765–75).

OSBORNE, Francis. Marquis of Carmarthen and 5th Duke of Leeds (1751–99). Minister under Pitt the Younger (1783–91).

PITT, William. Earl of Chatham (1708–78). Foreign Secretary (1756–57). Prime Minister (1757–61, 1766–68).

PORTER, James. Ambassador, Constantinople (1746–62).

ROSE, Colonel Hugh Henry. Baron Strathnairn (1801–85). Field Marshall. Special military service in Syria (1840–41). Consul-General, Beirut (1841–51). Secretary, Constantinople Embassy (1851–54).

RUSSELL, Lord John. 1st Earl Russell (1792–1878). Prime Minister (1846–52, 1865–66). Foreign Secretary (1852–53, 1859–62).

SKENE, James Henry. Vice-Consul Constantinople (1852). Consul, Aleppo (1855); attached to Alison Mission to enquire into the state of Syria, visiting Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem. Returned to Aleppo Consulate and retired in 1878.

STANLEY, Lord Edward George Geoffrey Stanley. 14th Earl of Derby (1799–1869). Prime Minister (1852, 1858–59, 1866–68).

THYNNE, Thomas. Viscount Weymouth and Marquis of Bath (1734–96). Minister (1768–70 and 1775–79).

WERRY, Frank Howard Stephen. Acting Consul, Aleppo (1837–41).

WEYMOUTH. See THYNNE.

WINCHILSEA. See FINCH.

Notes

Foreword

1. On this subject, the critical section of the conclusion should be read most carefully: criticism of the apriorisms of a large number of historical works, criticism of the explanations given for the legitimacy of *jihad* or of the unconditional adoption of Muslim theses. But also the originality consists in noting that the majority of studies are based on what the Arabs themselves have written, without taking into account the sources originating with the subjugated and vanquished peoples. As if the former were necessarily honest and the second biased! After having so often given a hearing to Islam, why not *also* hear all those conquered, then liberated, peoples of Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and elsewhere? This is the great merit and one of the innovations of this book.

2. Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam*, preface by Jacques Ellul, trans. from the French by David Maisel, Paul Fenton, and David Littman (Rutherford, N.J., 1985), 25–33.

3. See, for example, the collective book, Pierre Viaud, ed., *Les Religions et la Guerre. Judaïsme, Christianisme, Islam* (Paris, 1991).

4. Concerning this administrative machinery, as this book shows, it can seem somewhat disorganized, but in reality that arises from the extreme complexity of this empire (and once again this book is very “nuanced”) since, in reality, there is a large degree of fundamental unity in this system.

Introduction

1. Bat Ye'or, *Le Dhimmi. Profil de l'opprimé en Orient et en Afrique du nord depuis la conquête arabe* (Paris, 1980); idem, *The Dhimmi*.

2. Jovan Cvijic, *La Péninsule balkanique. Géographie humaine* (Paris, 1918).

3. See the interview, “Liban: ‘Il y a un peuple de trop . . .’,” *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Paris, 9 June 1982, p. 62; and the speech by Bashir Gemayel on 14 September 1982 at Dayr as-Salib (Lebanon), on the day he was assassinated, extracts of which were published in Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, Document 116, pp. 403–5.

4. Bat Ye'or, *Juifs et Chrétiens sous l'Islam. Les dhimmis face au défi intégriste* (Paris, 1994).

Chapter 1. The Pre-Islamic Orient

1. Fred McGraw Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquest* (Princeton, 1981), 168–69.

2. François Nau, *L'Expansion Nestorienne en Asie* (Paris, 1914); Michael G. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest* (Princeton, 1984).

3. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 169–70.

4. Ibid., 20–49; Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates* (London/New York, 1986), 18–21.

5. Kennedy, *The Prophet*, 16–17.

6. Ibn Ishaq (d. 767), in Alfred Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad. A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah*, trans. from Arabic with an introduction and notes (London/New York/Toronto, 1955), 524–25; al-Bokhari (al-Bukhari) (d. 869), *Les Traditions Islamiques* (al-

Sahih), trans. from Arabic by Octave Houdas and William Marçais (Paris, 1903–1914), vol. 2, t.41, chaps. 8, 9, 11, 17, and t.57, chap. 19. For the treaties between Muhammad and the Jews of Makna (near Eilat), see al-Baladhuri (d. 892), *The Origins of the Islamic State (Kitab Futuh al-Buldan)*, trans. from Arabic by Philip K. Hitti (New York, 1916), 1:93–94.

7. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 109.

8. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, trans. from Syriac and ed. by Jean-Baptiste Chabot (Paris, 1901), 2:403–4, 413.

9. Guillaume, *Life of Muhammad*, 525; Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, vol. 2, t.41, chap. 17; t.54, chap. 14; vol. 4, t.89, chap. 2; Muslim, *Sahih. Being Traditions of the Sayings and Doings of the Prophet Muhammad as narrated by his Companions and Compiled under the title "Al-Jami-U-Sahih"*, trans. from Arabic by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi (Lahore, 1976), vol. 3, chap. 723 (4366); Antoine Fattal, *Le Statut Légal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d'Islam* (Beirut, 1958), 85.

10. The *jihad* is a recurrent theme in Islamic sources. Here we will only mention: Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, vol. 2, chap. "De la guerre sainte," t.56; "De la prescription du Quint," t.57; "La Capitation," t.58; Muslim, *Sahih*, vol. 3, chaps. 704–53, "The Book of Jihad and Expedition"; al-Tabari, *Kitab al-Jihad (Book of Holy War)*, ed. and trans. from Arabic by Joseph Schacht (Leyden, 1933); Shaybani, (d. 805), in Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, (Shaybani's *Siyar*), trans. from Arabic (Baltimore, 1966); Duncan Black MacDonald, "Djihad," *EI* 1(1913):1041–42; Emile Tyan, "Djihad," *EI* 2(1991):538–40; Armand Abel, "Dar al-Harb" and "Dar al-Islam," *EI* 2(1991):126/127–28; Adolphe Marie du Caurroy de la Croix, "Législation Musulmane Sunnite, rite Hanéfite," trans. from Arabic, *JA*, 4th ser. (1851), 17: 211–55 and 568–91; 18: 290–321; (1852), 19: 519–50; 5th ser. (1853), 1: 39–91; 2: 471–528; Roger Arnaldez, "La Guerre Sainte, selon Ibn Hazm de Cordoue," in *Etudes d'Orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Lévi-Provençal* (Paris, 1962), vol. 2; Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955); idem, *The Islamic Conception of Justice*, foreword by R. K. Ramazani (Baltimore/London, 1984); cf. Fattal, *Le Statut*, 14–18, 372–73; for the modern period, see al-Azhar University, ed., *The Fourth Conference (1968) of the Academy of Islamic Research* (Cairo, 1970), 23–250; and D. [David Littman] F. [Yehoshafat Harkabi] Green, ed., *Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel. Extracts from the Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research, 1968*, 3d ed. (Geneva, 1976), 61–68; S. Ruhollah Khomeiny, *Principes politiques, philosophiques, sociaux et religieux de l'Ayatollah Khomeiny*, extracts trans. from the Persian and ed. by Jean-Marie Xavière (Paris, 1979), 22–23; Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade: Idéologie et Propagande dans les Réactions Musulmanes aux Croisades* (Paris, 1968), 209–19 (see bibliography); Rudolph Peters, "Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam," in *Nisaba*, vol. 5 (Leyden, 1977) and bibliography, 86–90; idem, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (Paris, 1979) and bibliography, 201–25; and two works which deal in depth with all aspects of this subject: Jean-Paul Charnay, *Principes de stratégie arabe* (Paris, 1984); idem, *L'Islam et la Guerre. De la guerre juste à la révolution sainte* (Paris, 1986), and their respective bibliographies.

11. Henri Laoust, *Le Traité de droit public d'Ibn Taymiya. Traduction annotée de la 'Siyasa šar'iya* (Beirut, 1948), 35–36.

12. Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Mahomet* (Paris, 1969), 521.

Chapter 2. The Era of Conquests

1. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 94–95, 170; Moshe Sharon, "The Military Reforms of Abu Muslim, their background and consequences," in Moshe Sharon, ed., *Studies in Islamic History and Civilisation in Honour of Professor David Ayalon* (Jerusalem/Leyden, 1986), 107–12; Abraham N. Poliak, "L'Arabisation de l'Orient sémitique," *REI* 12 (1938): 35–63; Kennedy, *The Prophet*, 15–21; for pre-Islamic Arab emigration, see René Dussaud, *La pénétration des Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1955); François Nau, *Les Arabes Chrétiens de Mésopotamie et de Syrie du VIIe au VIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1933); Georges Henri Bousquet, "Observations sur la nature et les causes de la conquête arabe," *SI* 6 (1956): 37–52; Jérôme Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide, 224–632* (Paris, 1904);

Eliahu Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages* (London, 1976), 11–12.

2. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 117.
3. Félix-Marie Abel, *Histoire de la Palestine depuis la conquête d'Alexandre jusqu'à l'invasion arabe* (Paris, 1952), 2:397.
4. Ibid., 399; cf. Sharon, "The Military Reforms," 112; and Demetrios J. Constantelos, "The Moslem Conquest of the Near East as Revealed in the Greek Sources of the Seventh and the Eighth Centuries," *Byzantion* 42 (1972): 329–30.
5. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 185.
6. Ibid., 176; Nau, *Les Arabes chrétiens*, 100–13.
7. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 210.
8. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 382.
9. *La Chronique de Jean de Nikiou*, ed. and trans. from Ethiopian by Hermann Zotenberg (Paris, 1879).
10. Ibid., 229.
11. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 2:418.
12. Ibid., 421.
13. Ibid., 431.
14. Ibid.
15. Edouard Dulaurier, *Recherches sur la Chronologie Arménienne: Technique et Historique* (Paris, 1859), 1:226.
16. Sébéos (Sépéos) (d. end of seventh century), quoted by Dulaurier, *Recherches*, 228.
17. Ibid., 231.
18. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 2:442.
19. Ibn Khaldoun, *Histoires des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique Septentrionale*, trans. from Arabic by William MacGuckin, Baron de Slane. New ed. by Paul Casanova (Paris, 1968), 1:210.
20. Ibn al-Athir (d. 1234), quoted by Alexander Alexandrovich Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes* vol. 2, *La Dynastie macédonienne (867–959)* (Brussels, 1950), 161–62.
21. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 3:175.
22. Evariste Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, vol. 1, *La Conquête et l'Emirat Hispano-Umayyade (710–912)* (Paris, 1950), 145.
23. For the *jihād* in Spain, see *ibid.*, vol. 2, *Le Califat Umayyade de Cordoue (912–1031)*.
24. Ibn al-Athir in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, vol. 1, *La Dynastie d'Amorium (820–867)* (Brussels, 1935), 364–68.
25. Ibn al-Idhari (d. end thirteenth century), in *ibid.*, 376–77.
26. Ibn al-Athir in Vasiliev, vol. 2, *La Dynastie macédonienne*, 136–37.
27. Nuwayri (d. 1332), in *ibid.*, 234. See also George Cable Miles, "Byzantium and the Arabs; Relations in Crete and the Aegean Area," *DOP* 18 (1964): 1–33; Francesco Gabrieli, "Greeks and Arabs in the Central Mediterranean Area," *DOP* 18 (1964): 57–67.
28. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 3:170–71.
29. Jean Cantacuzène, in Louis Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople depuis le règne de l'Ancien Justin, jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire, traduite sur les Originaux Grecs par Mr. Cousin, Président de la Cour des Monnoyes* (Paris, 1672–74), 7:919.
30. Nicéphore Bryenne, *L'Histoire des Empereurs Constantin Ducas, de Romain Diogène, de Michel Ducas et de Nicéphore Botaniate*, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, vol. 3, *passim*.
31. Nicéphore Gregoras, quoted by Dimitar Angelov, *Les Balkans au Moyen Age: La Bulgarie des Bogomils aux Turcs* (reprinted London, 1978), chap. 12: "Certains aspects de la conquête des peuples balkaniques par les Turcs," 242.
32. Michaelis Ducas, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 8:335.
33. Ibid., 375.
34. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 3:176.
35. Ducas, in Angelov, "Certains aspects", 260–61.
36. Speros Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1971).
37. Daniel C. Dennett, Jr., *Conversion and the Poll-Tax in Early Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); Frede Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classical Period with special reference to*

circumstances in Iraq (Copenhagen, 1950); Dominique and Janine Sourdel, *La Civilisation de l'islam classique* (Paris, 1983); Ignaz Goldziher, *Le Dogme et la Loi de l'islam, Histoire du développement dogmatique et juridique de la religion musulmane*, trans. from German by Félix Arin (Paris, 1920); Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam. A Study in Cultural Orientation*, 2d ed. (Chicago/London, 1969); idem, *Classical Islam. A History, 600–1258*, trans. from the German by Katherine Watson (London, 1970); Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964); Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (London, 1962); Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge, 1969); William Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh, 1973).

38. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 2:412.

39. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, *Le Livre de l'impôt foncier (Kitâb al Kharâdj)*, trans. from Arabic with notes by Edmond Fagnan (Paris, 1921), 51–52.

40. See also Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*.

41. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 226, 231–33, 237–38, 265–66; see Abu Yusuf, *Le Livre*, 37–61; cf. Poliak, "L'Arabisation," Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, 22–26.

42. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 106–17; Dennet, *Conversion*.

43. Iono Mitev, "Le Peuple Bulgare sous la Domination Ottomane (1396–1878)," with a preface by Georges Castellan, in Ivan Dujcev, Velizar Velkov, Iono Mitev and Lubomir Panayotov, *Histoire de la Bulgarie, des origines à nos jours* (Roanne, 1977), 249.

44. Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, *The Greek Nation, 1453–1669. The Cultural and Economic Background of Modern Greek Society*, trans. from Greek by Ian and Phania Moles (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976), 44; see also, idem, *History of Macedonia, 1354–1833*, trans. from Greek by Peter Megann (Salonika, 1973), 100–116; for the peasants' flight and the creation of new villages, 103–4.

45. Antoine Dabinovic, "Les pactes d'assistance entre les gouverneurs ottomans et les grands seigneurs de Bosnie et de Croatie depuis le XVe au XVIIIe siècle," in *Türk Tarih Kongresi* (5), 3 sekiyon (Ankara, 1960), 478–673.

46. Cantacuzène, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 7:191.

47. *Ibid.*, 314.

Chapter 3. Dhimmitude: Legalistic Foundation and Historic Conditioning

1. See Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll-Tax*; Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation*; Fattal, *Le Statut Légal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d'Islam*, 264–344; Arthur Stanley Tritton, *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects. A Critical Study of the Covenant of Umar* (London, 1970), chap. 13; Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, chap. 1 and 2. See also, Løkkegaard, "Fai," *EF²* 2(1991):869–70; Claude Cahen, "Kharadj," *EF²* 4(1990):1034–34; idem, "Djizya," *EF²* 2(1991):559–62.

2. Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll-Tax*, 114–15.

3. *Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahré* [pseudo-Dionysius], trans. from Syriac by Jean-Baptiste Chabot (Paris, 1895), pt. 4, 104–5.

4. *Ibid.*, 112; for the refuge-towns, cf. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, 17.

5. *Chronique de Denys*, 193–95; Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation*, 92.

6. *Chronique de Denys*, 105–16. In Syriac chronicles, the terms "Egyptians" and "Syrians" always allude to indigenous Monophysite Christians. The Arabs are called "Taiyaye" after a nomad tribe from the north of Arabia, the Banu Tayy or Tayyiya.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, 165.

9. *Ibid.*, 193; on the decline of agriculture, cf. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, 36; on the condition of the peasants, *ibid.*, 66.

10. *Chronique de Denys*, 108–9. The caliph visited Jerusalem in 758 and 771.

11. Angelov, "Certain aspects," 231–32; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organisation and Economy, Collected Studies* (London, 1978), chap. 6, 235; on the erosion of

the lands left to the nomads, cf. Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, 51, 53, 58; Xavier de Planhol, *Le Monde Islamique, Essai de Géographie Religieuse* (Paris, 1957), 50–53; for the refuge towns, *ibid.*, 84–103.

12. Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax*, 86–87.

13. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:426.

14. Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, *Le Livre de l'impôt foncier*, 197; Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 107.

15. *Chronique de Denys*, 10. This refers to the fiscal reform decreed by Abd al-Malik and the governor of Mesopotamia, al-Hajjaj.

16. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:490.

17. *Ibid.*, 505.

18. *Ibid.*, 522.

19. *Chronique de Denys*, 68. The Armenian chronicles tell of a similar situation in Armenia. Fiscal extortion by the Arabs, accompanied by a great deal of pillage and torture, caused frequent rebellions.

20. Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll-Tax*, 80.

21. *Chronique de Denys*, 134.

22. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire d'Espagne*, 1:307; *Le Siècle du Califat de Cordoue*, 3:196–216.

23. Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, see documents 7, 19, 20, 59, 79 and p. 74, n.4; Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, *Le Livre de l'impôt foncier*, 159–95.

24. *Chronique de Denys*, 133; Shlomo Dov Goitein, "Evidence on the Muslim Poll-Tax from Non-Muslim Sources," *JESHO* 6 (1963): 278–95; *idem*, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, vol. 2, *The Community* (Berkeley, 1971), 132, 380–94; Alexander Scheiber, "The Origins of Obadiah the Norman Proselyte," *JJS* 5, no. 1 (1954): 37.

25. Laurent d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier d'Arvieux, Envoyé Extraordinaire du Roy à la Porte, Consul d'Alep, d'Alger, de Tripoli & autres Echelles du Levant, contenant ses voyages à Constantinople, dans l'Asie, la Syrie, la Palestine, l'Égypte, & la Barbarie [1663–1685]*, collected by Père J. B. Labat (Paris, 1735), 6:439.

26. *Chronique de Denys*, 170.

27. Fiscal extortions are mentioned continually in *dhimmi* chronicles. For the methods and consequences of this impoverishment in Anatolia in the fourteenth century; cf. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline*, chap. 4.

28. Georges Vajda, "Un recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocains," *Hespéris* 12 (1951).

29. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 5:24.

30. The accounts in the English and French diplomatic correspondence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries describe the continual elimination process of the *dhimmis* in villages and towns in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia by Arab and Turkmen nomads. For Anatolia in the Middle Ages, see Speros Vryonis Jr., "Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor," *DOP* 29 (1975): 41–71; for the Balkans, see Angelov, *Les Balkans*; Paul Wittek, in Victor Louis Ménage, ed., *La Formation de l'Empire Ottoman* (London, 1982).

31. Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, vol. 2, t. 52, chap. 29; Koran 3:16–19, 71–72, 5:70–71. See Mario Grignaschi, "La Valeur du Témoignage des Sujets Non-Musulmans (*Dhimmi*) dans l'Empire Ottoman," in *La Preuve*, vol. 18, pt. 3, *Civilisations archaïques, asiatiques et islamiques*, *RSJB*, (Brussels, 1963), 227–36. In 1851 and 1858, the British consul in Jerusalem noted that the testimony of a Jew against a Muslim was refused by an Islamic court; cf. Albert M. Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem in Relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838–1914* (London, 1939), 1:171, 261. And p. 431–33 below.

32. Muslim, *Sahih*, vol. 4, chap. 1149 (6666); *idem*, "When it will be the Day of Resurrection, Allah would deliver to every Muslim a Jew or a Christian and say: That is your rescue from Hell-Fire" (6665); "There would come people amongst the Muslims on the Day of Resurrection with as heavy sins as a mountain and Allah would forgive them and He would place in their stead the Jews and the Christians" (6668); Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, vol. 2, t. 56, chap. 180:2. However, the Koran says: "Every soul earns only to its own account; no soul laden bears the load of another" (6:164).

33. Hady Roger Idris, "Les Tributaires en Occident Musulman Médiéval d'après le

Mi'yar d'al-Wansarisi," in Pierre Salmon, ed., *Mélanges d'Islamologie. Volume dédié à la mémoire de Armand Abel* (Leyden, 1974); idem, *La Berbérie Orientale sous les Zirides, Xe–XIIe Siècle* (Paris, 1962), 2:757–811.

34. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 5:15–16; Aryeh Shmuelevitz, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries: Administrative, Economic, Legal and Social Relations as reflected in the Responsa* (Leyden, 1984), 44 and chap. 2. The seventeenth-century Armenian chronicler Arakel de Tauriz confirms this situation; cf. Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*, trans. from Armenian by Marie-Félicité Brosset, in *Collections d'Historiens Arméniens* (St. Petersburg, 1874), vol. 1.

35. Edward Freeman in Despatch of Consul William Holmes (Bosna-Seraï) to Lord Derby, Foreign Secretary, London, 15 May 1877, *PP*, 1877 [C. 1768], 92, p. 554.

36. Hyamson, *British Consulate*, 2:501.

37. *Chronique de Denys*, 18; Michael the Syrian attributes these regulations to Umar b. Abd al-Aziz, the predecessor of Yazid; cf. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:488–89.

38. *Ibid.*, 3:102.

39. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 4:179.

40. *Ibid.*, 5:533. In 1744, at Aleppo, Belibio, a French Jewish protégé, having quarreled with the head of a caravan, had to take refuge in the consulate in order to escape having his hands cut off; cf. François Charles-Roux, *Les Échelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1928), 49.

41. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:488.

42. For the jurists' opinion on the destruction and confiscation or prohibitions concerning churches and synagogues, see Idris, "Les tributaires."

43. Sawirus [Severus] ibn al-Mukaffa, *History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church, known as the History of the Holy Church*, trans. from Arabic and annotated by Yassa Abd al-Masih, O. H. E. Burmester, Antoine Khater (Cairo, 1943–70), vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 35.

44. *Ibid.*, 36.

45. *Ibid.*, 47.

46. Jean-Maurice Fiey, *Communautés syriaques en Iran et Irak des origines à 1552* (reprint. London, 1979), chap. 3, p. 257; idem, *Assyrie Chrétienne. Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire et de la géographie ecclésiastiques et monastiques du Nord de l'Irak*, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1965–68); idem, *Mossoul Chrétienne* (Beirut, 1959).

47. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline*, chap. 4; Witteck, *La Formation*.

48. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 5:230.

49. *Ibid.*, 1:106.

50. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Les six voyages en Turquie et en Perse de Jean-Baptiste Tavernier* [1631–68], new ed. rev. and corr. (Rouen, 1712), 1:271. For the Balkans, cf. Nicolai Todorov, *La ville balkanique sous les Ottomans: XV–XIXe siècle* (London, 1977), chap. 6, p. 108.

51. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 6:26–27.

52. Antoine Morison, *Relation historique d'un voyage nouvellement fait au mont de Sinai et à Jérusalem* (Paris, 1705), passim.

53. Hyamson, *British Consulate*, 1:235.

54. The absence of a cross on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and the other churches in Palestine and their dilapidation are confirmed by contemporary engravings and photographs. See Ely Schiller, ed., *The Holy Land in Old Engravings and Illustrations* (Jerusalem, 1977): Auguste de Forbin (1817–18), 48, 51, 55; Adrien Dausatz; Baron Taylor (1830), 81; J. M. Bernatz (1837), 102; David Roberts (1839), 118; idem, *The First Photographs of the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1979), 198–202; (1862), 201–2 (1868, replacement of the cupola and fixing of a cross on the dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre); idem, *The First Photographs of Jerusalem and the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1980), 87 (1856), 64 (1865).

55. Charles Wilson, ed., *Picturesque Palestine, Sinai and Egypt* (London, 1882), 3:198–99.

56. Jérôme Maurand, *Itinéraire de Jérôme Maurand d'Antibes à Constantinople [1544]* (Paris, 1901).

57. Tavernier, *Les six voyages*, 1:40.

58. *Ibid.*, 47–48. These Christians had been deported from Armenia by Shah Abbas I. At first, the shah was well-disposed toward them but subsequently adopted a policy of persecution and forced conversion; see Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*.

59. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:96.

60. *Ibid.*, 351. Arakel de Tauriz mentions ransoms paid by the community to obtain the return of monasteries and churches.

61. Samuel M. Zwemer, *Law of Apostasy in Islam. Answering the question why there are so few Muslim converts and giving examples of their moral courage and martyrdom* (repr. New Delhi, 1975). There were a number of cases where *dhimmis* converted by force were allowed to return to their original religion, for the Koran forbade forced conversion. A. Roland Lebel mentions cases of forced conversions, cf., his *Les Voyageurs français du Maroc. L'exotisme marocain dans la littérature de voyage* (Paris, 1936). On Zulaika Hajwal, a fourteen-year-old Jewish girl, converted by force to Islam and beheaded by order of the sultan in 1834, see Hayyim Ze'ev Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa* (Leyden, 1981), 2:304.

62. Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, vol. 2, t. 56, chap. 144; vol. 3, t. 64, ch. 55: 1, 3; Koran, 3:80–84, 102; 4:91, 115; 32:22.

63. This incident provoked an explosion of popular fanaticism against the Jews in Tunis who were attacked and pillaged. The Europeans organized the defense of their district; see Jean Ganiage, *Les Origines du Protectorat Français en Tunisie, 1861–1881* (Paris, 1959), 71–72.

64. Morony, *Iraq after the Muslim Conquest*, 379; Nau, *L'Expansion*, 106–13.

65. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:1.

66. Ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire des Berbères*, 1:209.

67. Hirschberg, *History of the Jews*, 1:108; Moshe Perlmann, "Eleventh-Century Andalusian Authors on the Jews of Granada," *PAAJR* 18 (1948–9): 285.

68. Ibn al-Athir, cf. Ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire*, 2:590. Under the Marinid caliph, Abu Ya'qub Yusuf b. Ya'qub (1286–1307), all the Jews who sold wine to Muslims were killed and their families reduced to slavery throughout the Marinid states: cf. Idris, "Les Tributaires," 191.

69. According to a *hadith*, all children were born Muslims, it was their parents who made them Jews or Christians; see Muslim, *Sahih*, vol. 4, ch. 1107 (6423) (6426); Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, 1, t. 23; 93:3. The abduction and conversion of *dhimmi* children—particularly Christians—although illegal, was chronic at all periods, as is evidenced from numerous sources. At the time of the deportation of the Armenians by Shah Abbas, the Persian troops ordered to drive out the population "began, like marauders and robbers of men, to pillage, to abduct the children of Christians," cf. Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires* 291. Parents who rebelled suffered beatings and had their limbs mutilated.

70. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline*, 143–287.

71. Taki-Eddin-Ahmad Makrizi (d. 1442), *Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Égypte*, trans. from Arabic by Etienne Marc Quatremère (Paris, 1837), 1:107. However, the soldiers of the militia prevented the populace from setting fire to synagogues and Jewish houses; *ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 154. For the forced conversion of Copts at this period, see Donald P. Little, "Coptic Conversion to Islam under the Bahri Mamluks, 692–755/1293–1354," *BSOAS* 39 (1976): 552–69. See also Ita M. Lapidus, "The Conversion of Egypt to Islam," *JOS* 2 (1972): 248–62; Moshe Perlmann, "Notes on Anti-Christian Propaganda in the Mamluk Empire," *BSOAS* 10 (1942): 843–61. *Idem*, "Asnawi's Tract against Christian Officials," in *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume*, David Samuel Löwinger, Bela Somogyi, and Alexander Scheiber, ed. (Jerusalem, 1958), vol. 2.

73. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 1:152–53. For the Turkish raids in the Balkans just before the fall of Constantinople, cf. Charles Schefer, ed., *Le Voyage d'outremer de Bertrandon de la Brocquière*, with notes (Paris, 1892), 199–200.

74. Tavernier, *Les six voyages*, 1:54; 2:7, 65. The chronicler Arakel de Tauriz described the conversion of this population to Islam, either by force, by torture, or by the effects of deportation.

75. The pope's letter is dated 21 September 1658. See Walter Joseph Fischel, "The Jews in Medieval Iran from the 16th to the 18th Centuries: Political, Economic and Communal Aspects," paper, Conference, Institute of Asian and African Studies and Ben Zvi Institute, Jerusalem, 1974; and Ezra Spicandler, "The Persecution of the Jews of Isfahan under Shah Abbas II (1642–1666)," *ibid.*; for the same events, cf. Arakel de Tauriz, chap. 34,

489–96; Laurence D. Loeb, *Outcast: Jewish Life in Southern Iran* (New York: 1977), 17. The seventeenth-century *Jam Abbassi* code imposed restrictive and humiliating measures on the Jews in order to convert them.

76. David Cazès, *Essai sur l'histoire des israélites de Tunisie depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à l'établissement du protectorat de la France en Tunisie* (Paris, 1888), 103.

77. Mitev, "Le peuple bulgare," 251, 259.

78. Tavernier, *Les six voyages*, 1: 125.

79. Koran 2: 154, 156, 157. See Georges Vajda, "Ahl al-Kitab," *ET²* 1(1986):264–66; idem, "Juifs et musulmans selon le hadith," *JA* 229 (1937): 151–221; Eliahu Strauss [Ash-tor], "The Social Isolation of Ahl adh-Dhimma", in *Paul Hirschler Memorial Book* (Budapest, 1949), 73–94.

80. Moshe Perlmann, "Notes on the Position of Jewish Physicians in Medieval Muslim Countries," *IOS* 2 (1972): 315–19.

81. Israel Joseph Benjamin, *Eight Years in Asia and Africa from 1846 to 1855*. By J. J. Benjamin II . . . Preface by Dr. Berthold Seemann (Hanover, 1859), 94–103. See "Reports by Her Majesty's Diplomatic and Consular Agents in Turkey Respecting the Condition of the Christian Subjects of the Porte (1868–1875)," in *PP*, Turkey, no. 16 (1877); Hrand Pasdermadjian, *Histoire de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1986), 246–47, 296–97; Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, document 52.

82. Louis Frank, "Tunis, Description de cette Régence," in J. J. Marcel, ed., *L'Univers. Histoire et Description de Tous les Peuples: Algérie. Etats Tripolitains. Tunis* (Paris, 1862), 64–65.

83. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du Chevalier*, 1: 165. In the mid-fifteenth century, Bertrandon de la Brocquière (32–33) noted the prohibition on a Christian riding a horse in Syrian towns.

84. Morison, *Relation*, 155. For the prohibition on Europeans riding horses and even donkeys, demanded by the notables of Aleppo in 1770, see Charles-Roux, *Les Echelles*, 86; for Egypt at the same period, see Karsten Niebuhr, *Travels through Arabia and Other Countries in the East*, trans. from German by Robert Hero (Edinburgh, 1792), 1: 81–83.

85. Letter 16 May 1900 from J. Hoefler, Tripoli, to the president of the Alliance israélite universelle, Paris, *AIU* archives (LIBYE I.C.12), in David Gerald Littman, "Jews under Muslim Rule in the late 19th Century," *WLB* 28, n.s. 35/36 (1975): 71; for Morocco, see James Riley, *Loss of the American Brig Commerce: Wrecked on the Western Coast of Africa in the month of August 1815. With an account of Timbuctoo and of the hitherto undiscovered great city of Wassanah* (London, 1817), 1: 515–17, 537.

86. Nahum Slousch, *Travels in North Africa* (Philadelphia, 1927), 153; see also H. E. Wilkie Young, British vice-consul at Mosul (Iraq), "Notes on the city of Mosul," in the appendix to report no. 4, Mosul, 28 January 1909, FO 195/2308, text and introduction by Eli Kedourie, in *MES* 7 (1971): 232. In Palestine, it was commonplace for Arab children to throw stones at European travelers; see Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, 64 and 76, n.47.

87. Yomtob David Sémach, *A travers les communautés israélites d'Orient. Visite des écoles de l'Alliance Israélite* (Paris, 1931), 25, and idem, *Une mission de l'Alliance au Yémen* (Paris, 1910), 23, 31, 47. For the restrictions in Persia, cf. Loeb, *Outcaste*, chap. 2 and appendix 1.

88. Sémach, *Une mission*, 76.

89. Itzhak Ben Zvi, *The Exiled and the Redeemed* (London, 1958), 86–87.

90. Ash-tor, "Levantine Jewries in the Fifteenth Century," *BIJS* 3 (1975): 92. A similar practice is mentioned in Persia in 1622, but perhaps it was not applied, see Loeb, *Outcaste*, 297, n.65.

91. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Lettres sur la Turquie* (Paris, 1854), 2: 212; a number of European travelers have described the dark colors or the dilapidated appearance of the homes of the *rayas*.

92. Charles de Foucauld, *Reconnaissance au Maroc. Journal de Route, 1883–1884* (Paris, 1888), 398–400; Slousch, *Travels*, 483; for the Jabal Nafusa, cf. Mordechai Hakohen, *Hig'hid Mordekhai* (sect. 91), in Harvey E. Goldberg, ed., and trans. from Hebrew, *The Book of Mordekhai: A Study of the Jews of Libya. Selections from the 'Hig'hid Mordekhai' of Mordechai Hakohen*, trans. from Hebrew with an intro. (Philadelphia, 1980), 74.

93. Idris, "Les Tributaires," 173.

94. Slousch, *Travels*, 351–52. See also Littman, *WLB* 28, n.s. 35/36 (1975): 65–76; idem,

"Jews under Muslim Rule, II: Morocco 1903–1912" 29, n.s. 37/38 (1976): 13–19; idem, "Quelques aspects de la condition de *dhimmi*: Juifs d'Afrique du Nord avant la colonisation" (according to the documents of the AIU), in *YOD* 2/1 (1976): 22–52 (revised and expanded ed., Geneva, 1977); idem, "Mission to Morocco (1863–1864)," in Sonia and Vivian David Lipman, eds., *The Century of Moses Montefiore* (London: 1985), 171–229.

95. Ali Bey [Domingo Badia y Leblich], *Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and Turkey, between the years 1803 and 1807, written by himself* (London, 1816), 2: 242. Several nineteenth-century travelers mention that the Muslims in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus were among the most fanatic.

96. Joseph Wolff, *Researches and Missionary Labours among the Jews, Mohammedans, and other sects: 1831–1834* (London, 1835), 177. In Persia, the Jews were forced to wear a discriminatory badge until the beginning of the twentieth century. It was required in Hamadan, Teheran, Shiraz, Yazd, and other places; cf. Littman, "Les Juifs en Perse avant les Pahlevi," in *TM* 34 no. 395 (June 1979), 1920–29; idem, "Jews under Muslim Rule: The Case of Persia," *WLB* 32, n.s. 49/50 (1979): 7–11; and Loeb, *Outcaste*, 21.

97. Louise Février, "A French Family in the Yemen," *AS* 3 (1979): 132.

98. Mitev, *Le Peuple*, 249. The reports of the British consuls of that period confirm this information. Humiliating regulations regarding Christian and Jewish *dhimmi*s were in force throughout the Ottoman Empire and were revived by firmans and orders emanating from the sultans. The last, concerning discriminatory clothing, dates from 10 August 1837. Addressed to the Chief Rabbi of Istanbul by Sultan Mahmud II, it obligates him, in conformity with his functions, to impose on his coreligionists strict observance of the discriminatory laws regarding clothing—similar orders having been communicated to the Armenian, Greek, and Catholic patriarchs. See Abraham Galanté, ed., *Documents Officiels Turcs concernant les Juifs de Turquie. Recueil de 114 Lois, Règlements, Firmans, Bérats, Ordres et Décisions de Tribunaux*, trans. from Turkish (Istanbul, 1931), 119–20.

99. Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*, 275–76.

100. *Chronique de Michel*, 3: 343.

101. Idris, "Les Tributaires," 191.

Chapter 4. The Conquered Lands: Processes of Islamization

1. See Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, chaps. 5 and 6; D. and J. Soudel, chap. 7; Xavier de Planhol, *Les Fondements géographiques de l'histoire de l'islam* (Paris, 1968); Kennedy, *The Prophet*, 285–87, and chap. 11.

2. Donner, *Early Islamic Conquest*, 227, 231.

3. Anna Comnena, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 3: 457; Osman Turan, "L'Islamisation dans la Turquie du Moyen Age," *SI* (10) (1959): 137–52.

4. Nicetas, *Histoire de l'empereur Jean Comnène*, in Cousin, 5: 174; Xavier de Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens, nomadisme et vie paysanne* (Paris 1958).

5. Nehemiah Levtzion, ed., *Conversion to Islam* (New York, 1979), and idem, "Conversion to Islam in Syria and Palestine and the Survival of Christian Communities," in Michael Gervers and Ramzi J. Bikhazi, eds., *Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Medieval Islamic Lands* (Toronto, 1990), 294; Richard W. Bulliet, *Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period. An Essay in Quantitative History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).

6. *Chronique de Denys*, 34.

7. *Ibid.*, 46. Armenia was experiencing a régime of terror at this period, which provoked several uprisings. Here, the chronicler describes the disorders which afflicted the province of Arzanenus near the southern part of Mount Taurus, populated by Armenians.

8. *Ibid.*, 47. The chronicle describes in a confused way the discord between Armenian clans: the Bagratunis fighting for the Umayyads and the Mamikonians for the Abbasids. Other Armenians rallied to the Byzantines who, under Constantine V, invaded Sophenus as far as Erzerum (Theodisiopolis) in 751.

9. *Ibid.*, 49.

10. *Ibid.*, 56.

11. *Ibid.*, 49.
 12. For this period, see Joseph Laurent, *L'Arménie entre Byzance et l'islam depuis la conquête arabe jusqu'en 886*, with a bibliography and map (Paris, 1919). After this defeat at Bagravan, Armenia suffered bloody reprisals.
 13. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:60.
 14. Sawirus, *History of the Patriarchs*, 2:45.
 15. *Ibid.*, 45–46.
 16. *Ibid.*, 52–56.
 17. *Ibid.*, 56.
 18. *Ibid.*, 57.
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*, 59.
 21. Kennedy, *The Prophet*, 293.
 22. See Baladhuri, *Origins of the Islamic State*, 326; Daniel Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam. The Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven, 1981), 142–43, chaps. 5 and 6.
 23. Other sources mention more than three hundred thousand prisoners; see Pipes, *Slave Soldiers*, 124.
 24. En-Noweiri [Nuwayri], in Ibn Khaldoun, *Histoire*, 1:359 (appendix).
 25. al-Tabari, in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, 1:308, and *Chronique de Michel*, 3:100.
 26. Ibn al-Athir, in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, 2:148.
 27. *Ibid.*, 152–53.
 28. Matthew of Edessa, in Marius Canard, *L'Expansion arabo-islamique et ses répercussions* (London, 1974), 6:255; Osman Turan, "Les souverains seldjoukides et leurs sujets non-musulmans," *SI* 1 (1953): 65–100.
 29. Makrizi, *Histoire des Sultans*, 1:4.34; see Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj, 1225–1286. The son of Aaron, the Hebrew physician, commonly known as BAR HEBRAEUS*, trans. from Syriac by Ernest Alfred Thompson Wallis Budge (Amsterdam, 1976), 1:446.
 30. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 448.
 31. *Ibid.*, 453.
 32. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:342–43.
 33. *Ibid.*, 263.
 34. Pipes, *Slave Soldiers*, 147.
 35. Tavernier, *Les six voyages*, 1:36; on the persecution of the deported Armenians by Shah Abbas I in Persia, see Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*, in Brosset, 1:340–51. Under Shah Abbas II:
- "Sons of Christians whom the Persians found pleasing—boys, girls, betrothed women—were taken away by force, led to the king's palace, lined up among his slaves, and never to be returned to their masters [parents], and converted from Christianity to the Muslim religion. This was primarily a consequence of their infamous customs; then, to increase the number of slaves of the Persian race; lastly, after a certain period, the dwelling places, property, treasures of the parents, left by these abducted Christian children, were seized, pillaged, robbed" (303).
36. Tavernier, *Les six voyages*, 1:268–69.
 37. *Ibid.*, 294; for the Jews, see Eliezer Bashan, *Captivity and Ransom in Mediterranean Jewish Society (1391–1830)* (Hebr.) (Ramat Gan, 1980).
 38. Avedis Perperean, *Patmut'iw'n Hayoc* (History of the Armenians, 1771–1860) (Armenian) (Constantinople, 1871), 260–61.
 39. Haim Nahoum, ed., *Recueils de Firmans Impériaux Ottomans adressés aux Valis et aux Khédives d'Égypte 1006 H.-1322 H. (1597–1904)* (Cairo, 1944), 131. See below, p. 260–61 and pp. 433–37.
 40. Paul Wittek, "Devshirme and Shari'a," *BSOAS* 17 (1955): 271–78; Vacalopoulos, *The Greek*, 31–44; idem, *History*, 72.
 41. Ducas, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 8:337. See also Nahoum Weissman, *Les Janissaires. Étude de l'Organisation militaire des Ottomans* (Paris, 1938); Angelov, *Les Balkans au Moyen Age*; Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam*.

42. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:21. For the political instability, cf. Sourdel, chaps. 2 and 3; Kennedy, *The Prophet*, passim.
43. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:22.
44. *Ibid.*, 23. Names of native Arabian tribes.
45. *Ibid.*, 52.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, 53.
48. Bar Hebraeus, 1:181.
49. *Ibid.*, 210; for a general picture of the nomadic invasion and their depredations in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Iraq from the ninth to the eleventh century, cf. Kennedy, *The Prophet*, chap. 11; "The Bedouin, Dynasties," and 297, 307–8; Levzion, "Conversion"; Ashtor, *A Social*, chap. 2; Kamal S. Salibi, *Syria under Islam: Empire on Trial (634–1097)* (New York, 1977).
50. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:267.
51. *Ibid.*, passim, and for Anatolia, Vryonis, *The Decline*, 183; Turan, "Les souverains seldjoukides."
52. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:338.
53. *Ibid.*, 266.
54. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:289.
55. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:325.
56. *Ibid.*, 441.
57. *Ibid.*, 450.
58. *Ibid.*, 476.
59. The continuator of Bar Hebraeus, *ibid.*, 483.
60. Halil Inalcik, "The Emergence of the Ottomans," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, (Cambridge, 1977), 1:263–68.
61. *Ibid.*, 269.
62. *Ibid.*, 268. Vacalopoulos, *History of Macedonia*, 106.
63. Inalcik, "The Emergence", p. 283.
64. Halil Inalcik, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 1:343.
65. Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*, 307–9.
66. *Ibid.*, 309.
67. Fiscal extortion and ransoming are recurrent themes in all *dhimi* chronicles. The situation which existed before the period of reforms (*Tanzimat*) is mentioned by the Turcophile Ubicini, *Lettres*, 2:272–363, n.1. In the Armenian provinces the situation barely altered until World War I.
68. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:477.
69. Bokhari, *Les Traditions*, "La Capitation," chap. 17, 3.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*, chap. 3.
72. Coptic and Jacobite patriarchs often mention the benevolent attitude of certain caliphs and governors. Concerning protection measures for *rayas* written into Ottoman legislation, see Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, 7:134–35. *Firmans* by Murad III (April 1584, November 1585, December 1587) prohibited Muslims from pillaging tombstones from the Jewish cemetery (Golden Horn, Constantinople), and enjoined them to cease their harassment and their attempts to drive the Jews out; cf. Galanté, *Documents Officiels*, 62–66; *ibid.*, 191–92: prohibition on pirates pillaging and leading the *dhimmi* population of Naxos into slavery (Selim II, March 1568) and on soldiers and Muslims molesting them. On the Jews' gratitude to the sultan, see Shmuelevitz, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 33–34. It is interesting to read in Arakel de Tauriz about the friendly relations maintained with the Armenians by the shahs Abbas I and Abbas II.
73. *Chronique de Michel*, 2:474.
74. Paul Wittek, "Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum" (1936), in *idem*, *La Formation*, 1:285–319.
75. Dabinovic, "Les pactes,"; Cvijic, *La Péninsule*, 344–55. For the rallying to the Turks

of part of the Orthodox population and the clergy at the time of the conquest of Cyprus, see Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, 8: 5–23.

76. Ya'kubi, in Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, 1: 274.

77. Régis Blachère, "Regards sur l'aculturation" des Arabo-Musulmans jusque vers 40/661," *Arabica* 3 (1956): 259; Ashtor, *A Social*, 15–22.

78. Idris, "Les tributaires", 194. When Shah Abbas I deported the Armenians: "The stone-cutting workers were set apart, taken to Ispahan and housed there, because their industry was needed there to build houses, both for the king and the Persian people." Cf. Arakel de Tauriz, *Livre d'Histoires*, 488.

79. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:264; for the repeated frequency of deportations, see the chronicles and historical studies on Anatolia, cf. Vryonis, *The Decline*, 169; "Displacement of population"; idem, "Nomadization"; Turan, "L'Islamisation." At the time of the foundation of Qairuan, the governor of Egypt received the order to transfer there a thousand or so Coptic or Jewish families in order to develop the town's economy; cf. Shlomo Dov Goitein, "Changes in the Middle East (950–1159), as illustrated by the documents of the Cairo Geniza," in Donald Sidney Richards, ed., *Islamic Civilisation 950–1150* (Oxford, 1973). These transfers, motivated by economic causes, affected *dhimmi* populations and were not reserved exclusively for newly subjugated or enslaved populations. Some chronicles provide information on these transfers. Departures had to take place on the same day or at very short notice, two or three days, making it impossible for the deportees to sell their possessions. In order to discourage flight, they were counted, closely supervised, and forbidden to move from their new places of residence, generally very far from their places of origin. When all the village inhabitants were deported, the houses were burnt down and the entire village destroyed. Thus the community archives, the libraries, and even the memory of the deportees were annihilated.

80. Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:296.

81. Inalcik, "The Emergence," 288.

82. Angelov, "Certains aspects," 249, 256.

83. Evliya Efendi, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa in the Seventeenth Century*, trans. from Turkish by The Ritter Joseph von Hammer (London, 1846), 1:28.

84. Angelov, "Certains aspects," 262.

85. Inalcik, "The Emergence," 288.

86. Cvijic, *La Péninsule*, 353–87. Dusan T. Batakovic, *The Kosovo Chronicles* (Belgrade, 1992); idem, *Yugoslavie. Nations, Religions, Idéologies*, preface by Annie Kriegel. Trans. from Servo-Croat by Bruno Guillard and Slobodan Despot (Lausanne, 1994).

87. Costas P. Kyrris, "L'Importance sociale de la conversion à l'islam (volontaire ou non) d'une section des classes dirigeantes de Chypre pendant les premiers siècles de l'occupation turque (1570–fin du XVIIe siècle)", in *Actes du premier congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes*, 3 (Sofia, 1969).

88. Jean de Nikiou, *Chronique*, 234; Constantelos, "Moslem Conquest"; J. Meyendorff, "Byzantine Views of Islam," *DOP* 18 (1964): 113–32.

89. Simha Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires à Bagdad à l'Epoque Abbasside, IXe-XIe siècle* (Paris, 1981). For this period, see Richards, *Islamic Civilisation*.

Chapter 5. Relations between *Dhimmi* Communities

1. Henry Bettenson, ed., *Documents of the Christian Church* (London/New York/Toronto, 1956), 65–68.

2. Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society* (New York/London), 1982, vol. 1; Zvi Ankori, *Encounter in History. Jews and Christian Greeks in their Encounter through the Ages* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1984), chap. 4, pp. 66ff. and chap. 6, pp. 157ff.; Steven B. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204–1453* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1985).

3. *Chronique de Michel*, 3:359.

4. *Ibid.*, 109.
5. *Ibid.*, 358 and *passim*.
6. Consul-General John Cartwright (Constantinople), "Report from His Majesty's Consul General at Constantinople on the Consular Jurisdiction in the Levant," FO 406/14 (Report of 23 December 1835, FO 406/14).
7. Joseph Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs seldjucides dans l'Asie occidentale jusqu'en 1081* (Nancy, 1913), 22, n.1; Marius Canard, "Les Relations Politiques et Sociales entre Byzance et les Arabes," *DOP* 19 (1964): 33–56; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, 1:196.
8. Vryonis, *The Decline*, 50, n.256.
9. Cantacuzène, in Cousin, *Histoire de Constantinople*, 8:54.
10. Ducas, in Cousin, 8:335. Bayazid had insisted on settling twenty thousand Muslims at Galata (Constantinople) and had granted them ownership of all the gardens and vines outside the town. An Islamic court of law was set up; Evlya Efendi, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 28.
11. See Charles-Roux, *Les Échelles*; Francis Rey, *La Protection Diplomatique et Consulaire dans les Echelles du Levant et de Barbarie* (Paris, 1899), *passim*.
12. William Thomas Gidney, *The History of the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews, from 1809 to 1908* (London, 1909).
13. Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, 96, n.11; see Abraham Jacob Brawer, "Damascus Affair," *EJ* 5:1249–52 and the bibliography; Albert M. Hyamson, "The Damascus Affair of 1840," *JHSE* 16 (1945–51): 47–71; Tudor Parfitt, "The Year of the Pride of Israel: Montefiore and the Blood Libel of 1840," in Lipman, eds., *The Century*, 131–48.
14. Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire. L'Alliance Israélite Universelle (1860–1910)*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911/1920); André Natan Chouraqui, *Cent Ans d'histoire. L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la Renaissance juive contemporaine (1860–1960)* (Paris, 1965).
15. Sources for this period, particularly the diplomatic archives and the reports by English and French consuls, reveal the scorn felt by the Muslim authorities toward the Greeks, Maronites, Slavs, and Armenians who were seeking to emancipate themselves. See Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, "Documents," in the section "The Era of Emancipation," including PP, 1860 [2734] 69; 1861 [2800] 68; 1877 [C. 1739] 92; 1877 [C. 1768] 92; 1877 [C. 1806] 92.

Chapter 6. From Emancipation to Nationalism (1820–1876)

1. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976–77), 2:18, 149, 190.
2. Roderic H. Davidson, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), 95, 116, 195; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1968); Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840–1861: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (London, 1968).
3. William Holmes (Bosna-Serai) to Earl Granville, Foreign Secretary (London), no. 21 (24 February 1871), PP 1877 [C. 1739] 92, p. 665. On the subject of the injustices and corruption in the Ottoman Empire, see also "Report of Holmes to Elliot," ann. in *idem*, no. 21, pp. 666–72.
4. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Cerkes," *JIMMA*, 1, no. 2 and 2, no. 1 (1979–80): 7–27; Victor Guérin, *Description géographique, historique et archéologique de la Palestine* (Paris, 1868), vol. 1, "Judée," 84; Planhol, *Les Fondements géographiques*, 253–66; Stanford J. Shaw, "Ottoman Population Movements during the last years of the Empire, 1885–1914: some preliminary remarks," *JOS* 1 (1980): 191–205.
5. Hugh Rose (Beirut) to Lord Aberdeen, foreign secretary (London), 12 October 1841, PRO (London), FO 78/449, no. 110, in Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, 200. The emancipation of the Christians provoked a rebellion at Aleppo in 1850. The Greek Catholic Patriarch Maximos had made a triumphal entry with much ceremony and with costly religious accoutrements. Already irritated by conscription, the Muslims attacked the Christian dis-

tricts. See *idem*, 190–91 and the notes. The Jews, who kept their place with humility, were not attacked.

6. For the accusation of ritual crimes in the East, see Moïse Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des israélites de l'Empire ottoman depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1897), 47–48 and 87–88; Jacob M. Landau, "Ritual Murder Accusations in Nineteenth-Century Egypt," in *Middle Eastern Themes* (London, 1973), 99–142. See also Victor X. Fontanier, *Voyage dans l'Inde, dans le Golfe Persique par l'Égypte et la mer Rouge* (Paris, 1844–46), 2:607. The accusations against the Jews made and frequently repeated by the Eastern Churches caused the torture and death of a number of innocent people. See chap. 5, n.13 above.

7. After the ritual murder accusation at Damascus, Sir Moses Montefiore obtained a *firman* from the sultan Abd al-Majid on 6 November 1840, which declared the accusation of ritual murder to be false and prohibited its propagation in the Ottoman Empire.

8. Sir Henry Elliot (Therapia) to Lord Derby, foreign secretary (London), 20 November 1875, FO 424/39 (no. 767. Confidential. no. 518, extract).

9. Sir Henry Elliot (Therapia) to Lord Derby (London), 29 November 1875, FO 424/39 (no. 794, in no. 572, extract).

10. Edward Freeman (Bosna-Serai) to Lord Derby (London), 30 December 1875, FO 424/40 (no. 24. Political, in no. 56, extract).

11. Memorandum (5 January 1876) by Sir P. Francis (Constantinople) on the new judicial reforms envisaged in the last *firman*, FO 424/40 (no. 27, Enclosure in no. 136, Sir Henry Elliot to Lord Derby, 8 January 1876, extract). See document, p. 431.

12. See documents *supra*, pp. 399–408 and, for more details, Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, documents 44–50, pp. 259–78.

13. John Joseph, *Muslim-Christian Relations and Inter-Christian Rivalries in the Middle East. The Case of the Jacobites in an Age of Transition* (New York, 1983), 98.

Chaper 7. Nationalisms (1820–1918)

1. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Lettres sur la Turquie, ou Tableau, Statistique, religieux, politique, administratif, militaire, commercial, etc. de l'Empire ottoman depuis le Khatti-Chérif de Gulkhané (1839). Accompagné de Pièces Justificatives* (Paris, 1854), 2:32.

2. Kevork B. Bardakjian, "The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople," in Braude and Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews*, 1:89–100.

3. Davidson, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 114–35.

4. René Ristelhueber, *Histoire des peuples balkaniques* (Paris, 1950); Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York, 1958); Peter F. Sugar, *South-Eastern Europe under Ottoman Rule (1354–1804)* (Seattle, Wa., 1977); Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States (1804–1920)* (Seattle, Wa., 1977); Georges Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans: XIVe–XXe siècle* (Paris, 1991).

5. Nahoum, *Recueils de Firmans*, 91.

6. *Ibid.*, 109–10.

7. Ubicini, *Lettres sur la Turquie*, 2:415–18.

8. Robert William Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality of the Balkans* (London, 1917).

9. James Bryce, ed., *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–1916* (London, 1916); Frédéric Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1917); Johannes Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Dr. J. Lepsius* (Potsdam, 1919); *idem*, *Le rapport secret du Dr Johannes Lepsius, président de la Deutsche orient-mission et de la Société germano-arménienne Sur les massacres d'Arménie*, preface by René Pinon (Paris, 1918); Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens. Histoire d'un génocide* (Paris, 1977); Arthur Beylerian, *Les Grandes Puissances, l'Empire ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives françaises (1914–1918)* (Paris, 1983); Gérard Chaliand, ed., with the collaboration of Claire Mouradian and Alice Aslanian-Samuélian, *Le Crime de Silence. Le Génocide des Arméniens*, preface by Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Paris, 1984); Leslie A. Davis, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide of 1914–1917*, intro. by Susan Blair (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1989). Despite the ban by the Young Turks on giving

aid to the Armenians, individuals—Christians, Jews, and Muslims, both Turks and Arabs—tried to help them.

10. *The Times*, London, 24 November 1945, p. 4; document presented at the Nuremberg trials. Cf. Winfried Baumgart, "Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939: Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung," *VJHfZ* 16 (1968): 139; Kevork B. Bardakjian, *Hitler and the Armenian Genocide* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," *HGS* 1/2 (1986): 169–92; idem, "The Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide. A Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust," *HGS* 3/2 (1988): 151–69.

11. James Finn, *Stirring Times or Records from the Jerusalem Consular Chronicles (1853–1856)*, 2 vols. (London, 1878); Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, 228–41 (Document 35).

12. Jean Ganiage, *L'Expansion coloniale de la France sous la Troisième République (1871–1914)* (Paris, 1968), 30.

13. For a more detailed analysis of Arab nationalism, its origins, and its developments, see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London, 1967); Sylvia G. Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism. An Anthology* (Berkeley, 1976); Robert Benton Betts, *Christians in the Arab East. A Political Study* (London, 1979).

14. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, chap. 11, 273–79.

15. *Ibid.*, 309–11.

16. *Ibid.*, 267–73.

17. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Bible and Sword. England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour* (New York, 1984); Michael J. Pragai, *Faith and Fulfillment. Christians and the Return to the Promised Land* (London, 1985).

18. In a letter to the president of the AIU, Nahum Effendi, Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire, explains that his attitude, described as anti-Zionist, "saved the Jews of Turkey and Palestine from the fate of the Armenians and Greeks." See Esther Benbassa, *Un Grand Rabbin sépharade en politique, 1892–1923* (Paris, 1990), 234.

19. Constantin-François Volney, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785, suivi de considérations sur la guerre des Russes et des Turcs* (Paris 1825), 2:215. For more precise statistics for the end of the nineteenth century, see Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine. Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive* (Paris, 1896).

20. Bat Ye'or, *The Jews in Egypt* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1974), chap. 13; idem, "Zionism in Islamic Lands: The Case of Egypt," *WLB* 30, n.s. 43–44 (1977): 17–29; Michel Abitbol, "Zionist Activity in the Maghreb," *JQ* 21 (1981): 61–84. For an analysis of this period in the Ottoman Empire, see the doctoral thesis of Esther Benbassa, *Haim Nahum Effendi, dernier grand rabbin de l'Empire ottoman (1908–1920): son rôle politique et diplomatique*, 2 vols. (University of Paris III, 1987).

21. For an analysis of Zionism in the Ottoman Empire, see Esther Benbassa, "Israël face à lui-même: judaïsme occidental et judaïsme ottoman (XIXe–XXe siècle)," *Pardès* 7 (1988): 105–29; idem, "Zionism in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century," *Studies in Zionism*, in *JIS* 11/2 (1990): 127–40.

22. In his speech to the House of Commons on 23 May 1939 against the White Paper, Churchill declared: "Now, there is the breach; there is the violation of the pledge; there is the abandonment of the Balfour declaration; there is the end of the vision, of the hope, of the dream." See Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill* (London, 1976), 5 (1922–39): 1070.

23. *Ibid.*, *Auschwitz and the Allies* (London/New York, 1991).

24. In the words of the former colonial secretary, Leopold Amery: "We decamp ignominiously amid carnage and confusion." Letter to *The Times* (London), 14 May 1948, quoted in Tuchman, *Bible and Sword*, 349.

25. Since the French edition of this book was published in October 1991, the situation has changed significantly as a result of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. This was followed by the September 1993 Washington Declaration of Principles and the Agreement of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO. The November 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan—and positive relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Arab Gulf States—improved peace prospects, as has the Israel-PLO Accord of October 1995.

Chapter 8. Some Aspects of the Past's Revival in Modern Times

1. For North Africa, see Ganiage, *L'Expansion coloniale*, and the bibliography; Jean-Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe: 1830–1894*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1961–65); idem., *Documents d'histoire économique et sociale marocaine au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1969).

2. William Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957); Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1963); Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969); Khomeiny, *Principes politiques*; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam* (New Haven, 1985); Charnay, *Principes*; idem, *Islam*; Gilles Kepel, *The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Contemporary Egypt*, trans. from French by Jon Rothschild (London, 1985); Bruno Etienne, *L'Islamisme radical* (Paris, 1987); Olivier Carré, "Juifs et chrétiens dans la société islamique idéale d'après Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966)," *RSPT* 68 (1984); Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God. Islam and Political Power* (New York, 1983); idem, *The Rushdie Affair. The Novel, the Ayatollah and the West* (New York, 1990); Jean-Pierre Péroncel-Hugoz, *The Raft of Mohamed*, trans. from French by Georges Holoch (New York, 1987); William Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (London, 1988).

3. William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers. Political, Historical and Civil. Containing an Account of the Geography, Population, Government* (Boston, 1826), 134–38; Ellen G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Ages* (Madison, Mi., 1983); C. Richard Pennel, ed., *Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth-Century North Africa. The Journal of Thomas Baker, English Consul in Tripoli, 1677–1685* (Madison, N.J., 1989).

4. This observation was written in September 1990, when the French manuscript was submitted for publication. Since then, "the contentious *dhimmi* past" is still obfuscated or denied, and most Muslim intellectuals justify the *jihād* concept as an inoffensive inner struggle against one's evil instincts, or a defensive combat for justice.

Chapter 9. Characters of Dhimmitude

1. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, trans. from Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (London, 1967). 1:183.

2. Paul Wittek, "De la Défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (Un Demi-Siècle d'Histoire Ottomane), in *La Formation*, 2:1–33.

3. See Shmulevitz, *Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, chap. 2 for the coordination of legislations.

4. No study has appeared on the ambiguity of the position held by non-Muslim lay or religious community leaders. However, information can be found on Andalusia in Lévy-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne*; Eliahu Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain*, trans. from Hebrew by Aaron Klein and Jenny Machlowitz Klein, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1973/1979/1984); on the Armenians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see the interesting study by Hagop Barsoumian, "The Dual Role of the Armenian *Amira* Class within the Ottoman Government and the Armenian *Millet* (1750–1850)," Braude and Lewis, 1:89–100; Vcalopoulos, *The Greek Nation*, 31–45. Information can be gleaned from community chronicles and, for nineteenth-century Turkey, see Ubcini's two volumes, *Lettres sur La Turquie*.

5. Ibid. 2:347.

6. Jacob Mann, *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs. A Contribution to their Political and Communal History based chiefly on Geniza Material hitherto unpublished* (London, 1969), 1:13; Mark R. Cohen, *Jewish Self-Government in Medieval Egypt. The Origin of the Office of Head of the Jews, ca. 1065–1126* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

7. Goitein, *A Mediterranean*, 1:30–57. See also *ibid.*, "Changes," in Richards.

8. See above, chap. 3, n.67.

9. Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs from the earliest times to the present* (London/New York, 1968), 225 and chap. 21. As has already been stated in the preface, this book does

not deal with the considerable contribution by the Zoroastrians on the literary and scientific domains, which was fundamental in helping to fashion Islamic civilization. See also Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, *Studia Semitica*, vol. 2, *Islamic Themes* (Cambridge, 1971).

10. Alexander Alexandrovich Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison & Milwaukee, 1928), 1:284.

11. Shlomo Dov Goitein, *Jews and Arabs. Their Contact through the Ages* (New York, 1964), 70.

12. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 388.

13. Laurence Loeb's work deals precisely with this subject in relation to the Jewish community of Shiraz. As an example of mental conditioning, the following episode deserves mention: after the exodus and tragedies which struck the Jacobite communities of Iraq during World War I, the leaders of the Jacobites demanded to be heard at the peace conference in Paris (1919); the Jacobite bishop of Syria, Ignatius Afram I Barsum, the future patriarch, joined this delegation. During one session, he found himself defending the rights of the Arabs rather than those of his own community, bringing applause from the Arab delegates who called him the bishop of Arabism; see Joseph, *Muslim-Christian Relations*, 101. The Jacobite bishop wrote to the grand vizier to praise Islamic law and accuse the Armenians of massacring and pillaging their community (27 April 1896). He also wrote to Queen Victoria to praise the protection of the Turks (*ibid.*, 92–93). It is clear that this type of testimony was motivated by fear and insecurity. It punctuates the whole history of dhimmitude till the present day and—like statements by today's hostages—does not constitute credible testimonies.

14. Vajda, *Un recueil*, 47. For Bulgaria, cf. Mitev, "Le Peuple Bulgare," 252.

15. Vidiadhar Swiajprasad Naipaul, *Among the Believers. An Islamic Journey*, "Killing History," 2. Pakistan (London, 1981), chap. 4, 125–35.

Chapter 10. Conclusion

1. Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History. Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East* (London, 1973), 123–37; for a recent study, see Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent & Cross. The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1994); Lévy-Provençal notes the extreme poverty of sources on the Jews of Spain between the eighth and eleventh centuries. See "Les communautés juives dans l'Espagne califienne," *Evidences* (5) 32, Paris, May 1953, 15. See Ashtor, *The Jews*.

2. Davidson, *Reform*, 116. Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2: 128.

3. *Ibid.*, 2:149.

4. *Ibid.*, 128: The *dhimmis* refuse conscription in order to make money, whereas the Muslims fight and are subjected to the ordeals of war. The Muslim peasants suffer from the tyranny of the Muslim feudal lords just as much as the Christians who are defended by the Europeans (*ibid.*, 149). The condition of the Bulgarian peasants and other Christians was the same as that of all the other subjects of the empire (*ibid.*, 160); the same equalizing comparison for the Armenians (*ibid.*, 201). These arguments are taken from the report by the British consul at Smyrna, Charles Blunt, to Sir Henry Bulwer, British ambassador at Constantinople. Smyrna, 28 July 1860, (FO 424/21. Inclosure 2 in No. 6, pp. 38–42).

5. Shaw, *History*, 2: 18, 158, 259; Robert Mantran, "Les débuts de la question d'Orient (1774–1839)," in *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1989), 442.

6. Shaw, *History*, 2: 259.

7. Claude Cahen, *L'Islam des origines au début de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1968), 116.

8. *Ibid.*, 221.

9. *Ibid.*, 258.

10. *Ibid.*, 259.

11. Etienne, *L'Islamisme*, 285.

12. The observations by European travelers on vestimentary differentiation in the Ottoman Empire are confirmed by official Turkish documents. See Galanté, *Documents*.

13. Cvijic, *La Péninsule*, 465; Vacalopoulos, *The Greek Nation*, 211; and idem, *History*, 122–23 and *passim*.

14. See Wittek, "Devshirme and Shari'a"; J. A. B. Palmer, "The Origin of the Janissaries," *BJRL* 35 (1952–53): 470. See also n.15, Bíró Report 1993, para. 90.

15. Gáspár Bíró, *Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan*. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 51st. sess., Report of 1993 (E/CN.4/1994/48 of 1 February 1994): paras. 95 and 97, etc.; and Report of 1994 (E/CN.4/1995/58 of 30 January 1995): paras. 26 and 29, etc.). Some of these texts (from the 1994 report) were reproduced by Bat Ye'or in *Juifs et Chrétiens sous l'Islam. Les dhimmis face au défi intégriste* (Paris, 1994), 211–13, 233–34. See also Baroness Caroline Cox of Queensbury (Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords), *Sudan* [Col. 571], House of Lords Official report, Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), [Tuesday, 18 January 1994], Wednesday, 19 January 1994, vol. 551, no. 25, London, HMSO; idem, Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights, under the auspices of Christian Solidarity International (CSI), 1 March 1995 (E/CN.4/1995/SR.51) See also CSI's Report (visit 5–8 May 1995, dated Cairo, 9 May 1995 and signed by Baroness Caroline Cox and John Eibner), 5b: "Large-scale atrocities perpetrated against the people of the Nuba Mountains by GOS [Government of Sudan] forces. These include murder, enslavement, torture, rape and destruction of homes and crops.;" also Macram Max Gassi, Bishop of El Obeid (Sudan), Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights (auspices of Pax Romana), 1 March 1995 (E/CN.4/1995/SR.50). For a useful chronological documentation of events in the Sudan since 1992, see the monthly *Vigilance Soudan* (bound ed. vol. 1: 1992–93; vol. 2: 1994, Paris, Comité de Vigilance pour les Droits de l'Homme et les Libertés au Soudan, Director: R. P. Hubert Barbier,). These references to the situation in Sudan were added to the English edition in July 1995. The Sudanese government has constantly denied the facts contained in Mr. Bíró's Reports. See also, "Sudanese Christians 'sold as slaves,'" in *The Times* (London), 25 August 1995.

16. Abdullah al-Ta'ashi, the Khalifat al-Mahdi, was proclaimed successor to the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad) by the latter before his death in 1885.

17. Rudolf C. Slatin Pasha, an Austrian subject, resided in the Sudan from 1879 to 1895. Mastering Arabic fluently, he became a Colonel in the Egyptian army and held high posts in the Sudan; he was governor of Darfur before its conquest by the Mahdi in 1883. After General Charles George Gordon's death in Khartoum on 26 January 1885, he was held captive by the Khalifa in Omdurman and was "in continuous and close proximity to Abdullahi". He escaped in February 1895 and immediately wrote descriptions of his experiences, among which, *Fire and Sword in The Sudan. A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes*. Translated by Major F.R. Wingate. Illustrated by R. Talbot Kelly. (London & New York, 1896).

18. *Ibid.*, 48.

19. State treasury, made up of tithes, taxes on all booty, and confiscated property, as well as fines; *ibid.*, 231.

20. *Ibid.*, 472.

21. Officers of the Khalifa, who undertook continuous *razzias*.

22. *Ibid.*, 523. *Mulazemin*, "obliged" in Arabic. Like the janissaries, the *mulazemin* had been enslaved as children, and they were put in charge of other enslaved non-Muslim children.

Glossary

- ahl al-dhimma*. The peoples vanquished by the Muslims and considered to be protected by their treaty of surrender.
- ahl al-kitab*. The Peoples of the Book (Bible): Jews and Christians; other ethnoreligious groups were also included under this terminology.
- alim* (pl. *ulama*, anglicized as *ulema*). A scholar of Islamic religious and legal studies.
- aman*. Safety and protection granted to the *harbi* in Muslim territory, without which his life and property would be at the mercy of any aggressor; also, quarter given in battle.
- ata*. Military pay.
- awarid*. Special taxes, ransoms, or extortions; i.e., *avantias*, humiliating treatment and extortion of money.
- Bashi-Bozuk*. Irregular troops, police force.
- Capitulations*. Charters or treaties between the sultan and various European countries, stipulating commercial or religious clauses.
- dar al-harb*. "Domain of war": the non-Muslim world where Islamic law does not rule.
- dar al-Islam*. "Domain of Islam": the Muslim world where Islamic law rules.
- devshirme*. Turkish system of recruiting Christian children from among the *dhimmi* populations in the Balkans: for conversion, slavery, and assignment in the army as janissaries or for service in the Imperial Household and administrative duties of the Ottoman state.
- dhimma*. Originally a protection pact or treaty granted by the Prophet Muhammad to the Jewish and Christian populations whom he had subjected. See *ahl al-dhimma*.
- dhimmi* (*zimmi*, *raya*). Indigenous Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians who—subjected to Islamic law after the Arab or Turkish conquest—benefited from the *dhimma*.
- diwan*. Public registers, government offices.
- dragoman*. An interpreter with knowledge of Arabic, Turkish, and European languages.
- Échelle*. Commercial trading post in the Levant.
- fatwa*. Legal opinion issued by a jurisconsult based on the Koran and the Sunna.

fay. War booty taken from the infidels, henceforth the property of the *umma* and administered by the caliph.

funduq. Caravanserai reserved for foreign merchants.

ghazi. Combattant for the faith, engaged in *jihad*; also applied to frontier raiders.

ghazwa. Raid (*razzia*) by Bedouin tribes.

ghulam. Young male slave assigned to the sultan's service.

hadith. Saying or action (tradition), attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.

harbi. Inhabitant of the *dar al-harb*, the domain of war.

ichoghlani ("inside boy"). Christian child recruited through the *devshirme*, for service in the Ottoman sultan's court.

imam. Religious and political head of the Muslim community (*umma*). Used also for a spiritual authority.

Jacobite. Christian belonging to the Monophysite rite: Coptic, Aramean (Syriac), Armenian, or Ethiopian rite.

Janissary. Ottoman soldier, recruited from *dhimmi* Christian populations and, in later times, from among Muslims. See *devshirme*.

jihad. Holy war against non-Muslims; its aims, strategy, and tactics make up a theologico-legal doctrine. Also applied to a person's inner struggle to fulfill the commandments of Allah.

jizya. A fixed Koranic poll tax paid by the *dhimmis* to the Muslim state.

kharaaj. Land tax, which, in earlier times signified a general tax or tribute.

It was often confused by foreigners with the *jizya* or poll tax.

mamluk. Slave assigned to military service and in government.

mawla (pl. *mawali*). Originally a "client," who was often a non-Arab of an Arab tribe; at the time of the first conquests, they represented freed indigenous slaves.

Melchite. Christian belonging to the Greek Orthodox rite.

millet. Ethnoreligious (national) community.

Monophysite. See Jacobite.

Mozarab. Christian or Jewish native inhabitant of Muslim Spain.

murabit (pl. *murabitun*). Volunteer living in a *ribat*, dedicated to *jihad*.

muwallad. Neo-Muslims from Spain. Originally a non-Arab slave or a child of non-Arab converts.

Nestorian. Christian supporter of the dissident beliefs of Bishop Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople (428–31).

qadi. Judge administering Islamic law.

raya. See *dhimmi*.

ribat. Convent-fortress set up on the frontiers of the *dar al-harb*.

shari'a. Islamic sacred law. A juridical anthology based on the Koran and the Sunna.

sunna. The received words and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, embodied in *hadith*.

sürgün (exile). Deportation of populations.

tanzimat. Reform and renovation movement of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

umma. The Islamic community, generally in both its religious and ethnic significance.

vizier. Anglicized term for *wazir*.

waqf (pl. *awqaf*). Property devoted to an irrevocable endowment or trust, usually religious.

wazir. Officer—usually a civilian—with powers that varied according to periods and regimes.

zakat. Koranic alms tax.

Zaptieh. Soldier.

zimmi. See *dhimmi*.

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Index of Persons, Peoples, Tribes, and Institutions

Words of frequent occurrence, such as *dhimmis*, Christians, Arabs, Muslims, etc., have not been indexed. Spelling irregularities in some translated source documents have been retained. Page numbers and captions in italics refer to illustrations.

- Aali Pasha. *See* Ali Pasha
Aaronsohn, Aharon, 441 n. 2
Abbas I (shah of Persia), 90, 123, 362–64, 459 n. 58, 460 n. 69, 463 n. 35, 464 n. 72, 465 n. 78
Abbas II (shah of Persia), 90, 369, 460 n. 75, 463 n. 35, 464 n. 72
Abbas III (shah of Persia), 377 n. 1
al-Abbas (governor, Jazira), 305, 313 n. 2
al-Abbas (rebel leader), 333
Abbasids, 43, 48, 52, 58, 61, 63, 65, 69, 73, 75–76, 78, 84, 104, 106, 108, 116, 129, 138–39, 185, 202–3, 228–29, 231, 233–34, 316, 321, (poll tax disks) 323, 337, 462 n. 8
Abd al-Ala (official), 333
Abd al-Aziz b. Marwan (emir, Egypt), 124
Abdallah (son of the sharif of Mecca), 210
Abdallah Bey, 396
Abdallah b. Hazim, 272
Abdallah b. Tahir (general), 117, 314, 321 n. 6
Abd al-Hamid II (Ottoman sultan), 193, 386
Abd al-Majid (Ottoman sultan), 113, 167, 467 n. 7
Abd al-Malik (Umayyad caliph), 60, 77, 80, 84, 124, 128, 150, 279–81 n. 1, 458 n. 15
Abd al-Malik b. Abd al-Wahid b. Mughith (general), 281
Abd al-Qadir (emir, Algeria), 206
Abd ar-Rahman, Mulay (Moroccan sultan), 389
Abd ar-Rahman I (Umayyad emir, Spain), 109
Abd ar-Rahman II b. al-Hakam (Umayyad emir, Spain), 89, 128, 282
Abd ar-Rahman III (Umayyad caliph, Spain), 228
Abd ar-Rahman b. Thabit b. Thawban, 323
Abel, Armand, 455, 459 n. 33
Abel, Félix-Marie, 456 n. 3
Aberdeen (Lord), 466 n. 5
Abitbol, Michel, 468 n. 20
Abraham III of Crete (Armenian bishop), 377, 450
Abu Abd Allah (Almohad ruler), 342
Abu al-Aghlab, 289
Abu Anga (Sudanese official), 261, 433, 437 n. 1, 471 n. 21
Abu l-A'war Amr b. Sufyan al-Sulami (general), 276
Abu-Bakr (caliph), 39, 43–44, 57
Abu Da'ud. *See* Ahmad b. Abu Da'ud
Abu Hanifa (jurisconsult), 234, 325–26, 327 n. 27, 447
Abu Harb Tamim (al-Mubarqa), 117, 336, 337 n. 13
Abu'l Aghlab al-Abbas b. al-Fad'l b. Yakub (emir), 50, 131
Abu l-Hasan al-Maghribi (*qadi*), 132
Abu Ishaq. *See* al-Mu'tasim
Abulyanos (governor, Pentapolis), 271
Abu Nasr (archimandrite), 347
Abu Qasim (jurist), 327

- Abu Sa'id al-Hasan b. Ahmad al-Istakhari (jurist), 329–30 n. 4, 348
 Abu Shuja (vizier, Baghdad), 339
 Abu Ubayd al-Qasim (scholar), 381, 383 n. 2
 Abu Ubayda (general), 44
 Abu Ya'qub Yusuf b. Ya'qub (Marinid caliph), 460 n. 68
 Abu Yazid (Berber Kharijite rebel), 340, 341 n. 2
 Abu Yusuf Ya'qub (jurist), 73, 76, 125, 302, 324, 447, 457 nn. 39 and 41, 458 nn. 14 and 23
 Abyssinians (Christians), 359, 433
 al-Adawi (jurist), 362, 447
 Aghlabid (dynasty), 50
 al-Aghlab, Muhammad (emir), 290
 Agnig. *See* Vartig
 Ahad Ha'am, 204
 Ahmad b. Abu Da'ud (official), 320
 Ahmad b. al-Ajami, Sadr ad-Din (police chief), 359
 Ahmad b. Talib (*qadi*), 340
 Ahrun (priest), 233
 Ainslie, Robert, 389, 452
Airamis, (*House of Airamis*) 347
 AIU (Alliance Israélite Universelle), 160, 162, 441–42, 446, 461 nn. 85 and 87
 AJA (Anglo-Jewish Association), 162
 al-Akram, Fada'il (vizier's secretary), 360
 Ala ad-Din (official), 349
 Albanians, 115, 414, 417–18
 Alexander VII (Pope), 90
 Alexius I Comnenus (Byzantine emperor), 158
 Algerians, 206
 Ali b. Abi-Talib (caliph), 43, 57, 273
 Ali Bey. *See* Badia y Leblich, Domingo
 Ali Pasha, Mehmed Emin (grand vizier), 427
 Alkalay, Judah, 204
Alexandrinus, Thronos (bishops) 315
 Almohads, 50, 89, 229
 Almoravids, 50, 132
 Alp Arslan (Seljuk sultan), 109, 292
 Amatuni, Shapuh (Armenian leader), 274
 Americans, 165, 217, 258
 Amery, Leopold, 468 n. 24
 al-Amin (Abbasid caliph), 116, 336 n. 2
 Amr (rebel), 116
 Amr b. al-As (governor, Egypt), 44, 46–47, 108, 124, 144, 271–72
 Anazi (tribe), 420
 Andronicus III (Byzantine emperor), 67
 Angelov, Dimitar, 456 n. 31, 35, 457–58 n. 11, 458 n. 30, 463 n. 41, 465 nn. 82 and 84
 Anglicans, 163
 Ankori, Zvi, 465 n. 2
 Anna Comnena (Anne de Comnène), 102, 462 n. 3
 Antonian (*comes*, count; son of), 128
 Apsin (general), 317
 Aquelaye (tribe), 116
 Arakel (Armenian catholicos), 364
 Arakel of Tauriz, 375, 450, 459 nn. 34 and 58, 460 nn. 60, 69, 74, 460–61 n. 75, 462 n. 99, 463 n. 35, 464 nn. 65 and 72, 465 n. 78
 Arameans, Aramaic, 35, 36, 58, 77, 213, 224, 231, 233–34
 Araveghian, Katchian (Armenian leader), 274
 Ardzruni (family), 287
 Ardzruni, Ashot (Armenian prince), 286–87
 Ardzruni, Thomas (Armenian historian), 289, 451
 Arghun (Il-Khan), 229, 354–55
 Armenians, 27, 36, 65, 78, 80, 84, 88–90, 92, 97, 102–4, 113, 115, 122–23, 126, (*Patriarch*) 127, 129–31, 141, 142, 143–44, 148, (*Evangelical Canons*) 149, 155, (*Condemnation of Dergumidas*) 156, 159–60, 163, 170, 174, 179, 181, 190–93, 194, 195, (*place of execution*) 196, 197–98, 205, 209–10, 213, 234, 236, (*shot*) 241, 244, 247–49, 251, 256, 258–60, 265, 274, 277, 286, 287, 346, 359 n. 6, (*Bible*) 363, 365, 369, 375, 386, (*Badanadji*) 388, 422, 435, 437–40, 442, (*slaughtered*) 443, 444, (*Lady*) 445, 460 n. 69, 462 nn. 69, 7, and 8, 463 n. 35, 464 n. 78, 467–68 n. 9, 468 n. 18, 469 n. 4
 Arnaldez, Roger, 455 n. 10
 d'Arvieux, Laurent (French consul),

- 79, 81, 83, 85, 90, 92, 380, 458 nn. 25 and 29, 459 n. 34, 39, 48, and 51, 460 n. 73, 461 n. 83
- Asadis (tribe), 107
- Ashkenazim, 205, 258
- Ashtor (Strauss), Eliahu, 456 n. 1, 457 nn. 41, 1, 4, 9, and 11, 461 nn. 79 and 90, 464 n. 49, 465 n. 77, 469 n. 4, 470 n. 1
- Athanasius (notable), 124, 150
- Australians, 440
- Austrians, 177, 189, 248
- Ayalon, David, 455 n. 1
- Ayn ad-Dawla (military commander), 118
- Azamoglan (Child of the Tribute)*, 133
- Azury, Negib, 201
- Badia y Leblich, Domingo, 93, 96, 462 n. 95
- Badr (Bedr) Khan Bey (official), 397
- Badr ad-Din Muhammad al-Qarafi (jurist), 381, 383 n. 1
- Bagarat (prince of Taron), 286–87
- Bagrutuni (Armenian family), 286, 462 n. 8
- Baha ad-Din (Kurdish officer), 351
- al-Bakri (sheikh), 380
- al-Baladhuri (historian), 273, 280, 281, 447, 455 n. 6, 463 n. 22
- Balfour (Declaration), 468 n. 22
- Banu Hilal. *See* Hilalis
- Banu Ijil (tribe), 46
- Banu Nadhir (Jewish tribe), 38, 67, 297
- Banu Qaynuqa (Jewish tribe), 38
- Banu Qurayza (Jewish tribe), 38, 302
- Banu (Beni) Sachar (tribe), 420
- Banu Taghlib (tribe), 88, 107, 231, 300, 302 n. 4
- Banu Tayyi, Taiyaye, Tayiya, Tayyis (tribe), 47, 107, 111–12, 123, 228, 276–77, 283–84, 290–91, 314, 318, 333–36, 344, 457
- Bar Azrun (jurist), 344
- Bar Baihas (Ibn Bayhas, Syrian rebel), 336
- Barbier, Hubert, 471 n. 15
- Bar Daday, John (Manikonian?, Armenian leader), 103
- Baradakjian, Kevork B., 467–68 nn. 2, 10
- Bar Hebraeus (Jacobite historian), 29, 110, 118, 286, 339, (*Map: Candellabrum of the Sanctuaries*) 350, 359, 450, 463 nn. 29 and 30, 464 nn. 48, 50, 52, and 55, 465 nn. 79 and 80, 466 n. 7
- Bar Kochba (Jewish leader), 440
- Bar Qanbara, Theophilactus (patriarch), 150
- Bar Sauma (monk), 344
- Barsoumian, Hagop, 469 n. 4
- Bashan, Eliezer, 463 n. 37
- Bashi-Bazouk (Bozuk), 177
- al-Basri, Hasan b. Abi l'Hasan (notable), 329, 330 n. 3
- Batakovic, Dusan T., 465 n. 86
- Bat Ye'or, 375 n. 3, 407 n. 1, 454 n. 2 (Foreword), 1, 3 and 4 (Intro.), 458 n. 23, 461 nn. 81 and 86, 466 nn. 13 and 15, 467 n. 12, 468 n. 11 and 20, 471 n. 15
- Baumgart, Winfried, 468 n. 10
- Bayazid I (Ottoman sultan), 55, 115, 154, 466 n. 10
- Bayazid II (Ottoman sultan), 247
- Baybars, Rukn-ad-Din (Mamluk sultan), 109, 110
- Bedouins, 37, 39, 44–46, 60, 62, 73–74, 79, 83, 101, 106–7, 125, 131, 256, 299, (*Battle of the Rival Clans*) 332, 395, 397, 420, 441 n. 1
- Belbio (French protégé), 459 n. 40
- Benbassa, Esther, 468 nn. 18, 20 and 21
- Benjamin, Israel Joseph, 461 n. 81
- Ben Yehuda, Eliezer, 204
- Ben Zvi, Yitzhak, 461 n. 89
- Bérard, Victor, 439 n. 1
- Berbers, 43, 48, 50, 79, 89, 102, 107, 109, 228, 340, 456 n. 19
- Bertrandon de la Brocquière (voyager), 460 n. 73, 461 n. 83
- Bettenson, Henry, 465 n. 1
- Betts, Robert Benton, 468 n. 13
- Bey of Tunis (Muhammad), 178
- Beylerian, Arthur, 467 n. 9
- Bialik, Chaim Nahman, 204
- Biamaye (Egyptian Christians), 317–18
- Bird, Isaac, 402
- Biró, Gáspár, 260, 471 n. 15
- Blachère, Régis, 465 n. 77

- Blunt, Charles, 417, 420, 470
 Bodin (Byzantine notable), 283
 Bogomiles, 130
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 200
 de Bonnac (French ambassador), 154
 Bosniacs, 67, 132, 421, (*Pandours*) 422
 Bousquet, Georges Henri, 455 n. 1
 Bowman, Steven B., 465 n. 2
 Brant, James, 401, 404, 407–8, 452
 Braude, Benjamin, 465 n. 2
 Brawer, Abraham Jacob, 466 n. 13
 British (English), 440, 441
 Brophy, Charles A., 432–33
 Brosset, Marie-Félicité, 289 n. 3, 375 n. 2
 Bryce, James, 467 n. 9
 Bryenne, Nicephorus, 456 n. 30
 Buddhists, 234, 358, 359 n. 5
 Budge, Ernest Alfred Thompson Wal-
 lis, 463 n. 29
 Bugha (general), 288–89
 al-Bukhari (el-Bokhari), 447, 454 n. 6,
 455 nn. 9 and 10, 458 nn. 31 and 32,
 460 nn. 62 and 69, 464 n. 69
 Bulgarians, 53, 67, 80, 97, 115, 130,
 132, 146, 152, 163, 170, 174,
 181–82, 184, 187, 189–90, 209–10,
 223, 243, 248, 414, 418, 429
 Bulliet, Richard W., 462 n. 5
 Bulwer, Henry, 401, 407–8, 411–12,
 415, 417, 420–21, 427, 452, 470 n. 4
 Bundists, 205
 Bushr b. Burd (poet), 233
 Bustani, Butrus, 201
 Buyids (dynasty), 235
 Byzantines (Romans), 36, 47, 53, 57,
 61, 65, 73, 82, 107, 109, 115, 117,
 134, 144, 145, 147, 151, 184, 193,
 227, 231, 251, 276, 281, 283–84,
 290, 338, 462 n. 8
 Cahen, Claude, 457 n. 1, 470 n. 7
 Calvert, Charles J., 397, 409, 411–12
 Campbell, Patrick, 452
 Canadians, 440
 Canard, Marius, 463 n. 28, 466 n. 7
 Canning (Lord), 168, 395, 397, 452
 Cantacuzenus, John (Jean), 154, 456 n.
 28, 457 n. 46, 466 n. 9
 Capuchins, 155, 161
 Carmarthen (marquis of), 389, 453
 Carmathians, 107, 228, 231
 Carmelites, 155
 Carré, Olivier, 469 n. 2
 Cartwright, John, 151, 466 n. 6
 Castellan, Georges, 457 n. 43, 467 n. 4
 Catherine II (the Great, empress of
 Russia), 186
 Catholics, 130, 154–58, 179, 181,
 190–91, 249, 258, 425–26
 du Caurroy de la Croix, Adolphe-
 Marie, 455 n. 10
 Cazès, David, 90, 461
 Celebi (Evlia Effendi), 447, 465 n. 83,
 466 n. 10
 Chabot, Jean-Baptiste, 455 n. 8, 457 n.
 3
 Chalcedonians, 58, 143, 145, 150
 Chaldeans, 157, 265, 446
 Chaliand, Gérard, 467 n. 9
 Charlemagne, 153
 Charles-Roux, François, (*Jew and Arme-
 nian*) 142, 380 n. 2, 459 n. 40, 461 n.
 84, 466 n. 11
 Charnay, Jean-Paul, 252, 455 n. 10,
 469 n. 2
 Chouraqui, André Natan, 466 n. 14
 Churchill, Winston Spencer, 468 n. 22
 Circassians, 90, 179, 192, 206
 Cogalnitcheanu, 184
 Cohen, Mark R., 469 n. 6, 470 n. 1
 Comitajis (Bulgarians), 187
 Communists, 205
 Comnenus, Alexius. *See* Alexius I
 Comnenus
 Comnena, Anna. *See* Anna Comnena
 Constans II (Byzantine emperor),
 275 n. 6
 Constantelos, Demetrios J., 456 n. 4,
 465 n. 88
 Constantine I (the Great, Roman em-
 peror), 34, 230
 Constantine V (Byzantine emperor),
 462 n. 8
 Copts, Coptic, 27, 36, 47, 58, (*Evange-
 listary*) 59, 65, (*Annunciation*) 72,
 74–75, 78, 84, 105, 112, 132, 140,
 143–44, 148, 174, 199, 213, 224,
 231, 258, 265, (*fabric*) 319, 417,
 460 n. 72
 Cos, (bishop of), 276
 Cousin, Louis, 456 nn. 29, 30 and 32,
 457 n. 46, 462 nn. 3 and 4, 463 n. 41,
 466 nn. 9 and 10

- Cox, Caroline (Baroness), 471 n. 15
 Christian Solidarity International (CSI), 471 n. 15
 Crusaders, 89, 135, 140, 249, 254
 Cuinet, Vital, 468 n. 19
 Cvijic, Jovan, 28, 247, 258, 454 n. 2, 464–65 nn. 75 and 86, 471 n. 13
 Cyriacus. *See* Kurkuas, Joannes
 Cyrus (patriarch of Alexandria), 144, 271
- Dabinovic, Anthony, 457 n. 45, 464 n. 75
 Dadrian, Vahakn N., 468 n. 10
 al-Damanhuri, Ahmad b. Abd al-Mun'im (theologian), 383, 447
 Dandini, Girolamo, (*Maronite*) 95
 Daniel (biblical), 75
 Davis, Leslie A., 467 n. 9
 Davidson, Roderic H., 466 n. 2, 467 n. 3, 470 n. 2
Delacroix, Eugène, (Giaour and Hasan) 188
 Dennett, Jr. Daniel C., 456 n. 37, 457 n. 42 (chap. 2), 1 and 2, 458 nn. 12 and 20
 Derby (Lord), 430, 431, 432, 452, 459 n. 35, 467 n. 8, 9, 10 and 11
Dergumidas (Condemnation of Armenian priest), 156
 Dinka (Sudanese tribe), 261
 Dionysius of Tell-Mahre (patriarch), 148, 314, 317, 321 nn. 5 and 8, 450
 Dionysius (Denys) of Tell Mahre (pseudo), 73, 75, 78, 82, 116, 124, 144, 281, 313, 380 n. 1, 451, 457 nn. 3, 5, 6, and 10, 458 nn. 15, 19, 21, 24, and 26, 459 n. 37, 462 n. 6
 Disraeli, Benjamin, 163
 Dominicans, 155
 Donner, Fred McGraw, 59, 454 nn. 1 and 3 (chap. 1), 455 n. 7, 455 n. 1, 456 nn. 2, 5, 6, and 7, 457 n. 41, 462 nn. 1 and 2
Doré, Gustave (Hasbeya and Rasheya masses), cover and 402,
 Dreyfus, Alfred, 205
 Druzes, (*at Dayr al-Qamar*) 394, 403, 404
 Dshqal-Oghli (general), 364
 Ducas, Michael (Byzantine historian), 56, 115, 456 nn. 32 and 35, 463 n. 41, 466 n. 10
 Dujcev, Ivan, 97, 457 n. 43
 Dukhy, Mohammed (sheikh of Banu Sacher), 420
 Dulaurier, Edouard, 280, 292 n. 2, 456 nn. 15 and 16
 Dupuis, J. H., 429
 Dussaud, René, 455 n. 1
 Dutch, 83
 Dyophysites, 184
- Egyptians, 57, 98, 109, 123, 141, 143, 275, 316–20, 330, 400
 Eibner, John, 471 n. 15
 Elias Sultan, Khalifalu (official), 365–66
 Elliot, Henry, 176, 428–29, 452, 467 nn. 8, 9 and 11
 Ellul, Jacques, 17, 454 n. 2
 Enver Pasha, 441
 Euphemius (Greek admiral), 145
 Esqutaos (Egyptian leader), 271
 Essad Pasha (governor), 428
 Ethiopian, 234
 Etienne, Bruno, 257, 469 n. 2, 470 n. 11
 Evliya Efendi. *See* Celebi
 Europeans, 68, 159, 165
 Ezra (biblical), 327 n. 3, 395, 398, 411, 421, 438
- Fadhl (governor, Egypt), 317
 Fatimids (dynasty), 112, 153, 228, 231, 337, 381
 Fattal, Antoine, 455 n. 9, 457 n. 1
 Feinberg, Absalom, 441 n. 2
 Février, Louise, 97, 462 n. 97
 Fiey, Jean-Maurice, 347, 459 n. 46
 Finch, Heneage. *See* Winchilsea
 Finn, James, 397–99, 416–17, 452, 468 n. 11
 Fischel, Walter Joseph, 460 n. 75
 de Feriol, Charles (French ambassador), 157
 Fontanier, Victor 467 n. 6
 de Foucauld, Charles, 94, 461 n. 92
 Fouquier, Jean, 83
 Francis, P. (British consular judge), 178, 431, 432–33, 452, 467 n. 11
 Franco, Moïse, 467 n. 6
 Francis I (king of France), 159

- Franck, Louis, 92, 461 n. 82
 Franks, 118, 234, 282, 343
 Freeman, Edward, 81, 177, 430, 431, 452, 459 n. 35, 467 n. 10
 French, 82, 155, 191, 197, 206, 208, 251, 258, 407, 441
 Friedman, Ellen G., 469 n. 3
 Fu'ad Pasha (foreign minister), 401, 408
 Fumey, Eugène, 390
 Gabrieli, Francesco, 456 n. 27
 Gaj, Ljudevit, 184
 Galanté, Abraham, 462 n. 98, 464 n. 72, 471 n. 12
 Ganiage, Jean, 460 n. 63, 468 n. 12, 469 n. 1
 Gannawaye (tribe), 116
 Garji (Gorgi), Mattatya, 391, 450
 Gassi, Macram Max (bishop of El Obeid, Sudan), 471 n. 15
 Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Maurice, 455 n. 12
 Gedaliah of Siemiatyc, 380, 450
 Gellabas (slave traders), 435
 Gemayel, Bashir (president of Lebanon), 28, 454 n. 3
 Georgians, 97–98, 206, 357, 376
 Georgius (patriarch), 150
 Germans, 209–10, 440
 Ghassanids (Christian tribe), 36, 44, 144
 Ghazan (Il-Khan), 235, 358, 359 n. 5
 Ghazi b. al-Wasiti (jurist), 349, 447
 Ghevond (Armenian historian), 275, 450, 313 nn. 1 and 5
 Gibb, Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen, 457 n. 37
 Gidney, William Thomas, 466 n. 12
 Gil, Moshe, 337 n. 13
 Gilbert, Martin, 468 n. 22
 Goddard, Léon (abbé), 390
 Goitein, Shlomo Dov, 380, 458 n. 24, 465 n. 79, 469 n. 7, 470 n. 11
 Goldberg, Harvey E., 461 n. 92
 Goldziher, Ignaz, 457 n. 37
 Gordon, Charles George, 471 n. 17
 Gordon, Judah Leon, 204
 Graham, Cyril, 401, 402, 404
 Granville (Earl), 428, 452, 466 n. 3
 Greeks, 27, 35, 37, 47, 52, 53, 57, 65, 67, 71, 81, 85, 89–90, 99, 109, 115, 117–18, 122, 129–30, 132, 134–35, (*Patriarch*) 137, 143–47, 151–54, 158, 160, 163, 169–70, 172, 174, 176, 180–81, 184–86, 189, 191, 195, 197, 210, 213, 223, 226, 233–34, 243–44, 247–50, 276, 290, 359 n. 6, 386, 389, 399, (*Peasant*) 410, 425–27, 462 n. 98; Greek Orthodox, 130, 134, 143, 146, 154–55, 158, 190–92, 224, 249
 Green D. [David Littman] F. [Yehoshafat Harkabi], 455 n. 10
 Green, William Kirby, 428–29, 452
 Gregoras, Nicephorus (Byzantine historian), 456 n. 31
 Gregorians, 190
 Gregory XV (Pope), 155
 Grignaschi, Mario, 458 n. 31
 von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 457 n. 37
 Guillaume, Alfred, 454–55 nn. 6 and 9
 Guérin, Victor, 466 n. 4
 Guna-Khan (emir), 362, 365

Habakkuk (biblical), 307
 Habib b. Maslama (general), 47, 277
 Habsburgs, 120
 Hacker, Joseph, 369 n. 1
 Hagar (children of, sons of), 77, 277
 Haiduks (Bulgarians), 187
 Haim, Sylvia G., 468 n. 12
 al-Hajjaj (general), 63, 281 n. 1, 458 n. 15
 Hajwal, Zulayka, 460 n. 61
 al-Hakam I (Umayyad emir, Spain), 104, 128
 al-Hakam II (Umayyad caliph, Spain), 228
 al-Hakim (Fatimid caliph), 89, 112, 153, 337, 339 n. 2
 Halpern, Manfred, 469 n. 2
 Hamdanids (dynasty), 107, 231
 Hanbalis, 61, 99. *See* Ibn Hanbal
 Hanafis, 61, 82, 99, 234. *See* Abu Hanifa
 Harkabi, Yehoshafat, 455 n. 10
 Harun al-Rashid (Abbasid caliph), 73, 112, 116, 153, 299, 302 n. 1, 334, 336 n. 2, 337 n. 5
 Harun al-Wathiq (Abbasid caliph), 336–37
 Hasan (chief of Rebi'aye), 336

- Hasan b. Jarrah (chief of Tayy Bedouins), 112
 Hawazin (tribal confederation), 300, 302n. 3
 Henry IV (king of France), 154
 Hentchak (organization), 195
 Heraclius (Byzantine emperor), 36–37, 144
 Herzl, Theodor, 204
 Hess, Moses, 204
 Hetairia Philiké (organization), 187
 Hilalis (tribe), 107
 Hindus, 131
 Hirschberg, Hayyim, Ze'ev (J.W.), 323, 338, 460nn. 61 and 67
 Hisham (Umayyad caliph), 78, 109, 281
 Hitler, Adolf, 198, 207
 Hitti, Philip K., 455 n. 6, 469 n. 9, 470 n. 12
 Hizkiya (poet), 375 n. 3
 Hoeffler, J., 461
 Holmes, William Richard, 170, 427, 453, 459 n. 35, 466 n. 3
 Hospodars (officials), 152, 186
 Houdas, Octave, 455 n. 6
 Hourani, Albert, 468 nn. 12 and 14
 Hourayn b. Ishaq (physician), 233
 Hungarians, 53, 132
 al-Husayn, 272
 al-Husayn b. Ahmad (emir of Sicily), 290
 Hyamson, Albert M., 458 n. 31, 459 n. 36 and 53, 466 n. 13
 Hyspilanti, Alexander, 187
 Iberians, 97
 Ibn Abdun, 341, 447
 Ibn Abitur, Joseph, 112
 Ibn Abi Zayid al-Qayrawani, 295, 447
 Ibn Askar (lexicographer), 361, 448
 Ibn al-Athir (chronicler), 282, 290, 341, 448, 456nn. 20, 24 and 26, 460 n. 68, 463 n. 26
 Ibn Bakhtishu (physician), 233
 Ibn al-Balansi, Ubayd Allah (commander), 282
 Ibn Battuta (voyager), 448
 Ibn Bukhtari (rebel), 104
 Ibn Fadlan, Abu Abdallah b. Yahia (jurist), 348
 Ibn al-Fuwati (historian), 349, 448
 Ibn Hanbal (jurisconsult), 448
 Ibn al-Humam. *See* Kamal b. al-Humam
 Ibn al-Idhari, 456n. 25
 Ibn Ishaq (biographer of Muhammad), 234, 448, 454n. 6
 Ibn Khaldun (historian), 221, 296, 448, 456n. 19, 460nn. 66 and 68, 463 n. 24, 469 n. 1
 Ibn Killis, Ya'qub (vizier), 234
 Ibn Miskawayh (historian), 448
 Ibn al-Muqaffa, Sawirus (Severus), 233, 451, 459 n. 43, 463 n. 14
 Ibn Naghrela, Joseph (Jewish vizier), 229
 Ibn Naghrela, Samuel (Jewish vizier), 228
 Ibn Naqqash (preacher), 330, 448
 Ibn Nujaym (jurist), 383n. 5
 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (theologian), 328, 448
 Ibn Shaprut, Hasday (Jewish vizier), 228
 Ibn Taghribirdi (historian), 360, 448
 Ibn Taymiya, 299, 448, 455 n. 10
 Ibn Tulun (ruler of Egypt, Palestine, Syria), 106
 Ibn Zakri (Moroccan jurist), 361
 Ibn al-Zubayr (rebel), 280, 281 n. 1
 Ibrahim (Emir of Harran), 335
 Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi (ruler of Baghdad), 333, 336 n. 2
 Ibrahim b. Muhammad Ali Pasha, 200
Ichoghiani or Pages, 245
 Idris, Hady Roger, 458 n. 33, 459 n. 42, 462 n. 101, 465 n. 78
 Idris I (Moroccan sultan), 89
 Igan (emir), 110
 Ignatius Afram I Barsum (patriarch), 470 n. 13
 Il-Khans (dynasty), 359
 Inalcik, Halil, 457 n. 11, 464nn., 60, 63, 64 and 72, 464–65 n. 75, 465nn. 81 and 85
 Iohandjan (brother of Arakel, the catholicos), 364
 Isa, 334
 Isaac (Jewish notable), 339
 Israelis, 223, 243, 249
 al-Istakhari. *See* Abu Sa'id al-Hasan Isulv (general), 292

- Italians, 201
 Iyadayites (tribe), 320
- al-Jabarti (el-Djabarti), Abd al-Rahman (historian), 381, 447
 Jabir b. Abdallah (hadith compiler), 297
 Jacobites, 33, 36–37, 50, 121, 126, 143–45, 155, 157, 159, 179, 197, 229–32, 235–36, 308, 347 n. 2, 359 n. 1, 470 n. 13
Jalal ad-Din (Khwarazm-Shah), (Battle of Bolnisi) 357
 Janissaries, 115, 132, 187, 234, (*A Janissary*) 238, 245
 Jarrahites (tribe), 107
 Jelalis (rebels), 120, 367, 369
 Jelavich, Barbara and Charles, 467 n. 4
 Jesuits, 155, 200
 Jesus of Nazareth, 440
 Jews, Jewish, 62–63, 65, 68, 71, 73, 77–80, 82, 84, 99, 107, 110–13, 117, 121, 126, 129, 131, 140–41, (*Jew and Armenian*) 142, 143–45, 148, 150, 154, 157–61, (*Damascus Blood Libel*) 161, 162–64, 167, 174, 181, 184, 192, 198, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209–10, 219, 227–34, 237, 244, 246, 256, 297, 309, 325, 327–30, 335, 337, 339–40, 354, 358, 359 n. 5, 360, 369–75, 377–80, 383, (*A Jew*) 387, 415–16, 455 n. 6, 459 n. 40
 Jirak (commander), 288
 Joel (biblical), 289
 Johannes. *See* Obadyah the Proselyte
 St. John of Damascus, 124, 144, 231
 John of Damietta (prefect), 47
 John of Nikiou (Coptic bishop and historian), 46–47, 138, 144, 450, 456 n. 9, 465 n. 88
 Joseph (Armenian priest), 343
 Joseph, John, 467 n. 13, 470 n. 13
 Joseph (patriarch), 317
 Joshua (biblical), 296, 365
 Judeans, 141
 Judhamis (tribe), 107
 Julian (*comes*, count), 145
 Justinian (Byzantine emperor), 94, 143, 256–58, 265
 Juvaini, Ata-Malik (historian), 357
 Kalbis (tribe), 49, 107
 Kamal ad-Din Muhammad b. al-Humam (jurist), 381, 383
 Kamal, Yusuf, 232, 315
 Kara George (ruler of Serbia), 187
 Karaites, 148, 151
 Karajich, Vuk, 184
 Karaveloff, Ljuben, 184
 Karpat, Kemal H., 466 n. 4
 Kedourie, Elie, 461 n. 86
 Kelaun. *See* Qala'un
 Kemalists, 220
 Kennedy, Hugh, 454 nn. 4 and 5, 455 n. 1, 462 n. 1, 463 n. 21, 464 n. 42
 Kepel, Gilles, 469 n. 2
 Kerim (Karim) Pasha, 395
 Khadduri, Majid, 455 n. 10
 Khalid b. Walid (general), 47, 144, 234
 Khalifat al-Mahdi. *See* al-Ta'ashi
 Khalifalou Elias Sultan. *See* Elias
 Khalil b. Zadan (official), 306
 de Khanikoff, N., 391 n. 1
 Kharbanda (commander), 353
 Kharijites, 109
Khatchadur (painter), (Armenian Bible) 363
 al-Khawarizmi (magus), 233
 Khazai al-Aryan (Druze chief), 401
 Khazin (family), 201
 Khomeini, Ruhollah (ayatollah), 216, 455 n. 10
 Khosroes (Kesra), 233, 273
 Khurasan, Slar (general), 292
 Khurasanians (troops), 104
 al-Khuri, Khalil, 201
 Kiani Pasha (governor), 418
 Kilij Arslan II (Seljuk sultan), 132
 Kiprisli Pasha, Mehmed (grand vizier), 415
 Klein, Samuel, 184
 Klephtes (Greek rebels), 187
 ha-Kohen, Mordechai, 461 n. 92
 Köprülü, Mehmed Pasha (grand vizier), 384
 Köprülü, Fazil Ahmed Pasha (grand vizier), 384
 Korais, Adamantios, 184
Krikonis of Aght'amar (painter), (Romance of Alexander) 368
 Kurds, 63, 79, 98, 117–20, 125, 192–93, 197, 236, 345–47, 350–51

- Kurkuas (*domestikos*), Joannes, 291, 292 n. 3
- Kutlu (Qutlu) Beg (emir), 347, 349
- Kyrris, Costas P., 465 n. 87
- Labourt, Jérôme, 455 n. 1
- Lakhmids (Christian tribe), 36, 144
- Landau, Jacob M., 467 n. 6
- Laoust, Henri, 455 n. 10
- Lapidus, Ira M., 460 n. 72
- Latins, 52, 129, 146, 158, 227, 251, 398
- Laurent, Joseph, 463 n. 12, 466 n. 7
- Lazarists, 155, 200
- Lebanese, 213
- Lebel, Roland A., 460 n. 61
- Le Hay, Jacques, (Dergumidas) 156, (Suluk Bashi) 385*
- Leo the Great (Pope), 143
- Leo III the Isaurian (Byzantine emperor), 126, 281
- Lepsius, Johannes, 467 n. 9
- Leven, Narcisse, 466 n. 14
- Leveson-Gower, George. *See* Granville
- Lévi-Provençal, Evariste, 455 n. 10, 456 nn. 22 and 23, 458 n. 22, 469 n. 4, 470 n. 1
- Levtzion, Nehemiah, 462 n. 5, 464 n. 49
- Levy, Reuben, 457 n. 37
- Lewis, Bernard, 465 n. 2, 466 n. 2, 470 n. 1
- Little, Donald P., 460 n. 72
- Littman, David Gerald, 161, 455 n. 10, 461 n. 85, 461–62 n. 94, 462 n. 96
- Loeb, Laurence D., 461 nn. 75, 87, and 90, 462 n. 96, 470 n. 13
- Løkkegaard, Frede, 456 n. 37, 457 nn. 1 and 5
- Longworth, J.A., 412, 415
- Lortet, Louis, (St. John Baptist Church) 86*
- Lutherans, 157
- Maccabees, 440
- MacDonald, Duncan Black, 455 n. 10
- Macler, Frederic, 467 n. 9
- al-Maghili, 360–61, 448
- Maghribis, 85
- Magians, 309, 322, 382
- al-Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad (ruler of Sudan) 84, 89, 150, 260–61, 336, 437 n. 4, 471 nn. 16 and 17
- Mahmed. *See* Muhammad b. Marwan
- Mahmud II (Ottoman sultan), 169, 191, 462 n. 98
- Mahmud Pasha (grand vizier), 176
- Maimonides, Moses (physician, philosopher), 229
- Malik (brigand), 336
- Malik b. Anas (jurisconsult), Maliki, 61, 328–29, 330 n. 1, 448
- Malik Salih (governor, Mosul), 89, 346–47
- al-Maliki, Abu Bakr (historian), 340, 449
- Malmesbury (Earl), 397–99, 453
- Mamikonian(?), John. *See* Bar Daday
- Mamikonian, Musheg (Armenian leader), 103
- Mamikonians, 462 n. 8
- Mamluks, 89, 109–10, 140, 234, 346, 351
- al-Ma'mun (Abbasid caliph), 79, 84, 112, 116, 129, 131–32, 148, 233, 284, 316, 318, 333–34, 336–37 nn. 2 and 7
- Manicheans, 36, 89, 309
- Mann, Jacob, 469 n. 6
- al-Mansur (Abbasid caliph), 74, 78, 88, 104, 131, 233, 305, 313
- al-Mansur, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub (Almohad ruler), 342
- Mansur b. Sarjun (Byzantine prefect), 144
- Mantran, Robert, 470 n. 5
- Ma'oz, Moshe, 466 nn. 2 and 5
- al-Maqrizi, Taqi ad-Din (historian), 449, 460 n. 71, 463 n. 29
- Marçais, William, 455 n. 6
- Maronites, 83, 92, (*Jerusalem*) 95, 150, 163, 176, 195, 200–201, 265
- al-Marrakushi (historian), 342, 449
- Marwan b. al-Hakam (I, Umayyad caliph), 88, 279–80
- Marwan al-Himar (II, Umayyad caliph), 78, 102, 150, 279–80
- Masarjawayh (physician), 233
- Maslama b. Abd al-Malik (general), 48, 154, 281
- Massalit (Sudanese tribe), 435
- Mas'ud (Seljuk sultan of Iconium), 118, 132
- Mas'ud II (Seljuk sultan), 351

- Matthew of Edessa (Armenian author), 292, 451, 463 n. 28
 Maurand, Jérôme, 459 n. 56
 al-Mawardi (jurist), 449
 al-Mawsili, Ibrahim (musician), 234
 Maximos (Gr. Catholic patriarch), 466 n. 5
 Mayers, S., 415
 Maysur (Fatimid general, Ifriqiyya), 340, 341 n. 2
 Mazdeans, 33
 Mechitarists, 184, 190
 Mdjmđj, Medjmđj (general), 292
 Melchites, 36–37, 47, 121, 124, 126, 131, 134, 143–44, 150, 153, 159, 199, 200–201, 229–31, 296
 Mehmed II (Ottoman sultan), 55, 130
 Mehmed Bek (*ehitim al-dawla*, minister), 369–73
 Mesopotameans, 123
 Meyendorff, Jean, 465 n. 88
 Michael VI Stratioticus (Byzantine emperor), 291
 Michael the Syrian, 39, 47, 55, 77, 81, 83, 87, 98, 124, 144–45, 148, 284, 291, 293, 320, 346, 380, 451, 455 n. 8, 456 nn. 11, 18, 21, 28, and 34, 457 n. 38, 458 nn. 13 and 16, 459 nn. 37 and 41, 460 nn. 59 and 65, 462 n. 100, 463 n. 13, 25 and 32, 464 nn. 42, 43, 54, 68 and 73, 465 n. 3
 Miège, Jean-Louis, 469 n. 1
 Miles, George Cable, 456 n. 27
Minas of Vaspurican (painter), 270 (*St. Mark*)
 Mirdasids (dynasty), 231
 Mirza-Satgh (governor), 374
 Mitchell, Richard P., 469 n. 2
 Mitev, Iono, 457 n. 43, 461 n. 77, 462 n. 98, 470 n. 14
 Mleh (Armenian leader), 292 n. 3
 Moldo-Wallachians, 186
 Mongols, 53, 89, 119, 140, 235, 254, 346, 353, 358
 Monophysites, 33–36, 44, 46–47, 57–58, 63, 65, 99, 124, 126, 134–35, 143–45, 150, 154–55, 157–58, 184, 190–91, 198, 224
 Montefiore, Moses, (*Damascus Blood Libel*) 161, 163, 467 n. 7
 Moore, Niven, 399
 Moors, 283
 Mordechai (biblical), 111
 Mordechai Hakohen, *See* ha-Kohen, Mordechai
 Morison, Antoine, 93, 459 n. 52, 461 n. 84
 Moroccans, 206
 Morony, Michael, 454 n. 2, 456 n. 8, 457 nn. 40 and 42, 458 n. 14, 460 n. 64
 Moses (biblical), 296, 365, 440
 Mozarabs, 128
 Mu'awiya (Umayyad caliph), 47, 48, 131, 275–77
 al-Mu'ayyad Sayf-ad-Din (Mamluk sultan), 359, 360 n. 1
 al-Mudabbir, Muhammad, 84
 al-Mughira (general), 57
 Muhammad (Prophet), 37–40, 44, 61–62, 71, 81, 91, 115, 121, 234, 246, 261, 273, 277–80, 297–302, 326–30, 351, 455 nn. 6, 9 and 10
 Muhammad I b. Abd ar-Rahman (Umayyad emir of Spain), 89, 282
 Muhammad b. Abd Allah b. al-Aghlab (emir of Sicily), 290
 Muhammad IV (Ottoman sultan), 384
 Muhammad Ali Pasha (ruler of Egypt), 113, 167, 178, 191, 199
 Muhammad b. Marwan (Mahmed) (general), 88, 279, 280 nn. 3 and 4
 Muhammad b. Tahir (emir), 314
 al-Mu'izz (Fatimid caliph), 234
 Mujahid, 272
 al-Muktafi (Abbasid caliph), 118
 al-Muqtadi (Abbasid caliph), 339
 al-Muqtadir bi-Amrallah (Abbasid caliph), 348
 Murad I (Ottoman sultan), 53, 132
 Murad III (Ottoman sultan), 464 n. 72
 Murray, John, 386, 453
 Musa (son of Ottoman sultan, Bayazid I), 55
 Musa b. Musab (governor of the Jazira), 312, 313 n. 2
 Musa b. Nusayr (general), 109
 Muscovites, 90
 Muslim (*hadith* compiler), 81, 449, 455 nn. 9 and 10, 458 n. 32, 460 n. 69

- Mustafa III (Ottoman sultan), 384, 386
- al-Musta'in (Abbasid caliph), 104
- al-Mustansir (Fatimid caliph), 153
- al-Mu'tasim (Abbasid caliph), 48, 82, 87, 109, 117–18, 282–83, 284n. 1, 318, 335–36
- al-Mutawakkil (Abbasid caliph), 84, 104, 233, 286, 337, 339n. 1, 348
- al-Mu'tazz (Abbasid caliph), 104
- Nadir khan (shah of Persia), 375, 377n. 1
- Nahum, Haim (effendi), 463n. 39, 467n. 5, 468n. 18
- Naipul, Vidiadhar Swiajprasad, 240, 470n. 15
- Napoleon III (French emperor), 200
- Nasr ad-Din Qajar (shah of Persia), 390
- Nasir ad-Din Allah (Abbasid caliph), 348
- Nasr b. Shabat al-Uqayli (rebel), 79, 116–17, 129, 333–34
- Nau, François, 454n. 2, 455n. 1, 456n. 6, 460n. 64
- Nawruz (officer), 356, 359n. 5
- Nebuchadnezzar (king of Babylon), 440
- de Nerval, Gérard, 98
- Nestorians, 33–37, 44, 58, 63, 65, 74, 80, 85, 90, 92, 107, 118–19, 121, 126, 129, 131, 134, 140, 143–44, 154, 157–59, 197, 198, 224, 229–31, 233, 235, 258, 296, 335, 344, 350, 353
- Nicetas, 102, 462n. 4
- Nicholas II (tsar of Russia), 196
- Niebuhr, Karsten, 461n. 84
- Nikiou. *See* John of Nikiou
- Nili (organization), 441
- Ninevites, 359
- Nujaym, Bulus, 201
- Numayris (tribe), 107
- Nur ad-Din Mahmud (son of Zangi), 98, 111, 118, 344–45
- Nuraus (Coptic notable), 380
- al-Nuwayri (en-Noweiri), 456n. 27, 463n. 24
- Obadyah the Proselyte (Johannes), 339–40, 451
- Obadyah (Persian Jew), 371
- Obradovic, Dimitriji, 184
- Oghuz (tribe), 53
- Omer Pasha, Serder Ekrem (general and governor), 421, 423, 430
- Orkhan (Ottoman sultan), 53, 66, 76, 113
- Oppas (archbishop of Seville), 145
- Osborne, Francis. *See* Carmarthen
- Osman Bey (official), 404
- Osman Ghazi b. ErtoghriI (Ottoman sultan), 53, 66, 75
- Osman Pasha (official), 426
- Osman Wad Adam (Sudanese slave-trader), 433, 437n. 2
- Ottomans, 53, (*Map: The Ottoman Empire*) 54, 65, 68, 70, 76–77, 86, 97–98, 120, 129, 132, 217, 252, 364, 409, 411, 413–14, 431, 438
- Pahlavi, Reza (shah of Persia), 68; Pahlavi dynasty, 216
- Palmer, J. A. B., 471n. 14
- Palmerston (Lord), 168
- Panayotov, Lubomir, 457n. 43
- Parfitt, Tudor, 466n. 13
- Pasdermadjian, Hrand, 461n. 81
- Pennel, C. Richard, 469n. 3
- Perlmann, Moshe, 460nn. 67 and 72, 461n. 80
- Péroncel-Hugoz, Jean-Pierre, 469n. 2
- Perperean, Avedis, 463n. 38
- Persians, 27, 37, 43, 46, 57, 61, 71, 117, 141, 231, 234, 316–19, 334, 362, 460n. 69
- Peters, Rudolph, 455n. 10
- Petrus (deacon), 291
- Phanariots (Greek), 152, 186, 189, 256
- Pharaoh (biblical), (*Pharaoh on his Throne*) 64, 298
- Phocas (Byzantine emperor), 37
- Picquet, François, 157
- Pierotti, Ermete, (Church of the Holy Sepulchre)* 168
- Pinsker, Leo, 204
- Pipes, Daniel, 463nn. 22, 23, 34 and 41, 469n. 2
- Pitt, William (earl of Chatham), 384, 453
- de Planhol, Xavier, 458n. 58, 462nn. 1 and 4, 466n. 4
- Poles, 90

- Poliak, Abraham N., 455 n. 1, 457 n. 41
 Policarius (Greek Orthodox patriarch), 191
 Porter, J., 384, 453
 Pragai, Michael, 468 n. 17
 Presbyterians, 200
 Prince of Wales, 87
 Protestants, 157, 167, 179, 181, 190, 255, 258, 425
- al-Qahir (Abbasid caliph), 348
 Qala'un (emir). *See* Sayf-ad-Din Qala'un
 Qara Arslan (emir of Hesna) 342–44
 al-Qarafi. *See* Badr ad-Din Muhammad
 Qasim (governor of Armenia), 279, 280 n. 3
 al-Qasim Abu Ubayd. *See* Abu Ubayd
 Qasim b. Qutlubugha (jurist), 381, 383 n. 3
 Qays(ites) (tribe), 49, 104, 116
 Qudama b. Ja'far (jurist), 234
 Quraysh (tribe), 61, 333
 Qutb ad-Din (Zangid atabeg), 344
- Rabi (*comes*), 128
 Rabi'aye (Bahrayn tribe), 336, 337 n. 10
 Radulesco, 184
 Raja b. Ayyub (commander), 336
 Rakovskii, George, 184
 Ratti-Menton (count, French consul), 160
 Razin (official), 312, 314 n. 9
 Recafred (bishop of Seville), 128
 Reshtuni, Theodore (general), 274–75
 Rey, Francis, 466 n. 11
 Richards, Donald Sidney, 465 n. 79
 Riley, James, 461 n. 85
 Ridwan Katkoda, 380
 Ristelhueber, René, 467 n. 4
 Romanus III (Byzantine emperor), 153
 Romanus IV (Byzantine emperor), 153
 Romans, 141. *See also* Byzantines
 Rose, Hugh Henry, 173, 395, 397, 453, 466 n. 5
 Rosenthal, Erwin Isaac Jacob, 470 n. 9
 Roslin, Thoros (*painter*), (*Fourth Gospel*) 149
 Rothschilds, 163
- Rumanians, 169–70, 174, 186, 189–91, 243, 248
 Russell, John (Lord), 407, 416–17, 453
 Russians, 157, 170, 186, 191, 209–10, 213, 248, 398, 409, 415
- Sa'ad ad-Dawla (Jewish vizier), 229, 354, 356
 Sa'ad ad-Din, Shihab (emir), 404
 Sa'ad b. Mu'adh, 302
 Sa'd b. Abi Wakkas (general), 272
 Sabari, Simha, 465 n. 89
 Sabeans, 309, 322, 324 n. 1, 348
 Sabib (commander), 334
 Sabunji (Christian treasurer), 124
 al-Sadat, Anwar, 216
 Safavids, 112, 369
 al-Saffah (Abbasid caliph), 150, 313 n. 1
 Sahak (Armenian prince), 287
 Sa'id (rabbi), 371
 Salah ad-Din (Saladin)(Ayyubid sultan), 118
 Salibi, Kamal S., 464 n. 49
 Samaritans, 44, 141, 143, 164, 309, 322, 360
 Samné, Georges, 201
 Samuel of Ani (Armenian author), 292, 451
 Sandalaya, Athanasius (patriarch), 150
 Sassanids, 33, 35, 77, 143
 Sasson, D., 441–42, 446
 Sayf al-Dawla (Hamdanid emir), 49
 Sayf-ad-Din Qala'un al-Alfi (Mamluk sultan), 110
 Schacht, Joseph, 455 n. 10, 457 n. 37
 Scheiber, Alexander, 458 n. 24
 Scolarius (George Gennadios), 130
 Sefaradim, 258
 Selim I (Ottoman sultan), 114
 Selim II (Ottoman sultan), 464 n. 72
 Seljuks, 53, 66, 89, 118, 120, 132, 192, 217, 235, 292, 369
 Sémach, Yomtob David, 86, 96, 461 nn. 87 and 88
 Sepeos (Sébéos), 275, 451, 456 n. 16
 Serbs, 53, 67, 115, 130, 132, 134, 146, 152, 163, 169–70, 174, 182, 189, 243, 248, 258, 424
 Sergius (patriarch of Constantinople), 44
 Seton-Watson, Robert William, 467 n. 8

- Sfez, Samuel (Batto), 88
 al-Shabrawi, Abdallah (sheikh), 380
 al-Shafi'i (jurisconsult), Shafites, 61, 99, 449
 Shaftesbury (Lord), 163
 Shakir Pasha (chief commissioner), 437
 Shaler, William, 469n. 3
 Sharon, Moshe, 375 n. 3, 455 n. 1, 456 n. 4
 Shaw, Ezel Kural, 466 n. 1, 470 nn. 2, 5 and 6
 Shaw, Stanford Jay, 466 nn. 1 and 4, 470 nn. 2, 5 and 6
 al-Shaybani (jurist), 449, 455 n. 10
 Shaybanis (tribe), 107
 Shenuti I (Coptic patriarch), 105
 Shi'tes, 116
 Shilluks (tribe), 261, 435
 Shmuelevitz, Aryeh, 459 n. 34, 464 n. 72, 469 n. 3
 Sind b. Ali (astronomer), 233
 Sinisaya (people of Sasun), 291, 292 n. 4
 al-Siqilli, Jawhar (general), 234
 Sisebut (Vizigoth king), 144
 Sivan, Emmanuel, 455 n. 10, 469 n. 2
 Skene, James Henry, 401, 420, 421, 453
 Slatin, Rudolf C., 260–61, (*Slave Dhow*) 262, (*Slave Market*) 434, 437, 471 n. 17
 Slavs, Slavonic, 27, 52, 65, 67, 122, 129–30, 134, 146, 152, 163, 176, 181, 184, 186, 190, 195, 206, 209–10, 224, 234, 250–51, 258–59
 Slousch(z), Nah(o)um, 93, 96, 461 nn. 86, 92 and 94
 Smith, William Cantwell, 469 n. 2
 Sokolovic, Mehmed (grand vizier), 134
 Solomon (biblical), 75
 Sophronius (patriarch of Jerusalem), 44
 Sourdrel, Dominique & Janine, 457 n. 37, 462 n. 1, 464 n. 42
 Spanish, 27, 89, 130, 164, 181, 224, 249
 Spicehandler, Ezra, 460
 Stavrianos, Leften Stavros, 467 n. 4
 Stanley, Edward. *See* Derby
 Stratford de Redcliffe (Viscount). *See* Canning
 Sugar, Peter F., 467 n. 4
 Sulayman b. Yasar, 272
 Sulayman (Umayyad caliph), 281
 Sulaymanaye, Sulaimanites (Banu Sulaym), 116, 333
 Suleyman (son of Orkan), 53
 Suleyman II (Ottoman sultan), 159, (*Battle of Mohacs*) 294
 Sunnis, 116
 Suraya Pasha (governor), 417
 Suwayad (family of): Wadhkoki, Nafis (goldsmith), 347
 Syriac(s), 27, 52–53, (*Pharaoh*) 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 73, 78, 102, 112, 150, 155, 199, 213, (*Encyclopaedia*) 232, 233, 236, (*Habakkuk*) 307, (*Bar Hebraeus*) 350, 359 n. 6
 Syrians, 57, 74–75, 82, 84, 122–23, 126, 131, 141, 179, 184, 231, 277, 306, 397, 403
 al-Ta'ashi, Abdullah (Khalifat al-Mahdi) (ruler of Sudan), 260, 437 n. 4, 471 nn. 16 and 17
 al-Tabari (historian), 233, 449, 455 n. 10, 463 n. 25
 Taghlibis. *See* Banu Taghlib
 Tagritanaye, Tigritanians, 351
 Tahir b. al-Husayn (officer), 333, 336 n. 1
 Tahir Pasha, 399
 Taiyaye, Tayiya, Tayyis (tribe). *See* Banu Tayyi
 Tadjiks (Arabs), 277, 287–88
 Tama (tribe), 435
 Tamerlane (Tamerlang), 235, (*T. Takes Tiflis fortress*) 376
 Tamim. *See* Abu Harb
 al-Tamimi, Sawada (emir), 290
 Tamimis (tribe), 107
 Tanukhis (tribe), 89, 107
 Taqi ad-Din Umar (governor of Armenia), 118
 Tatars, 347, 350
 Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste, 85, 87, 90, 112, 380, 459 nn. 50 and 57, 460 n. 74, 461 n. 78, 463 nn. 35 and 36
 Ternon, Yves, 467 n. 9
 Theodore (general), 271–72
 Theodosius (general), 271

- Theodosius (bishop of Edessa), 314, 316, 321 n. 5
- Theophilus, 284
- Thevet d'Angoulesme, André, (Devshirme, Slavery) 114, (Azamoglan) 133, (Ichoghiani) 245, (Recaptured Christian Slaves) 253*
- Thomas (bishop of Arwad), 276
- Thomas (Father), (Damascus Blood Libel) 161*
- Thynne, Thomas. *See* Weymouth
- Titus (Roman emperor), 440
- Todorov, Nicolay, 459 n. 50
- Tritton, Arthur Stanley, 457 n. 1
- Tuchman, Barbara W., 468 nn. 17, 24
- Tughril Beg (Seljuk sultan), 118, 290, 292
- Tummal, Zeki (officer, Sudan), 261, 433, 435, 437 n. 1, 471 n. 21
- Turan, Osman, 462 n. 3, 463 n. 28, 464 n. 51, 465 n. 79
- Turkomans, 49, 102, 118, 120, 122, 235, 345–46, 351, 458 n. 30
- Turks, 27, 52, 53, 55, 63, 65–66, 76–77, 79, 85, 89, 95, 100, 102, 117–19, 125, 130, 132, 133, 135, 146, 152, 189, 195, 196, 209–10, 226, 235–36, 245, 249–50, 283–84, 290–92, 343, 350, 378, 386, 389, 401, 409, 411–14, 418–21, 422, 423–24, 426, 429–30, 433, 471 n. 21
- Tyan, Emile, 455 n. 10
- Ubayd Allah. *See* Ibn al-Balansi
- Ubicini, Abdolonyme, 129, 181, 220, 226, 461 n. 91, 464 n. 67, 467 nn. 1 and 7, 469 n. 4
- Udilak, Jean, 177
- Umar b. Abd al-Aziz (II, Umayyad caliph), 61, 81, 83, 88, 138, 281 n. 4, 323, 328–30, 459 n. 37
- Umar Ibn al-Khattab (I, caliph), 39, 43, 46–47, 57, 59, 61–63, 77, 80, 101, 125, 138, 274, 281, 298–302, 323–25, 329–30 n. 5, 348
- Umayyads, 43, 58, 60, 63, 69, 72–73, 84, 102, 106, 108, 116–17, 124, 129, 138, 185, 192, 202–3, 230, 233, 272–73
- Uqaylids (tribe), 107
- Urwat b. Naj, 329
- Uthman (ruler in Syria), 333
- Uthman b. Affan (caliph), 43, 57, 59, 101
- Uthman b. Hunayf al-Ansari, 322
- Vacalopoulos, Apostolos E., 457 n. 44, 463 n. 40, 464 n. 62, 469 n. 4, 471 n. 13
- St. Vahan of Gogh'ten (Armenian martyr), 280
- Vajda, Georges, 458 n. 28, 461 n. 79, 470 n. 14
- Vahevonni, Theodosius (Armenian leader), 274
- Vanmour, Jean-Baptiste, (Dergumidas) 156*
- Vardan (Armenian historian), 281 n. 1, 451
- Varinika, Nouri Aga, 177
- Vartig (prince), 275
- Vasiliev, Alexander Alexandrovich, 456 nn. 20, 24 and 26, 470 n. 10
- Velestinlis, Rhigas, 184
- Velkov, Velizar, 457 n. 43
- Viaud, Pierre, 454 n. 3
- Victoria (queen of England), 470
- de Vogüé, Charles Jean Melchior, (Airamis House) 34, (Chaqqa Convent) 80, (St. Simeon Church) 122, (Qalb-Luzeh Church) 273*
- de Volney, Constantin François, 205, 468 n. 19
- Vryonis, Speros Jr., 56, 369 n. 1, 456 n. 36, 458 n. 27 and 30, 459 n. 47, 460 n. 70, 464 n. 51, 465 n. 79, 466 n. 8
- Wa'il (Christian tribe), 302
- al-Walid I (Umayyad caliph), 84, 88, 131, 138, 280
- Walid (Christian secretary), 314
- al-Walid b. Salih, 272
- Wallachian (Rumanian), 182
- al-Wathiq (Abbasid caliph), 284, 337
- Watt, William Montgomery, 457 n. 37, 469 n. 2
- Weissman, Nahoum, 463 n. 41
- Werry, Frank Howard Stephen, 395, 453
- Weymouth (Viscount), 276, 386, 453
- William II (German emperor), 439, 441 n. 1
- Wilson, Charles, 459 n. 55

- Winchilsea (earl of), 384, 452
 Witizia (Visigoth king), 145
 Witteck, Paul, 223, 458n. 30, 459n. 47,
 463n. 40, 464n. 70, 469n. 2 (chap.
 9), 471n. 14
 Wolff, Joseph, 96, 426n. 96
 Wooley, C. Z., 441

 Xavière, Jean-Marie, 455n. 10

 Yahya (imam of Yemen), 89
 Yaqdan, 314
 Ya'qub Arslan, 118
 al-Ya'qubi (historian), 465n. 76
 Yaqut (geographer), 234
 Yazid II (Umayyad caliph), 82, 131,
 459n. 37
 Yazid b. Usayd, 281
 Yemenites, 116–17, 334

 Young Turks, 195, 467n. 9
 Young, Wilkie, 461
 Yuhanna b. Masawayh (physician), 233
 Yusuf b. Abu Seth (emir), 286–88

 az-Zahir (Fatimid caliph), 154
 Zanj, Zotaye (black slaves), 321n. 9
 Zangi, Imad-ad-Din, 112
 Zankoff, 184
 Zawili, Ayyub (officer), 340
 Zaydan, Jurji, 201
 Zionists, 204–5, 249
 Zohrab, James, 421, 426–27
 Zoroastrians, 27, 29, 33, 38, 58, 63, 65,
 69, 121, 128–29, 135, 148, 231,
 233–34, 264, 322, 470
 Zotaya (rebel slaves), 318–21
 Zubeir Pasha, Rahama (Sudan), 261
 Zurayq, Qustantin, 201
 Zwemer, Samuel Marinus, 460n. 61

Index of Places

Page numbers and captions in italics refer to illustrations

- Aboit, 46, 47
 Abu Ghosh, 206
 Abyssinia, 433, 435
 Acre, 421
 Adamakert, 286
 Adana, 109, 110, 132, 195
 Adhorbijan. *See* Azerbaijan
 Adrianople (Edirne), 132, 429
 Adriatic, 146
 Aegina (island), 50
 Afghanistan, 33, 97, 390
 Africa, 52, 116, 139, 158, 172, 198, 215, 216, 219, 252; Africa, Black, 113, 260, 321 n. 9; Africa, North, 34, 35, 43, 48–49, 60, 63, 80–81, 89, 92–94, 96–98, 101, 107–8, 140, 144, 152–53, 159, 162, 164, 175, 178, 198–99, 210, 228, 229, 234, 342 n. 1, 360, 389
 Aghbak (Armenian canton), 286, 289 n. 1, 367
 Aghdja-Ghala. *See* Yervandashat
 Aghdznik (Greater Armenia), 275, 289 n. 5
 Agh'iovit, 274
 Aghovania, 97
 Aght'amar: (*Krikonis: Church of Holy Cross*) 278, 368
 Akhmul (monastery), 118
 Alashkert, 367
 Alava, 282
 Albania, 55, 97, 414
 Aleppo (Berrhoe), 47, 48, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89, 107, 111, 155, 157, 231, 320, 336 n. 3, 344, 348, 395–97, 399, 420, 459 n. 40, 461 n. 84, 466 n. 5
 Alexandretta, 85
 Alexandria, 35, 104, 105, 106, 144, 197, 227, 230–32, 272, (*Thronos Alexandrinos*) 315, 321
 Algiers, 85
 Algeria, 68, 96, 172, 178, 198, 200
 Amanus. *See* Maurus
 America, 176, 217, 219, 265
 Amid. *See* Diyarbakir
 Amkabad (Ainkawa, near Arbil), 351
 Amorium, 48, 109, 131, 277, 281 n. 1, 282
 Anatolia, 29, 43, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 65, 66, 76, 85, 87, 90, 99, 102, 108, 112, 113, 118, 120–22, 132, 146, 152, 154, 155, 172, 181–93, 217, 227, 235, 244, 247, 255, 275, 282, 458 nn. 27 and 30
 Andalusia, 81, 84, 89, 104, 109, 128, 132, 228, 229, 244, 256, 340
 Andorra, 282 n. 1
 Ani, 109, (*Church of St. Gregory*) 285, 292, 367
 Ankara (Ancyra), 109, (*Armenians shot*) 241
 Ansaireh (mountains), 401
 Antioch, 35, 47, 48, 89, 107, 110, 111, 118, 145, 197, 231, 281 n. 2, 318, 333
 Apahunik, 288
 Aparan, 367
 Aqhdja-Qala. *See* Yervandashat
 Arab Gulf states, 468 n. 25
 Arabia, 33, 35, 36, 37, 43, 46, 49, 56, 57, 107, 121, 122, 125, 128, 148, 172, 198, 217, 228, 243, 263, 302, 420, 457 n. 6
 Ararat, 120, 274, 275 n. 3 (Mount), 285, 362, 367, 375
 Araxes (river), 88, 275 n. 5, 280 n. 2, 364–66
 Arbil (Arbela), 119, 235, 347, 349–51, 358
 Archipelago, 55

- Ardavel (Ardabil), 374
 Ardjesh, 367
 Argni, 292
 Arhovank, 288
 al-Arish, 46
 Armenia, 29, 33, 34, 43, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 60, 73, 87, 90, 102, 104, 108, 109, 111, 112, 118, 120, 121, 123, 132, 133, 140, 146, 151, 154, 158, 172–75, 176, 179, 181, 184, 192–99, 205, 230, 234, 240, 249, 274–77, 279–81, 286–87, 289n. 5, 292, 313n. 1, 314n. 11, 345, 362, 367, 377n. 3, 458nn. 19 and 30, 459n. 58, 462n. 7, 463n. 12
 Arzanianus (river), 281
 Artzke, 367
 Arwad, 276
 Arzan (river), 281n. 3
 Arzanenus (province), 102, 314n. 10, 462n. 7
 Arzun, 312
 Asia, 52, 56, 62, 70, 92, 120, 125, 139, 146, 151, 158, 172, 191, 198, 215, 216, 219, 235, 252, 281, 437, 454n. 2
 Assyria, 111, 274, 280, 281n. 3, 286, 344
 Astarbad, 374
 Athens, 154
 Athlit, 441
 Athos, 50, 182 (Mount)
 Atlas (mountains), 92, 94, 96
 Atrpatakan, 286
 Attalia, 102
 Attica, 55
 Austria, 160, 166, 168, 170, 173, 175, 186, 187, 190, 192, 197, 206, 209, 427
Avdat (Negev): (Church of St. Theodore) 103
 Avignon, 49
 Ayas, 109, 110
 Aydin, 120
 Ayla. *See* Eilat
 Ayntab, 119
 Ayn al-Tamar, 234
 al-Azhar, 234, 381
 Azerbaijan (Adhorbijan), 90, 97, 157, 313n. 1, 349
 Bab Qudrat (fort), 391
 Babil. *See* Baghdad
 Babula, 343
 Babylon (Old Cairo), 46, 144
 Babylonia, 23, 35, 37, 43, 46, 107, 131, 151, 227, 230, 231, 233, 279, 286
 Badr (battle of), 296–97
 Baghdad (Babil), 73, 90, 107, 112, 117, 129, 155, 228, 229, 231–34, 287, 306, 318, 319, 330n. 4, 334, 336n. 2, 337, 339, 349, 354, 356, 358, 381, 442
 Baghin, 292
 Bagravan, 104, 377n. 1, 463n. 12
 Bahr al-Ghazal, 260–61
 Bahrain, 33, 299, 337n. 10
 Baladh, 118, 336
 Balis (Beit Balas), 117, 334, 336n. 3
 Balkans, 52, 53, 65, 76, 91, 112, (*Devshirme Christian Children for Slavery*) 114, 115, 120, 125, 129–30, 132, 134, 146–47, 164, 166–67, 169, 171–72, 179, 182, 186, 193, 199, 202–5, 207, 244, 247, 250, 252, (*Recaptured Christian Slaves*) 253, 255, 414, 454n. 2
 Bandar, 374
 Bandari-Qum, 374
 Barbary, 159
 Barcelona, 49
 Bar Gagai (monastery), 291
 Bargahis, 343
 Bari, 50
 Basen, 367
 Basra (Bassora), 59, 131, 233, 274, 319, 381
 Basrut, 317
 Ba'uth (monastery), 354
 Bayt al-Hikma (academy), 233
 Behnesa (Bahnasa), 46, 271
 Beirut (Beyrouth), 395, 401, 403, 404, (*Christians fleeing*) 405
 Beit Ma'ada, 104
 Beit (Bayt) al-Mal (state treasury), 261, 436–37n. 3
 Beit Sabta, 314, 321n. 3
 Beit Zabday. *See* Qardu
 Belgrade, 412
 Berkri, 274, 367
 Berlin, 192, 438
 Berrhoe. *See* Aleppo

- Bessarabia, 172
 Beth Arbaye, 352
 Beth Kudida, 347
 Bethlehem, 44
 Beth Man'im, 351
 Beth Risha, 351
 Beth Sahraya, 347
 Beth Shean, 44, (*Synagogue mosaic*) 45
 Bezhnunik (Bznunik, Peznunik), 274, 287
 Bilbays, 46
 Birah, 119
 Biredjik, 90
 Bithynia (province), 53, 55, 276
 Bitlis, 437
 Black Africa. *See* Africa, Black
 Black Sea, 146, 172, 193, 291, 292 n. 5, 433 n. 1
Boiana (Church of): ("Visitation") 183
Bolnisi: (Battle of Bolnisi) 357
 Bordeaux, 21
 Borim (monastery), 334
 Bosnia(-Herzegovina), 55, 81, 130, 132, 173, 175, 176, 187, 206, 415, 421, (*Bosniac Pandours*) 422, 424, 427, 431 n. 1, 432
 Bosna Serai. *See* Sarajevo
 Bosphorus, 438
 Britain. *See* Great Britain
 Bu Zayn, 93
 Bucharest, 209
 Bukhara, 93, 96, 348
 Bulgaria, 53, 55, 66, 90, 97, 174, 183, 184, 188, 209, 258, 433 n. 1, 454 n. 1, 470 n. 4
 Burgas (Bourgas), 432
 Butira, 50
 Byzantium, 34, 37, 44, 53, 55, 57, 58, 62, 64, 96, 110, 123, 126, 129, 143-44, 150, 153, 158, 192, 198, 217, 223, 230, 231, 233
 Bznunik. *See* Bezhnunik

 Cairo, 93, 153, 220, 234, 349, 359-60, 381. *See also* Babylon
 Calabria, 131
 Callinicum (Raqqa), 314, 321 n. 2, 334, 336
 Callisura, 277
 Camonova. *See* Kumanova
Cana (Galilee): (Wedding) 214
 Cappadocia, 48, 49, (*Troglodyte dwellings*) 91, 276-77, 281, 345
 Carmel, 206
 Carthage, 48, 230
 Castile, 49
 Castrogiovanni, 50, 290
 Catania, 50
 Caucasia, 173, 195-96, 198, 206
 Cefalu, 50
 Cerdagne (La Cerdana), 282
 Cesarea, Palestine, 35, 44, 131, 206, 230, 271
 Cesarea, Cappadocia (Kayseri, Anatolia), 276-77, 437
 Chalcedon, 36, 143
Chaqqa (Convent of), 80
 Charap-Khan, 367
 China, 33, 319
 Chios, 55, 76, 187
 Chiracavan, 367
 Chram (Xram), 88, 279, 280 n. 2
 Cilicia, 47, 109, 132, 193, 236, 256, 276, 345
 Claudia (region), 119, 346
 Coele-Syrie, 53
 Coimbra, 49
 Coloneia, 49
 Constantia (Salamis), 48, 275
 Constantinople (Istanbul), 37, 44, 48, 55, 57, 64, (*St. Sophia*) 67, 87, 93, (*Sale of Christian Family*) 110, 113, 115, 130-34, 141, (*Jew and Armenian*) 142, 143-46, 151-52, 155, 166, 168, 176, 178, 184-85, 189, 190-91, 193, 198, 207, 240, 256, 259, 281 n. 1, 293, 377, 384-88, 397, 401, 404, 409, 417-18, 425-27, 431, 438, 441-42, (*Armenian Lady*) 445, 462 n. 98, 464 n. 72. *See also* Galata, Golden Horn, Has-Köy, Pera, Phanar, (The) Porte
 Cordova, 89, 104, 128, 228, 232
 Corinth (gulf), 50
 Cos (island), 50, 145, 276
 Crete, 50, 104, 276
 Crimea, 172, 206
 Croatia, 186
 Ctesiphon (Mada'in), 35, 46, 230
 Cyclades, 50
 Cyprus, 48, 50, 85, 112, 132, 134, 158, 197, 275, 465 n. 75

- Cyrrhus, 320
 Cyzicus (peninsula), 50
 Dades (Greater Atlas, Morocco), 94
 Dakuka, 117
 Dalmatia, 56
 Damanhur, 46, 272 n. 1
 Damascus, 47, 89, 93, 107, 116–17, 129, 144, 150, 155, 160, (*Blood Libel*) 161, 191, 232, 280, 318, 336, 401, 403–4, (*Massacre of Christians*) 405, 406 n. 2, 407–8, 428, 467 n. 7
 Damietta, 47, (*Coptic Evangelistary*) 59
 Danube, 56, 173, 414, 415 n. 1
 Darfur, 113, 261, 471, 435, 471 n. 17
 Daron (Taron), 47, 274, 287
 Davin. *See* Dvin
 Dayr al-Abyad (Sohag): (*Coptic Monastery*) 105
 Dayr al-Qamar: (*Druzes at*) 394, (*Christian refugees*) 402
 Dayr as-Salib, 454 n. 3
 Dayr al-Zur, 196, 197, 444
 Dead Sea, 397
 Delta, Nile, 46
 Demirdash, 381
 Diyarbakir (Diar Bakr, Amid), 155, 235, 240, 337 n. 11, 354, 437
 Dizac, 97, 98
 Djughha. *See* Julfa
 Dorylaeum, 102
 Dumavand, 374
 Dvin (Davin, Tevin), 47, 274–75, 280
 Dzaghcnots-Dzor, 367
 Dzor (Zur), 274, 275 n. 1
 Edessa (Urfa), 104, 112, 116, 124, 292, 314, 316, 321 n. 5, 333, 335, 337 n. 9, 346 nn. 1 and 7
 Edlib, 400
 Egehadzor (Egeghna-Zur), 367
 Egypt, 34–35, 37, 43, 46–47, 55, 59, 60, 63, 65, 72, 75, 77–78, 81, 84, 96, 99, 104, 105, 106–9, 112, 116, 118, 121, 132, 135, 138, 140, 144–45, 148, 153–54, 159–60, 163, 167, 172, 178, 191, 197–200, 209–10, 213, 216, 220, 227–30, 234, 244, 271, 274, 301, 314, 315, 317–18, 319, 320, 321 nn. 4 and 7, 328, 330 nn. 2 and 5, 333–34, 337, 339 n. 2, 359–60, 381, 441 n. 2, 461 n. 84
 Eilat (Ayla), 38, 455 n. 6
 Elam, 46, 85, 455 n. 6
 El Obeid, 471 n. 15
 Elvira, 89
 Emesa. *See* Homs
 England, 166
 Ephesus, 36, 109, 154
 Epirus, 55
 Erevan. *See* Yerevan
 Erzerum (Theodisopolis), 104, 113, 155, 193, 437, 462 n. 8
 Eshnu, 349
 Etchmiadzin, 193, 364
 Etna (Mount), 289
 Euboea, 50, 55
 Euchaita, 47, 276
 Euphrates, 33, 46, 90, 107–8, 119, 197, 281 n. 3, 319, 321 n. 2, 336 nn. 3 and 4, 346 nn. 2 and 8
 Europe, 52–56, 70, 120, 125, 140–41, 146, 152, 158, 160, 164, 166–74, 176, 178–80, 181, 204, 206, 209–10, 215, 217, 219, 235, 247, 251–52, 255, 257, 264–65, 417 n. 1
 Faddak (oasis), 35
 Famagusta, 85
 Farama. *See* Pelusium
 Fars, 33
 al-Fasher, 435
 Fashoda, 261, 433
 Fayyum (oasis), 46, 105, 271
 Fez, 79, 89, 237, 361
 Fezzan, 108
 France, 42, 49–50, 154, 159–60, 162, 166, 168, 172, 176, 178, 186, 190, 192, 199–201, 203, 208–10, 257, 281, 417 n. 1, 427
 Fustat (Old Cairo), 59, 228, 229, 232, 318
 Gaghzvan, 367
 Galata (at Constantinople), 115, 466
 Galatia, 259, 276, 466 n. 10
 Galicia (Spain), 282
 Galilee, 34, 76, 122, 173, 175, 206, 231, 440
 Gallabat, 435
 Gangres, 48
 Garabad, 346
 Gargar, 343
 Garhni-Dzor, 366–67

- Gatzko, 430
 Gaurabad, 370
 Gaza, 44, 102, 206, 417, 441 n. 2
 Gedera, 441 n. 2
 Gegham, 367
 Geneva, 195
 Genoa, 158
 Georgia, 109, 118, 172, 275 n. 6, 277 n. 1, (*Battle of Bolnisi*) 357
 Germanicea. *See* Mar'ash
 Germany, 197, 255
 Gharkunik, 367
 Gilan, 374
 Gogh'ten, 280
 Golan, 44, 173, 206
 Golden Horn (at Constantinople), 464
 Golgotha (at Jerusalem), 292
 Gozaldaba, 371
 Gradiska, 427
 Granada, 89, 228
 Great Britain (Britain), 86, 162, 166, 168–70, 172, 176, 179, 187, 190, 192, 198, 209–10, 212, 417 n. 1, 427
 Greece, 48, 53, 55, 79, 97, 121, 131, 133, 164–66, 174, 179, 184, 257, 409, 454 n. 1
 Guedidah (Jadida), 395
 Gulpekian, 374

 Habhshushyatha (monastery), 347
 Habura. *See* Khabur
 Hajar, 300
 Halys (river), 47, 276
 Hamadan, 88, 96, 374, 462 n. 96
 Hamzatshimar, 367
 Hani, 333
 Harput (Hesna, Hesona, Hisn Ziyad, Kharput), 49, (*Place of Execution*) 196, 342–44, 346 n. 5, 353–54, 437, (*Slaughtered Armenians*) 443, 444
 Harran, 104, 116, 150, 314, 324, 333–35
 Harsan, 49
 Hasbeya, 401, (*Massacre of Christians*) 402, 403–4
 Has-Köy (Constantinople), 438
 Hawran: (*Convent of Chaqqa*) 80, 107, 404
 Hazanit (Hanzith), 343
 Hebron (al-Khalil), 87, 93, 102, 240, 462 n. 95
 Herat, 290
 Hermon, 401, 403
 Herzegovina. *See* Bosnia
 Herzl (Mount), 441 n. 2
 Hesna (Hesona, Hisn Ziyad). *See* Harput
 Hierapolis. *See* Mambij
 Hijaz, 35–39, 43–44, 60, 131, 202, 246, 439
 Hira, 46, 333
 Hisn al-Gharat, 282
 Hoghts (stronghold), 288, 289 n. 5
 Holy Sepulchre (Church of), 86, 154, 168, 292, 336, 459 n. 54
 Homs (Emesa), 107, 116
 Horus, 428
 Hunayn (battle of), 300, 302 n. 3
 Hungary, 55, 294

 Iakhsh-Khan, 366
 Iconium (Konya), 118, 132
 Ifriqiyya, 81, 96, 341
 India, Indies, 166, 172, 198, 319
 Indian Ocean, 35
 Indus (river), 33, 264
 Iraq (Mesopotamia), 29, 33, 35–36, 43–44, 46–48, 53, 55, 56, 59–60, 63, 65, 67, 73–75, 77, 79, 81, 93, 99, 101–2, 104, 106–8, 111–12, 116–18, 121, 129, 135, 143–44, 153, 155, 165, 178, 195–96, 198–99, 209–10, 213, 217, 227, 230–31, 233–35, 244, 272, 274, 276, 286, 305, 312–13, 321 nn. 2 and 9, 324 n. 1, 333, 345, 346 n. 2, 383 n. 2, 470 n. 13
 Iran. *See* Persia
 Isfahan, 86, 90, 98, 369, 373–74, 375 n. 1, 465 n. 78
 Israel, 45, 76, 89, 92, 103, 175, 178, 203, 208–10, 213, 218–19, 258, 265, 304, 441 n. 2, 468 n. 25
 Istanbul. *See* Constantinople
 Italy, 43, 50, 131, 198, 265, 292, 339

 Jabal Gharian, 93
 Jabal Jur, 118
 Jabal Maqlub, 347 n. 2
 Jabal Musa, 197
 Jabal Nafusa, 461 n. 92
 Jabal al-Tur. *See* Tur Abdin
 Jaffa (Joppa), 44, 84, 206, 314, 440
 Jannina, 115
 Jaranda (Gerona), 282

- Jazira (region), 33, 87, 104, 107, 116–17, 313n. 2, 316, 321n. 7, 359n. 1
- Jazirat Ibn Umar, 337n. 12
- Jericho, 206, (*Synagogue mosaic*) 207
- Jerusalem, 35, 37, 44, 75, 86, 93, (*Maronite Priest and Pilgrims*) 95, 96, 117, 153, 155, 158, 161, (*Church of Holy Sepulchre*) 168, 191, 206, 230, 233, 240, 336–37, 377, (*Western Wall*) 379, 380, 397–98, 416, 439, 458n. 31, 462n. 95
- Jordan, 34, 107, 468n. 25
- Judea, 34, 122, 154, 207, 440
- Julfa (Djughha), (*Khatchadur: Bible, New Julfa*) 363, 364, 370
- Kabatiya (Qabatiya), 399
- Kaisum, 117
- Karabagh, 97, 123, 275n. 6
- Karbi, 368–69
- Karin, 367
- Kars, 176, 364, 367
- Karkisiya, 46
- Kashan, 374
- Kayseri (Anatolia). *See* Cesarea
- Kerkh-Bulaqh, 367
- Keshlath, 351
- Kfar Bar'am: (Synagogue)* 76
- Kfar Nahum: (Synagogue)* 175
- Kfeir, 403
- Khabur (Habura, river), 345, 353
- al-Khalil. *See* Hebron
- Kharput. *See* Harput
- Khartoum, 260, 471n. 17
- Khaybar (oasis), 35, 38–39, 62, 71, 300
- Khilat (Khlath), 280, 287–88, 289n. 3
- Khnus, 367
- Khosrovakert, 275
- Khouth (fortress), 287
- Khoy, 367
- Khunsar, 374
- Khurasan, 63, 104, 374–75
- Khuzistan, 33
- Kirkuk, 117
- Kirman, 374
- Kogovit, 274
- Kordofan, 113, 260, 435
- Kosovo, 420n. 3
- Kuchuk Kainarji (Treaty of), 157, 176, 186, 190
- Kufa, 59, 107, 232, 274
- Kumanovo (Camonova), 418, 420n. 2
- Kurdistan, 92, 108, 314n. 10
- Kurhudara, 366
- Lamos (river), 286
- Lar, 374
- Latakia, 421
- Leon, 49, 282
- Lebanon, 34, 92, 155, 160, 164, 173–75, 179, 200–201, 203, 208–9, 218, 237, 239, 258, 281, 394, 401, 402, 407n. 1, 454n. 3
- Libya, 93, 108, 209–10, 217
- Likfair (Kufayr), 399
- Litani (river), 34
- Logobardia, 131
- London, 384, 386, 389, 398–99, 407, 417, 428, 432
- Lore, 367
- Mabbug, 334
- Macedonia, 53, 55, 90, 172–73, 175, 187, 191, 420n. 1
- Macon, 367
- Machpela (Cave of, Hebron), 87
- Mada'in (Ctesiphon), 46
- Madrid, 468n. 25
- Maghreb. *See* Africa, North
- Mahdiyya, 341
- Maipherkat (Martyropolis), 103, 312, 314n. 11
- Makna, 455n. 6
- Malatia. *See* Melitene
- Ma'lula (Maloula), 396, 397n. 3
- Mambij (Hieropolis), 337n. 6
- Manzikert (Malazgird), 53, 367
- Mar Ahudemmeh (church), 335
- Mar Bar Sauma (Mount), 343
- Mar Georgius (church), 335
- Mar James (church), 344
- Mar Matai (monastery), 119, 347, 351
- Mar'ash (Germanicea), 48, 88, 104, 131
- Mardin (Marda), 74–75, 104, 112, 119, 179, 235, 306, 346nn. 6 and 7, 354, 359n. 1
- Marrakesh, 390
- Mashhad, 390–91
- Masisah, 110
- Mauritania, 229
- Maurus (Mount; Amanus), 281
- Mawsil. *See* Mosul

- Mecca, 37, 60–61, 94, 203, 209–10, 217, 220, 281 n. 1
 Medina (Yathrib), 35, 37–39, 46, 58, 62, 94, 131, 217, 299, 381
 Mediterranean, 29, 35, 43, 50, (*Map: Arabs in the M.*) 51, 52, 106, 111, 230, 265
 Medzamor (river), 274–75
 Meknes, 132, 390
 Melitene (Malatia), 49, 118, 132, 281, 290–91, 292 n. 3, 346, 437
 Mesopotamia. *See* Iraq
 Messina (Sicily), 50
 Mimis, 403
 Mingrelia, 133
 Modica, 50
 Mogk (Mokh), 102, 288, 289 n. 4
 Mohacs (Hungary): (*Battle of Mohacs*) 294
 Moldavia, 55, 152, 186, 189, 191
 Monastir, 409
 Montenegro, 55, 186–87, 189, 209, 427
 Mopsueste, 110
 Morava, 259
 Morea. *See* Peloponnese
 Morocco, 68, 78–79, 92–94, 96, 132, 178, 197, 218, 220, 229, 237, 252, 468 n. 25
 Moscow, 213
 Mostar, 426
 Mosul (Mawsil), 88–89, 104, 111, 118–19, 155, 234–35, 313, 336, 344–46, 347 n. 1, 351, 354, 359, 441–44, 461
 Mucur, 90
 Musalla, 391
 Mush, 39, 49, 437
 Mu'ta, 39
 Muthallath-Imam, 371
 Mzab, 96
 Nablus, 44, 399, 417, 462 n. 95
 Nahavend, 57
 Najd, 36, 44
 Najran, 300
 Nakhidjevan (Nakhichevan, Naxcawan), 88, 274, 279–80, 364, 367
 Narbonne, 43, 282
 Navarino, 172, 176, 181
 Naxos, 464 n. 72
 Negev, 34, 44, 102, 103, 107, 304
 Nezib, 167
 Nicaea (Iznik), 48
 Nikiou, 46, 271
 Nile, 34–35, 46, 262, 272 n. 1
 Nineveh, 347 n. 2, 359 n. 7
 Nisibin (Nusaybin), 313, 336, 344–45
 Noragiugh (Rhami), 288
 North Africa. *See* Africa, North
 Noto, 50
 Nuba (mountains), 260, 433
 Nubia, 108, 113, 234
 Nuremberg (trials), 468 n. 10
 Obersalzberg, 198
 Odessa, 187
 Ohrid, 184
 Oman, 33
 Omdurman, 261, (*Slave market*) 434, 435–36, 471 n. 17
 Oppido, 339
 Ordu, 274
 Orontes, 107, 401
 Pakistan, 220
 Palermo, 290
 Palestine, 34–36, 47, 49, 53, 55–56, 60, 63, 67, 74–75, 77, 79, 84, 86–88, 96, 99, 102, 106–8, 112, 117, 122–23, 131, 135, 144, 151, 153, 160, 163, 165, 173, 175, 178–79, 199, 203–6, 208–10, 218, 227–28, 249, 271, 292, 336, 377, 399, 406 n. 2, 439, 441 n. 2, 458 n. 30, 459 n. 54, 461 n. 86, 464 n. 49, 468 n. 18
 Pamplona, 282
 Pamphylia, 276
 Paris (Treaty of, 1856), 168, 176, 187, 441; 470 n. 35 (Conference)
 Paros (island), 50
 Pathos, 48, 276
 Pecs, 184
 Peloponnese (Morea), 55, 132, 186–87, 191
 Pelusium (Farama, Nile Delta), 46, 317
 Pentapolis, 271
 Pera (at Constantinople), 384
 Pergamum (Bergama), 48, 281 n. 1
 Persia (Iran), 29, 33–36, 44, 47, 58, 62–63, 68, 80, 85, 90–93, 94, 96–99, 112, 120, 136, 155, 159, 162–63, 172, 178–79, 198, 216, (*Battle of Rival Clans*) 332, 252, 265,

- 273, 332, 364, 367, 377 n. 3, 461 n.
90, 463 n. 35
- Persian Gulf, 33
- Peznunuk. *See* Bezhnunuk
- Phahrabad, 374
- Phanar (at Constantinople), 93, 185
- Philippoli (Philippopolis), 429
- Pisa, 158
- Pishabur, 352
- Poitiers, 43
- Poland, 55, 198, 378
- Pontus (Euxinus), 276, 291, 292 n. 5.
See also Black Sea
- Porte, (The; at Constantinople), 120,
155, 159, 163, 166–68, 178, 184,
187, 189–90, 195, 199, 206, 209,
386, 396–97, 406, 412, 414, 419,
421, 425, 431
- Port Said, 441
- Portugal, 229
- Pristina, 417
- Prisren (Prizren), 418, 420 n. 3
- Provence, 265
- Prussia, 168, 427
- Puigcerda (near Andorra), 282 n. 1
- al-Qadisiyya (battle of), 46
- Qairuan, 96, 228, 232, 234, 340–41,
465 n. 79
- Qal'at Sim'an: (Church and Convent of St.
Simeon Stylite) 122*
- Qalb Luzeh: (Church of) 273*
- Qardu (Beit Zabday), 336, 337 n. 12
- Qazbin (Qazwin), 374
- Qum, 374
- Qubba (Qubbeh), 335
- Qubbat al-Azab, 380
- Quneitra, 206
- Ragusa, 50, 290
- Rametta, 290
- Ramlah, 88
- Raqqa. *See* Callinicum
- Rasheya, 401, (*Massacre of Christians*)
402, 403–4
- Refadi: (House of Airamis) 34*
- Reggaf, 435
- Reshtunik, 275, 288
- Rhodes (island), 50, 115, 197, 276
- Rhône (river), 49
- Rodhopes (mountains), 182
- Rome, 50, 130, 146, 150, 155, 189–90,
230, 292–93
- Rumania, 172, 184, 189, 258, 454 n. 1
- Rumelia, 132, 415 n. 1
- Russia, 157, 160, 162–63, 166–68,
172–73, 175, 186–87, 189–90,
192–93, 198, 201, 205, 208–10,
249–50, 255, 263–64, 409, 411,
417 n. 1, 427
- Rustchuk, 415
- Sa, 271
- Sabaktan, 345–46
- Safed, 93
- Sahara, 96
- Saida, 155, 191
- Salamast, 367
- Salonica. *See* Thessaloniki
- Samaria, 34, (*St. John the Baptist
Church*) 86, 122
- Samarqand, 348
- Samarra, 287
- San'a, 93, 97, 329
- San Stefano (Treaty of), 172, 176,
190, 193
- Santiago de Compostela, 49
- Sarajevo (Bosna Serai), 170, 177, 421,
426, 430, 466–67
- Sardinia, 50, 161, 168
- Sardis, 48
- Sariha, 49
- Sarug, 335
- Sasun, 195, 292 n. 4
- Sawad, 33, 46, 63, 107, 272–73, 299,
301–2
- Sbirina, 351
- Sebastia (Sivas), 113, 118, 437
- Sennar, 113
- Serbia, 55, 77, 172, 174, 177, 184, 187,
258, 454 n. 1
- Seville, 89, 128, 132, 145, 232, 341
- Sharon (region), 206
- Shiraz, 90, 96, 374, 462 n. 96, 470 n. 13
- Shivta (Negev): (Northern Church) 304*
- Shushtar, 374
- Sicily, 43, 50, 131, 145, 229, 265, 290
- Sijistan, 108
- Silawkia (Seleucia, Cilicia), 286
- Sind, 43
- Sinjar (Siggarr), 336, 352, 359 n. 4
- Siuni (Siyuni), 277 n. 1
- Sis, 109–10

- Sistan, 33
 Sivas. *See* Sebastia
 Skopje. *See* Uskup
 Slavonia, 133
 Smyrna, 85, 102, 470
 Sofia, 183
Sohag: (Dayr al-Abyad Monastery) 105
 Sophenus (province), 462 n. 8
Sopochani: (Monastery fresco) 177
 Soviet Union, 198, 220
St. Sophia (Constantinople), 67
 Spain, 43, 49–50, 52, 60, 63, 65, 78, 83, 101–2, 104, 108–9, 121, 131, 144–45, 152, 217, 227–30, 234, 246, 255–56, 265, 281–82, 321 n. 6, 342 n. 1, 456 n. 23, 470 n. 1
 Sudan, 29, 107, 259–61, (*Slave Dhow*) 262, 263–64, 433, (*Slave Market*) 434, 471 nn. 15 and 17
 Sugra (Sajur; river), 334
 Suk ar-Raqiq, 436
 Suleymaniya, 88
 Surhagan, 351
 Susa (Persia), 46
 Susa (Ifriqiyya), 341
 Susiana, 33, 43, 57
 Syracuse, 50
 Syr-Daria, 43
 Syria, 33, 34, 35, 37, 43–44, 47, 49, 53, 55–56, 59–60, 63, 67, 74–75, 77, 79, 80, 83–84, 88–89, 98–99, 102, 106–8, 112, 116–18, 121, 122, 131, 136, 144, 151, 154–55, 157, 159, 163, 165, 175–76, 178–79, 196–97, 200, 203, 208–10, 213, 217, 227–28, 231–32, 252, 273, 276, 292, 301, 325, 333, 337 n. 6, 339 n. 2, 345, 352, 396, 406, 407 n. 1, 411, 421, 464 n. 49, 470 n. 13
 Tabriz. *See* Tauriz
 Tabuk (oasis), 35
 Tafilalet, 96
 Tagrit, 33, 46, 118, 231, 235
 Ta'if (oasis), 35, 299, 381
 Tangiers, 109, 389
 Tanisis (Tanis), 314, 316
 Taormina, 50, 290
 Taron. *See* Daron
 Tarsus, 109–10, 286
 Tauriz (Tabriz), 87, 356, 358, 365, 367, 374
 Taurus (mountains), 192; (Mount), 462 n. 7
 Tayma (oasis), 35
 Teheran, 88, 96, 462 n. 96
 Tela, 104
 Tell 'Arab, 346
 Tell Besmeh, 346
 Tell-Mahre, 73
 Tevin. *See* Dvin
 Teycheira, 271
 Tharthar (river), 359 n. 4
 Thelkhum (Tell Qum), 292
 Therapia, 427, 429, 467 n. 8
 Thessaly, 55, 411 n. 1
 Thessaloniki (Salonica), 109, (*Poll Tax Receipt*) 338, 409, 411 n. 1
 Thrace, 53, 55–56, 120, 191
 Tiberias, 93, 107
 Tiflis, 195, 357, 375, (*Tamerlane Takes Tiflis*) 376, 377 n. 1
 Tigris, 33, 46, 107, 118–19, 281 n. 3, 289 n. 5, 314, 319, 336, 337 n. 11, 347 n. 1, 351–52, 442, 444
 Tokat (Docea), 87
 Toledo, 144
 Transjordan, 206
 Transoxania, 108
 Travnik, 82
 Trebizond, 55, 154
 Tripoli (Lybia), 48, 108, 461 n. 85
 Tripoli (Lebanon), 155, 401, 421, 428
 Tripolitania, 94, 96, 271
 Tubaz, 399
 Tunis, 86–87, 89, 178, 460 n. 63
 Tunisia, 90, 96, 197, 220, 228, 460 n. 25, 468 n. 25
 Tur Abdin (Jabal al-Tur), region, 235, 336, 337 n. 11, 345, 351
 Turkestan, 217
 Turkey, 86–87, 91, 97–99, 151, 159–60, 163, 167, 169, 172–73, 176, 181, 189–90, 196, 198, 220, 241, 249, 261, 265, 278, 285, 401, 411, 414, 417 n. 1, 432, 443, 468 n. 18
 Ubullla, 46
 Urdzna-Zur, 367
 Urmī, 367
 Uskup (Skopje), 417–18, 420 nn. 1 and 2

- Van, 367, 437
 Van, Lake, 47, 270, 275nn. 1 and 2,
 277 n. 1, 278, 289nn. 2 and 4
 Vaspurakan, (*Minas: St. Mark the Evan-
 gelist*) 270, 277 n. 1, 286–88
 Venice, 158, 184
 Vienna, 53, 55, 219
 Visoka, 177

 Wadi Natrun, 105
 Wadi Rumm, 38
 Wallachia, 55, 132, 152, 189, 415 n. 1
 Washington (Declaration), 468 n. 25
 Wasit, 348, 381
 Wastaw, 353
 Western (Wailing) Wall, 86, (*Jerusa-
 lem*) 379
 Widdin, 412–13, 415

 Xram. *See* Chram

 Yarmuk, 144
 Yathrib. *See* Medina
 Yazd (Yezd), 374, 462 n. 96
 Yahudiya, 375 n. 1
 Yemen, 43–44, 60, 68, 78, 80, 86, 89,
 92–98, 152, 164, 175, 179, 209–10,
 252, 300, 381
 Yerevan (Erevan), 275 n. 4, 362, 367,
 375
 Yervandashat (Aqhdja-Ghala), 364
 Yugoslavia, 258, 420 n. 3

 Zab (river), 289 n. 1, 347
 Zagros (mountains), 33
 Zamora, 49
 Zarishat, 367
 Zaytuna (mosque), 86
 Zebabdeh, 399
 Zenaga, 96
 Zur (Dzor), 274